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PREFACE 
 
 
 This book started as my Ph.D. thesis at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies at London University, based on research in the records of the West Bank 
shari`a courts of Bethlehem, Hebron and Ramallah, and funded by a grant from the 
British Academy. It has since undergone substantial updating and has also had the 
benefit of subsequent research carried out by a Palestinian women’s rights 
organisation, the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling, in the records of 
the courts in Nablus, Dura, Gaza City and Rafah. 
 
 Many acknowledgments are due to friends, family and colleagues who, over 
the course of my Ph.D. research and in subsequent years, have helped my work in 
many different ways. Amongst the shar`i judiciary, I am indebted to then Acting Qadi 
al-Quda, the late Shaykh Sa`ad ad-Din el-`Alami, for his permission to work for an 
extended period in the shari`a court records, and to the judges and staff of three courts 
who were extremely generous in giving time and space while I was researching. In 
particular, Shaykh Taysir al-Tamimi, at the time judge at Bethlehem and later the 
Hebron court, and currently Deputy Qadi al-Quda in Palestine, and Shaykh Hiyan 
Hilmi al-Idrisi, then judge at Ramallah court and currently in Jerusalem, were 
unfailingly welcoming and helpful, contributing greatly to my education in matters 
shar`i, and providing me with texts, documents and on occasion figures which were 
enormously helpful in my study. Shaykh Taysir Tamimi also made time to meet me to 
discuss developments in the shar`i system after the arrival of the Palestinian 
Authority. In Jordan, the Qadi al-Quda, Shaykh Muhammad Mheilan, also made time 
to meet with me and similarly provided me with documents as well as giving me the 
benefit of his insights.  I was also helped enormously by a number of lawyers working 
in the shar`i system, and would like in this regard to thank Saadi al-Qishta and 
Ragheb al-Qasem in Jordan, and Fouzi al-`Amleh and especially Ala al-Bakri and 
Hanan Rayan in Palestine.  
 
 Other lawyers who deserve particular thanks include, in Jordan, Firas Bakr 
and Reem Abu Hassan, for their friendship and their assistance in the more recent 
stage of the work; and Asma Khadr, for her help and her efforts down the years. In 
Palestine, I would thank all the friends and colleagues at al-Haq and elsewhere, with 
special thanks to Charles Shamas, Salwa Du`aybis, and Susan Rockwell and, at the 
earlier stages, Muhammad and the Da`is family. In recent years I have been privileged 
to work on a research project with the WCLAC and would like to thank Maha Abu 
Dayyeh for both organising this and for being consistently supportive; and friends and 
colleagues at the Women’s Studies Centre at Birzeit University, especially Rema 
Hammami, Penny Johnson and Fadwa Labadi, for making the final bits of writing 
much more interesting.  Penny deserves particular thanks, along with Raja Shehadeh, 
for consistently encouraging me to finish the work, as does Raja for generously giving 
me some material he had collected on the shar`i system in Arab Jerusalem.  
 
 Thanks also go to the Gaza branch of the Model Parliament: Women and 
Legislation, in particular Marwa Qasim and Karam Nashwan and other members of 
the Legal Committee. The WCLAC research which is cited in this study is based on 
research in court records by lawyers Hiyam Karkur, Rim Jaber, Fatima Mukhallalati 
and Ghada Shadid, and I would thank them for that work and WCLAC for allowing 
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me to cite the study here and to reproduce the table of their material. Part of the 
second chapter appeared in an article in Islamic Family Law (eds. Mallat and 
Connors) in 1990; I am grateful to Dr. Mark Hoyle, General Editor of the Arab and 
Islamic Law Series, for permission to include this material in this book. 
 
 Elsewhere, Abdullahi An-Na’im, Emma Playfair, Sara Hossain and Urmi Shah 
have been as encouraging as possible while I was finishing this book; Leila Othman 
Asser and Randa Alami provided enormous support and help all the way through, and 
Randa’s technical assistance was invaluable: for all of which, my particular thanks. Of 
my other friends, Martin Asser and Anne Fitzgerald edited chapters for me, and Ian 
Edge, also as my former Ph.D. supervisor, has been an encouraging colleague. Other 
chapters were read by my family: Elsie and Geoffrey Knights, Sian and Michael 
Smith. To them, and my nieces Rhiannon, Eluned, Lowri and Bethan, my love and 
thanks. 
 
 
A Note on Case Material and Language 
 
 The material collected in my work in the shari`a courts is not, in this 
publication, referenced to the particular court records; these records are not ‘public’, 
the cases are not published, and it is only fair to make every effort to ensure that 
identification of the parties is not possible. A full table of the case material is included 
in the Appendices, and published decisions from the Appeal Courts are of course fully 
referenced. A glossary of Arabic terms appears at the end of the book; the character 
“`” is used to denote the Arabic letter `ayn. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION: COURTS, CODES AND CASES 
 
1.1 Legal Context and Contemporary Scholarship 
 
 This study provides an examination of the rules governing Muslim personal 
status law for Palestinians in the West Bank, with comparative reference to Gaza. It 
focusses on the derivation of these rules, how they are applied by the shar`i judiciary, 
and what criticisms are directed at the law and practice by civil society groupings 
(particularly the women’s movement) as the Palestinians build towards statehood and, 
sooner or later, the first ever Palestinian law of personal status. 
 
 The elections of 1996 afforded that part of the Palestinian people then resident 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip their first opportunity to elect a Palestinian 
legislature. During the course of the century, the West Bank area had been ruled by 
the Ottoman Turks as part of Palestine, originally within the ‘Greater Syria’ 
administrative area; by British military occupation and then the British Mandate 
authorities, as part of Palestine; by Jordanian military and then civilian rule as part of 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; then under Israeli military occupation.  The Gaza 
Strip was administered by Egypt from 1948-1967, and came under Palestinian 
Authority jurisdiction rather earlier than most of the West Bank in May 1994.  The 
West Bank Palestinian population of over a million1 comprises urban and rural sectors 
as well as refugees in the camps created to house some of the hundreds of thousands 
displaced by the creation of Israel in 1948 and their descendants.2 Since 1994 
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significant numbers of Diaspora Palestinians have come back as ‘returnees’. The 
population is overwhelmingly young, with some 47% under the age of fifteen, and a 
sex ratio of 103.2 males to 100 females. It is 92% Sunni Muslim. 3  The Palestinian 
population world-wide is estimated at some seven million.4 
 
 Various aspects of the legal history of Palestine and the political struggle of 
the Palestinian people for self-determination during the course of this century (and 
particularly since the 1960s) have been treated in a large number of studies and 
publications. After the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, 
the literature focussed not only on the socio-economic situation of Palestinians in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, but also on their status under international law, 
violations of international humanitarian and human rights law by successive Israeli 
governments, and the use of law, or quasi-legal instruments, by the occupying 
authorities.  There has also been detailed consideration of the changes made to the 
legal system by the Israeli authorities, and of the court structures, in particular the 
military court system.5 The legal situation changed again after the Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed in 1993 by the head of 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) Yasser Arafat and the Israeli prime 
minister, the late Yitzhak Rabin. The Declaration of Principles and subsequent 
negotiations resulted in a series of agreements transferring specified power to the 
Palestinian Authority set up initially in Gaza and Jericho in 1994. The original 
timetable envisaged a five-year interim period after which ‘final status’ negotiations 
would settle remaining questions on borders, refugees, water, Israeli settlements in the 
occupied Palestinian territory, and the question of Jerusalem. By the summer of 2000, 
this timetable was already a year behind schedule. The Oslo framework, with its 
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numerous and rather serious flaws -- especially in regard to the protections of 
international law -- and the performance of the Palestinian Authority have since been 
the subject of a developing body of literature.6 
 
 This study aims to fill a particular gap in the existing legal literature on 
Palestine by examining the body of law that governs the personal status of Muslim 
Palestinians in the West Bank, and the courts that apply it.  For historical and practical 
reasons, family law and the shari`a law courts were less directly affected by the 
various regimes controlling the area over the last century than other areas of the law.  
Issues of marriage, divorce and the relationship between the spouses were not 
considered matters of the most immediate import when considering an area that for 
over thirty years was under direct military occupation, (which continues in some 
areas) and a people that has been historically denied the right of self-determination.  
Nevertheless, the texts on personal status considered in this study affect nearly all the 
Muslim majority of the Palestinian population of  the West Bank (as well as 
Palestinians in Jordan) at some point in their lives.  The comparative reference to 
family law in Gaza extends the scope of the study, albeit case material is not included. 
 
 On another level, this study contributes to the existing literature on Muslim 
family law in the Middle East, by providing the opportunity to trace the development 
of the family law  issued by one Arab state (Jordan) from its first codification in 1951 
to the promulgation of a revised law in 1976, along with the discussions of new 
legislative proposals in the 1980s and 1990s. Until recently, there was little in-depth 
law-focussed study in English of the practical implementation of contemporary family 
law codes of the Middle East, so the way in which the reforms noted by earlier 
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scholars have worked out in practice were not generally known in any detail to those 
outside the legal communities in those countries.  Aharon Layish's 1975 work Women 
and Islamic Law in a Non-Muslim State was something of an exception, based as it is 
on extensive study of the records of the shari`a courts in Israel in the 1960s. 
However, the law that was and is the basis of the rules applied in those courts is the 
Ottoman Law of Family Rights 1917, supplemented in Israel by amendments 
introduced through ‘secular’ legislation by a non-Muslim authority and applied to the 
Muslim Palestinian population of the Israeli state. Elsewhere in the Middle East, 
codifications of family law implemented by the national legislatures of countries with 
Muslim majorities have long since replaced the Ottoman law.  In this sense, of course, 
the current study also considers an area that constitutes the exception rather than the 
rule: the national personal status code of a Muslim Arab state (Jordan) as applied in 
an area that does not legally form part of that state (the West Bank) nor itself 
constitute a state, at least during the period studied. In Gaza, by way of comparison, 
we are dealing with a codification of Islamic family law drawn up by a Muslim Arab 
state (Egypt) specifically for use in territory over which it was not sovereign (the 
Gaza Strip) and which it never applied in its own courts. 
  
 More recent times have seen the publication of a number of works in English 
based on court records or court observation, and examining either the workings of law 
or the social processes involved in negotiating litigation procedures. Particular 
mention might be made here of Ziba Mir-Hosseini's legal anthropological work 
comparing the application of Muslim family law by courts in Morocco and Iran,7 and 
of Ron Shaham’s consideration of the extent to which Egyptian qadis implemented 
the family law reforms of the 1920s, based on shari`a court decisions published by 
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the Bar Association.8 In Palestine, Annalies Moors' work based on her research in the 
Nablus shari`a court records provides essential context for any discussion of 
marriage-related property matters (notably dower) considered in the current study,9 
and Judith Tucker’s study of family law-related fatwas of a number of Hanafi muftis 
working in Ottoman Syria and Palestine gives historical perspective to current-day 
application.10 
 
 Important background and contextual material regarding the regulation of the 
family in general and gender relations in particular is to be found in the published 
results of a number of major social science projects undertaken in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip during the 1990s, notably the results and analysis of an extensive social 
survey published in 1993 with contributions from a range of social scientists from 
Palestine and elsewhere.11 There is an extensive literature on the Palestinian women’s 
movement and on the role and status of Palestinian women which has been published 
in English by Palestinian and non-Palestinian scholars in a variety of disciplines -- 
including work by Rema Hammami, Joost Hiltermann, Eileen Kuttab, Islah Jad, 
Penny Johnson, and Julie Peteet. Their work helps to set the consideration of family 
law in a social and political context in particular in the concluding examination of 
developments towards a Palestinian family law.    
 
 That said, the limits of this study are clear: it is based on law and law-focussed 
research.  This includes a detailed examination of texts (the texts of the law and 
associated regulations and directives), and the writings of their interpreters 
(contemporary commentators, lawyers and judges) and of shari`a court records to 
determine recourse had to courts and positions on implementation and interpretation 
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taken by the judiciary.  It does not include case studies of the background to and 
progress of individual petitions, except in so far as these can be drawn from the court 
records, nor involve other forms of social science research using instruments such as 
questionnaires or structured interviews.12 It is written within the framework of studies 
in Muslim family law. Where possible it draws on sources from other disciplines in 
assessing patterns and phenomena documented in the court records, the potential 
effect of various proposed reforms to the existing law, and the difficulties presented 
by current legislation particularly in regard to realisation of its protections by women.  
 
 In a sense, the limits of this study coincide with the limits of law in the 
particular area of personal status.13 Customary rules frequently constitute a stronger 
controlling force than ‘law’, particularly over matters involving women and the 
family. An illustration is the role of the marriage guardian: while in law previously 
married women aged over eighteen are explicitly entitled to marry on their own 
authority and have no need to register the consent of a male guardian, the court 
records show that this is almost entirely ignored in practice, with the courts recording 
a guardian's consent in cases where there is unequivocally no legal requirement to do 
so. Palestine may be seen to fit at least one pattern here, in that it can be argued that 
the impact of 'deep legal pluralism' disproportionately affects the rules that govern the 
lives of women.14 Wing’s articles evaluating custom, religion, women’s legal status 
and the operation of parallel rule systems in the West Bank during the intifada go 
some way to describing this in a limited context.15 On another level, writing in the 
1980s, Bisharat briefly outlines ‘the complex of institutions and customs grouped 
roughly under the rubric of al-qada’ al-`asha’iri’ (‘tribal adjudication’) as a number 
of distinct practices or levels including ‘blood judges’ and the ‘manshad’ who has 
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customary jurisdiction over cases involving ‘ the chastity of women.’16 On the whole, 
however, little systematic study has been made of the interplay of law and custom in 
contemporary Palestine, although the extensive observations of the anthropologist 
Granqvist published in the 1930s retain some resonance when examining the data 
from certain rural communities.17 Peteet’s in-depth considerations of dispute 
processing and gender relations in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon provide 
considerable insight into the systems at work in those communities.18 
 
 Writings on legal pluralism which might shed further light on such facts and 
processes within society have tended to avoid the Arab world, as noted in a collection 
of essays produced in an effort to start remedying this gap.19 Botiveau’s contribution 
to this collection emphasises that ‘Palestinian law is described first and foremost in 
terms of diversity’ and indeed that ‘pluralism is one of the organizing principles of 
state law in the Arab world.’20 Examining the implications of  ‘internal pluralism’ for 
the emerging Palestinian state (including the territorial division between the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip) he seeks to explain the dynamics behind the ‘quest for legal 
homogenization’ discernible in different sectors of society as well as at the level of 
the governing authorities, as a process involving shared central values expressed as 
‘the quest for the formulation of a Palestinian identity.’21 In this process, as discussed 
further in the Conclusion, the shari`a court system and the implementation of 
personal laws are asserted as having an historical and national legitimacy at the same 
time as being premised on the distinctive identity of separate religious communities 
within the Palestinian people. At the same time, the years since Oslo have seen moves 
towards the re-institutionalisation of customary processes of dispute resolution,22 but  
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existing studies on particular aspects of this development do not yet reveal to what 
extent recourse to and indeed litigation in the shari`a courts may be affected.23 
  
 The Palestinians are not a people well served, historically, by ‘state’ law.  
Beginning with the British Mandate authorities in 1917, those in control of designing, 
passing and implementing legislation have had at the very best an ambiguous attitude 
towards the rights and interests of the Palestinian population; at the worst they have 
pursued, through law, a predatory and annexationist agenda aimed explicitly or 
implicitly at their dispossession and exile. In addition, over the decades of Israeli 
military occupation of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, 
the regular court system was stripped of much of its jurisdiction (which was 
transferred to the Israeli military courts) and systematically under-resourced and 
under-developed.24 During the intifada -- the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip that erupted in December 1987 -- the popular boycott of goods and 
services from or administered by the Israeli occupation authorities was accompanied 
by a wider popular transfer of authority over social regulation and dispute settlement 
to ‘neighbourhood committees’ and politically-constituted conciliation committees 
whose processes had strong resonance with customary law.25 In other aspects, certain 
individuals and groups took on roles as judge, jury and executioner of persons 
accused of collaboration with the occupation authorities.26 The severe undermining 
domestically of the ‘law’ as expression of the state, as process and as protection could 
not but be reinforced by the sustained failure of the international community to ensure 
that the protections of international law were afforded to the Palestinian population.27 
In the national framework, since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 
1994, its head, Yasser Arafat, has frustrated attempts by the Palestinian Legislative 
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Council (elected in January 1996 under the framework of the PLO-Israel ‘Interim 
Agreement’)28 to have the draft Basic Law (a sort of interim constitution) ratified and 
implemented by the executive authority in the areas under its control. The executive 
as a whole has been criticised for failing to implement legislation.29  
 
 Nevertheless, the substantive content of state-generated law has been a major 
focus of advocacy activities by all sectors of civil society in Palestine during the 
transitional (or ‘interim’) period preceding statehood. This applies to the non-
governmental movement in general as well as the women’s movement in particular 
and, where personal status law is the subject, the hierarchy of the shar`i establishment 
as well as members of political parties that may be generally termed ‘Islamist’. The 
directions these debates have taken are examined more closely in the final chapter of 
this study.   
 
 The study begins with an outline of the history of shari`a courts in the West 
Bank, particularly their operation under direct Israeli occupation and in the period 
since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. It then considers the text of the 
laws applied by the West Bank shari`a courts to the conclusion and regulation of the 
marriage contract; claims arising within marriage; divorce; and claims arising after 
the end of marriage. Each chapter includes an examination of the derivation of the 
relevant rules and a consideration of the application of this law by the courts in the 
light of material from the shari`a court records examined for the purpose of this study 
and set out below, with further consideration of Appeal Court rulings where 
appropriate. The concluding chapter seeks to assess the prospects for a future 
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Palestinian family law in light of developments in the debate on family law during the 
course of the transitional period since 1994. 
 
1.2 Sources of Law in the West Bank Shari`a Courts 
 
 Along with most Arab states of the Middle East, the Jordanian legislature has 
largely replaced the use of the texts of the classical jurists with state-legislated 
codifications of law covering most matters of personal status. The text and application 
of the Jordanian Law of Personal Status (JLPS) 1976 is considered in this study by 
comparison with its predecessor, the Jordanian Law of Family Rights 1951 (JLFR).30 
The study and comparison of texts in this work is done in the framework of a 
recognition of the significance of the relationship of state with law, and of the state as 
a critical actor in this regard, a significance clearly vested in the matter of text and 
law-making by civil society actors in today’s Palestine. The development of the law-
making process in Palestine and the likely significance of a prospective text are 
discussed further in the Conclusion.  
 
 For students of Islamic law the matter of ‘text’ also retains an independent 
significance, demonstrating the movements of a legislature largely within the fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudential) tradition in response to a changing socio-economic context. 
Where relevant, therefore, this study also considers commentaries on the legal texts, 
including those contained in the Explanatory Memoranda to the laws, and the text-
book commentaries produced by scholars seeking to trace the origins of specific 
provisions of the Jordanian law in the positions of the classical schools of law. The 
opinions of the two contemporary commentators on the JLPS (Mahmud Sirtawi and 
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Muhammad Samara) are clearly indicative of ongoing debates in shar`i circles, and 
while they do not work from case material, their interpretations of how the law should 
be applied are enlightening.  
 
 Reference is also made to the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917 -- the 
first state-promulgated codification of Muslim family law -- and by way of 
comparison to the  Egyptian-issued Law of Family Rights  applied in the shari`a 
courts in the Gaza Strip. There is also a consideration of certain articles of proposed 
revisions to the JLPS produced by various (and successive) drafting committees in the 
latter half of the 1980s in the process of the Jordanian Parliament’s review of 
temporary legislation issued in its absence over the period 1974-1984, including the 
JLPS.31 In particular, reference is made in this study to the revisions proposed in 1985 
and 1987, showing reflection on the operation of the JLPS over the previous ten years 
or so. In addition, a full draft of a proposed text was drawn up in 1996 by the 
Jordanian National Committee for Women which gives an interesting perspective on 
the aspirations of the ‘establishment’ women’s movement in Jordan with regard to 
personal status law.32 In the West Bank, the Conclusion considers in more detail the 
efforts of various actors apparently engaged in drafting a Palestinian personal status 
law, but during the study particular reference is made to the proposals generated 
through two non-governmental rights-based processes: the 1994 al-Haq conference on 
Women, Justice and the Law, and the 1998 Palestinian Model Parliament: Women 
and Legislation. Finally in terms of texts, there is interesting comparative material in 
the work of a committee of jurists charged by the Council of Arab Justice Ministers 
with drawing up a Draft Unified Arab Code of Personal Status, and from a different 
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perspective the One Hundred Measures text of egalitarian personal status provisions 
drafted by the Maghreb-Egalité collective in the early 1990s.33 
 
 The JLPS builds on the JLFR in adopting some Egyptian-inspired innovations 
which had not been previously taken up by the Jordanian legislature.  Notable 
examples of these are significant modifications to the law of succession which 
introduce the ‘obligatory bequest’ (al-wasiyya al-wajiba) for orphaned grandchildren 
previously excluded from succession by the death of their parent;34 the right of the 
spouse to share in the return (radd) of the remainder of the estate where no other heirs 
remain;35 and a solution to the ancient problem of the possible exclusion of full 
brothers (or full brothers and sisters), who inherit as agnates the remainder of the 
estate, by their uterine collaterals who are allotted fixed shares which exhaust the 
estate so that there is no remainder.36 
 
 Syrian approaches to mukhala`a (divorce with renunciation), the maximum 
`idda (‘waiting’) period after divorce and the related issue of filiation/legitimate 
paternity (nasab) are also adopted in the JLPS, and the innovative Syrian introduction 
of compensation (ta`wid) for injurious unilateral divorce talaq by the husband is 
modified into a wider Jordanian text.  While thus owing a substantial amount to the 
1953 Syrian code, and  through it to the Egyptian legislation of the 1940s, the JLPS 
introduced rules on custody that appear to be of indigenous inspiration, as well as 
maintaining those locally-inspired rules that first appeared in the JLFR.  
 
 The diverse sources from which the JLPS is drawn means that, like its 
predecessors and parallels, it includes provisions from all four major Sunni schools as 
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well as a certain amount of material from less obvious sources, as noted by the 
Jordanian Qadi al-Quda (Chief Islamic Justice).37 However, although the JLPS is 
considerably more comprehensive than the JLFR, Article 183 maintains the same text 
as the JLFR and the Ottoman law before it, requiring recourse to the majority opinion 
of the Hanafi school in any matter not explicitly covered by the code.38 When it is 
necessary to consult majority Hanafi opinion, the text used in the West Bank and also 
the Gaza Strip is the 647-article compilation of selected Hanafi rules on personal 
status matters drawn up last century by the Egyptian Minister of Justice Muhammad 
Qadri Pasha.39 An examination of the records of rulings (sijillat al-ahkam) in the 
shari`a courts of the West Bank reveals that reference is had to Kitab al-Ahkam most 
frequently in the areas of the breastfeeding of children, custody, the accommodation 
and clothing of the wife, occasional clarification on mukhala`a, and the marriage 
guardian. 
 
 Another text frequently referred to in the rulings of the West Bank qadis40 is 
the ‘Book of Maintenance’, Kitab an-Nafaqat, a 1937 Arabic translation of an original 
Turkish text setting out detailed Hanafi rules on maintenance.41 This text is referred to 
frequently in maintenance and ta`a rulings.  The  specific provisions referred to 
mostly concern the cutting of maintenance awards; the time when maintenance 
becomes due to a wife and the circumstances when her right lapses; reassessment of 
maintenance levels; what exactly is required to be covered by maintenance; the fee 
that in some circumstances a woman can claim for breastfeeding babies and taking 
custody of minors; maintenance for minors; and the requisite characteristics and 
contents of the marital home in which a husband may legitimately call his wife to 
obedience (ta`a). 
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 In the matters examined in this study, these three texts - the codified law (the 
JLFR and subsequently the JLPS) the Kitab al-Ahkam, and the Book of Maintenance - 
were the sources of substantive law.42 In addition, occasional references were made in 
cases of interdiction to the Majalla, the compilation of Hanafi rules on civil law 
matters promulgated by the Ottomans at the end of the nineteenth century.43 Qadis 
might also refer to Shari`a Appeal Court decisions to support a ruling owing more to 
local practice and interpretation than to classical positions.  The Egyptian principles 
contained in al-Jundi's Fifty Years' Principles of Shar`i Justice were also occasionally 
referred to, as were the opinions of the eighteenth/nineteenth century mufti Ibn 
Abidin.44  
 
1.3 Courts and Case Material   
 
 At the end of the 1990s there were thirteen first instance shari`a courts in the 
West Bank, including the East Jerusalem court.45 Each court session is presided over 
by a single qadi (judge); the larger courts have more than one qadi attached.46 Each 
court keeps its own records (sijillat), which in the case of the older courts demonstrate 
the extent to which shari`a jurisdiction has been restricted since the earlier Ottoman 
times.  Records dating from the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are 
described by Doumani, who conducted extensive research into the Nablus shari`a 
court records, as showing the shari`a court to be a ‘primary instrument of social 
control’, forming the major link between the Ottoman rulers and the local 
population.47 Information is to be found on weights and measures and the supervision 
of foodstuffs and transport costs; on coins; on jizya (poll tax) payments for non-
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Muslims, on building ventures and the adjudication of criminal and civil cases.  
Mandaville notes that most entries are in Arabic, although a few types of entry (such 
as financial reports) may be in Turkish.48 
 
 Of all the West Bank shari`a courts, Jerusalem has the richest collection of 
sijillat, stretching back to the first half of the sixteenth century with only one small 
gap.49 The records of Nablus court are second to Jerusalem in age and continuity, 
going back to 1656,  but with substantial gaps. Doumani notes the diversity of subject 
and indeed of litigants shown in the records as continuing until the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, when the restriction of jurisdiction of the shari`a courts began, 
leading to a specialisation of the courts’ functions and coinciding with the use of 
separate records, rather than one general log-book.50 The more recent records of the 
West Bank courts show an increasing specialisation and formalisation, due to tighter 
specification of jurisdiction and to the increasing centralisation of power and ease of 
communication and document reproduction. Over the period covered by this study -- 
that is, the twenty years 1965-1985 --  increasing standardisation can be noticed in the 
later sijillat.  One cause of this has been the introduction of standardised forms for all 
the various deeds (hujaj) that can be registered at court. According to Muhammad 
Mheilan, then Qadi al-Quda in Amman, these forms were introduced  in 1979 to aid 
efficiency in the courts.51 The increasing recourse had by all strata of West Bank 
Muslim society to lawyers in dealings with the shari`a courts may also have 
contributed to a certain amount of standardisation in presentation and progress of 
claims.  The content of the entry in the sijill is ultimately a matter for the qadi; 
however, in general, there is a noticeable increase in the length of the entries in the 
later records - those of 1985, for example, compared to those of 1965. The extra 
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length is usually accounted for by a more detailed and formalised phrasing of the 
substance of the claim, and of the qadi’s ruling. Selections of the standardised 
documents used in the West Bank shari`a courts under Jordanian rule, along with 
information on the shar`i judiciary during that time, are contained in the book 
produced by Shaykh Muhammad Mheilan. The Palestinian Qadi al-Quda, Shaykh 
Muhammad Abu Sardane, has produced a similar compilation detailing the situation 
of the shar`i judiciary and courts under Palestinian Authority rule. 
 
 The jurisdiction of the shari`a courts in the West Bank is regulated in 
accordance with the 1952 Jordanian Constitution by the Law of the Principles of 
Shar`i Procedure 1959. Article 105 of the Jordanian Constitution grants the shari`a 
courts exclusive jurisdiction in matters of personal status concerning Muslims, 
Islamic waqfs (pious endowments), and diya (‘blood wit’) where either both parties 
are Muslims or where a non-Muslim party agrees to shar`i jurisdiction.  In the Shar`i 
Procedure Law, this general statement was expounded into a detailed description of 
matters coming under the exclusive jurisdiction of the shari`a courts.  In particular, 
the following ‘personal status matters’ are listed: 
 Article 2(8):  marriage; divorce; dower,  trousseau (jihaz), and all payment by 
 way of dower; maintenance; filiation/legitimate paternity; custody; 
 Article 2(9):  all that occurs between the spouses, the origin of which is the 
 contract of marriage; 
 Article 2(16); everything related to personal status between Muslims; 
 Article 2(17):  every contract of marriage registered with the shari`a courts or 
 by a ma’dhun (marriage registrar) and all matters arising from any such 
 contract. 
 
Article 2 also includes matters relating to the guardian (wali),52 the property of 
orphans and the establishment of legal majority, interdictions due to legal 
incompetence, wills and rights in succession, death-bed gifts and missing persons.53 
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 Within this jurisdiction, the vast majority of tasks dealt with by the shari`a 
courts are of the type requiring the final act to be registered as a deed (hujja) in the 
relevant record, rather than claims (da`awa) which are the subject of litigation and are 
recorded in the ‘record of rulings’ (sijill al-ahkam).54 This applies, for example, to the 
majority of the work on succession; the shari`a court does not in general deal with the 
specific details of estates and inheritances, but simply draws up a list of the heirs 
together with the respective portions of the estate, and forwards it to the Land 
Registry Offices.55 Only when there is a need to correct a previous determination of 
rights to succession will a claim be raised, for example by an heir missed out from the 
list submitted to the court.56 
 
 For the purposes of this study, the sijillat for the years 1965, 1975 and 1985 
were examined in the shari`a courts of Bethlehem, Ramallah and Hebron. In 1965, 
the shari`a courts in the West Bank were applying the JLFR 1951 and were under the 
direct administration of the Jordanian authorities.  In 1975, the West Bank courts were 
applying the JLFR but in practical isolation from Jordan, the Israeli occupation of 
1967 having severed the direct links between the east and west banks of the River 
Jordan.  In 1985, under Israeli occupation, the West Bank courts were applying the 
JLPS 1976. Of the three courts, that of  Hebron is the oldest, with sijillat dating from 
1867 when it was first separated from the jurisdiction of Jerusalem.  The records in 
Ramallah and Bethlehem courts date from their establishment in 1949 and the mid-
1950s respectively.57 
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 The choice of the courts of  Hebron, Ramallah and Bethlehem was made both 
because of the lack of prior attention to them by contemporary scholars publishing in 
English, who have concentrated on Nablus and Jerusalem; and on the assumption that 
they would reflect many of the diverse sectors of population and the various 
influences at work in the Muslim communities of the southern West Bank at the time. 
Bethlehem is the second smallest of the courts existing in 1985, the last year of the 
survey, a year before the creation of three new, relatively small courts in sub-districts 
of the West Bank.  The court had one qadi and its catchment area included three 
refugee camps and the Ta`amira Bedouin settlement that has been the subject of 
papers by Aharon Layish,58 as well as the rural area surrounding the town.  Bethlehem 
town traditionally had a sizeable concentration of Christian inhabitants, as was also 
the case with Ramallah.59 Ramallah is a medium-sized court, and usually had two 
qadis attached, serving also Ramallah's twin town of al-Bireh. The court has 
jurisdiction over a number of refugee camps and villages and a large urban population 
with a high rate of emigration. The court of Hebron, in the south of the West Bank, 
has a large catchment area and had two qadis attached; Hebron District is the largest 
in the West Bank.60 Hebron (both town and rural districts) has a reputation for 
‘traditionalism’, with strong clan ties and an active system of ‘tribal law’ (al- qada’ 
al-`asha`iri).  It also traditionally provides many of the staffers of the shar`i judiciary. 
Bedouin settlements, notably in the villages of Zahiriyya and Bani Na`im, and the 
relative proximity of the area to the Bir as-Sab`a (Beersheva) area inside Israel and 
dealings with Bedouin tribes there, are also factors reflected in the sijillat.61 All three 
courts at that time had a Palestinian university within their catchment area.62 In each 
court, material was drawn from  the following types of records: 
 sijillat al-ahkam - the records of the qadi’s rulings on claims (that is, involving 
 litigation);  
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 sijillat at-talaq - these registers comprise deeds (hujaj) of talaq (unilateral 
 divorce) pronounced by the husband either unilaterally or in exchange for the 
 wife waiving certain or all of her financial claims on him, as part of a 
 mukhala`a agreement (that is, divorce by mutual consent or divorce for 
 renunciation);   
 Marriage contracts - these are bound separately in books of 150/200 contracts 
 in chronological order and according to the ma'dhun (marriage registrar) who 
 recorded them.63 
 
In addition, occasional recourse was had to the sijillat al-mutanawwa`a - registers of 
miscellaneous deeds which consist largely of procedural and administrative petitions 
and authorisations, including for example the registration of conversions to Islam, 
increase in dower, waqf, confirmation of marriage,64 wills, revocation of talaq 65 and 
correction of previous deeds. 
 
 This study is based in the first instance on the 8535 marriage contracts,  992 
deeds of talaq/mukhala`a  and 1679 rulings by the judges registered in the three 
courts in the years selected, which I studied over the course of years 1986-87 at the 
court premises, and which formed the basis of my Ph.D. thesis.  It should be noted 
that the material does not represent all claims presented to the courts in each year, but 
only those that were resolved - that is, claims that reached the stage of a  ruling from 
the judge at the end of litigation.  In addition, it is possible that a few marriage 
contracts registered in 1985 remained with individual marriage registrars in the books 
of contracts they were continuing to use through 1986 and 1987.  The table in Annex I 
shows the breakdown of material by year and court.  For the purposes of Chapters 
Three and Four, a detailed record of a random sample of just over 10% of the 
contracts in each court was made, totalling 857 contracts. The deeds of talaq and 
mukhala`a form the basis of Chapter Six. For Chapters Five, Seven and Eight, the 
litigation rulings form the basis for the consideration of the application of the text of 
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the law. The table in Annex II shows, in a rough breakdown, the subject matter of the 
litigation dealt with in the courts of Bethlehem, Ramallah and Hebron in the relevant 
years.66 
 
 A second source of primary material from the court records comes from a 
research project carried out under the auspices of the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid 
and Counselling (WCLAC), a Palestinian women’s organisation based in Jerusalem, 
for which I acted as research director and principal writer for the project. Lawyers 
working with WCLAC conducted research in the records of six shari`a courts: 
Hebron and Dura, Ramallah and Nablus in the West Bank, and Gaza City and Rafah 
in the Gaza Strip.67 The years chosen for study were 1989, 1992, 1993 and 1994, to 
reflect any differences between the material during the intifada and after the arrival of 
the Palestinian Authority in Gaza (and Jericho) in 1994.  The table in Annex III sets 
out the content of this material, which included a review of 2189 court rulings 
following litigation on cases related to maintenance, obedience, judicial divorce, 
compensation for arbitrary divorce, dower, and custody and related claims (such as 
the fee for custody); it also included a review of 4418 deeds of talaq registered in the 
court records in those years. In addition, a total of 954 contracts of marriage were 
used as an randomly-selected sample for the research on age of marriage from the 
courts of Ramallah, Gaza and Rafah. The review of the court material did not exactly 
parallel the design of the earlier research, and did not include individual case details: 
hence the two sets of data are mostly kept separate in this study.68 This later material 
is used to supplement the original research by providing a comparative indication of 
the application of the Egyptian-issued Law of Family Rights and recourse had to the 
courts in the Gaza Strip; similarly to provide a comparative indication of application 
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of the JLPS in Nablus, a large court with a wide catchment area in the biggest town in 
the northern West Bank; and to provide a general update on any developments that 
can be discerned from the 1990s material. 
 
 Additional material on the interpretation and application of personal status law 
is to be found in a number of published collections of selected principles and 
decisions from the Shari`a Court of Appeal in Amman. All three such works cited in 
this study (by `Amr, al-`Arabi, and Dawud) are invaluable for the researcher as well 
as for the practitioner. Dawud’s collection reproduces the selected decisions in the 
most detail, providing the opportunity for an examination of the ijtihad 
(interpretation) of the Appeal Court on substantive matters of personal status.69 
Finally, two Palestinian scholars have published short studies based on West Bank 
court records. `Ayyush published his findings and analysis of marriage and divorce in 
the West Bank shari`a courts over the years 1978-1983 in the bulletin of Bethlehem 
University, and Shalabi’s studies of marriage and divorce at the Ramallah court over 
the years 1985-1989 were published by Bir Zeit University.70 These studies are used to 
compare and extend the findings of the current work. 
 
1.4 Process and Procedure in the Shari`a Courts 
 
 On procedural matters, the primary reference in the West Bank courts is the 
Law of Shar`i Procedure of 1959, as amended in 1980,71 but there is also frequent 
reference to various procedural parts of the Majalla,72 indicating the less than 
comprehensive nature of the Jordanian procedural law. The 1959 law is still based on 
the Ottoman Law of Procedure for Shari`a Courts of 1917, although it is considerably 
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more comprehensive.73 It substantially extends the classical rules on procedure and 
evidence, establishing court structures allowing for appeal and for a plurality of 
judges in higher levels, and procedural rules regulating such matters as costs, 
decisions in absentia and written evidence.  However, the basic evidential rule 
remains that given as a General Principle in Article 76 of the Majalla: ‘Evidence is for 
the one who affirms; the oath for the one who denies’.74 In the system summarised by 
this principle, the person ‘affirming’ is the claimant (mudda`i) while the person 
denying is the person ‘claimed against’ or the respondent (mudda`i `alayhi). In shar`i 
procedure, the claimant is the person whose statement runs counter to the presumption 
(operating in favour of the norm, al-’asl), and the respondent is the person whose 
assertion is supported by this presumption.75 Thus Article 77 of the General Principles 
of the Majalla states: 
 The object of evidence is to prove what is contrary to appearance; the object of 
 the oath is to ensure the continuance of the original state. 
 
 Since conflicting claims are often raised in one case, the claimant/respondent 
roles may change accordingly in so far as the burden of proof is concerned. In a 
maintenance claim, for example, the wife will begin by claiming something against 
the normal state of affairs, that is, that despite his legal obligation,  her husband is not 
paying her maintenance. If the husband denies this, she will have to prove her claim.  
However, if the husband admits to not paying maintenance but  states that he has a 
shar`i reason for not doing so, then he carries the burden of proof in proving this 
defence because he is now claiming that, contrary to the legal norm, his wife is not 
entitled to maintenance (i.e. that she is nashiz, disobedient).76 
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 Although in litigation the descriptions of  ‘claimant’ and ‘respondent’ will not 
alter formally during the progress of the claim, still the assignment at each stage of the 
roles of mudda`i and mudda`i `alayhi is highly significant because of the burden of 
proof placed on the person whose assertion runs counter to the legal presumption.  
Hooper’s translation of the following articles from Book 16 of the Majalla, frequently 
referred to in the sijillat al-ahkam on the West Bank, provide a useful summary of 
litigation procedure and demonstrate the importance of the correct assignment of the 
burden of proof: 
 Article 1817:  If the respondent admits the claim, the judge shall give 
 judgement on the admission.  If he denies, the judge shall call upon the 
 claimant for his evidence. 
 Article 1818:  If the claimant proves his case by evidence, the judge shall give 
 judgement accordingly.  If he cannot prove it, he has a right to the oath, and if 
 he asks to exercise such right, the judge shall accordingly tender the oath to 
 the respondent. 
 Article 1819:  If the respondent swears the oath, or if the claimant does not ask 
 for the oath to be administered, the judge shall order the claimant to give up 
 his claim upon the respondent. 
 Article 1820:  If the respondent refuses to take the oath, the judge shall deliver 
 judgement based upon such refusal.  If the respondent states that he is 
prepared  to swear an oath after judgement has been so delivered, the judgement 
shall  remain undisturbed.77 
 
 Litigants’ respect for the oath is shown not just in refusal to take it on the part 
of the respondent, but also in the waiving of the right to have it administered to the 
respondent on the part of a claimant who has failed to prove his or her claim.78 
Recourse to the oath is a frequent occurrence in the West Bank as elsewhere, since the 
nature of the disputes, being largely domestic and personal, often precludes the 
presence of witnesses other than the parties to the claim.  In addition, in the West 
Bank, in the many cases where a spouse, usually the husband, is absent and of 
unknown whereabouts, the claimant must take the oath to support his/her claim due to 
the impossibility of the oath of denial being administered to the absent respondent.79 
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 With regard to witnesses, the classical rules are altered in the Jordanian law 
along the lines of the Egyptian Codes of Shar`i Procedure of 1910 and 1931, allowing 
for example for the calling and questioning of witnesses by either party; no explicit 
text however has replaced the general rule requiring the testimony of two women for 
every one man, which therefore stands, with the standard exceptions that the jurists 
traditionally made for matters on which women alone are expected to have expert 
knowledge.80 The classical rules of procedure have also been modified to 
accommodate an increasing primacy given to written evidence, particularly such 
official documents as birth and marriage certificates.81  All the judges in the shar`i 
courts are men. 
 
 It remains to consider the position of appeal in the shar`i structure.82 Jordanian 
law allows for only one stage of appeal within the shar`i system, from the first 
instance court to the Shari`a Appeal Court.  The period within which appeal is 
allowed is 30 days from the date of the judgement, or from the defendant's 
notification thereof if the hukm was issued in absentia.  There are certain types of 
rulings which, if no appeal is raised by a litigant within the 30 days, are automatically 
submitted to the Appeal Court by the first instance court for the ruling to be checked 
and verified; the first instance court’s decision is not implemented until that 
verification is made.  The types of rulings to which this procedure of automatic 
review applies are those involving haqq allah (literally ‘the right of God’) and are 
listed by Article 138 of the Law of Shar`i Procedure as including inter alia: 
 rulings on minors, incompetents, waqf and Treasury matters, and decisions on 
 dissolution of marriage (faskh), judicial divorce (tafriq) and unilateral divorce 
 (talaq), breastfeeding entailing a prohibition on marriage, respites granted for 
 disease and madness, and other matters related to haqq allah...83 
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In considering a case brought before it, then, the Appeal Court, which is convened by 
a President and two members, considers issues of both substantive and procedural 
law.  It may abrogate a decision in full, modify it, or return it to the first instance court 
with recommendations on how to proceed.  If the Appeal Court returns a ruling, with  
recommendations, to the first instance court, and the qadi there insists on his former 
ruling, the decision is raised again to the Appeal Court; if the Appeal Court in turn 
again disagrees, then it may either hear the case itself or return it for another first 
instance court to consider.84 
 
 The Shari`a Court of Appeal, under Jordanian law, also has a carefully defined 
role to play in exercising collective ijtihad to come to authoritative or new rulings.  
Article 150 of the Law of Shar`i Procedure provides that where there are contrasting 
Appeal Court rulings on the matters in question, or where it sees it appropriate to 
issue a ruling contrary to all previous rulings, the court considering the case shall be a 
panel of five rather than the usual three judges.85 The judicial exercise of ijtihad in 
Jordan is thus carefully regulated; firstly, it is the task of the legislature, in drawing up 
the codes of family law on which all but the rarest rulings will be based.  Secondly, 
the Appeal Court exists to deal with points arising in practice, and to confirm or reject 
the ijtihad exercised of necessity by the individual qadi in the first instance court in 
those cases in which he is faced with a novel situation not covered by the texts and 
without previous Appeal Court decisions to guide him or when he considers it might 
be time to challenge an established practice or interpretation.  Such occasions are rare. 
In practice, the majority of appeals submitted by West Bank litigants to the Shari`a 
Court of Appeal in the case material of this study were based on procedural 
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arguments, and procedural irregularities were also the cause of most of the instances 
where a ruling subject to mandatory review was abrogated by the Appeal Court.86 
 
 From 1967 to 1994, the shari`a courts of the West Bank had recourse to a 
Shari`a Court of Appeal in Jerusalem rather than the Court in Amman, a fact 
recognised in Jordanian law after some ten years of its de facto existence. From 1995 
to the time of writing, while the Jerusalem Shari`a Court of Appeal continued to serve 
the shari`a court of first instance in the city, both still administered by Jordan, a 
Palestinian Authority Shari`a Court of Appeal established by decree of Yasser Arafat 
convened in Nablus to hear appeals from the remainder of the West Bank. These 
developments are considered in the following chapter, against the background of the 
history of the shari`a court system in the area. 
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ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
1. Takkenberg, 1998, 21, gives an ‘indication’ of 1,250,000 Palestinians in the 
West Bank (including East Jerusalem) in 1995, and 880,000 in the Gaza Strip. The 
PCBS survey of 1997 put the West Bank Palestinian population at 1,873,476 with 
210,209 resident in annexed parts of East Jerusalem. It put the Palestinian population 
of the Gaza Strip at 1,022,207. On the numbers of refugees displaced in 1948, see 
below Chapter Two, note 59. By way of comparison, Abu Lughod, 1971, 162, put the 
June 1967 (pre-war) population of the West Bank including East Jerusalem at 975,000 
and the Gaza Strip at 400,000 according to UNRWA estimates. In a later article 
(1984, 255), she further estimates that in 1967 the population of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip represented about 50% of the total Palestinian nation; in 1983 she 
estimated at 1.3 million the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
constituting only 29% of all Palestinians. 
 
2. Takkenberg, 1998, 21, includes in his estimates for the Palestinian population 
in 1995 cited above in note 1 a total of 517,400 UNRWA-registered refugees in the 
West Bank and 683,600 in the Gaza Strip. The FAFO survey of 2500 households in 
the early 1990s found 40% of all the households surveyed (in the West Bank 
including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip) to be registered as UNRWA refugees, 
and while Gaza had the majority of camp-dwelling refugees, 60% of UNRWA-
registered refugees were by then living outside the camps. Heiberg, 1993 
(‘Household’), 160.  Graham-Brown, 1984, 62, gives a 1982 figure of refugees 
constituting 40% of the population of the West Bank. 
 
3. PCBS, 1998, 5. The same source indicates a very low proportion of elderly 
people, with only 3.4% aged 65 or over. See further Abu Libdeh, Ovensen and 
Brunberg, 1993. Hammami and Johnson, 1999, 323, give a figure of 80,000 PLO 
cadre members and their families who have been given the right to residence under 
the terms of the Oslo Accords. Bisharat, 1989, 11, writing in the 1980s, estimates a 
Christian minority of about 8%, concentrated in the areas of Ramallah, Bethlehem and 
Jerusalem; it is widely believed to have decreased since then, although figures are 
hard to come by. The FAFO survey of the early 1990s found 96% of the Palestinian 
population in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, including East Jerusalem, to be Muslim.  
In the Gaza Strip the proportion was 99.8%, ‘making Gaza one of the most compact 
Muslim areas in all of the Middle East’ while even in Jerusalem, Bethlehem and 
Ramallah, where 90% of Christians live, Christians were only 15% of the population 
in Arab Jerusalem and 11% of the population in Bethlehem and Ramallah. The issue 
of Christian-Muslim relations has become one of some sensitivity since the arrival of 
the Palestinian Authority; for an examination and refutation of the charges by Israeli 
officials in the light of reported incidents and PA policies, see The Myth of Christian 
Persecution by the Palestinian Authority, LAW, 1998.  
 
4. Hammami and Johnson, 1999, 319, citing Arzt, D., Refugees into Citizens: 
Palestinians and the End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, New York: US Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1996. 
 
5. See for example work by Shehadeh, Mazzawi, Playfair, and the Palestinian 
human rights organisation al-Haq cited in the Bibliography. 
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6. Notably, on the first subject, Shehadeh  1997, and Cotran and Mallat, 1996; 
and publications by Palestinian human rights organisations on the second. 
 
7. Mir-Hosseini, 1993. 
 
8. Shaham, 1997. 
 
9. Moors, 1994. 
 
10. Tucker, 1998.  
 
11. Heiberg and Ovensen, 1993. 
 
12. Shaham, 1997, 19, describes as ‘disappointing to some extent’ the limitations 
of the Egyptian shari`a court records in regard to social and background data. 
Compare Gerber’s description of the limitations of the summaries he studied in the 
Ottoman court records of the seventeenth and eighteenth century: Gerber, 1994, 15.  
 
13. The immediate reference here is to Allott, 1980.  
 
14. Stewart, 1997, 28, writing about the public/private divide in the law under 
colonial regimes in Africa, notes that ‘women's activities are regulated through 
customary law because of their position within the family and clan but also through 
work in the subsistence and informal economies’. 
 
15. Wing, 1993 and 1994. 
 
16. Bisharat, 1989, 39-43. 
 
17. Granqvist, 1931, 1934 and 1935. 
 
18. Peteet, 1987 and 1991. 
 
19. Dupret et al. (eds.), 1999. Bisharat, 1989, 171-177, gives a short evaluation of 
the workings in society of various formal jurisdictions and informal processes of 
dispute resolution in the West Bank in the 1980s. Of the formal system (civil courts, 
Israeli military courts, and shari`a courts (along with other religious courts), he notes 
(at 176) that ‘only the Islamic courts have any true moral legitimacy to complement 
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reasons for the secrecy in which the debates appear to be conducted.  
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madhhab al-imam abi hanifa, was first published by the Egyptian government in 1875 
although never formally implemented as ‘law’. See Shaham, 1997, 14. It is 
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Qadi al-Quda, see Chapter Two. 
 
47. Doumani, 1985, 156. 
 
48. Mandaville, 1966, 313. At 313-314, he details the types of information 
contained in these records. 
 
49. The Jerusalem records have a gap of 28 months, from April 1574 to August 
1576: Doumani, 1985, 161. Researchers have long been aware of the potential of 
these collections and a project was begun in the 1980s to index the contents of the 
Jerusalem records: Doumani, 159. The Jerusalem court is by far the best equipped of 
the shari`a courts in the West Bank. At the time the research for this study was 
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facilities; all entries in all the records were kept in longhand and copies of individual 
judgements were made either longhand or typed on carbons on a manual typewriter. 
Records of proceeding were taken down in longhand by a court clerk sitting next to 
the qadi during the session. Word processors are currently being introduced: Bakri, 
2000, 18. 
 
50. Doumani, 1985, 159. 
 
51. Mheilan, 1986, p.95. Mheilan reproduces these standard forms in the second 
half of his book. As an example of increasing centralisation and standardisation of 
procedure, Mheilan describes a 1978 circular (ta`mim) form the Qadi al-Quda in 
Amman informing the courts of a simplification in the procedures for the 
identification of persons before the qadi – henceforth, either the personal 
acquaintance of the qadi or official state documentation was to be sufficient, 
obviating the need for identification by for example village elders. In the West Bank, 
it was many years before the shari`a courts would accept identity cards issued by the 
Israeli military authorities in the West Bank as proof of identity. 
 
52. As well as the wasi (trustee) and the qayyim (custodian/curator) 
 
53. As well as waqf, diya, and other matters not related to personal status. 
 
54. Mheilan, 1986, p.54-55, reproduces the 1985 annual report on the shari`a 
courts that he as Qadi al-Quda forwarded to the Prime Minister in Amman. The 
report gives the total number of claims resolved by litigation in 1985 in both the West 
Bank and Jordan as 20,915; the total number of deeds and documents registered was 
185,401. The table for the West Bank is in places incomplete. 
 
55. Succession orders are executed by the Land Registry Offices, not the 
Execution Offices. Meron, 1982, 363. 
 
56. By way of example, in one case in the 1985 material, one of the deceased’s 
two wives raised a claim against the other in order to secure the inclusion in the list of 
heirs of her own minor daughter by the deceased. 
 
57. Doumani, 1985, 161. 
 
58. Layish, 1979 and 1980-82. 
 
59. Graham-Brown, 1984, 242. See above, note 4: in the early 1990s the FAFO 
survey found 11% of the population in Bethlehem and Ramallah to be Christian. 
 
60. Masudi, 1987, p.225, gives 1985 population figures for Hebron District as 
195,000; Ramallah District as 126,000 and Bethlehem District as 84,000. 
 
61. Another factor that distinguishes Hebron from other towns in the West Bank is 
that it has sizeable Israeli settlements in the middle of the town; this is not however a 
factor reflected in the records of the shari`a courts. Also see Frisch, 1997, 344-346,  
on the impact of ‘Hebronite customary law’. 
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62. Since 1986, Bir Zeit University in the village of Bir Zeit in Ramallah district 
has come under the jurisdiction of the Bir Zeit shari`a court established that year. 
 
63. This has been the case since British Mandate times. Doumani, 1985, 159. 
 
64. Tasaduq al-zawaj. This is a deed registered by the two spouses who have lost 
their papers or who failed from the beginning to register their marriage in court. It is 
not the same as the claim of proof of marriage (ithbat zawaj) where one party is 
absent (or perhaps dead) or denies the claim. The sijillat mutanawwa’a in Bethlehem, 
for example, contain many examples of elderly couples applying for documentation 
confirming their marriage, having lost their papers during their flight from other parts 
of Palestine during the 1940s, and being either unable or unwilling to go in person to 
the shari`a court now inside Israel. The same problem may arise if, for whatever 
reason, the marriage notary (ma’dhun) neglects to render to the court the third copy of 
the contract. 
 
65. Previously, revocation of talaq was registered in the sijillat at-talaq. 
 
66. The subject breakdown is only rough because some of the claims, especially in 
1965, involve compound claims, in the majority of cases combining maintenance and 
some other element. In such cases, in this table, the non-maintenance element of the 
compound element is shown, while those claims shown here as ‘maintenance’ 
represent claims that were solely for maintenance award; see below Chapter Five. In 
1985, the court actions shown in the table constituted nearly 40% of all actions ruled 
on in the West Bank shari`a courts; Mheilan, 1986, 55, gives the total court actions 
resolved in the West Bank in 1985 as 1632. 
 
67. The court records research was carried out by Hiyam Qa’akur, Reem Jaber, 
Ghada Shahid, and Fatima Mukhallalati. 
 
68. A study detailing and analysing the results of the WCLAC research has been 
published in the West Bank: Welchman, 1999. Preliminary papers were prepared by 
Ghada Shadid, Hiyam Qa’akur and Reem Jaber. 
 
69. Al-`Arabi, 1973 and 1984; `Amr, 1990; Dawud, 1999. 
 
70. `Ayyush, 1985; Shalabi, 1992. 
 
71. The 1980 amendments (Laws 10/1980, Official Gazette 2928, 3 May 1980; 
and 30/1980, Official Gazette 2972, 1 December 1980) introduced changes to 
notification procedures and to the rules on urgent execution; the 1990 law (Law 
9/1990, Official Gazette 3704, 1 August 1990) added rulings on diya to the list of first 
instance decisions subject to automatic review (failing an appeal by a litigant) by the 
Shari`a Appeal Court. 
 
72. Particularly Book 16 entitled the Administration of Justice by the court; but 
including also the Books on Actions (Book 14), Evidence (15), Admissions (13) and 
Agency (11). 
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73. The Jordanian Law of Shar`i Procedure 1959 contains 160 articles in 23 
chapters, as compared to the Ottoman law of 65 articles in six chapters. The Jordanian 
law includes, inter alia, chapters on jurisdiction and competence notification, 
litigation, evidence (with a special section on written evidence), third persons, 
guarantee of court costs and expenses, emergency execution, decisions in absentia 
and objections to such decisions, appeal, retrial and the precautionary attachment of 
goods.  
 
74. Hooper, 1936, 10-11, traces this principle to a hadith attributed to the Prophet. 
The same formulation appears in the letter traditionally attributed to the second 
caliph, `Umr Ibn al-Khattab, as addressed to Abu Musa al-Ashari and dealing with the 
basics of procedure. The letter is partially reproduced in Doi, A.R., Shari`ah: The 
Islamic Law, London: Ta Ha Publishers, 1994, 14-15. 
 
75. See Anderson, 1949. 
 
76. Schacht, 1964, 191, gives further examples of the presumption in operation 
and the consequent assignment of the burden of proof; as does Anderson, 1949, 6. 
 
77. Hooper, 1933, 499-500. These articles come from Book 16 (The 
Administration of Justice), Section 4 (The Hearing of a Court Action). 
 
78. In one claim in the 1985 case material, a woman claimed her trousseau (jihaz) 
to the value of 1400 Jordanian dinars (at the time, worth about 2500 sterling) from her 
husband who she claimed was refusing to hand the property over to her. The husband 
denied the claim, and the case spent several months in the courts. In the end of the 
woman was unable to prove her claim and asked for the oath of denial to be 
administered to her husband. The man declined to take the oath, and thus caused his 
wife’s claim to be established and himself to be held liable for the full amount. In 
another case in the same year, a woman raised a maintenance claim against her 
husband, to which he offered the shar`i defence of her ‘disobedience’ (nushuz). He 
was unable to prove her disobedience, and on his request, the woman was offered the 
oath of denial to his defence. She refused to take it, so he was given the opportunity of 
taking the oath to establish his defence, and upon his taking it, her claim for 
maintenance was rejected by the court. Coulson, 1964, 124-125, held reliance on the 
oath to display ‘an altruistic reliance upon the force of religious belief’ which he 
clearly considered a contributing factor in the development and maintenance of other 
‘non-shar`i’ jurisdictions, especially in criminal matters. He did nevertheless 
acknowledge (1964, 65) that ‘the swearing of the oath is not a matter lightly regarded 
in traditional Muslim society’. On this, see Gerber, 1994, 48-50; after providing 
examples of the efficacy of the oath in cases from Ottoman material and referring to 
David Power’s compelling example from Morocco, he concludes that ‘[t]he case of 
the oath suggests that we may be influenced by our hidden ethnocentric blinders 
concerning this system of law, and that it is time we tried to view this legal system on 
its own terms.’ The numerous examples in the West Bank court material of the 
apparent efficacy of the oath in establishing the truth would give support to this 
statement. 
 
79. Thus the wife must take the oath supporting her claim to maintenance from an 
absent husband, or to separation from an absent husband on grounds of his refusal to 
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maintain her. See further Chapter Two for the impact of the Israeli occupation in 
rendering the status of anyone outside the West Bank as of ‘unknown whereabouts’. 
 
80. These rules make the examination of the witness’ character (the process of 
tazkiyya) less critical, by allowing both parties to question the witnesses on the 
content of their testimony. However, in a 1996 ruling the Amman Shari`a Appeal 
Court criticised the first instance court for not having investigated properly the 
respondent’s challenge made against the witnesses, to the effect that they did not pray 
or fast and were ‘known liars’: 41627/1996, Dawud, 1999, I, 295-296. Either party 
can call witnesses and although the latter must swear the oath before giving their 
testimony, there is no requirement for them to make the initial formal declaration ‘I 
give testimony’, which was still a requirement in the Majalla (Articles 1684 and 1689, 
compare Article 65 of the Jordanian law). The court can also question and recall the 
witnesses if this is considered necessary and appropriate. On the provisions in Egypt 
and in the Majalla, as well as comparative law in Syria, see Anderson, 1951 
(‘Competence and Procedure’), 43-44. For an examination of the discussions of jurists 
on the one man / two women rule, see Fadl, 1997. A suggestion by lawyer Asma 
Khadr in 1998 that the gender specific rules on witnesses be dropped proved 
controversial for leading members of the shar`i judiciary, as noted in the Conclusion. 
 
81. The written report of a doctor is now required in support of testimony before a 
court to establish insanity, imbecility and diseases and diseases that provide grounds 
for the dissolution of marriage (Article 90 of the Law of Shar`i Procedure). Official 
state documents, including birth and marriage certificates, and documents written by 
the Clerk of the Justice, are considered decisive proof for the matter for which they 
are drawn up, and can be challenged only for forgery (Article 75). Financial claims 
based on such a document cannot be refuted by personal testimony, with the sole 
exception of the defence presented in such financial claims by one spouse against the 
other, which enables the wife to claim her dower despite written acknowledgement of 
receipt by her father (Article 89, see further Chapter Five). 
 
82. It is frequently noted that a formal system of appeal was not strictly 
recognised in the ‘pure’ shar`i system (for example Schacht, 1984, 189; Anderson, 
1949, 15; and most expansively perhaps Shapiro). On a practical level, however, 
Eisenman, 1978, 48, notes that an appeal system was well-established practice in the 
Ottoman Empire and indeed before. More recent scholarship such as that by David 
Powers, 1992, disputes the strictly hierarchical vision of appeal, arguing for the 
practice of judicial review, well-established in the shar`i system, to be considered in 
this light.  
 
83. Note that the reference to talaq means talaq bi-da`wa, i.e. talaq occurring as a 
result of litigation, not a talaq registered by the husband at court. When a first 
instance decision on dissolution or judicial divorce is verified by the Appeal Court, 
the woman’s `idda (‘waiting period’) is calculated as of the date of the first instance 
ruling; if it is abrogated, the divorce is considered never to have happened. 
 
84. Law of Shar`i Procedure 1959, Articles 146 and 149. 
 
85. The Qadi al-Quda deputises the two extra qadis for this panel. 
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86. In one case in the 1985 material, in appealing a maintenance award made 
against his client, the husband’s lawyer won his appeal when the Jerusalem Shari`a 
Appeal Court observed that the notification sent by the first instance court required 
the husband’s presence in court on ‘12/13/1985’. In another case, a series of decisions  
involving the establishment of an out-of-court talaq were sent back four times by the 
Appeal Court in Jerusalem who each time found fault with the text of the oath or the 
person to whom it was administered. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE SHARI`A COURTS: A CONSTANT IN A CHANGING WORLD?  
  
 
2.1 Introduction 
     
 In many ways, Islamic family law and the shari`a court system in Palestine 
have constituted the most constant feature of the formal Palestinian legal system since 
the mediaeval period; to this day, both law and courts display features of their direct 
inheritance from the Ottoman tradition. This is not to suggest that either law or courts 
have been monolithic and unchanging; indeed Beshara Doumani is of the opinion that 
‘the shari`a courts as social institutions have changed radically over the past 450 
years.’1 In terms of jurisdiction, and the role the courts were able to play in society at 
large through the exercise and representation of that jurisdiction, this is certainly the 
case.  Nevertheless, those involved in what is now left of the shari`a court system are 
wont to emphasise the centuries of unbroken legal tradition embodied by the shar`i 
judiciary in Palestine.2 George Bisharat notes the ‘greater moral legitimacy of the 
Islamic courts within the community and the greater familiarity and intelligibility of 
their laws and procedure’ -- that is, compared to the civil court system and the Israeli 
military tribunals in operation in the West Bank during the occupation.3 Late Ottoman 
and post-Ottoman British Mandate changes to law and courts are what led Bentwich, 
writing in 1948, to describe the legal system in Palestine as a mosaic.4 Half a century 
later, Botiveau notes that ‘jurists make no bones about the fact that acculturation to 
models imposed from outside is part of the Palestinian legal experience.’5 In this 
framework of importation, acculturation, transplants and pluralism, the shari`a courts 
remain something of a cultural as well as legal constant. Circumstances led the shar`i 
system in the West Bank to positively assert this standing in the years of direct Israeli 
occupation, and the association of the shar`i system with a national Palestinian 
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identity and cultural heritage articulated in the twentieth century has been a feature of 
the claims for its place in the Palestinian state.6 This chapter traces the history of the 
shari`a courts and the development of Islamic family law in the area, from Ottoman 
times until the arrival of the Palestinian National Authority and the establishment 
within it of the Department of the Qadi al-Quda (Chief Islamic Justice) in the 1990s.  
 
2.2 Ottoman Rule 
 
 The sanjaks (administrative districts) of Palestine were conquered as part of 
the Syrian provinces from the Mamluks by Selim I in 1516 as the Ottoman Empire 
was rising to the peak of its power. Apart from a brief spell under Egyptian rule in the 
nineteenth century, Palestine remained under the Ottomans until the dismantling of 
the empire at the end of the first world war.  The Ottomans based their rule on the 
shari`a, and orders (firmans) issued by the ruling authorities from their early days in 
Palestine required the observance of its provisions, particularly in places sacred  to 
Islam such as Jerusalem and Hebron.7 Qanun (state-issued law) dealing with matters 
ostensibly outside the jurisdiction of the shari`a and equally binding on Ottoman 
subjects was issued by the central authorities and the two were frequently 
accommodated through the fatwas of the Muftis, in particular those of the highest 
Islamic dignitary of the Empire, the Grand Mufti and Shaykh of Islam in Istanbul. 
Colin Imber’s study of Ebu’s-su’ud, sixteenth century jurist and Grand Mufti to 
Sulayman ‘The Law-Giver’, explains with a wealth of examples how and to what 
purpose this was done, and how the bodies of law worked together.8 
 
 The Hanafi school of law enjoyed the official patronage of the Ottoman rulers, 
and a Hanafi Qadi al-Quda was appointed in Damascus and was always an Ottoman, 
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with final jurisdiction over the province; by the 18th century, it seems that Jerusalem 
had its own Chief qadi, who Bisharat states was rotated annually by the central 
authorities.9 Hanafi qadis were appointed to the districts of Jerusalem and Nablus, and 
although as in the past people might still take their cases to the judge of their preferred 
school of law for rulings in accordance with that school, at times the non-Hanafi 
judges had to seek approval for their decisions from the Hanafi appointee. Judith 
Tucker’s examination of fatwa collections from Ottoman Palestine includes a 
recommendation that, in the given circumstances, the Hanafi qadi should himself 
appoint a Shafi`i deputy in order to divorce a woman in accordance with Shafi`i 
doctrine.10 
 
 Under the Ottomans, qadis had jurisdiction beyond the administration of the 
shari`a.  Sixteenth century firmans required the qadi to apply both shari`a and qanun 
law, and, with variations in time and place, many matters of civil administration as 
well as criminal law were directed to them as second in authority only to the 
administrative governors.11 In family law matters, as in other areas of the shari`a, the 
qadi would make his ruling in accordance with and citing from the authoritative texts 
of the school to which he adhered, whether these were from the ‘classical age’ (that is, 
before the thirteenth century CE) or subsequent texts acquiring a later authority.12 
Recent scholarship has extended understanding of the way in which the doctrine was 
applied; in particular, the fatwas of the Ramla Mufti Khayr al-Din al-Ramli provide 
much material on the way in which this scholar sought to resolve legal questions of 
his time.13 
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 In accordance with the millet system of rule followed by the Ottomans in 
Palestine, recognized non-Muslim communities had their own system of religious 
laws and courts, the latter largely based in Jerusalem.14 Each millet court in theory had 
jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, wills and related personal status matters of 
their members, as well as over religious affairs.15 Goadby states that in Palestine, the 
jurisdiction of the non-Muslim millet courts was limited to marriage and filiation, and 
that ‘in practice all questions of successions were brought before the Moslem Courts’ 
which ruled according to the shari`a law  on succession: 
 
 Christians became, therefore, accustomed to the application of Moslem law in 
 cases of inheritance, and the old Byzantine law which was the traditional law 
 of the principal Palestinian Christian Community, that of the Orthodox 
 Church, became obsolete.16 
 
 Together with the Greek Orthodox, the Rabbinical courts were the most 
significant courts of recognized millets in Palestine, and Chigier states  that the 
Rabbinical courts did in fact exercise jurisdiction over intestate succession as well as 
over wills.17 The primacy of the shari`a system, as the religion of the state, was 
expressed in the residual shari`a court jurisdiction over any ‘mixed’ case involving a 
Muslim and a non-Muslim and also any case involving members of a non-recognised 
community.18 
 
 In addition, from the sixteenth century onwards, the Consular courts of 
European nations also had a part to play in the law of the Ottoman empire, including 
family law, through the system of Capitulatory privileges, granting them jurisdiction 
over cases involving their nationals and also Ottoman nationals belonging to the 
religious communities taken under the ‘protection’ of these foreign states.  This system 
developed into a powerful political structure that, combined with direct military and 
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economic pressure from European imperial powers (including loss of territory) was one 
of the motivating factors behind the ‘Tanzimat’ reforms to the law and the legal system 
carried out by the Ottomans in the second half of the nineteenth century.19 Initially this 
consisted of formally removing from shar`i jurisdiction whole areas of law that had in 
practice been covered by a mostly shari`a-infused mix of customary and qanun law for 
centuries. This process began after the Egyptian occupation of Palestine and Syria 
(1831-40), during which time criminal and administrative matters had been transferred 
to local councils set up in the districts, leaving the shari`a courts to deal with personal 
status and property matters only.20 
 
  The Ottomans sought to reconcile their reforms with the demands of the 
shari`a; the Hatti-i Sherif of Gulhane, the initial and innovatory imperial proclamation 
from the Sultan, justified the introduction of new laws on the basis of strengthening the 
state and preserving Islam.21 The Hatt-i Sherif was followed in 1856 by a second 
imperial edict, the Hatt-i Humayun, which was dominated by the theme of ensuring 
equality among Ottoman subjects22 and provided for a major reconstruction of the legal 
system with regard to the rights of non-Muslim subjects. It provided for secular mixed 
courts composed of Muslims and non-Muslims to hear commercial and criminal cases 
between people of all religions, and stated that non-Muslims of recognised 
communities might take succession issues to their own religious court, rather than to 
the shari`a courts as had been the  practice. The text of a memorandum addressed to the 
European powers outlined this policy: 
 Suits which relate to religious law or which by their nature can only interest 
 Moslems among themselves, or Christians among themselves, will be brought 
 as heretofore before the Moslem Religious Courts for Moslems and the 
 Ecclesiastical Courts for Christians.23 
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     This was rather more than reaffirmation of the millet policy of communal religious 
jurisdiction in matters of personal status, for in practice the shari`a courts had exercised 
a far wider jurisdiction, including residual jurisdiction, and heard all mixed cases. Non-
Muslim testimony was validated and through the 1860s and 1870s nizamiyya (regular, 
statute) courts were established throughout Palestine applying codes of law based on 
European (mostly French) models that excluded shar`i jurisdiction.24 In Doumani’s 
words, ‘the shari`a courts found themselves at the losing end of a process of 
centralization of power.’25 Just as significant as the removal of these areas from shari`a 
jurisdiction, both for the substance of Islamic law and for the way it came to be applied 
in the shari`a courts, were the Ottoman codification of Hanafi rules on civil law issues 
in the ‘Majalla,’ and on family law in the Ottoman Law of Family Rights.   
 
 The Majalla covered certain areas of civil and commercial law ruled 
traditionally by the shari`a and outside the scope of the imported codes, but 
constituting integral parts of many of the issues arising in the new nizamiyya courts.  
The apparent ignorance of many of the judges in the new courts of how to ‘find’ the 
law in the authoritative texts of the schools prompted the drafting of guidelines.26 A 
committee of Ottoman jurists sitting in Istanbul drew up the Majalla, promulgated in 
various parts over the years 1867-1877, and it was approved by the Sultan for use in the 
nizamiyya courts in civil suits; thus traditional Islamic law, in this semi-codified state, 
became a law of territorial application in secular courts in the Ottoman lands.  The 
Majalla was intended by its drafters to serve as a guide to those who had difficulties in 
having recourse to the traditional body of doctrine in the classical texts.  Its application 
as a veritable Civil Code came after the collapse of the Ottoman empire.27 
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 The form of the Majalla is extremely significant in the history of the shari`a: as 
Brinkley Messick puts it, initiating ‘the transformation of the shari`a into law.’28 As for 
substance, the drafting committee in places selected minority Hanafi opinions where 
these were seen as more appropriate than the established majority view, referring in 
justification of this approach to the sultan's established power to order the application 
of a particular variant Hanafi view.29 One article provided specifically for the sultan's 
right to order the application of a certain jurist if this were in the public interest.30 
Change might also be effected by silent omission; in line with policy and promises to 
the European powers, the word ‘Muslim’ was simply left out of the otherwise 
traditional qualifications required for a valid witness.31 The ordering of the application 
of a particular view from within the Hanafi school was to be widened in the twentieth 
century to include the views of other schools, and even the individual views of certain 
prominent early jurists not adopted by any of the four schools, in a codification-based 
methodology known as takhayyur (selection).32 
 
  Meanwhile the shari`a courts continued to apply classical Hanafi law in its 
traditional form, drawing for their rulings from the authoritative texts of the school. A 
circular of 1887 attempted to remove the remaining confusion of jurisdictions between 
the various sets of courts: the nizamiyya courts were to hear penal, commercial and 
civil suits, while the shari`a courts had jurisdiction over the Muslim community in 
personal status, succession, and the customary diya and qisas (compensation and 
retaliation).33 
 
 In the 1870s, with the accession of Abdul Hamid II and his decision to rule by 
decree and subsequent dismissal of the newly established Legislative Assembly, the 
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‘Tanzimat’ reform  period as such came to an end.  At the very end of the Ottoman 
empire, following the restoration of the constitution in 1908,  came the first codification 
of Islamic law on marriage, divorce and related matters in the Ottoman Law of Family 
Rights (OLFR), for application as law (that is, not for use as guidelines) in the shari`a 
courts.   The OLFR was promulgated on 7/11/1917, just one month before the British 
military conquest of the southern West Bank area including Jerusalem and Hebron,34 
and was not therefore put into real effect in this area by the Ottomans themselves. The 
original law included provisions on the family law of non-Muslims as well, but in 
Palestine the British were to restrict its application to Muslim subjects.35 
 
2.3 British Rule 
 
 The end of the first world war found Palestine under British military 
occupation. During the war years, different promises had been made to various parties 
by the British regarding the future of the Arab lands that were to be freed from Ottoman 
rule through the Arab revolt encouraged by the allies. The Hussein-Macmohen 
correspondence of 1915-1916, the Sykes-Picot or Tripartite Agreement of 1916 and the 
Balfour Declaration of 1917 all had bearing on the proposed status of Palestine after the 
war was over.36 In the end, it was the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which, incorporated 
into the preamble to the Mandate for Palestine awarded to Britain at San Remo in 1920, 
was by far the most significant to the practical running of the country and to the lives of 
the population. 
 
 The Mandate for Palestine vested in Britain legislative and executive powers. 
The Capitulatory privileges were abrogated and the judicial system was required to 
guarantee the rights of foreigners and local inhabitants, and implied that the separate 
 55 
competences for religious communities would be retained. The Palestine Mandate, 
unlike for example the Iraq Mandate also held by Britain, was a ‘Class B’ mandate, not 
requiring the Mandatory power to facilitate development towards an independent state. 
It specifically required the Mandatory Power to facilitate immigration and settlement 
on the land by Jews. A census carried out by Britain in 1922 showed Muslim Arabs to 
make up 78% of the population, Jews 11% and Christian Arabs just over 9%.37 
 
 The neighbouring area of Transjordan was excepted from all the clauses turning 
on the facilitation of a Jewish national home in a memorandum to the Legislative 
Council approved on 16/9/22, pursuant to Article 25 of the Mandate. A separate 
administration for Transjordan was set up under the general supervision of the 
Mandatory power. The Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922, in effect a constitutional 
document for Palestine, was not applicable to Jordan,38 but set out in full the legislative, 
judicial and executive powers for Palestine.39 
 
 In Palestine, the British retained the basis of the nizamiyya court system of the 
Ottoman Tanzimat period and the separate jurisdictions in personal status for different 
religious communities.40 Slight modification was made to the jurisdiction of religious 
courts that may be read as reflecting that Palestine was no longer being ruled by an 
Islamic authority. The residuary jurisdiction of the shari`a courts was given over 
largely to the civil courts.41 Articles 51-55 of the Palestine Order-in-Council define 
personal status and the respective jurisdiction of the shari`a, Rabbinical and Christian 
courts. The shari`a courts were to have exclusive jurisdiction in Islamic waqf (pious 
endowments) and in personal status as defined in Article 51: 
 suits regarding marriage or divorce, alimony, maintenance, guardianship, 
 legitimation and adoption of minors, inhibition from dealing with property of 
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 persons who are legally incompetent, successions, wills and legacies, and the 
 administration of the property of absent persons.  
 
Article 52 of the Order-in-Council made reference for the purpose of defining 
jurisdiction to the Ottoman Law of Shar`i Procedure; appeal from the qadi's court lay to 
the Shari`a Court of Appeal in Jerusalem whose decision was final. That the shari`a 
courts had exclusive jurisdiction even in the case of foreign Muslims was clear by 
contrast with the terms of Articles 53 and 54, regarding rabbinical and ecclesiastical 
courts, where the jurisdiction was constrained to ‘members of their communities other 
than foreigners’.42 Article 64 explained that personal status matters concerning non-
Muslim foreigners were to be heard in the District Courts where their own personal law 
would be applied.  The rabbinical and ecclesiastical courts were to exercise a somewhat 
narrower jurisdiction than the shari`a courts, having exclusive jurisdiction only with 
regard to marriage and divorce, alimony and confirmation of wills,43 and in pious 
endowments constituted according to their own law.  Jurisdiction in other matters of 
personal status for the Jewish and Christian communities was concurrent with the civil 
courts and might only be dealt with in their religious courts with the consent of all 
parties to an action.44 The Order did not specify the courts of which communities 
exactly were to be allotted such authority, but Goadby, writing in 1926, states that in 
practice it was those religious courts established under the 1923 Succession 
Ordinance.45 The judgements of the religious courts were to be executed by the civil 
authorities.46 Where conflicts of jurisdiction arose between different religious 
communities, the Chief Justice was to decide which court had jurisdiction, and where 
the conflict was between civil and religious jurisdiction, provision was made for a 
special tribunal to decide.  Palestinians not belonging to a recognised religious 
community came under the civil courts.47 
 
 57 
 The complicated structure of an interlocking religious and secular courts system 
was thus defined by the British Mandate authorities. To summarise, the shari`a courts 
retained exclusive jurisdiction in personal status and waqf of all Muslims, including 
foreigners, but had no jurisdiction over non-Muslims.48 The rabbinical and 
ecclesiastical courts were assured a wider jurisdiction than they had formerly held in 
practice, although this was narrower than that of the shari`a courts.  The jurisdiction of 
the civil courts included that formerly held by the commercial and consular courts, as 
well as the residual jurisdiction previously held by the shari`a courts. 
 
 The High Commissioner was now the legislative power in Palestine. In the 
Palestine Order-In-Council of 1922, four classes or sources of legislation were 
identified:  Ottoman law in force on 1/11/14, and ‘such later Ottoman laws as have 
been or may be declared to be in force by Public Notice;’49 Palestine Orders-in-
Council, Ordinances and Regulations; ‘the substance of the common law, and the 
doctrines of equity in force in England’; and ‘the powers, procedure and practice’ of 
courts in England.50 Specifically English legal principles, as well as British legislation, 
entered in this way into the body of law applied in Mandatory Palestine and the effect  
continues to be felt in certain areas of the law to this day.51 However, in the area of law 
and administration considered by the British colonial power to be directly and 
exclusively the business of the majority Muslim community, much of the Ottoman 
heritage was preserved. On 1/1/22 the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC) was created 
under a special order issued the previous year; it was headed by the Mufti of Jerusalem 
and was established in order, according to Bentwich, ‘to meet Moslem objection to the 
appointment and dismissal of religious judges by non-believers.’52 The SMC 
administered waqf and general Muslim affairs, as well as the shari`a court system, 
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including the appointment and dismissal of qadis and all other shari`a and waqf 
officials. 
 
 The OLFR of 1917 and its accompanying Law of Shar`i Procedure were given 
specific legal effect in Palestine in the Muslim Family Law (Application) Ordinance 
1919.53 The British repealed the sections in the OLFR relating to Christians and Jews, 
while retaining in full the majority of the law which applied to Muslims.  The Ottomans 
had justified their codification of shari`a rules on marriage and divorce in an 
accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, relying on both juristic and social grounds 
with reference to istislah (consideration of the public interest).54 As compared to the 
Majalla, which had drawn on variant and minority opinions within the Hanafi tradition, 
views from the other Sunni schools of law were included where this was considered 
necessary, although the basis of the law remained recognisably Hanafi. The irony was 
that the application of this law to Palestine and Transjordan was effected not by the 
Sultan of a Muslim state but by the non-Muslim British administrator. The British also 
carried over the amendments to the Ottoman Criminal Code, backing up registration 
requirements of marriage and divorce for all communities (in the Registration 
Ordinance of 1919) with a six-month prison sentence in the Palestine Criminal Code of 
1936. The existence of the OLFR was presumably the reason why the British felt no 
need to introduce legislation into the area of family law as they had in India, for 
example. In the Criminal Code of 1936, the British did introduce changes in the ages of 
capacity for marriage and legal majority, but it seems that no attempt was made to 
ensure enforcement of these rules in the shari`a courts.55 Muslims were exempted from 
the felony of ‘bigamy’ in the Criminal Code by virtue of their personal law permitting 
polygyny.56 While ‘principles of English law’ did enter the Palestinian legal system, 
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their influence on the substance and application of the law applied in the shari`a courts 
was less than in other spheres.57 
 
 In short, when, in the spring of 1947, the British Mandate authorities turned the 
question of Palestine over to the United Nations, the shari`a courts had a well 
established jurisdiction adapted from the later Ottoman model and were applying 
Ottoman codifications of Islamic law drawn mainly from the Hanafi tradition, with 
supplementary recourse to the authoritative opinions of the school,  and the addition of 
certain procedural and administrative requirements. 
 
2.4 Jordanian Rule 
 The United Nations Partition Plan of 1947 provided for the withdrawal of the 
British Mandatory forces and the establishment of separate Arab and Jewish states in 
Palestine, with Jerusalem to be administered as a corpus separandum, an international 
zone administered by a Trusteeship Council on behalf of the United Nations.58 On 
14/5/48, British troops withdrew from Palestine and at midnight the mandate came to 
an end.  In the fighting that ensued between Jewish and Arab forces, the intended 
Jewish state made gains in territory beyond that assigned to it in the Partition Plan, 
while the projected Palestinian Arab state was never established.  Those areas not 
conquered by the Jewish forces came under the control of Jordan (the West Bank) and 
Egypt (the Gaza Strip).  Jerusalem was split under Israeli and Jordanian control. A huge 
proportion of the Palestinian Arab population of the area of central Palestine that 
became Israel was displaced and left as refugees, south to Gaza, east to the West Bank 
and Jordan, and north into Lebanon.59 The newly-established United Nations found 
itself obliged to create a special organ, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, 
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specifically to assist the displaced Palestinian population, most of whom were housed 
in makeshift refugee camps under UNRWA auspices, the majority in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. 
 
 The area of Transjordan had gradually acquired administrative autonomy 
through the Mandate period in Palestine. In 1946, Britain concluded a Treaty of 
Alliance with the Kingdom of Transjordan, and in 1948 a new treaty was signed, two 
months before the end of the Mandate. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan thus entered 
the 1948 conflict as a fully independent sovereign state.60 
 
 In July 1948, a ceasefire was agreed upon and the armistice concluded in April 
of the following year between Israel and Jordan left Israel in control of West Jerusalem 
and the larger part of Mandatory Palestine and Jordan holding East Jerusalem (the Old 
City) and the area of Palestine closest to Jordan not conquered by the Israelis - the West 
Bank of the River Jordan.61 From this time,  the West Bank was used as a territorial 
description, as distinct from the East Bank (of the Jordan) which constituted Jordan 
proper.  The remainder of Palestine, the Gaza Strip, came under Egyptian control 
during the war and was administered by the Egyptians until the 1967 war.62 
 
 The courts had stopped functioning during the war and the first steps taken in 
the administration of law in the West Bank by the Jordanians came in the form of 
military orders and proclamations.  As early as May 1948, a proclamation extended the 
1935 Defence Law of Jordan to the West Bank, and all laws and regulations in force in 
Palestine up to that date were declared as continuing in force unless they contradicted 
that Defence Law.63 In December 1948, notables from the West Bank, proclaiming a 
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representative capacity, met in Nablus and Jericho to invite King Abdullah of Jordan to 
annex the West Bank to his rule.64 Elections were held to send West Bank delegates to 
the Jordanian Assembly, which on 24/4/50 passed a resolution declaring the two banks 
as one state, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and guaranteeing the equality and 
rights of all citizens.  This integration of the two banks of the Jordan did not receive 
international recognition,65 but nevertheless was given internal constitutional effect by 
an enactment of August the same year, subjecting the West Bank including East 
Jerusalem to Jordanian law.  
 
 After the August enactment, laws in force before the union were declared as 
remaining  in force until repealed or amended, thus preserving Mandate laws and the 
military and temporary regulations issued during the two preceding years of military 
rule.66 In addition, a committee of lawyers and judges was set up to work towards 
unifying the laws of the two banks of the Jordan. Jordan, having had more autonomy in 
its internal affairs and having been more separated from the Mandate authority, was 
still governed largely by Ottoman legal tradition, with less British (or English) 
influence and legislation than was the case in Palestine. The committee was responsible 
for the promulgation of various laws to cover both banks. Jordanian legislation came to 
cover most areas of penal, commercial and procedural law, with Ottoman law 
remaining in force in certain traditional areas. Isolated pieces of Mandatory legislation 
also remained; they were something of an anomaly in the Kingdom, sometimes in force 
on the West Bank but not valid on the  East Bank.67 
 
 Jordan ruled the West Bank until the war of 1967, much of the time under a 
state of emergency declared in 1956.68 The Jordanian Constitution of 1952 repealed the 
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1922 Palestine Order-in-Council and its amendments, although retaining laws enacted 
in accordance with it.69 Legislative power was vested in the National Assembly and the 
King. Executive power was vested in the King, who exercised it through his ministers. 
Judicial power was to be exercised by the various courts and all judgements were to be 
pronounced in the name of the King.70 
 
 Section VI of the Constitution, entitled ‘The Judiciary’, provides for three types 
of courts to be set up -- statute or regular courts (the Ottoman nizamiyya), religious 
courts (diniyya) and special tribunals.71 In accordance with these provisions, the Law 
on the Establishment of Regular Courts was promulgated in 1952, granting the regular 
courts jurisdiction over all persons in all civil and criminal matters except those under 
the jurisdiction of the religious courts or special tribunals.72  The shari`a courts retained 
their customary jurisdiction over Muslims but did not regain any of the former 
residuary jurisdiction of Ottoman times. The Jordanian Constitution specifies shari`a 
court jurisdiction as exclusive over questions of personal status where the parties are 
Muslims, issues of diya where the parties are Muslim, or one is a non-Muslim but both 
agree to shari`a court jurisdiction, and matters relating to Islamic waqf.73 The personal 
status of foreigners was to be dealt with in the regular courts under their own national 
law where such was customary.74 The qadis in the shari`a courts were to be appointed 
by the Jordanian Qadi al-Quda, whose status was that of a government minister, with 
the approval of the king.   
 
 The Law of Establishment of Shari`a Courts 1951 had made basically the same 
points as were reiterated in the Constitution, unifying the shari`a court system in the 
West Bank and Jordan, and establishing 24 shari`a courts of first instance (with a 
 63 
single qadi) of which eight were in the West Bank.  Occasional legislation in following 
years established additional courts in, for example, Bethlehem (1955) and Qalqiliya 
(1965).  Shari`a Courts of Appeal, consisting of a president and two members passing 
final decisions by a majority of votes, were convened at first in both Jerusalem and 
Amman, but in 1951 a law was passed providing for a single Shari`a Court of Appeal, 
based in Amman, although it might be convened in Jerusalem if the need arose.75 
Jerusalem thus lost the permanent Shari`a Court of Appeal situated there since the 
beginning of the Mandate. 
 
 The Jordanian Constitution also dealt with non-Muslim religious courts (majalis 
al-tawa’if) which were to proceed according to laws specially laid down for them.  The 
Constitution, and a later law of 1958 extending the 1938 Religious Councils Law of 
Transjordan to the West Bank, gave the ecclesiastical courts jurisdiction (not defined 
explicitly as exclusive or otherwise) in all matters of personal status, succession  and 
waqf for their community.  Personal status was to include the same issues in non-
Muslim religious courts as in the shari`a courts; this  represented a considerable 
widening of jurisdiction for the non-Muslim courts compared to Mandate times, 
although the word ‘exclusive’ does not appear.76 The Jordanians initially recognised 
five Christian denominations as having this jurisdictional competence.77 Jordan did not 
recognise rabbinical courts. 
 
 The Jordanian legislators stayed faithful to the Ottoman tradition by retaining 
Hanafi fiqh as the residual jurisprudence of the shari`a courts, although the population 
is generally held to be predominantly Shafi`i.78 The Law on the Establishment of 
Shari`a Courts instructs the shari`a  courts to make their decisions in accordance with 
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the most approved opinion of the Hanafi school, unless there exists a contrary provision 
of statutory law on the subject.79 
 
 The Jordanian legislators were prompt in their promulgation of an independent 
national code on marriage, divorce and associated matters, preceding a series of similar 
national codes by Arab states in the 1950s. The Jordanian Law of Family Rights 
(JLFR) was promulgated in 1951 for application in the shari`a courts. The JLFR was 
modelled fairly closely on the OLFR, but incorporated some of the Egyptian reforms of 
the intervening years, and added certain provisions of indigenous inspiration.   In 
procedural matters too, the 1959 Law on the Regulation of Shari`a Courts80 kept quite 
close to the Ottoman law of procedure that had been preserved in Palestine by the 
British. The Jordanians also issued a Criminal Code in 1951, replaced by a new law in 
1960;81 both codes included the by now standard penalties for offences against family 
law. 
 
 By the end of Jordanian rule, then, the shari`a courts in the West Bank were 
applying Jordanian codes of family law and procedure, and had seen the removal of the 
permanent Shari`a Court of Appeal that under the British had been situated in 
Jerusalem.  This court was to be re-established in Jerusalem under the unlikely 
circumstances of Israeli occupation. 
 All laws which were in force in the area on June 7th 1967 shall continue to be 
 in force as far as they do not contradict this or any other proclamation or order 
 made by me (the West Bank Military Commander) or conflict with the 
 changes arising by virtue of the occupation of the Israel Defence Forces of the 
 area.87 
 
 Chapter Four of Shehadeh's Occupier's Law examines in detail some of the 
‘changes arising’ in the legal system due to the Israeli occupation in the regular 
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(nizamiyya) court system.88 These have included the abolition of the Court of 
Cassation, the highest court in the four-tier Jordanian system, together with the 
additional functions carried out by its members, and the transfer of the Jerusalem Court 
of Appeal in the regular system to Ramallah. An Israeli Officer in charge of the 
Judiciary was appointed to whom were transferred all powers of the Jordanian Minister 
of Justice, and the Military Governor appointed a committee to whom passed the 
powers of the Judicial Council in appointing judges and public prosecutors; all court 
processes were required to take place and all decisions to be issued ‘in the name of law 
and justice’.  The Execution Departments attached to the local regular courts were put 
under the administration of the Israeli military authorities.89 
 
 Soon after the occupation, on 24/7/67, some twenty notable Muslim 
personalities in Jerusalem established a body called al-hay'a al- islamiyya (the Islamic 
Board) to administer Muslim affairs in the West Bank, in particular in East Jerusalem, 
in the absence of a Muslim sovereign. The body developed into al-hay'a al-islamiyya 
al-`uliya, the Supreme Islamic Board.  Kupferschmidt observes that this body was 
established as ‘an outspoken act of protest against the Israeli annexation of East 
Jerusalem’ and that the Israeli government ‘has therefore withheld any formal 
recognition.’90 
 
 The Acting Chief Islamic Justice, the Qadi al-Quda, became head of the 
Supreme Islamic Board and directly supervised the work of the shari`a courts still 
functioning under the indirect administration of Jordan, providing the link between the 
shar`i systems in Jordan and the West Bank. From the start, the shari`a court system 
was placed in a situation of some confrontation with the Israeli occupation authorities. 
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Although the Israeli authorities assumed all supervisory functions for the regular court 
system, the shar`i judiciary refused to accept confirmation of appointment or payment 
from the military authorities or to attach Israeli stamps to court documents. In East 
Jerusalem, the judges of the shari`a first instance court refused to countenance 
integration into the Israeli state system, which would involve their own appointment 
under the Israeli Qadis Law 1961 and the swearing of an oath of loyalty to the state of 
Israel.91 
 
 As it became clear that the occupation was not going to be removed in a matter 
of weeks or even months, the shar`i judiciary maintained their stand and the Israeli 
authorities extended the jurisdiction of the Israeli shari`a court of Jaffa to include East 
Jerusalem, in an attempt to preclude recourse to the Jerusalem court by the Muslim 
Palestinians resident in the annexed part of the city, and so to force compliance by the 
judges.  In August of 1969, instructions were issued to the Execution Offices of the 
West Bank not to execute decisions issued by the shari`a courts.92  This move aroused 
protests from the Palestinian judiciary as a whole. Just after the order was issued, a 
local Arabic newspaper reported that the magistrate, public prosecutor and head of 
Execution in Jericho, Zuhayr al-Bushtawi, had sent a memorandum to the Israeli Justice 
Affairs Officer, in which he stated his objection to the non-execution of shari`a court 
decisions.93 A few weeks later, the Magistrate of Hebron, Hussein ash-Shuyukhi, was 
reported by the same paper to have resigned in protest at:  
 the interference in the powers of the courts by the Israeli Officer in charge of 
 the Judiciary, and his insistence on preventing the Execution Departments of 
 the regular courts from executing the decisions of the shari`a courts.94 
 
Two articles published in the local newspaper al-Quds in April of 1970, one by a shar`i 
lawyer and one by a qadi in the shari`a courts, stressed that the principle behind the 
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stand being taken by the shar`i judiciary was its need for independence and for 
inviolability from the effects of transient political change. The first noted that even the 
British had not attempted to interfere politically in the shar`i judiciary; the second 
stressed that:  
 The political order must have no influence upon the work of the shari`a 
courts,  whatever the source be of such political motive:  for temporal politics has no 
 fixed constants...95 
 
 By the time the above articles were published, the newspapers had reported that 
some Execution Departments in the West Bank were in fact executing shari`a court 
decisions despite instructions to the contrary.96  Although in practice decisions of the 
shari`a courts in the West Bank, excluding Jerusalem, were in fact executed through  
the Execution Offices during the direct Israeli occupation, it is not clear whether there 
were any written instructions countermanding the original orders for non-execution. 
Meron is thus at least partly right when stating that: 
The judgements rendered by these Qadis could certainly not be executed 
by the official Execution Offices, were it not for the Military Governor's 
decision to honour these judgements...97 
 
  The authorities’ decision indicated a reluctance to force further confrontation 
with the shar`i judiciary and the Muslim community on this specific point, and there is 
no doubt some merit in Meron’s point made in partial explanation, that the Israeli 
authorities were used to the vestiges of the Ottoman millet system in Israel itself, 
rendering them more ready to take an ‘abdicatory’ attitude towards the jurisdiction of 
the religious courts.98 However, it is also the case that for the Israeli authorities there 
was little strategic economic or political advantage in directly controlling the courts 
dealing with personal status issues in the West Bank (apart of course from East 
Jerusalem) particularly as they had no independent means of execution.  In adminis-
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trative terms,  therefore, the position of the shari`a courts in the West Bank as 
described by al-Husseini in 1970 held good until the autumn of 1994: 
 [the shari`a courts] continue to be linked to His Excellency the Qadi al-Quda 
 and to the shar`i Judicial Council in Amman.... they  are all subject to the 
 terms  of ... the laws constituting the shari`a courts, and to the authority of the 
 Qadi al-Quda in their administration.99 
 
 After 1967, then, the West Bank qadis continued to be tested and appointed in 
Amman after recommendation by the Acting Qadi al-Quda in Jerusalem to the 
Jordanian shar`i Judicial Council.  In contrast to the Gaza Strip qadis, where the 
shari`a courts were under Israeli administration like the regular courts, the qadis in the 
West Bank were paid by the Jordanian authorities; court fees were sent to Amman via 
the Acting Qadi al-Quda in Jerusalem and were taken into account in the Amman 
financial reports of the Department of the Qadi al-Quda.100  Court fees were levied and 
collected in Jordanian currency only; Israeli shekels were not accepted. Judgements 
were issued in the name of the Jordanian king, in accordance with Article 27 of the 
Jordanian Constitution, and each separate ruling, or hukm, was entered under this 
formula in the court records.  Should the ruling be of a nature to need the services of an 
Execution Office, it was written out again under the heading ‘In the name of God, the 
Merciful, the Beneficent’, rather than the ‘law and justice’ formula used in the regular 
courts under the terms of Military Order 412.  Further, the Jordanian authorities 
established four new shari`a courts in the West Bank in the 1970s and 1980s.101 Within 
this picture of determined non-recognition of the occupation by the West Bank shari`a 
court system, and the apparent accommodation of this by the Israeli occupation 
authorities, there were both minor and more far-reaching effects on the system as a 
result of the occupation.  These effects are most obvious in the shari`a court in East 
Jerusalem. 
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2.5.2 The Shari`a court of East Jerusalem 
 
 Having refused integration into the Israeli state system, the judges and of the 
East Jerusalem  shari`a court saw their documents and rulings refused recognition by 
Israel courts, official offices and agencies -- what Yitzhak Reiter has described as 
policies based on ‘passive non-recognition of the Shari`a Court system in Jerusalem’102  
and a concerted effort to have Palestinian Muslims of East Jerusalem repair to the 
Israeli shari`a court of Jaffa as much as possible. In the spring of 1968, the Jaffa 
shari`a court dealt directly with the conflicting jurisdictions in a claim raised by an East 
Jerusalem Muslim applying for the lifting of an order for attachment (hajz) placed upon 
his person by the East Jerusalem court in 1949 at the application of the defendants.103 
The plaintiff's lawyer argued his claim on the  basis of the Israeli Law of Legal 
Competence and Guardianship of 1962, which he noted had repealed all provisions 
relating to the attachment of  property on the grounds of a person's ‘profligacy’ or 
‘squandering’.  The original attachment order had been given on these grounds under 
Jordanian law.104 
 
 The defendant's lawyer argued for dismissal of the claim or its transfer to the 
East Jerusalem shari`a court, on the grounds of non-competence.  He claimed that the 
case should be heard by the same court that had placed the attachment order on the 
plaintiff, and challenged the administrative measures that had extended the Jaffa court's 
jurisdiction to East Jerusalem.  
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 As to the question of competence, the plaintiff's lawyer submitted that the East 
Jerusalem qadis were not properly appointed judges under Israeli law.  He referred to 
the Israeli Law of Shari`a Courts 1953 and the Israeli Qadis Law 1961, which detailed 
the methods of appointment of qadis,  including the oath of allegiance to the state 
(Article 7 of the 1961 Law)  and the publishing of appointments in the Israeli Official 
Gazette. Since the East Jerusalem qadis had gone through none of these procedures, he 
submitted that they could not be considered judges under the law.105 The Jaffa qadi 
agreed with this argument, while also accepting the plaintiff's submission regarding the 
extension of the Jaffa court's jurisdiction: 
 Since its establishment on 19 November 1950, the Jaffa shari`a court has 
 exercised jurisdiction in personal status matters for Jaffa and the Southern 
 Region including Jerusalem; adding a part to the whole does not require the 
 granting of new authority. 
 
 Only the person legally appointed by the Israeli authorities to fulfill the function 
of judge could decide such claims, and hence, the court stated,  
 No person or court in the eastern part of Jerusalem has the right to hear 
 personal status claims according to the laws of the land: the Jaffa shari`a court 
 is the court holding jurisdiction over such claims arising in East Jerusalem. 
 
 This decision was given In July 1968, a little over a year after the annexation of 
East Jerusalem.  On 26 September, a ‘Shar`i Statement’ was issued in East Jerusalem in 
response to the Jaffa decision under the signatures of the Acting Qadi al-Quda, eight 
West Bank qadis and three West Bank Muftis, ‘proclaiming the will of the Muslims in 
the protection of their rights, the independence of their judges and the administration of 
their religious affairs...’ The statement quoted from the Jaffa decision, stating that it 
relied on laws imposed by the Israeli authorities in violation of the terms of the shari`a. 
It drew attention to the threat being posed to the rights of the Muslim community in 
East Jerusalem, noting that they would be subject to legislative provisions that were  
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binding on them neither in statutory nor shar`i terms.  The condemnation of the Jaffa 
decision and of the Israeli policies behind it was supported by references to 
international law, including the Hague Regulations, and to UN resolutions from the 
previous year refusing to recognise the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem. Tracing 
the history of the Jerusalem shari`a court back to ancient times, the Statement stressed 
the continuity of authority from which it derived its competence, and noted: 
 At no time in our history, even under the British Mandate, has any ruler 
 interfered with the independence of the shar`i  judiciary in our land, or given 
 themselves the right to appoint Muslim qadis:  all have left that to the 
 Muslims, and acknowledged their rights to independence in their jurisdiction 
 and in the administration of Islamic waqf and Muslim holy places...106 
 
 This statement did not elicit the desired response from the Israeli authorities, 
and two months later a local Arabic newspaper reported the failure of contacts between 
various Israeli governmental departments and Islamic groupings in Jerusalem aimed at 
finding a solution to the problem.107 That those attempts had also failed to find an 
answer to the human problems involved is illustrated by the following extract from an 
‘Open Letter’ published in a local newspaper in 1970.  The letter was signed by ‘A 
Citizen of Arab Jerusalem’ and was addressed to the Israeli Minister of Religious 
Affairs; it described the difficulties faced by some East Jerusalem bridegrooms: 
 
 When a son of Arab Jerusalem wants to get married, he goes to the 
 departments of the shari`a court in the city for the shar`i qadi to process the 
 marriage.  When this is over, he heads for the (Israeli) Interior Ministry to get 
 himself registered as married. The Interior Ministry, however, refuses to 
 acknowledge this contract because it has been issued by the shari`a court in 
 Arab Jerusalem, and they tell him to go to the shar`i judge in Jaffa or some 
 other qadi in Israel...  So off he goes to one of these judges to ask for a new 
 contract to be written out. The qadi starts things off by asking for shar`i proof 
 in order to complete the contract.  The bridegroom presents the evidence to the 
 qadi, who then refuses the Quranic contract when he learns that the bride is 
 under 17 years of age, saying that the law in Israel does not permit the 
 ma'dhun (marriage notary) to marry a girl under 17....and this is where the 
 problems really start!  What is to be done?  The groom is married and a child 
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 is on the way, but he can't register the child in his Identity Card, and he can't 
 get a birth certificate for it...108 
 
 Several of the aspects of the situation under discussion are raised by this letter.  
Firstly, there is the introduction of state-issued territorial (not communal) legal 
provisions into the law applied by the shari`a courts in Israel; secondly, there is the 
non-recognition of any document issued by the Jerusalem shari`a court on the part of 
the Israeli authorities; and thirdly there is the burden of double recourse. These last two 
points are referred to in the following paragraph taken from the Reply to the above 
Open Letter from a Spokesman for the Ministry of Religion, published a week later in 
the same paper: 
 It is natural that the Israeli Ministry of the Interior should not recognise  
 marriage certificates still bearing the name of the Hashemite King of Jordan 
 and verified by a shari`a court that will not cooperate with government 
 institutions, despite the fact that nearly three years have passed since the city 
 of Jerusalem was unified.  Instead, they carry on as if nothing has changed, 
 caring nothing for the alterations in the affairs of Muslims and doing nothing 
 to help them avoid difficulties...109 
 
 This reply purported to correct the Open Letter in stating that for an East 
Jerusalem marriage to be recognised by the Interior Ministry it was not necessary for 
the whole marriage to be done again, only for the marriage to be proved before the 
Jaffa court. This might be misleading, as a claim to prove an existing marriage would in 
any case necessitate the presence of both parties, or of one partner and witnesses, in the 
Jaffa court, as opposed to a simple ratification of the Jerusalem contract which could be 
secured by the efforts of the groom alone. The claim in any case would be subject to 
fees in the Israeli court, just as the contract was subject to fees in the Jerusalem court, 
in addition to the costs involved in the transport of spouses and/or witnesses to Jaffa. 
The Israeli government’s answer to this problem was to encourage the Muslims 
involved to avoid the Jerusalem court altogether, as shown by the Spokesman’s  reply:  
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 These difficulties can be avoided if those wishing to marry go to one of the 
 two marriage notaries appointed by the Jaffa court in unified Jerusalem... 
 
 Later on, the Israeli authorities considered establishing a permanent branch of 
the Jaffa shari`a court in Jerusalem: in 1973 it was reported that the Jaffa qadi was to 
head the branch.110 Less than two months later, however, the same paper reported that 
the Israeli government had revoked that decision and was considering, as an alternative, 
the possibility of having the decisions of the East Jerusalem court recognised by the 
Execution Offices.111 It also reported the Israeli Justice Ministry to be considering 
recognising the Supreme Islamic Board as the sole body responsible for appointments 
and promotions of shar`i judges in Jerusalem and the West Bank. However, as with 
other attempts to find solutions to the situation, these suggestions came to nothing. 
 
 In the 1980s, moves by the Israeli authorities concentrated again on setting up a 
shari`a court in Jerusalem, although this time the Minister of Religious Affairs decided 
to set up a new Israeli shari`a court in the city, rather than just a branch of the Jaffa 
court. A statement issued in response to this proposal by the late Shaykh Sa`ad ad-Din 
al-`Alami, then Acting Qadi al-Quda and head of the Supreme Islamic Board, was 
published on 11 February 1985 in al-Sha`ab newspaper, calling on the Israeli minister 
to revoke his decision and instead to recognise and execute the decisions issued by the 
shari`a court in East Jerusalem.  Shaykh Sa`ad ad-Din went on to deplore the burden of 
double recourse and duplicate fees borne by East Jerusalem Muslims, which could be 
removed by recognition of the East Jerusalem court.  Perhaps the clearest proof that 
little had changed since 1967 lay in the reference Shaykh Sa`ad ad-Din made to the 
‘Shar`i Statement’ of 1968, of which large parts were quoted in the 1985 article, 
showing that for the shar`i judiciary,  the arguments therein stood unchanged.  
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Nevertheless, in April 1988, Radio Israel announced that a shari`a court had been 
established in West Jerusalem; Reiter refers to this as the Jaffa court which moved to a 
West Jerusalem location.112 
 
 Besides being subject to conflicting jurisdiction and duplicate court fees, the 
East Jerusalem Muslim Palestinians are also subject to conflicting legislation. In his 
Reply to the Open Letter quoted above, the Israeli Spokesman for the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs had exhorted the ma'dhuns appointed by the Jerusalem shari`a court 
to: 
 remember, when they are going about their tasks in Jerusalem, which is in 
 Israel, that Israeli law does not allow girls under 17 to marry, and that every 
 action in contravention of (that law) is going to create problems for those who 
 use their services. 
 
 The difference in the age of capacity for marriage is only one of the ways in 
which personal status law as applied in the shari`a courts in Israel differs from that 
applied in the Jerusalem court and the rest of the West Bank.  In 1970, when the Open 
Letter was published, the Jerusalem court was applying the provisions of the Jordanian 
Law of Family Rights of 1951, which gave the ages of full capacity for marriage as 
eighteen and seventeen for males and female respectively, but allowed females aged 
fifteen to seventeen and males aged fifteen to eighteen to marry with the permission of 
the qadi, on proof of sufficient maturity and physical development. The Israeli Age of 
Marriage Law 1950, on the other hand, imposed a criminal penalty on persons involved 
in the marriage of a girl under the age of seventeen.113 While the Israeli law did not 
actually invalidate the marriage if it was recognised by the parties' personal law, it 
could be made the grounds for dissolution on application by the girl, her parents or 
 75 
guardians or a Social Affairs employee, although such dissolution did not cause the 
penalty to lapse.114 
 
 The Open Letter thus describes the situation facing East Jerusalem Muslim 
Palestinians: a marriage that would be both shar`i and legal in the East Jerusalem court 
might expose the male parties involved to a criminal penalty if referred to the Jaffa 
court. Problems would obviously arise if the relationship proved problematic: the 
young wife, for example, unable to have recourse to the Jaffa court, would have her 
case (for example for dower) heard in Jerusalem and would be unable to get it executed 
through formal channels.  While the possibility of claiming  'special circumstances' to 
effect an under-age marriage does exist under Israeli law, Layish found ‘no indication 
that Muslims availed themselves of this opportunity’. He continues that ‘Muslims 
preferred in such circumstances to obtain a marriage confirmation, or at any rate not to 
have recourse to a civil court.’115  Layish here is talking about Muslims inside  Israel, 
but the statement would also apply to East Jerusalem Muslims. The proof of marriage 
would be carried out at Jaffa when the bride was of legal age according to Israeli law. 
In this regard, Layish notes for the three years up to 1970: 
 
 About a third of the approximately 100 marriage confirmations issued by the 
 Qadi of  Jaffa to residents of East Jerusalem (the city and the villages in its  
 area of jurisdiction) were clear cases of offences against the Age of Marriage 
 Law or of reasonable suspicion in such offences.116 
 
 Another and rather sharper distinction between the laws applied in the shari`a 
court of East Jerusalem and that of Jaffa is on the subject of polygyny. Neither the 1951 
Jordanian law nor its replacement in 1976 placed any legally enforceable restrictions on 
polygyny, while in Israel it is a criminal offence.117 A polygynous union would be valid 
under the law applied in the East Jerusalem court  but could not be registered in the 
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Jaffa court and might lead to prosecution should it be discovered.  Reiter noted forty 
polygynous marriages registered in the East Jerusalem shari`a court in 1975; Ayyush 
found a total of 475 over the period 1973-1983.118 This gives rise to the same potential 
problems regarding recourse to legal remedy and execution that apply to marriages to 
girls underage by Israeli law.  In his discussion of polygyny, Layish notes that in one 
case the Jaffa qadi registered the proof of a polygynous union between Palestinians 
from East Jerusalem, taking care to indicate that the marriage had been concluded 
before 1967 and therefore before Israeli law was applied to the area.  He notes nine 
convictions on the charge of polygyny for the year 1969, but gives no details on where 
those nine were resident, so it is not clear whether East Jerusalem Palestinians were 
involved.119 It is however possible that while the  Israeli authorities refuse to afford any 
recognition to documents issued by the East Jerusalem shari`a court, a marriage 
contract issued there for a polygynous union might be used as a basis for a criminal 
prosecution in the Israeli courts, although Reiter notes that it is rare that a formal 
complaint is registered.120 
 
 These and other differences in the law applied in Israel and imposed by the 
Israeli authorities on the Muslim Palestinians of East Jerusalem are not accepted by the 
Palestinian shar`i judiciary in East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank. They are 
challenged on the grounds of being non-shar`i both in content and by dint of being 
issued by a legislature not empowered to issue rules for shari`a courts, besides the issue 
of illegal annexation.121 
 
 The original instructions for the non-execution of decisions from shari`a courts 
appear to have applied, as noted above, to all the shari`a courts in the West Bank, 
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including the East Jerusalem first instance court and the shari`a Court of Appeal.  
While the Execution Offices did however go back to executing decisions from the rest 
of the shari`a courts of first instance, there was no official execution through the 
normal channels of rulings from the Jerusalem shari`a court following the order issued 
in 1969.  This can be seen from the statistics used by Meron in his article on the 
religious courts in the West Bank; the statistics are drawn from the Execution Offices in 
the West Bank and list the number of decisions issued by each one and the shari`a 
court where the decision originated.  The list of courts does not include Jerusalem, 
although Jaffa is listed.122 
  
 However, there were times when decisions issued by the Jerusalem court did 
obtain execution by some informal means or other, shown inter alia by the circulation 
in 1985 of a memorandum to the West Bank Execution Offices reminding them of the 
instructions on the non-execution of rulings from the East Jerusalem shari`a court.  
Following this, the Jerusalem court was unable to obtain execution of its decisions 
other than through voluntary compliance.  
 
 The problems in obtaining execution also affected some Palestinians living in 
some areas outside the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem as specified by the Israeli 
authorities in 1967.  However, whereas Palestinian Muslims resident inside those 
boundaries had the option of recourse to the Jaffa court where decisions can obtain 
execution, Palestinians carrying West Bank identity cards could not raise claims in 
Jaffa.  These Palestinians were at the same time subject to the Ramallah or Bethlehem 
military and nizamiyya jurisdictions in other areas of litigation. This situation arose 
because certain outlying areas of the Jerusalem District, as it was under Jordan, were 
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not included in the area of Jerusalem annexed by the Israeli authorities in 1967, but 
were administratively transferred to the Ramallah or Bethlehem districts for regular 
court and military court jurisdiction.123 However, since the (Jordanian-specified) 
jurisdiction of the shari`a courts did not recognise any change, they remained subject to 
the Jerusalem shari`a court. This would result in non-execution of rulings if the claim 
had to be raised in a particular court, as specified in the Jordanian Law of Shar`i 
Procedure, and if that court happened to be Jerusalem. 
 
 The reverse, of course, also applied:  decisions from a West Bank shari`a court 
could not be executed in Jerusalem; a resident of the West Bank would not be able to 
execute an award made in a West Bank court against a spouse resident in East 
Jerusalem or in Israel. Those entitled and willing to go to the Jaffa court could however 
have their decisions executed through the Israeli-administered West Bank Execution 
Offices against a spouse resident there. The only place that decisions of East Jerusalem 
could be executed was on the East Bank of the Jordan. Yet another quirk in this 
complicated state of affairs lay in the fact that decisions issued in the Israeli-
administered shari`a courts of the occupied Gaza Strip had to be be verified in the East 
Jerusalem court if they were to obtain recognition and/or execution in Jordan. 
 
 Obviously, not all documents or decisions of the shari`a courts actually need 
execution procedures.  Till the time of writing, East Jerusalem Muslim Palestinians 
entitled to go to the Jaffa court may well do so where there is a need for execution in 
Jerusalem for example, or where they need a document acceptable to the Israeli 
authorities; otherwise, they continue to have recourse to the East Jerusalem court if they 
do not need execution, or if for example they require recognition of the document in 
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Jordan. Reiter found that an examination of the records of the East Jerusalem and Jaffa 
courts in 1987 ‘illustrates that there are very few Muslims who approach only one of 
the two shari`a courts.’124 This is probably still the case and likely to remain so until 
determination of the fate of city and its Palestinian population in the final status 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. 
 
2.5.3 The Shari`a Court of Appeal in East Jerusalem 
 
 
 In 1951, Jerusalem lost the permanent appeal court that operated there 
throughout the Mandate period when the Jordanian Regulation of the Shari`a Court of 
Appeal provided that: 
 There shall be one Appeal Court in the Kingdom for all the  shari`a courts, 
 with its headquarters in Amman: it may convene in Jerusalem when 
 necessary.125 
 
 After the 1967 war, the shar`i judiciary in the West Bank was cut off from the 
Shari`a Appeal Court in Amman, and the same Muslim notables who formed 
themselves into the Supreme Islamic Board also organised a Shari`a Court of Appeal in 
Jerusalem along the lines laid down in Jordanian law but made up of West Bank qadis 
under the presidency of the Acting Qadi al-Quda.126 The measures taken against the 
shari`a court of first instance in Jerusalem, and to a lesser extent in the rest of the West 
Bank, also included this Court of Appeal. Meron, writing in 1982, notes ‘some 
hesitation’ as to the authority of the Shari`a Court of Appeal as a result of the 
administrative order of August 1969 ordering the Execution Offices in the West Bank 
not to execute rulings from the shari`a courts, and continues: 
 This measure was probably the result of the refusal of the Qadis in Jerusalem 
 to accept nomination under the Israeli Qadis Law of 1961, thus denying 
 validity to proceedings held and decisions given by them...Later, however, the 
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 administrative order was amended so as not to apply to the Moslem Court of 
 Appeal in Jerusalem.127 
 
 In practice, in the years following 1967, an Appeal Court decision would be 
returned to the first instance shari`a court where the appealed decision originated, 
where it was written out and submitted to the Execution Office in the relevant West 
Bank town as ‘having reached the stage of a final decision’ without reference to the 
Shari`a Court of Appeal in East Jerusalem.128 
 
 In statutory terms, the Jerusalem Shari`a Appeal Court had no basis in 
Jordanian law for some ten years, although the Jordanian authorities were appointing its 
members for some years before they made the Jerusalem Appeal Court a fact in law as 
well as in practice. The delay was probably due to political reservations on the 
implications of this, but finally in 1977 the Jordanian authorities issued the Shari`a 
Courts of Appeal Regulation (no.20/1977) which repealed the 1951 Regulation 
stipulating Amman as the permanent seat and provided that ‘A Shari`a Court of Appeal 
shall be constituted in both Amman and Jerusalem.’129 Article 3 of the Regulation 
provided that the Amman Appeal Court would deal with decisions issued by the shari`a 
courts in the East Bank and the one in Jerusalem with those from the West Bank. The 
Regulation thus provided a statutory basis for a situation that had prevailed in practice 
since the 1967 occupation. 
 
 The existence of two Shari`a Courts of Appeal brought about the possibility of 
conflicting appeal judgements for the two areas; the Regulation made no provision as to 
whether the rulings of one court should prevail in such circumstances, and it is to be 
assumed that each area would follow the rulings of the local appeal court. In practice, 
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the collected Amman decisions were freely quoted in West Bank courts, together with 
decisions from the Jerusalem court. 
 
 One area where the two Appeal Courts can be seen to have taken contradictory 
stands and where the Jerusalem decision might be seen in light of the circumstances of 
occupation (despite denial of such influence by the Jerusalem judges) is that of 
compensation for arbitrary talaq. The provision for such compensation came post-
occupation, introduced in the Jordanian Law of Personal Status  of 1976 and thus in 
effect only for a matter of months before the separate jurisdictions of the two Appeal 
Courts were formalised in law. The key ruling issued by the Jerusalem Appeal Court in 
this matter originated in a 1984 case in the Ramallah first instance shari`a court when a 
woman submitted a claim for compensation for a talaq pronounced by her husband in 
1983.  The divorce, a second revocable talaq, became final on the termination of her 
`idda without revocation of the talaq.  Both the claimant and her ex-husband were 
residents of  Beit `Anan, a village which had been within the jurisdiction of Jerusalem 
before 1967 but was transferred by the Israelis outside the annexed area to the 
jurisdiction of Ramallah. Thus, the residents of the village came under the Ramallah 
military and regular courts, and carried West Bank identity cards, but were subject to 
the Jerusalem shari`a court for personal status matters.   
 
 The ex-husband's lawyer sought dismissal of the woman’s claim on the grounds 
that the man was resident within the shar`i jurisdiction of Jerusalem. He quoted Article 
3(5) of the Jordanian Law of Shar`i Procedure to detail those claims that might be 
heard in any court without regard for the residence of the defendant: ‘All courts have 
the right to assess maintenance..(and) to hear applications for custody, fees for suckling 
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and accommodation.’ These claims constitute an exception from the general rule laid 
down in the same article, that claims are to be heard in the shari`a court with 
jurisdiction over the area where the respondent lives; the exceptions do not include 
compensation. The qadi of Ramallah agreed that, technically, his court was not 
competent to hear the claim, which belonged in Jerusalem, but pointed out that if the 
claim were heard in Jerusalem, formal execution of any award that might be given 
would be impossible.  He therefore held that the Ramallah court was able to hear the 
claim in order to avoid injury to the woman, ‘in view of the circumstances of 
occupation and the impossibility of executing decisions of the Jerusalem shari`a court.’ 
The Ramallah qadi went on to award the woman compensation and the ex-husband 
appealed. The Shari`a Court of Appeal in Jerusalem held that the Ramallah court was 
indeed competent to hear the compensation claim, but had taken the correct decision for 
the wrong reasoning: claims for compensation, said the Appeal Court, had the 
characteristics of maintenance awards and thus fell within the terms of the above-
quoted article of the Law of Shar`i Procedure and, like maintenance claims, could be 
heard in any court.130 
 
 Besides the implications of treating compensation like maintenance, the Jeru-
salem Appeal Court with this decision established a principle entirely contrary to the 
one previously established by at least four appeal decisions in Amman on the same 
subject and dating back to 1978.  These state: 
 The shari`a court has no competence to consider a claim for compensation for 
 arbitrary talaq if the respondent is not resident in its area of jurisdiction and 
 the claim is defended on that basis.131 
 
 Obviously, had this principle by the Amman court been acted upon in Jerusa-
lem, the Ramallah court would have been held not competent and the case transferred 
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to the court of the husband's residence - Jerusalem, leaving execution of whatever 
award was made to the goodwill of the husband.  The three Amman decisions 
establishing the Jordanian principle are  published in the collected decisions of the 
Appeal Court;  the contrary Jerusalem judgement can be seen as an example of 
consideration being made of the practical circumstances occasioned by the Israeli 
occupation in laying down principles for the West Bank.  However, the text of the 
decision itself explicitly denies any such consideration. Whatever the Appeal Court's 
motivation, its reasoning amounts to a novel procedural interpretation of a question of 
substantive law. 
 
 The insistence of the Jerusalem court that its decision in the compensation case 
was not prompted by consideration of the circumstances of occupation was upheld 
shortly after the above case in another claim raised in Ramallah which ended up in the 
Appeal Court.132 The residential circumstances of the parties involved led to a similar 
situation as that described above: while the woman was a resident of a refugee camp in 
the district of Bethlehem, the man was resident in an area in the shar`i jurisdiction of 
Jerusalem but according to the Israelis under Ramallah military and regular jurisdiction. 
 
 The woman was claiming her deferred dower after the termination of her `idda 
from a talaq in 1983. The ex-husband's lawyer defended the claim on the grounds that 
the Ramallah court was not competent to hear the claim, as dower was in the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the area of the respondent's residence - that is, in the shar`i system, 
Jerusalem.  The woman's lawyer quoted two Appeal Court decisions to argue for 
consideration of the claim in Ramallah: the above Jerusalem precedent on 
compensation, and another case from the Amman Appeal Court which had established 
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the principle that the first instance shari`a court in Amman could hear a claim for ta`a 
(obedience) even though the defendant (the wife) was resident in Jerusalem ‘because of 
the circumstances of occupation and the capture of the (West) Bank’ which meant that 
the husband, not allowed by the Israelis to cross the bridge into the West Bank, was 
unable to present his claim in Jerusalem where the wife was resident.133 
 
 In the claim for deferred dower, the Ramallah qadi agreed with the arguments 
and precedents submitted by the woman’s lawyer, rejected the man’s defence, and held 
that the Ramallah court was competent to hear the claim, 
 given that the present occupation has prevented the execution of the decisions 
 of the Jerusalem shari`a court, which would cause injury to the claimant ... 
 and that the shari`a does not accept injury (to be caused by law) and that there 
 are precedents for this decision... 
 
 Following the award of deferred dower to the woman, the husband's lawyer 
appealed in Jerusalem on his original grounds and this time the Jerusalem Shari`a 
Appeal Court agreed with the arguments of  lack of competence.  The court stated that 
the principle of the compensation decision could not be applied to the present case, as 
deferred dower was not comparable with maintenance and had none of its 
characteristics: unlike compensation, it was not calculated in terms of maintenance, nor 
was it paid in installments. The court also declared that the Amman principle in the ta`a 
case was not applicable to the circumstances of the present case as there was no 
physical obstacle preventing the wife from submitting her claim in Jerusalem, where 
the husband was resident. The decision did not discuss the obstacles posed by the 
occupation, which would prevent the wife obtaining formal execution of her award 
from the shari`a court of  first instance in Jerusalem. 
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 The two cases in the Jerusalem Court of Appeal discussed above thus involved 
the same arguments by both sets of lawyers, with the Court accepting the appeal in the 
dower case and rejecting it in the case of compensation by virtue of an original 
interpretation of the nature of compensation.  As noted above, the compensation case is 
something of an exception in that it constitutes a contrary position to that taken in 
Amman: but a proper assessment of all the ways in which the Jerusalem Appeal Court 
did or did not adapt its rulings to take account of the occupation would require a 
systematic study of all the rulings made there after 1967. 
 
2.5.4 Shari`a courts outside East Jerusalem 
 In terms of the laws applied, the shari`a system in the West Bank stood as an 
exception to the regular courts, where all Jordanian laws in force were frozen in their 
pre-occupation state, and where the only post-1967 legislation applicable was the huge 
body of Israeli military orders.  The residents of the West Bank were thus deprived of 
the benefits of modifications to Jordanian legislation and of new legislation introduced 
after the occupation, including the 1976 Jordanian Civil Code, which repealed large 
parts of the nineteenth century Ottoman Majalla. However, the same year, 1976, saw 
the promulgation in Amman of the Jordanian Law of Personal Status, replacing the 
Jordanian Law of Family Rights of 1951. The JLPS was applied in the West Bank 
shari`a courts as a matter of course.  The same applied to other laws, modifications and 
regulations in the shar`i system promulgated in Jordan after 1967, including the Law of 
Establishment of Shari`a Courts of 1972 (replacing the original 1950 version) and its 
more recent amendments; two Laws of 1980 Amending the Law of Shar`i Procedure 
1959; a 1979 modification to the 1952 Shar`i Advocates' Law; and of course the 1977 
Shari`a Appeal Courts Regulation. 
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 However, the shari`a courts in the West Bank were obviously faced with 
challenges arising from the social and economic effects of the occupation on those 
under their jurisdiction.  One example is the number of persons who are classed, for 
purposes of a shari`a court hearing, as ‘of unknown whereabouts’. Under the Law of 
Shar`i Procedure, in the normal process of notification for a court session, the relevant 
papers would be sent to the shari`a court with jurisdiction in the area where the 
respondent to be notified is resident;134 if the person is believed to be in the locality, the 
notice may be displayed in the court building and in the last known place of residence 
or work. Other lawful methods include sending the notification to the governmental 
department or company where the person is employed, or to the prison governor if the 
person is in prison. After 1967,  however, in the West Bank, direct liaison and therefore 
formal communications with Jordan were obstructed by the fact of the occupation: 
anybody physically outside the West Bank was for notification purposes ‘of unknown 
whereabouts’. This included anybody living in Jordan; in Israel, since there was no 
liaison with the shari`a courts in Israel; in  the Gaza Strip, unless the qadi there 
responded to a personal letter from a West Bank qadi (thus avoiding any liaison with 
the Israeli authorities administering the shari`a courts in the Strip); and, it seems, 
anybody held in an Israeli prison in the West Bank on a ‘security’ charge, since this 
would involve going through the military authorities. In 1980, a modification to the 
Law of Shar`i Procedure added the following clause: 
 if the person [to be notified] is resident outside the Kingdom and the court is 
 satisfied that notification is not possible through the appropriate official 
 parties, then the court may carry out notification by publication in a local 
 newspaper.135 
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 Finally, another effect of the occupation lay in the fact that the West Bank 
shari`a courts no longer transferred the files of those in violation of provisions of 
family law to the criminal courts for prosecution.  The  Jordanian Penal Code of 1960 
sets penalties for certain offences arising from family law, such as non-registration of a 
talaq pronounced out of court, or involvement in the marriage of an under-age woman.  
Before the occupation, if such an offence came to light during proceedings in the 
shari`a court, the court would transfer the papers of the case to the regular court system 
in order for a criminal prosecution to take place if appropriate.  However, while the 
regular courts were under the administration of the Israeli military authorities, the non-
liaison policy maintained by the shari`a courts meant that this official process was 
suspended. It is not clear how far this may have affected the intended deterrent effect of 
the penal legislation.136 
 
 December 1987 saw the beginning of the intifada, the uprising in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, which had a profound effect on the community. Amongst other 
direct effects, women were widely mobilised into political and practical action by, inter 
alia, the detention of massive numbers of the male population and the need to create 
workable socio-economic and political structures in the face of the reprisals, repression 
and widescale collective penalties imposed by the military authorities.137 Some of these 
effects were felt in areas directly related to Islamic family law:  Warnock reports that 
dower was ‘increasingly being seen as a burdensome custom and incompatible with  
belief in the equality of women’, so that a reduction in levels of dower could be seen as 
a political act as well as a response to the severely straitened economic situation in the 
territories.138 The extent to which such patterns actually affected gender relations within 
Palestinian society and might be sustained post-intifada, and indeed post-independence, 
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is a matter of quite immediate significance, as will be considered at the end of this 
study. The work of the shari`a courts was also directly affected by the uprising: in 
particular, the first few years saw a sharp drop in the number of claims filed at court, 
perhaps prompted partly by a reluctance to initiate litigation under such circumstances 
(a sense of ‘priorities’) and partly by the fact that the execution of rulings from the 
courts was subjected to severe disruption,139 as indeed was the work of the courts and 
society at large. 
 
 In July 1988, not yet a year into the uprising, King Hussein of Jordan 
announced the formal severance of administrative ties between Jordan and the West 
Bank.140 Enabling legislation followed: on 7 August 1988, Regulation no.28 dissolved 
all Jordanian governmental departments and institutions in the West Bank, with the 
explicit exception of the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs and the Department of 
the Qadi al-Quda, the latter being the department administering the shari`a courts.141 
The Executive Committee of the Palestine National Council subsequently issued a 
decision declaring the Palestine National Council to be the Palestinian legislative 
authority; all laws and orders in force until the date of Jordan's severance of ties were to 
remain in force until repealed or amended by that legislative authority.142 In November, 
the nineteenth session of the Palestine National Council, meeting in Algiers, issued the 
Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine.143 
 
 On the ground, these developments were an important part of the lead-up to the 
bilateral peace negotiations that began in Madrid in 1991 and resulted in September 
1993 with the White House Lawn handshake between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin 
formally launching the ‘interim’ or ‘transitional’ phase of the Oslo peace process. In 
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May 1994, the signing of the Israel-PLO Gaza-Jericho Agreement and entry of PLO 
forces paved the way for Yasser Arafat’s triumphal return to Gaza to head the 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA), and for the incremental transfer from the Israeli 
occupation authorities to the PA a range of civil functions and responsibilities including 
administration of the regular (nizamiyya) and shari`a court system and the Execution 
Offices in the territorial areas submitted to their jurisdiction by this and the subsequent 
Interim Agreement.144 
 
2.6 The Shari`a Court System and the Palestinian Authority 
 
 On 20 May 1994, Yasser Arafat issued a decree from Tunis (where the PLO had 
been headquartered since its exit from Beirut in the summer of 1982) ordering that ‘all 
regular, shari`a and sectarian courts, at their respective levels, shall continue their 
functions in accordance with the laws and regulations that are in force’ and confirming 
existing judges in their positions.145 Also from Tunis, Arafat appointed Shaykh 
Muhammad Abu Sardane as Wakil (junior minister, or under-secretary of state) to the 
Minister of Justice within the Palestinian Authority for the affairs of the shar`i judiciary 
and ifta.146 Arriving in the Gaza Strip in August to take up his position, Shaykh 
Muhammad Abu Sardane set about upgrading the shar`i system both quantitatively -- 
according to his own claims doubling the number of  employees in the shar`i system in 
the first ten months -- and qualitatively, with requirements for training and promotion 
involving academic and professional qualifications.147 He cancelled the stamps used 
during the Israeli occupation in the shari`a courts of Gaza and replaced them with 
stamps bearing the standard of the PNA.148 He directed the design and production of 
over two dozen standard document forms for use in the shari`a courts of both the West 
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Bank and Gaza, including those on which are registered deeds (hujaj) of talaq, increase 
or decrease in dower, khul` divorce, revocation of talaq, freedom from impediments (to 
marry) and others.149 He supported a petition from the people of Bani Suhaila in the 
Gaza Strip to open a shari`a court there, a petition which was granted by Arafat and the 
court duly opened.150 
 
 In the West Bank, however, the affairs of the Palestinian shar`i judiciary did not 
progress so smoothly. Relations between the PNA and Jordan were increasingly 
strained. Less than 24 hours after the 1993 Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles 
was signed at the White House, Jordan and Israel had signed a Common Agenda, 
followed in July 1994 by the Washington Declaration signed between King Hussein 
and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, declaring an end to the state of war that had 
existed between their two countries for 46 years. The Washington Declaration included 
a paragraph emphasising that:  
 Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 
 Muslim Holy Shrines in Jerusalem.  When negotiations on the permanent status 
 will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in 
 these shrines...151 
 
 Palestinian sensitivities over the status of Jerusalem were inflamed by the 
implication that Jordan might be involved at Israel’s insistence in the ‘final status 
negotiations’ in regard to the future status of the city, the east side of which the 
Palestinian side had always insisted was to be the capital of the future Palestinian state. 
Jordanian officials protested in defence of their ‘traditional role’ in safeguarding 
Muslim religious sites in the city; King Hussein was quoted as saying that ‘Palestine is 
for its people. However, the holy sites are for the Islamic nation as a whole’ and as 
being embittered at the attitude taken towards Jordan’s historic role.152 Figures were 
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cited indicating the extent of the financial investment that Jordan had made in this 
special role since 1948.153 The Council of the Arab League insisted that Jerusalem 
should be under Palestinian sovereignty,154 presaging the disruption of the Organisation 
of Islamic Conference summit in Casablanca at the end of the year, which failed to 
agree to Jordan’s request to include in a Jerusalem resolution a recognition of Jordan’s 
role in administering the Islamic holy sites.155 Jordan’s position was that it would 
continue to administer the sites until the final status talks were over, when it would be 
able to hand them over to Palestinian control.156 
 
 In the meantime, in September, as rumours began to circulate of the content of 
the Israel-Jordan peace treaty including the identical reference to Jordan’s ‘special role’ 
in the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem’, Jordan announced that it would be cutting 
administrative ties with the shari`a courts and the Waqf Department agencies in the 
West Bank as of 1 October, with the exception of those in East Jerusalem.157 For its 
part the PNA’s Council of Ministers announced its decision that the PA would take 
over responsibility for the employees of the waqf and the shari`a courts in the West 
Bank as of that date.158 On the due date, the Jordanian-appointed Acting Qadi al-Quda 
in Jerusalem asked the qadis of the shari`a courts elsewhere in the West Bank to return 
to his care their Jordanian-issued seals, since their link with the Jordanian Qadi al-
Quda’s Department had now been severed. Shaykh Abu Sardane instructed all the 
qadis to continue work as normal, although clarifying that the signature of the qadi on 
the document would render it valid during the period the court system was awaiting 
delivery of new seals and stamps ordered by the PNA.159 
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 On the morning of 2nd October Abu Sardane went to Jerusalem to meet with 
the acting Qadi al-Quda and head of the Shari`a Appeal Court, Shaykh Abdin, to 
discuss arrangements concerning the Shari`a Appeal Court and in particular the 
possibilities of this court continuing, even under Jordanian supervision, to hear appeals 
from the shari`a courts in the rest of the West Bank. It was clear that a political 
decision would be needed to resolve this issue and, in memoranda that followed from 
Shaykh Abu Sardane to Yasser Arafat and to the Jordanian Government, the 
Palestinians formally proposed that the existing connection be maintained.160 More 
precisely, the suggestion was that the Jordanian government mandate the head of the 
Shari`a Appeal Court and its members to work in the shar`i system of the PNA in the 
West Bank until the political future of Jerusalem was determined, to hear appeals from 
the West Bank shari`a courts. Although this was not to be agreed, one step forward was 
the agreement by the Jordanian Foreign Ministry to verify all documents referred to it 
after verification by the embassy of the state of Palestine in Amman, avoiding the need 
for verification of the West Bank and Gaza Strip qadis by the Jordanian appointees in 
Jerusalem, as had been proposed in the memorandum.161 
 
 At the same time, a meeting of the shar`i judges produced a petition to Yasser 
Arafat requesting the establishment of the post of Qadi al-Quda in the PA for the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip along with the continuation of the connection with the Shari`a 
Appeal Court in Jerusalem.162 Abu Sardane’s position was quickly upgraded to Qadi 
al-Quda of the shar`i courts, with the rank of Minister, independent from the PA 
Ministry of Justice and directly answering to the President of the PA.163 As discussions 
on the future arrangements for the shari`a courts continued, the Jordanian-appointed 
Mufti of Jerusalem died.164 Within a week, Yasser Arafat had appointed Shaykh 
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Ekrameh Sabri as Mufti of Jerusalem and the Palestinian lands, while Jordan extended 
the mandate of Shaykh Abdin, Acting Qadi al-Quda, to be Mufti as well.165 For a while 
the city had two Muftis ostensibly doing the same job; but by the spring of 1995, the 
Jordanian appointee had retired and was replaced by a Jordanian-appointed ‘deputy 
secretary general for Jerusalem affairs.’166 
 
 A compromise had also been forced on the issue of the Shari`a Court of Appeal; 
with the Jordanians continuing to decline to accept the arrangement proposed by the 
Palestinians, and cases building up in the West Bank first instance shari`a courts, 
Yasser Arafat issued a decision on 2nd January 1995 establishing a Shari`a Court of 
Appeal in the shar`i judicial system of the PNA. The court was to have its permanent 
seat in Jerusalem, while provision was made for it to convene elsewhere.167 In practice, 
as of the summer of 2000, the Palestinian court sits in Nablus to hear appeals from all 
the West Bank first instance shari`a courts except Jerusalem. In Jerusalem, the first 
instance court hears cases and registers deeds from East Jerusalem’s Muslims, as 
before, while the Shari`a Court of Appeal still situated there hears appeals only from 
that one court, both still being administered by the Jordanian Qadi al-Quda. 
 
 The arrangements for execution of judgements reveal the continuing Palestinian 
claims over the shari`a court of first instance in Jerusalem. Appeal decisions from the 
PA regular Court of Appeal (sitting in Ramallah) have held rulings from shari`a courts 
in Jordan and from the Israeli shari`a court of first instance in Jerusalem to be ‘foreign 
judgements’ coming under the terms of Law on the Execution of Foreign Judgements 
1952, issued by the Jordanians and applied in the West Bank, which requires such 
rulings to be processed for implementation through the regular court system.168 In the 
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case of the Israeli-administered Jerusalem court, the Court of Appeal  has held that such 
rulings ‘at the current stage fall outside the competence of the [PA] Execution 
Department.’169 Similarly, in regard to Jordanian courts, the Court has held that a 
decision issued by a shari`a court in Amman ‘has been issued by a court outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of Palestinian land, and is consequently considered a foreign 
judgement’ which was therefore outside the competence of the PA Execution 
Department ‘before the measures set out in the said law [of Foreign Judgements] have 
been followed’.170 This implies that decisions from Jordan may be properly processed 
and implemented as foreign judgements, but those issued from the Israeli shari`a court 
in Jerusalem may not. By contrast, rulings of the Jordanian-administered shari`a court 
in Jerusalem are routinely executed by the PA execution offices in the same manner as 
they execute rulings from the PA-administered shari`a courts.171 
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the Maronite communities. According to Goadby, the Coptic, Nestorian and 
Protestant communities were not  recognized for jurisdictional purposes in Palestine.  
Meron, 1982, 354, adds the Syrian Orthodox community and points out that this list 
 was repeated  in the Second Schedule of the 1939 Palestine Order-in-Council.  
 
46. Article 56, Palestine Order-in-Council. 
 
47. Bentwich, 1948, 37; Rubenstein, 1967, 386-387. 
 
48. Bentwich, 1948, 36; Goadby, 1926, 118-119. 
 
49. Hooper, 1936, 57, notes that Article 46 of  the  Order-in-Council does not 
stipulate a post 1 November 1914 cut-off date for ‘such later Ottoman Laws as have 
been or may be declared to be in force by Public Notice,’ but that Article 59 of  the 
Transjordanian Organic Law mentioned the date 23 November 1918. 
 
50. Article 46 Palestine Order-in-Council;  Hooper, 1936, 28-29. 
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51. See Mogannam, 1952, 195, regarding some of  the Ordinances which 
constituted almost exact copies of  the corresponding English  law. For the continuing 
effects of the introduction of English  legal principles in Israel, see for example 
Friedmann, 1967. With specific regard to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, see 
Moffett, 1989, for the discussion on the controversial revival, as part  of  ‘local 
law’ by the Israeli occupation authorities, of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 
1945,  issued by the British and providing for such measures as deportation, 
administrative detention and house demolition, used extensively by successive Israeli 
governments against the civilian Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. 
 
52. The Order Establishing a Supreme Moslem Council (SMC) for Moslem 
Religious Affairs was issued on 20/12/21 and was referred to in the Order-In-Council, 
Article 52.  Bentwich, 1926, 36.  The  SMC was originally four members elected by 
adult male Muslims, but later on (from 1935) the members were nominated by the 
Government. Rubenstein, 1967, 389. See also Eisenman, 1978,  77-78; and for an in-
depth study of the SMC, see Kupferschmidt, 1987.  
 
53. Hooper, 1936, 59. 
 
54. Anderson, 1951 (‘The Contract of Marriage’), 114. 
 
55. In the OLFR, as in the Majalla, marriage was not allowed below the minimum 
age of  puberty (twelve for boys and nine for girls in accordance with standard Hanafi 
doctrine). The age of full capacity for marriage was eighteen for males and seventeen 
for females, and between this age and the minimum age of marriage, the qadi might 
allow the marriage if convinced the party was sexually mature. The British made the 
age of full competence eighteen for both sexes and required a medical certificate for 
marriage under fifteen. See Eisenman, 1978, 103-105. 
 
56. The simple repeal of this exemption clause in 1951 made polygyny a crime for 
Palestinian Muslims in Israel.  See below, Chapter 4. Another piece of Ottoman 
legislation specifically applied by the British in Palestine and Transjordan was the 
1913 Law  of Inheritance, promulgated before the cut-off date for Ottoman laws 
specified in the Order-In-Council. In applying the Ottoman law in their 1923 
Succession Ordinance, the British legislator not only confirmed its validity but 
attempted in some measure to extend its use. The Succession Ordinance required that 
the Ottoman law (giving equal shares to male and female in inheritance to miri 
property i.e. where the title was  held by the ruler) be the law applied by all  religious 
and civil courts for all miri holdings.  For mulk property  (absolute private property) 
the religious courts were expected  to apply their own personal law, but while for 
Muslims mulk property could only be distributed according to traditional Islamic law, 
in the other communal courts the consent of all the concerned  parties was required 
for the application of  the  personal law on intestacy, while on the request of one of 
the parties the issue would be regulated under the terms of the Ottoman law for miri. 
The Ottoman law thus became the only law applicable to miri land, and the residual 
law for mulk land of non-Muslims. In  practice, Goadby noted that he was ‘informed 
that in fact daughters having a right to share under the Ottoman law frequently 
renounce.’ Goadby, 1926, 121-124.  Compare the situation in Israel: Layish, 1975, 
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280. On circumstances in which it is ‘socially condoned’ for a daughter to take her 
share, see Moors, 1996, 77. Succession to miri property was returned to regulation by 
the traditional shari`a rules (which generally give the male twice the share of the 
female) in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip by legislation issued respectively by 
Jordan in 1991 and Egypt in 1965.    
 
57.  By comparison, see Pearl and Menski, 1998, 33-38 on the development of 
‘Anglo-Mohammadan law’ as a case-law system under British colonial rule of India. 
 
58. For a discussion of  the Partition Resolution (United Nations General 
Assembly  181 of  29 November 1947) and in particular the proposed 
internationalisation of the city of Jerusalem, see Cattan, 1981, 7-9; Mazzawi, 1997, 
239-247. 
 
59. Various sources estimate that upwards of 700,000 Palestinians of a population 
of  900,000 were displaced over the borders of what is now Israel in or following 
1948. Among these refugees were the members of the Supreme Muslim Council and 
many waqf officials and workers.  Rubenstein, 1967, 389; Dumper, 1994, 25-26. See 
Takkenberg, 1998, 18-21 on the difficulties in ascertaining numbers. He cites Israeli 
historian Benny Morris as concurring with the ‘loose, but probably not inaccurate, 
contemporary British formula’ of ‘between 600,000 and 760,000 refugees.’ 
Takkenberg, 1998, 20, note 62, records 914,221 Palestinian refugees registered with 
UNRWA on 31 June 1950 (outside Israel, where a further 45,800 were receiving 
UNRWA relief); of these, the Gaza Strip held 198,227 and Jordan including the West 
Bank 506,2000. 
 
60. Wright, 1951, 441. 
 
61. Wright, 1951, 449. 
 
62. In September 1948, the short-lived All-Palestine Government was established 
in Gaza under the Egyptians. For details on this, and on King Abdullah of Jordan's 
annexation of the West Bank, see Shlaim, 1990, and al-Qasem, 1994, 190-191. 
 
63.  Mogannam, 1952, 195-196. 
 
64. Al-Khalil, 1981, 15-16; Wright, 1951, 445-446. 
 
65. Only Britain and Pakistan recognised the union; Britain subjected this 
recognition to a proviso concerning sovereignty over the city of Jerusalem (given the 
provisions of UNGA resolution 181). Wright, 1951, 456-457. 
 
66. Law no.28 of 1950. 
 
67. See Mogannam, 1952, 195-196. 
 
68. The state of emergency, reinforced at the time of  the 1967 war, was finally 
lifted in 1989.  See the report by Amnesty International, Jordan: The Protection of 
Human Rights after the Lifting of the State of Emergency, London 1990. 
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69. Article 129(ii) and (iii) of the Jordanian Constitution. 
 
70. Articles 25-27 of the Constitution.   
 
71. Articles 98-99 of the Constitution. On the special tribunals in Jordan, see 
Kilani, 1966. 
 
72. Under this law, a four-tier system on the Ottoman model was set up with 
magistrates' courts presided over by a single judge in districts and sub-districts, courts 
of first instance in every district with a president and a plurality of judges to hear civil 
and criminal issues outside the jurisdiction of the magistrates' courts and to act as 
appellate courts from them. Two Courts of Appeal were established, in Amman and 
Jerusalem, and finally a Court of Cassation was set up in Amman to act as Supreme 
Court of Appeal in civil and criminal matters from the Courts of Appeal, and as a 
High Court of Justice, in which role it might hear administrative suits. The Court of 
Cassation replaced the recourse to the Privy Council of Mandate times. Two members 
of the Court of Cassation sat on the special tribunals convened to decide cases of 
conflicts of jurisdiction between courts, a function that had formerly gone to the 
Senior Judicial Officer or to similar tribunals. See Mogannam, 1952, 202-203. 
 
73. Articles 103(2) and 105 of the Constitution; the term used is wahadha. For 
details of the current jurisdiction of the shari`a courts, see above Chapter 1.3. 
 
74. Article 103(1) of the Constitution. 
 
75. Article 2, Law no.3 on the Regulation of the Shari`a  Court of Appeal, 1951. 
See further below. 
 
76. Article 109 of  the Constitution. Meron, 1982, 353 note 2, and 355, considers 
this expanded jurisdiction a ‘major innovation’ of  the 1952 law. The 1938 
Transjordanian Law of Religious Councils (no.2 of 1938) was extended to the West 
Bank by Law no.9 of 1958 (Official Gazette no.1366 of 1 February 1958).   
 
77. Layish, 1984, 4; Shehadeh, 1980, 21; and al-Qasem, 1992-1994, 201, all note 
five Christian communities recognised by Jordan. However, Meron, 1982, 355-357 
and note 21, adds four other Christian communities who he say sought and obtained 
recognition after 1958 when the Transjordanian law on Religious Councils was 
extended to the West Bank. The recognised communities elected their own judges. 
The First Schedule of the Transjordanian Religious Councils Law 1938 listed the 
following recognised Christian communities: Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, 
Armenian, Latin, Arab Episcopal, Maronite, Lutheran, Syrian Orthodox, Seventh Day 
Adventists. Meron (1982, 356) lists three communities (Armenian Catholics, Syrian 
Catholics and Chaldeans) as recognized by the British but not by Jordan. 
 
78. Goadby and Doukhan, 1935, 11; Layish, 1975, 3. Al-Shafi`i was born in either 
Gaza City or Askelan. 
 
79. Article 22 of the Law on the Establishment of  Shari`a Courts, 1951. The same 
text comes in Article 130 of the JLFR. 
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80. Law  no.31/1959, replacing Proclamation  no.10/1953.  Meron, 1982, 354, 
note 7, notes three successive Laws of  Shar`i Procedure; Laws nos. 95/1951, 
10/1952, and 31/1959, ‘but apart from minor modifications the Ottoman provisions 
still prevail there.’ 
 
81. See Mogannam, 1952, 197, for some of the differences between the Palestine 
Criminal Code of 1936 and the Jordanian Criminal Code 1951.  
 
82. Shehadeh, 1980, 18. 
 
83. Brecher, 1978, 13. 
 
84. Israeli Ordinance no.5727/1967:  Bakri, 1986, 8; Brecher, 1978, 25-26; Hirst, 
1974, 18. A dunum is roughly  equal to 900 square metres. Schmelz, 1981, 65, gives 
the figure of  71,000  Palestinians within the expanded municipal borders of  
Jerusalem in September 1967; Layish, 1975, 4-5, gives a figure of 69,000. 
 
85. Hirst, 1974, 18; Bakri, 1986, 8. 
 
86. On UN Security Council resolutions regarding Israel’s 1967 annexation of 
Jerusalem, see Mazzawi, 197, 248-257. 
 
87. Shehadeh, 1980, 18. 
 
88. Shehadeh, 1988, 76-101. 
 
89. Military Orders 310/1969 and 412/1970; see Shehadeh, 1980, 18-20. 
 
90. Kupferschmidt, 1987, 260. The Arabic title of the Supreme Muslim Council of 
Mandatory times, the subject of Kupferschmidt's book, uses the word majlis rather 
than hay’a. See also Dumper, 1994, 78-79. 
 
91. The shar`i judiciary’s reasons for resisting were set before the public in press 
articles, for example Ahmed Abdel Ahmed, ‘al-mahkama al-shar`iyya fi’l-quds wa’l-
ihtilal,’ in al-Quds, 26 April 1974. 
 
92. There is some  confusion regarding this order; some say it referred to all 
shari`a courts, some say only to East  Jerusalem; local press coverage at the time 
clearly stated that it applied to all the shari`a courts. I was unable to trace a copy of 
the original directive. 
 
93. Al-Quds, 25 August 1969; also cited in Shehadeh, 1980, 22. 
 
94. Al-Quds, 16 October 1969; his reasons were included in a memorandum sent 
to the West Bank Military Commander. Also noted by Shehadeh, 1980, 51 note 16. 
 
95. Jilani in al-Quds, 24 April 1970, and  al-Husseini in al-Quds, 27 April 1970. 
 
96. See al-Quds, 23 April 1970. 
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97. Meron, 1982, 365. 
 
98. Meron, 1982,  356. 
 
99. Al-Husseini, 1970. An article by the qadi of  Nablus published in al-Quds on 4 
February 1974 similarly emphasised the fact that ‘the Jordanian Government has not 
relinquished responsibility for the shari`a courts...’ 
 
100. See Mheilan, 1986, 54-55. The tables for the West Bank accounts are 
incomplete. 
 
101. In Salfit in 1976, and in Tubas, Birzeit and Dura in 1986. The Israeli 
occupation authorities in the Gaza Strip validated the opening of two new shari`a 
courts by Military Order, bringing the total number of shari`a courts there to five: 
Meron, 1982, 361. On the position taken by the Gaza qadis, see Dumper, 1994, 92. 
 
102. Reiter, 1997, 13. Meron, 1982, 363, presents the issue of Palestinian Muslims 
in East Jerusalem from the perspective of the occupation authorities: 
 
 These Muslims, having been deprived of the services of the Moslem Court of 
 Jerusalem which refused to accept nomination under Israeli law, address 
 themselves to the Moslem Court at Jaffa, which is the only court competent to 
 issue judgments in family matters, executable at the Execution Offices. 
 
103. Case no. 39/1968 in the Jaffa court. I am grateful to Ala and Hanan Bakri for 
providing me with an Arabic transcript of the proceedings and decision. 
 
104. The   property  of a 'profligate' (safih) or 'squanderer' (mubadhdhar) may be 
made the subject of an attachment order under Jordanian law in the West Bank courts, 
including East Jerusalem. The case material from 1985 included an example of an 
application for attachment on these grounds raised by a man against his paternal 
cousin. 
 
105. Another side to this controversy was raised by the claim made in the court by 
the defendant's lawyer, that the plaintiff had himself first gone to the East Jerusalem 
court to get the attachment raised, but his pleading was not recognised, as by the law 
applied in the East Jerusalem court he was not qualified to act. The plaintiff's lawyer 
denied this and stated that even if it had been the case, and he could therefore have 
been said to have implicitly recognised the East Jerusalem court, such recognition by 
a lawyer had no bearing on whether a court was competent under the law.  
 
106. See Bakri, 1987, 9-10. Jilani, 1970, notes: ‘Everyone is aware of the real 
reasons behind the actions of the Israeli authorities - eliminating the shar`i judiciary 
and gaining control of the Islamic waqfs.’ Kupferschmidt, 1986, 260,  notes that 
Jordan still closely supervises the administration of the waqfs in the West Bank, 
including the very important ones in East Jerusalem. This remains the case during the 
‘transitional period’, as discussed below. 
 
107. Al-Quds, 27 November 1968. 
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108. Al-Quds, 5 March 1970. 
 
109. Al-Quds, 13 March 1970. 
 
110. Al-Quds, 26 January 1973. 
 
111. Al-Quds, 12 March 1973. 
 
112. Al-Quds, 6 April 1988, quoting  Radio Israel of the previous  day. Reiter, 
1997, 11. 
 
113. Article 2 of the Israeli Age of Marriage Law, 1950. Arabic text in Natur, 1981, 
138-139. 
 
114. Layish, 1975, 15. Layish notes that if a girl were pregnant or had given birth, 
the District Court (rather than the shari`a court) was empowered to permit her 
marriage to the father of the child. In 1960, an amendment to this Law extended the 
District Court’s power to permit the marriage of a girl of sixteen even where there 
was no pregnancy, provided that ‘special circumstances’ existed convincing the judge 
of the need for the marriage. 
 
115. Layish, 1975, 20. 
 
116. Layish, 1975, 28. 
 
117. This was achieved in 1951 by the repeal of  the 'good defence' to the charge of 
bigamy in the Criminal Code  taken over from the Mandate period.  With a further 
amendment in 1959, the only good defences for polygyny now in Israel are 
 continuous absence of the spouse for seven years or mental illness making consent to 
divorce by the affected spouse impossible.  
 
118. Reiter, 1997, 17, found a total of 1031 contracts that year. `Ayyush, 1985, 82-
83, found an average annual rate of polygamy in Jerusalem of 3.9%, the second 
lowest rate he recorded in all the West Bank courts over that period -- the lowest 
being in Jenin. 
 
119. Layish, 1975, 83 and 73-75. 
 
120. Reiter, 1997, 17; he gives no numbers, but states the law is enforced only in 
the event of such a complaint being lodged by the first wife or one of her relatives. In 
1970, in Criminal Appeal Case no.135, the Israeli Appeal Court held that an Israeli 
Palestinian man who had married a second wife in the West Bank could be tried for 
polygyny in Israel. The first instance court had ruled itself not competent to hear the 
case, brought by the state, as the offence had occurred outside the borders of Israel. 
The case is referred to by Layish, 1975, 88 note 35. I am grateful to advocates Ala and 
Hanan al-Bakri for the Arabic text of the decision. 
 
121. See Bakri, 1986, 12-13. 
 
122. Meron, 1982, 367. 
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123. A 1985 paper by Advocate Ala ad-Din Bakri summarised the situation as 
follows: By virtue of Military Order 39/1967 and later amendments, the regular court 
jurisdiction of Bethlehem would include all areas formerly under the Jerusalem 
jurisdiction, with the exception of those areas to which Israeli law had been extended 
(i.e. the annexed areas).  Twenty of these villages were later transferred to Ramallah 
jurisdiction by Military Order 567/1974. Thus, the villages of Abu Dis, Anata, 
 Izariyya, and al-Khan al-Ahmar were under Bethlehem for military and regular 
jurisdiction remained under Jerusalem in the shar`i system, and in the Ramallah 
District the same applied to all or part of the  villages of Biddu, Beit Ijza, Beit Iksa, 
Beit Hanina, Beit Duqqu, Beit Surik, Bir Nabala, Jaba', al-Judeira, al-Jib,  Hizma, 
Rafat,  Ram, Qatanna, Qalandiya, Kufr Aqab, Mukhmas,  an-Nabi Samwil and al-
Qubeiba. The status of some of these villages remained under contentious discussions 
at the end of the ‘interim’ phase of the Oslo Accords. 
 
124. Reiter, 1997, 15. One indication of the way in which the Jaffa and East 
Jerusalem shari`a courts work can be gleaned from an examination of local Arabic 
newspapers published in East Jerusalem, in which the courts publish notices for 
persons to attend court hearings or notify them of decisions taken in absentia, where 
the person to be notified is ‘of unknown whereabouts’ (see below). During the three 
months September - November 1986, the three local newspapers Al-Quds, Al-Sha`ab 
and Al-Fajr, published 153 such notifications issued by the West Bank courts, of 
which 22 came from the Jerusalem court. 23 notices were published by the Jaffa 
court. The largest single group of notifications made by the Jaffa court concerned 
succession, listing heirs who stood to inherit from the estate of a deceased and 
providing a time period for objections or additions thereto. It is to be assumed that the 
property involved lay within the Jerusalem area so that for any heir to obtain 
distribution of the estate, the documentation would have to be processed through the 
Jaffa court. The one notice from the Jerusalem court on succession was the result of a 
claim made by the widow of a deceased resident for 500 Jordanian dinars from the 
estate for her deferred dower; notice was given in this case to the other heirs, resident 
in Amman and Kuwait. An award of this sort could only be executed on property in 
Jordan.  On the other hand, the largest single group of Jerusalem court notices 
concerned petitions for separation on the wife’s initiative on the grounds of absence 
and injury, notifying absent husbands from East Jerusalem listed as of unknown 
whereabouts’ and living abroad, mostly in the Americas. Wives married in Jerusalem 
under Jordanian law would have to petition the Jerusalem court for their divorce. 
Reiter, 1997, 16, table 1, presents a more detailed breakdown of the claims made by 
East Jerusalem Muslims in the Jaffa (and West Jerusalem) and East Jerusalem courts 
in 1987. However, his findings (that the East Jerusalem court is used more for actions 
on marriage, divorce and child-related claims, while Palestinians from East Jerusalem 
‘turn more often for cases of inheritance or waqf’ to the Jaffa court) do not 
immediately appear to be supported by the figures he gives. 
 
125. Regulation no.3/1951, Official Gazette no.1982, 1 September 1951. 
 
126. See Shehadeh, 1980, 19-20 on the transfer of the regular Court of Appeal from 
Jerusalem to Ramallah. 
 
127. Meron, 1982, 360. 
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128. This is also in accordance with Jordanian procedural law. 
 
129. Regulation no.20/1977, Official Gazette no.2695, 16 April 1977. 
 
130. Text in Ra.App.1984:77-177-25. 
 
131. Al-`Arabi, 1984, 168, 20368/1978, 20404/1978 and 21669/1981. Dawud, 
1999, I, 213, 22386/1981. The Amman rule was reaffirmed in 39465/1995 - Dawud, 
217. 
 
132. Ra.App.1985:101-9-8. 
 
133. Amman Shari`a Appeal Court decision no.17578/1973; the decision is not 
published, but two decisions stating the rule to which it constitutes the exception are 
published  in  al-`Arabi, 1973, 161, 13035/1963 and 13331/1964:  ‘The shari`a court 
is not competent to hear a claim of ta`a if the wife is not resident within the area of its 
jurisdiction and the claim is defended on this basis...’ 
 
134. Article 18, Law of Shar`i Procedure 1959. 
 
135. Law no.10/1980, Official Gazette no.2928, 3 May 1980, Article 23(3). 
 
136. Thus, for example, in Article 101 of  the JLPS,  it is provided that a husband 
who divorces his wife out of court must register the talaq in the shari`a court within 
fifteen days, or be liable to the penalty stipulated in the Criminal Code for this 
offence. This is not only for administrative reasons, but also to ensure that the wife is 
informed of the incidence of the talaq within a reasonable amount of time. The 
Jordanian Criminal Code of 1960 lays down in Article 281 a prison sentence of up to 
one month or a fine for failure to register a  talaq within  the specified time limit. 
Under normal circumstances, a husband coming to acknowledge an out-of-court talaq 
after the specified fifteen days would be informed of his offence and the papers would 
be transferred to the regular courts in contemplation of prosecution,  while the talaq 
would be duly registered and would be valid. However, during the direct Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank, the shari`a courts would not transfer the papers to the 
regular system. 
 
137. See in general Warnock, 1990; Hiltermann, 1991; Giacaman and Johnson, 
1990; Abdo, 1991 and 1994; Kuttab 1993. 
 
138. Warnock, 1990, 63. Reduction in dower levels was also reported in al-Quds, 
12 December 1988. The article also noted a tendency towards earlier marriage and a 
smaller age difference between the spouses -- presumably at least partly because the 
reduced financial commitments involved meant that men could marry younger but 
also, as suggested in the article, encouraged by the fact that so many of the youth were 
obliged to stay home due to the closure of all schools and institutions of education in 
the first year of the uprising and for several months thereafter. The Palestinian 
universities remained closed for several years. 
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139. The qadi of Ramallah very kindly provided the following figures of all claims 
filed in Ramallah court during the years 1985-1989, together with the figures for 
Nablus and Tulkarim courts: 
year Ramallah Nablus  Tulkarim 
1985 460  642  283 
1986 451  645  264 
1987 466  558  305 
1988 288  320  185 
1989 263  337  207 
 
140. The text of King Hussein’s statement is reproduced in IV Palestine Yearbook 
of International Law, 1987/1988, 297-300. 
 
141. Regulation no.28/1988 Repealing the Governmental Apparatus in the West 
Bank, Official Gazette no.3565, 16 August 1988. Text of decision reproduced in al-
`Abadi, 1998, 38-39. According to al-`Abadi, 1998, 37 (at the time of writing the 
Minister of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs and holy places in Jordan), the decision was 
taken in order to give the opportunity to the PLO to realise its national rights (a 
reference to the Rabat summit of 1974) while retaining supervision over al-Aqsa and 
other waqf sites and the shari`a courts in the West Bank due to their significance to 
the Muslim world. 
 
142. Decision of 22 August 1988. Reproduced in Al-Ittihad, 24 August 1988. 
 
143. This was on 15 November 1988. A previous Declaration of Independence for 
the State of Palestine had been issued on 1 October 1948 by the National Council in 
Gaza. Text of the 1988 Declaration in IV Palestine Yearbook of International Law, 
1987/1988, 1294-1296; and see Shlaim, 1990. 
 
144. The PLO-Israel Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area was signed 
in Cairo on 4 May 1994, superseded the following year by the Interim Agreement on 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip signed on 28 September 1995. The Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements of 13 September 1993 is 
sometimes referred to as the Oslo I Agreement, while the Interim Agreement is Oslo 
II. For a rigorous and critical examination of the legal terms and implications of these 
agreements, see Shehadeh, 1997. 
 
145. It also ordered that ‘all laws, regulations and orders that were in force prior to 
June 5, 1967 in the Palestinian territories (the West Bank and Gaza) shall remain valid 
until they are unified.’ Published in Al-Quds 24 May 1994, reproduced in Palestine 
Yearbook of International Law 1992/1994. Shehadeh, 1997, 149, notes that the 
decision ‘was widely publicised in the local press and served the political purpose of 
deflecting criticism that the Declaration of Principles had confirmed all the military 
legislation Israel had passed during its 27 years of occupation’. See also al-Qasem, 
1992-1994, 192. 
 
146. Decision no.17 of 6 May 1994 appointing Abu Sardane as Wakil to the 
Ministry of Justice for shari`a courts: Abu Sardane, n.d., 93 and 42. Abu Sardane 
noted that when he arrived in the Occupied Palestinian Territories there was no 
‘Council of Ifta’ and so he sought to ‘gather together qualified persons to sit on such a 
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Council in order to deliver fatwas on matters affecting the Muslim population.’ Abu 
Sardane, n.d. 248; Al-Heya al-Jadida, 26 January 1996. 
 
147. Abu Sardane, n.d., 247; Al-Nahar, 11 July 1995. 
 
148. Decision no.2 of Wakil Muhammad Abu Sardane, reproduced in Abu Sardane, 
n.d., 57. 
 
149. Abu Sardane, n.d., 248 and 83. 
 
150. Decision (un-numbered) of 1995 by Yasser Arafat as President of the 
Palestinian Authority and chairman of the PLO, and the Bani Suhaila petition for the 
court, opened on 16 April 1995, reproduced in Abu Sardane, n.d., 164 and 162-163 
respectively. 
 
151. Reproduced in VIII Palestine Yearbook of International Law 1994-1995, 277-
279. The Common Agenda is reproduced at 275-276. The Treaty of Peace between 
Jordan and Israel, signed in Wadi Araba in the south of Jordan in the presence of a 
wide array of world dignitaries on 26 October 1994, included the identical paragraph 
regarding Jordan’s special role (Article 9, see 290). 
 
152. Palestine Report, 7 August 1994; see also al-Nahar 22 July 1994, quoting 
King Hussein as saying that ‘sovereignty over Jerusalem should be for God alone,’ 
and al-Nahar 24 September 1994. 
 
153. For example, Palestine Report, 25 September 1994 quotes the Waqf 
Department’s Director of al-Aqsa mosque as stating that over the period 1953-1993, 
Jordan spent $485 million in social and religious services in the West Bank, that over 
half the Waqf’s budget goes to the West Bank, that it employs 2500 persons in the 
West Bank and in East Jerusalem runs 35 mosques and 300 dunums of Muslim 
graveyards. Al-`Abadi, 1998, 42, similarly claims that in 1994 of a fifteen million 
dinar budget, 7,632,000 dinars were spent by the Waqf on the departments working in 
Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank. 
 
154. Final statement of the Cairo meeting of the Council of the Arab League at 
foreign minister level. Al-Quds, 16 September 1994. 
 
155. Seventh summit of the OIC; Al-Quds, 14 December 1994. The final statement 
of the summit, taken after King Hussein had left apparently in protest at the rejection 
of Jordan’s proposed amendment, affirmed support for the PLO in having all 
authorities transferred to it in the Occupied Territories including Jerusalem. However, 
it remained the first time in the 25-year history of the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference that the resolution on Jerusalem was taken without consensus due to 
Jordan’s reservations. Al-Quds, 16 December 1994. 
 
156. See for example al-`Abadi, 1998, 42; and interview with Jordanian Prime 
Minister `Abdel Salam Majali in Al-Nahar, 10 November 1994. 
 
157. This decision appears to have been taken on 27 September 1994, although 
some newspaper reports refer to it as originally undated. 
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158. Reproduced in Abu Sardane, n.d., 69. 
 
159. Al-Quds, 3 October 1994; Abu Sardane, n.d., 234-235. Earlier reports (Al-
Quds, 2 October 1994) stated that Abu Sardane had ordered the shari`a courts not to 
surrender the seals. 
 
160. The memoranda pointed out that the Israeli occupation authorities would not 
allow the PA to establish its own Shari`a Appeal Court in Jerusalem and that in any 
case this would constitute duplication, while to establish a court outside Jerusalem 
would constitute a concession of a Palestinian political right. Abu Sardane, n.d., 68, 
reports his memorandum to Arafat on 8 October 1994 and to Jordan on 18 October 
1994. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
GETTING MARRIED: THE WHO AND HOW OF THE CONTRACT  
 
3.1 The Contract 
 
 Getting married is something nearly all Muslims in the West Bank do at least 
once in their lives. Those who never marry are a tiny proportion of the population, 
and some 10.5% of men and 4% of women marry more than once.1 The severe 
dislocation and disruptions to Palestinian society over the course of the twentieth 
century, and the substantial changes in the socio-economic determinants affecting 
‘who marries whom and why’, as Rema Hammami puts it in the FAFO report,2 appear 
to have impacted the social rules for organizing marriage rather than forcing change 
in the legal rules, which have accommodated these changes more or less within the 
existing shari`a-based framework.3 In society, developments in educational levels for 
women and increased social mobility, along with the existence of fora such as the 
Palestinian universities and student movements are identified as providing the context 
for the development of individually-negotiated relationships, while elsewhere in 
Palestinian society ‘the family continues to play an important role in organizing 
marital relations, and the exigencies of the entire family unit play a determinant role 
in the logic of marriage relationships.’4  
 
 The one real exception to the general conservatism of Jordanian law as applied 
in the West Bank courts in this area is the increasing of the legal age of capacity for 
marriage over the course of the twentieth century. While the provisions of the 
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Jordanian Law of Personal Status (JLPS) governing the process of getting married are 
thus fairly standard, the selection, in some cases implicitly, of Shafi`i rules in some 
areas is interesting as it may indicate a recognition of the rules of that school 
coinciding more closely in some cases with existing practice among the population.  
The law also sometimes selects minority Hanafi opinions, and introduces the kind of 
administrative extensions necessary to regulate the affairs of the territorial state 
complete with overseas consular officials and so on.   
 
 This chapter deals with the process and persons involved in concluding the 
marriage contract under the terms of the JLPS and as reflected in the marriage 
contracts registered in the courts. The issue of the age of capacity for marriage is 
examined in light of changes both by Jordan and more recently by the Palestinian 
Qadi al-Quda in the Gaza Strip aimed at bringing law there into conformity with the 
law applying in the West Bank. In the area of guardianship in marriage, clear patterns 
emerge of custom dictating the use made of available legal rules; women as a rule do 
not act for themselves in the actual conclusion of the contract, although they may sign 
alongside their male representative (wakil) and they (or the court) almost invariably 
register the consent of the wali (marriage guardian) to their marriage even in cases 
where it is explicitly not required by law.  
 
 In the occupied West Bank, as elsewhere in the Middle East, a Muslim 
marriage is created by the conclusion of a contract between the spouses, either 
directly or by their duly appointed representatives.  As defined in the JLPS, marriage 
is ‘a contract between a man and a woman whom the shari`a permits him (to marry), 
in order to establish a family and to create progeny between them.’5 Although the 
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contract is required to be recorded by court officials these days, the basis remains an 
oral offer and acceptance of marriage made in contractual terms.  As soon as the 
contractual agreement is made, those rights and obligations that arise from the 
existence of the contract, regardless of consummation of the marriage, take effect, and 
a formal dissolution of some kind is needed if the union is to be ended.  Similarly, 
before the formal contract is so concluded, no rights are conferred or obligations 
incurred. 
 
 This means that there is no effect in law of the state of pre-marital 
engagement, khutba, which is a normal part of the process leading up to marriage.6 
The JLPS states in Article 3 that: 
Marriage is not contracted by khutba, nor by the promise [of marriage], nor by 
the reading of the fatiha, nor by the receipt of anything by way of dower, nor by 
the acceptance of gifts. 
 
Two claims in the case material from 1965 showed the courts putting this principle into 
practice under the equivalent terms of the JLFR; both claims were raised by women 
seeking the qadi's intervention with men claiming to be engaged to them and seeking to 
prevent their marriage to another individual.7 Mahmud Sirtawi and Muhammad 
Samara, authors of two commentaries published on the JLPS, devote substantial space 
to the process leading up to and the conditions involved in concluding the contract of 
marriage in Islamic law.   Samara defines khutba as a man asking a woman in marriage; 
Sirtawi as the request by a man of a woman in marriage, or by a woman of a man, 
observing however that while jurists say that the latter procedure is permitted, it is not 
explicitly recommended.  While the engagement of a couple does not create a contract, 
it is agreed that a man should not engage in marriage the fiancée of another man, due to 
the social friction that may arise.8 
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 In addition, since the khutba is essentially a preparation for an  expected 
marriage, jurists take a detailed interest in what may and may not occur during the 
engagement period, in terms of social conduct.  Part of the reason for the khutba, 
assuming the couple have not had open social contact before, is for each to assess the 
other as a potential spouse, and both Sirtawi and Samara agree that the engaged couple 
can meet together provided this be in the presence of a mahram, a person within 
degrees of relationship to the woman that prohibit their marriage to her.9 Most of this 
discussion, however, assumes extremely restricted social contact, rather than reflecting 
the broader range of social practice that can be seen in different areas and social classes 
in the West Bank today.10 
 
 The engagement not being binding, either party to it may withdraw at any 
time.11 No legal liability is incurred, apart from the return of items given by the man to 
the woman towards the dower; the fiancé may recover the items he gave if they are still 
extant, for example jewellery, or their cash value if not, and amounts of cash must also 
be returned.12 Neither the man nor the woman, however, can sue for breach of promise 
if the other party breaks off the engagement.  Samara and Sirtawi consider the 
argument that the woman should be able to seek compensation if she suffers distress by 
the man's withdrawal from the engagement, but both agree with the position taken by 
the Jordanian legislators in omitting any mention of compensation.  Hanafi law does 
not grant compensation; Sirtawi notes that the classical jurists did not even discuss this 
question and Samara reminds his readers that changing social circumstances and 
attitudes, which might suggest the appropriateness of compensation, are not grounds on 
which to base a change in the law.13    
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 Yet if no obligations arise in law before conclusion of the contract, custom does 
not sanction their establishment until after the wedding (`urs), the public celebration 
that traditionally involves large numbers of people and includes the zifaf, or wedding 
procession, when the bride is escorted to her husband's house.14 Cohabitation is not 
sanctioned before the wedding. The conclusion of the contract is customarily termed 
katab al-kitab (the writing of the document) and those who have done this may be 
described as katibin al-kitab or as khatibin (engaged) as distinct from married. In shar`i 
terms, however, the couple are fully and legally married once the contract is concluded; 
rights and duties arise, and sexual intercourse is legal. One assumes that in the case of 
many of the substantial numbers of couples divorced before consummation of the 
contract, the zifaf never took place and the couple were viewed as engaged rather than 
married.  Nevertheless, since the contract had been written, a divorce is necessary to 
separate them.15 
 
 The contract of marriage is carried out in the West Bank by a ma'dhun, a 
marriage registrar, on behalf of the qadi, often at the home of one of the parties (usually 
the bride) while a substantial number are concluded at the shari`a court.16 The 
administrative regulations for the conclusion of the contract are supported by penal 
sanctions in the event of non-compliance; however, not registering the marriage in 
accordance with these regulations does not render the marriage void in shar`i terms. 
Registration seems to have first been made compulsory by the central Ottoman 
authorities as early as the sixteenth century, although the extent of compliance would 
be another question.17 Tucker notes that in seventeenth and eighteenth century Syria 
and Palestine, ‘the courts acted as a marriage registry’ with people from a variety of 
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social backgrounds entering their contracts into the records, placing ‘marriage and its 
consequent rights and obligations squarely under the jurisdiction of the Islamic court.’18 
Jordanian law has not used the procedure of registration to deny legal remedy to 
unregistered marriages; provided the shar`i conditions are met in full, the marriage 
contract is valid and can be established in court even if criminal penalties are imposed 
for non-registration.   
 
 The shar`i conditions attached to the contract of marriage address every aspect 
of the process, divided traditionally into the ‘pillars’ of the contract and the conditions 
proper, which in Hanafi texts are classified as including conditions of conclusion (al-
in`iqad), of validity (al-sahha), of implementation (al-nafadh) and of ‘bindingness’ (al-
luzum). 
 
3.1.1     Pillars of the contract 
 For the Hanafis, the pillars of the contract are the ijab and the qubul, the formal 
declaration of marriage by the two spouses or their legal representatives which 
constitute the contract, as provided in the JLPS.19 Samara defines the ijab as ‘the words 
uttered by one of the two contractors first, indicating his or her desire to conclude a 
contract of marriage,’ and the qubul as ‘the words uttered second by the other 
contractor indicating agreement to the desire of the first in concluding the contract’ - 
either party can begin the process, whether in person or through his or her wakil 
(representative).20  There are strict rules as to the phrasing of the ijab and qubul and the 
way in which they are uttered.  Article 15 of the JLPS provides that: 
 The ijab  and qubul shall be by explicit words such as inkah and tazwij, and 
 for the persons incapable of [speech] by known sign. 
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     It is usual to use the past tense in both parts of the contract, although it is 
permissible for one to be in the future or present tense  and the other in the past.21 The 
two root verbs stipulated for indicating marriage in the JLPS article were generally 
agreed upon among the classical jurists, but there were long discussions about the use 
of other words, including the Hanafi position that it was legitimate to use any words 
that indicate possession, and the debate over words such as ‘sale’ and ‘deliver’  Samara 
prefers the Shafi`i and Hanbali views, which held that only the words nikah and tazwij 
can conclude a contract of marriage, and attributes Article 15 of the JLPS to this 
position.  Both he and Sirtawi however would allow the colloquial verb jawwaz in the 
place of zawwaj so long as it gives the meaning of the ijab and qubul.22 
 
  The other major issue is that referred to directly in the JLPS, where one or 
both of the parties is unable to speak.  The basis of the contract is still oral; if the 
parties can speak, the contract is concluded by the utterance of the ijab and qubul. The 
majority view held that if one party could not speak, the contract is concluded by a 
sign recognisable to and understood by all those attending the contract session; only 
some of the Hanafis allowed for the alternative of writing .23 
 
 Finally, if the ijab and qubul are constructed in such a way as to suspend the 
marriage on an unrealised condition (for example, I'll marry you if my business 
prospers) or defers it to a future date (for example, after three months), no contract is 
concluded.  The presumption in the contract of marriage is that the effects arise 
immediately by the mere fact of its conclusion.  Such phrases may constitute a promise 
to marry, or a form of khutba with no legal effect, but do not conclude marriage.24  
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3.1.2     Conditions of conclusion 
 The conditions of conclusion are essentially related to the ijab and qubul.  
Firstly, they must agree in every respect; thus, any conditions stipulated in either the 
ijab or the qubul must be either repeated or explicitly accepted by the other party.  The 
exception is where the husband includes a figure for the dower higher than that 
specified by the wife, with the woman stating for example ‘I have married you for a 
dower of 1000 dinars’ and the man responding ‘I have married you for 2000 dinars’.  
The man is bound by the sum accepted in both ijab and qubul, that is, 1000 dinars.  
However, if the man were to specify a sum lower - thus for example, responding in this 
example with ‘I have married you for 500 dinars’ - then the qubul would be held not to 
agree with the ijab.25   
 
 The second ‘condition of conclusion’ is that the ijab and qubul must take place 
in one single ‘session’, without distraction from the matter at hand or interruption of the 
business of the contract.26 Connected to this is the condition that nothing occurs that 
suggests withdrawal of the ijab before the utterance of the qubul - if withdrawal in any 
form occurs, no contract is concluded.  Finally, each of the contracting parties must 
hear and understand the words of the other.27 
 
3.1.3     Conditions of validity  
 
  Three issues are included in the conditions of validity: the witnesses to the 
contract, the absence of temporary or permanent impediments to the marriage of the 
partners; and the intention of permanence in the terms of the contract. 
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 On the matter of witnesses, the JLPS takes the majority view in requiring the 
presence of witnesses28 and tends to the Hanafi view on the characteristics required of 
those persons: 
Art.16:  A requirement for the validity of the contract is the 
presence of two male witnesses or one male and two female 
witnesses, who are Muslims if the spouses are Muslims, and are 
sane and major, hearing the ijab and qubul and understanding the 
meaning thereof.  The ascendants and descendants of the fiancé 
and fiancée may witness the contract. 
 
 While the classical schools agreed on the requirements of sanity and majority, 
allowing two women to witness along with a man was the Hanafi and majority Hanbali 
position.29 There was also a discussion among the jurists as to the testimony of non-
Muslim witnesses.  Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusef held that if the woman is a non-
Muslim, then the witnesses could be two non-Muslims; others disagreed.  Samara, 
while supporting the view that marriage is concluded only by the testimony of Muslim 
witnesses, observes that implicitly the law appears to have taken the position of Abu 
Hanifa in allowing the testimony of non-Muslims if the wife is not herself a Muslim.30 
 
 The question of impediments to the marriage concerns whether the partners can 
legitimately be married to each other.  The categories of prohibitions are divided into 
permanent and temporary.  If the woman is under a permanent prohibition of marriage 
to a certain man, she can never be married to him.  If the prohibition is temporary, she 
may at some time become a lawful party to marriage with him, whether by reason of 
time (for example, the end of the `idda from her marriage to another man) or by her 
own personal status (for example being married to another man) or that of another 
woman (for example, her sister). 
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 The permanent prohibitions arise from specified degrees of blood kinship 
(qaraba or nasab), relationship by marriage or ‘affinity’ (musahira), and foster-rela-
tionship created by suckling (or breastfeeding, rada`).  The JLPS sets these out in 
Articles 24-26 in normal Hanafi fashion, although in some cases adopting the Hanafi 
position through omission rather than by positive ruling.31 With regard to the 
permanent impediment caused by a relationship through suckling, the JLPS explicitly 
adopts Abu Hanifa's position which reduces the number of persons affected by the 
prohibition.32   
 
 The classical jurists considered in detail the degree and nature of suckling that 
would raise the prohibition. Aspects considered in the discussions include during what 
period of the child's life the suckling had to occur; whether the milk had to be taken 
from the breast or also if it were taken from a bottle; whether the milk had to be 
produced as a result of pregnancy; and what amount of suckling gave rise to the 
impediment.  The Hanafis held that if within the first two years of its life, the baby 
imbibed any quantity of milk, the impediment was raised;33 since the JLPS does not 
deal with this question, this is the current position.34  
 
 Temporary prohibitions include the wife or mu`tadda (woman during the `idda, 
the mandatory waiting period following termination of marriage) of another man and 
various forms of unlawful conjunction.  Article 31 of the JLPS provides that a man may 
not be married at one time to two women ‘between whom there is an impediment of 
kinship or suckling such that if one of them were a man, she could not marry the other’.  
This impediment applies until after the end of the `idda of the man's current wife.35 
This means, for example, that a man cannot be married to two sisters at the same time, 
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nor to a mother and daughter.36 The other rule related to unlawful conjunction concerns 
numbers; a man is under a temporary prohibition from contracting any other woman in 
marriage so long as he has four wives or mu`taddas.37 The final temporary impediment 
listed in the JLPS is that which applies to a man who has divorced his wife three 
separate times in three separate sessions and so has ended the marriage by the ‘greater 
finality’; he is under a temporary prohibition from remarrying her until she has 
completed her `idda period from a subsequent consummated marriage to another man.38  
 
 As for the impediment caused by religion, a Muslim woman cannot marry any 
non-Muslim man, and a Muslim man cannot marry a non-Muslim woman who is not a 
kitabiyya - that is, a believer in one of the recognised monotheistic scripture-based  
religions.  The term ‘People of the Book’ (ahl al-kitab or kitabiyya) is generally taken 
to include the Jewish and Christian communities and to exclude polytheists and 
idolaters; for the jurists, those of the Zoroastrian and Hindu faiths gave rise to 
discussion but were usually excluded.  Sirtawi includes Buddhists and adds communists 
to the list of those women whom a Muslim man may not marry.39 The prohibition so 
imposed is temporary because conversion to Islam for the man, or to Islam or another 
revealed religion for the woman, would remove the impediment. A proposal in 1998 by 
advocate Asma Khadr that the Palestinian legislature should follow the example of 
Tunisia and simply omit any reference to the religion of the spouses seems, for the 
moment, to be an unlikely candidate for adoption in any imminent texts of a Palestinian 
personal status law.40 
 
 The third condition of validity, the intention of permanence of the contract, 
requires that the presumption of permanence not be in any way contradicted, for 
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example by a time limit being stipulated for the marriage. In line with Hanafi law, the 
JLPS holds both mut`a marriage and temporary marriage to be irregular.41 
 
3.1.4     Conditions of implementation 
     The conditions of implementation, or execution (nafadh), comprise the competence 
of the parties to act in and of themselves - that is, that they are sane and major - and 
their capacity to undertake an executable contract, in that neither is a faduli 
(uncommissioned agent).42 The conditions of implementation require that the contract 
be concluded by the husband or his wakil on one side, and, on the other, either the 
wife's marriage guardian (wali) or his wakil, or according to the Hanafis, the wife 
herself.43  
 
 The rules on the competence of the parties undertaking the contract differ 
according to the views of the schools on, inter alia, the age of marriage and the role of 
the marriage guardian (wali). The wakil is the duly appointed representative of one of 
the parties with the capacity to undertake the contract, charged with undertaking the 
contract on that party's behalf.  Thus, for the Shafi`is, the wakil for the wife's side of the 
contract would be representing the wali and would be appointed by him, since the 
woman cannot undertake the contract herself.44 A view of the Hanafis, however, allows 
a woman to marry herself on her own authority, and to represent herself in the contract 
session; therefore for them, the wakil is appointed by the woman to represent her in the 
contract - or indeed, she may pronounce her side of the contract herself.  The JLPS 
clearly took this Hanafi view in Article 14, stating that marriage is concluded by the 
ijab and the qubul of the two fiancées or their representatives.45  
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 The majority of the classical jurists allowed one person to represent both parties 
and therefore to pronounce both the ijab and qubul to conclude the contract, for 
example where the wakil was either guardian of both parties or the appointed wakil of 
both.  The JLPS, in Article 14, by using the dual form of wakil to indicate two 
representatives, appears to adopt the Shafi`i view that one person cannot undertake both 
ijab and qubul;46 it also implicitly requires the wali to be appointed wakil to act on 
behalf of his female ward, rather than acting per se as wali. 
 
 Under the JLPS, then, two persons must directly undertake the contract; they 
can be the engaged couple in person, or either or both of them can be represented in the 
procedures of the contract session by a duly appointed wakil. The marriage contracts 
registered in the courts of the West Bank examined for this study illustrate the 
implementation of these rules: of the 857 contracts taken as a 10% sample, 840 showed 
the groom to have represented himself, while in 843 the bride was represented by her 
wakil, usually also identified as her guardian.  At the same time, in most of the 
contracts in the case material, the woman herself appoints her wakil at the beginning of 
proceedings, sometimes signing the contract together with her wakil at the end.47  
 
 The few exceptions to the rule of women being represented by a wakil included 
foreign (mostly North American) women marrying on their own authority, and 
previously married Palestinian women, in some cases entering polygamous unions, who 
also did not always register the consent of a marriage guardian; in one even more 
unusual case a sixteen year old bride marrying for the first time represented herself in 
the contract session in the presence of her father, who attended to give his consent as 
her wali. Others included a woman whose wali was absent but had informed the court 
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of his consent, and a woman whose guardian, her father, was charged as wakil for the 
groom. As for the men, their representation by a wakil usually occurred only when the 
groom was not able to be present at the contract session. These included several 
resident in Jordan, and some further afield. The contract document in these cases 
usually registered the receipt by the court of a document conferring a restricted wakala 
on the man's wakil drawn up by the shari`a court in the area of his residence.  The one 
contract in the sample that differed from this pattern was concluded by a wakil for the 
woman, who was present, and by the husband on his own behalf  accompanied by a 
named wakil, with the contract document adding an explanatory note that the presence 
of the wakil was due to the fact that the husband concluded the contract by signs rather 
than by speech. 
 
 In sum, the West Bank case material shows a pattern of behaviour that fits with 
the Shafi`i legal rules -- and, it appears, local custom -- not endorsing a woman to 
herself conclude the contract of marriage. In practice, the woman, whether previously 
married or not, appoints a wakil (usually her wali) to represent her in the ijab and 
qubul, while the man does it in person unless physically unable to do so. It may also be 
that women perceive and exploit the involvement of their guardian as wakil in the 
process in this manner as representing not the bride alone for the single performace of 
the act, but rather the support and strength of the woman’s natal family vis-à-vis that of 
the husband’s family, which custom perceives them as entering on marriage, 
emphasising and reinforcing the woman’s weight and position in her new family.48 
 
3.1.5   Conditions of bindingness 
 
 Samara defines the conditions of bindingness (luzum) as: 
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 the conditions on which depend the continuation of the contract; neither 
 spouse  nor anyone else can prevent the contract taking effect, once all the 
 conditions of conclusion, validity and implementation have been met, unless 
 one of them has the right to do so because the contract is not binding.49    
 
 Three issues are usually discussed under this category: the 'equality' or 
‘suitability/adequacy’ (kafa'a)  of the bridegroom, the proper dower (mahr al-mithl) 
and the ‘option of puberty’ (khiyar al-bulugh). Under classical Hanafi law, the exercise 
of a veto or right of objection by the appropriate party based on any of these three 
principles could dissolve the marriage, so that the contract, if subject to those rules due 
to the circumstances in which it was concluded, remained non-binding until the right of 
objection or withdrawal either lapsed, was exercised or was waived. 
 
 The rules on the option of puberty are peculiar to the Hanafi school and arise 
directly from their distinct position on the mandate of the wali to marry off minor 
wards.  The jurists from the other schools allowed only the father or grandfather to 
conclude a marriage for minor wards; the Hanafis allowed a wali in a further degree of 
relationship to do so, but made the contract non-binding.  When the ward married as a 
minor by a wali other than his/her father or grandfather reached puberty, they had the 
‘option of puberty’  - that is, the choice of withdrawing from the marriage.50 However, 
since the marriage of minors is no longer permitted under the law, the option of puberty 
also does not arise as far as the law is concerned, and the JLPS does not deal with this 
part of Hanafi law.51  
 
 This is almost, but not quite, the case with the other two conditions of bind-
ingness. The Hanafis built up an extensive doctrine on kafa'a.52 The doctrine of kafa'a 
applies to the bridegroom only, on the explicit assumption that a man's status is not 
lowered by that of his wife, while a woman's position in society is gauged by that of her 
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husband.53 With marriage being seen as a social and familial rather than a purely 
individual arrangement, the doctrine of  kafa'a was presented as a way for the bride's 
family to conserve the standing of their daughters and thereby the family itself.  The 
quality of kafa'a was described as the right of the bride, and of the wali; if the 
bridegroom misrepresented his status to the bride and she later discovered him not to 
have been her equal at the time of the contract, she held the right to seek dissolution of 
the marriage. Furthermore, if the woman married herself under certain circumstances to 
a man not her equal without the consent of her wali, the guardian had the right to seek 
dissolution, acting on behalf of the interests of the family as a whole.  
 
 According to the classical Hanafi doctrine, the factors on which the bride-
groom’s kafa’a  was assessed included lineage (nasab), confession of Islam, freedom, 
piety, occupation and financial means.54 The Ottoman Law of Family Rights 
maintained the classical rules to a large extent, requiring that the groom be ‘equal to the 
woman in financial means, occupation and suchlike.’55 In Egyptian cases from that 
time, Shaham finds that the consideration of occupation would only operate in cases 
where the gap was considerable.56 The Jordanian legislators, first in the JLFR and then 
in the JLPS, kept a special chapter in the law entitled kafa'a, but substantially reduced 
the scope and effect of the doctrine, which is now constrained to financial terms. 
Article 20 of the JLPS provides that: 
 It is a requirement of marriage that the man be the equal of the woman in 
 means (mal); that is, that the husband be capable of [producing] the prompt 
 dower and of [paying] the wife's maintenance... 
 
 Thus, in law at least, kafa'a now consists simply of the groom's ability to pay 
the prompt dower and the wife's maintenance.57 Furthermore, Article 20 stipulates that 
the kafa'a of the bridegroom is assessed at the time of the contract, so if it ceases 
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thereafter, this cannot affect the marriage.58 Thus, under the JLPS, provided that the 
groom is able at the time of the contract to provide adequate maintenance for his wife 
and to pay the prompt dower, the doctrine of kafa'a cannot affect the continuation of 
the contract. 
 
 However, should the groom in fact not be her equal under these restricted terms, 
the JLPS retains the option of dissolution in Article 23: 
 On application, the qadi may dissolve the marriage by reason of lack of 
 kafa’a, provided the wife has not conceived from the man. If she has become 
 pregnant, the marriage may not be dissolved. 
 
 Here, the law has maintained the classical Hanafi remedy of dissolution, but 
constrained it with the minority Hanafi view that the option of dissolution on these 
grounds lapses after childbirth or pregnancy.59 The option of dissolution may be 
exercised by the woman and her wali, or by the wali alone, if she married without his 
consent. The JLPS gives them both the right to seek dissolution in a case where the 
man misrepresented his status, or where they explicitly stipulated kafa'a as a condition, 
but not otherwise, and the possibility of dissolution is again constrained by the 
provision that it may not be sought if at the time of litigation the man is indeed the 
equal of the woman.60  
 
 In the letter of the law, then, the doctrine of kafa'a has been stripped of its class 
and social implications and technically is maintained to further protect the wife's 
financial rights against her husband (and the aspect of family standing involved in 
this).61 Kafa'a is to be assessed at the time of the contract, and a subsequent decline in 
means has no effect; however, the wife can obtain deliverance of her dower and 
maintenance through the courts, or seek dissolution in the event of non-payment.62 If, 
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on the other hand, unbeknownst to the wife and her wali, the man was not capable of 
paying the dower and maintenance at the time of the contract, simply that fact in time 
does not give the wife an additional right to seek dissolution if his means increase 
rather than decrease, so if when she gets to court he is able to provide her with 
maintenance and pay the dower, she will have no remedy against him. 
 
 For the other schools, the doctrine of kafa'a only had effect in the case of 
misrepresentation of the groom's status, since they did not endorse a woman marrying 
without the consent of a guardian. The JLPS is not entirely clear on the requirement of 
the wali's consent in a contract of marriage, as is discussed below. The last article in the 
Chapter of Kafa'a, however, indicates that there can be cases where a woman concludes 
a valid marriage without the consent of her wali. Such a marriage could theoretically 
become the subject of a subsequent plea for dissolution by the wali, on the grounds of 
the non-equality of the groom, as provided in Article 22: 
If the bikr (virgin) or thayyib (previously married woman) who has 
reached her eighteenth year denies having a wali and marries herself [to 
a man], and then a wali presents himself, then if she married herself to 
an equal, the contract stands, even if the dower is below the proper 
dower; but if she married herself to a non-equal, then the wali may 
petition the qadi for dissolution of the marriage. 
 
 In his article on the doctrine of kafa'a, written in the late 1950s, Ziadeh observes 
that it is not entirely a theoretical matter, citing some instances in various countries 
where kafa'a has been invoked.63 However, neither the case material examined in the 
West Bank nor the published collections of rulings from the Shari`a Court of Appeal in 
Amman give any mention of a case involving kafa'a either under the JLFR or the JLPS. 
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 The ‘proper dower’ (mahr al-mithl) referred to in Article 22 brings in a third 
disputed condition of bindingness.  The proper dower is defined in the JLPS in classical 
Hanafi fashion as the dower ‘which is the dower of the wife and her peers from among 
her paternal relations ...’  as opposed to the specified dower settled upon by the parties 
in the contract session.64 The proper dower is in some ways a ‘fall- back’ dower: it falls 
due when a valid contract of marriage has no dower specified in it, or where the 
specification is irregular, or in the event of an irregular but consummated contract of 
marriage, if the proper dower is lower than the specified dower.  The proper dower is 
assessed according to varying characteristics of the woman and her peers. While the 
JLPS has kept it for these cases, it is rarely needed, since irregular specification or lack 
of specification of dower is uncommon in an age when contracts of marriage are 
registered by court officials. The JLPS has furthermore explicitly adopted (in Article 
22) the opposite opinion of the majority, rendering the proper dower not a condition for 
the bindingness of the contract.65 
 
3.1.6  Types of contract 
 The Hanafi jurists divide marriage contracts into four categories, according to 
the effects to which they give rise:  valid (sahih), void (batil), irregular (fasid) and 
suspended (mauquf).66  The effects of a valid contract, one which fulfills the 
requirements of the pillars and the conditions, include the raising of the prohibition of 
musahira (affinity) between those who become related by the marriage; the falling due 
of the dower and the payment of maintenance to the wife; the legalisation of sexual 
relations, the establishment of paternity and mutual inheritance entitlements. 
 
 132 
 The jurists of the different schools varied in their categorisation of non-valid 
contracts, both as to reason and as to effect.67 Samara summarises the Hanafi 
distinction as being that a void contract is one that is lacking a condition of conclusion, 
while an irregular contract lacks a condition of validity.68 The JLPS takes the approach 
of listing the conditions that cause a contract to fall into each category, and defines the 
distinction by effect only. 
 
 Thus, the JLPS lists contracts of marriage as void in the case of the marriage of 
a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man; of a Muslim man to a non-Kitabiyya woman; 
and of a man to a woman who is under a permanent prohibition by reason of 
relationship by blood, affinity or rada`.69 This is a more detailed list than that which 
had appeared in the parallel article of the JLFR which had inter alia omitted to classify 
contracts involving a couple under permanent prohibition by rada` or affinity. Sirtawi, 
while not referring to this omission in the JLFR, criticises the categorisation in Article 
33(3) of the JLPS of a contract involving parties under a prohibition created by rada` as 
void and therefore giving rise to no effects at all even if consummation occurs.  He 
notes that the classical jurists held such a contract to be irregular,70 due to the many 
different opinions among the jurists as to the rules on rada`.71 He further points out a 
grammatical slip; the clause renders void contracts between a man and a woman in a 
prohibited relationship to him as set out in Articles 24, 25 and 26.  Sirtawi points out 
that the Arabic phrase used here to indicate relationship, dhat rahim mahram, can refer 
only to blood kinship and therefore cannot properly be used to refer to the prohibitions 
created by relationships arising from rada` or affinity.72 Although he does not refer to 
it, the Shari`a Appeal Court in Amman made a similar point in two decisions of 1980, 
when, despite a clarification in the Official Gazette, it held marriages concluded in 
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contravention of the impediment of rada` to be irregular rather than void, as in the 
Kitab al-Ahkam and the OLFR; in both cases, the ruling was on claims made for dower 
after the dissolution of the marriage, and the ruling of the contract as irregular gave the 
woman the right to dower, which would not have fallen due in a void contract.73   
 
With regard to the effects of a void contract, Article 41 states: 
A void marriage, whether consummated or not, has no effect and therefore no 
rulings of a valid contract are established between the spouses, such as 
maintenance, paternity, `idda, the impediment of affinity and inheritance. 
 
 Here, there is no explicit reference to mahr as not arising in a void contract.  
The questions that arise here relate to the imposition of the penalty (hadd) for zina 
(illegal sexual relations), which most jurists held as falling due if consummation occurs 
in a contract the couple knew to be void.  According to Abu Hanifa, however, while if 
consummation occurs it is indeed zina, the ‘semblance of a contract’ (shibh al-`aqd) 
causes the hadd penalty to lapse and the woman is due dower, the general principle 
being that every sexual relationship gives rise either to mahr or to the hadd for zina. 
 
 The hadd penalties are in any case not part of state law in either Jordan or the 
West Bank, and Samara wonders therefore whether the omission of mahr from the list 
of effects not arising in a consummated void marriage is intended to indicate an 
adoption of the position of Abu Hanifa, or whether the phrasing of Article 41, listing 
those effects as examples (‘such as maintenance’) is, as is probably the case, intended 
to be non-exhaustive and mahr can therefore also be understood as not falling due in 
any circumstance in a void marriage.74  
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 In the case of an irregular contract, no effects arise if the parties are separated 
before the union is consummated, but certain specified effects arise in the event of 
consummation before separation.  Article 34 of the JLPS lists irregular contracts as 
those where one or both of the parties were not competent according to the conditions 
of capacity at the time of the contract; the contract was concluded without witnesses; 
the contract was concluded under coercion; the witnesses to the contract were not 
competent to act under the stated requirements; the contract is concluded with a woman 
subject to the rules of unlawful conjunction due to rada` or kinship; or it is a mut`a 
marriage or temporary marriage.75 In the event of such a marriage being consummated, 
Article 42 of the JLPS provides that: 
dower and `idda are due, paternity is established and the impediment of 
affinity raised, while the remaining effects [of marriage] such as inheritance 
and maintenance before or after separation are not due. 
 
 In a later article, the JLPS takes Abu Hanifa's view that the dower due in these 
circumstances is the lower of the specified or the proper dower.76  
 
 Couples are prohibited from remaining in a void or irregular marriage, and if 
they do not separate themselves, the qadi is charged with separating them.77 The public 
interest involved in the separation of couples involved in such marriages was 
emphasised by the proposed inclusion in an early draft revision of the JLPS of a clause 
giving any shari`a court the jurisdiction to consider claims for the dissolution of 
marriages due to their being void or irregular, without regard for the residency of the 
spouses, in order  ‘to speed up consideration of these claims since they involve haqq 
allah,’ the right of God.78  
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 The JLPS does not explicitly include the category of ‘suspended’ contracts, 
which were concluded according to classical Hanafi law when the person actually 
undertaking the contract did not have the shar`i capacity to do so - for example, a 
discriminating minor, where the effect of the contract is suspended on the consent of 
the wali.  The majority of non-Hanafi jurists held such contracts not to be valid and the 
current Jordanian law applied in the West Bank does not allow them to be concluded.79 
 
 This is indeed the case with many of the concerns addressed by the classical 
jurists writing on the contract of marriage.  The nature of the rules adopted by the JLPS, 
and the mandatory supervision and registration of the contract by an official of the 
shari`a court has removed questions connected to for example the marriage of minors, 
at least in law. The case material does however show examples, albeit rare, of 
applications for dissolution of marriage on the grounds of the invalidity of the contract, 
usually for reasons connected with the capacity or status of one of the parties, involving 
one of the permanent or temporary impediments to marriage.   
 
3.2 Capacity of Bride and Groom 
 
 There are two basic requirements that potential parties to a marriage contract 
must fulfill in order to be competent to conclude the contract: sanity and a minimum 
age.  These requirements, however, are not absolute -- parties not fulfilling them may 
still become a partner in a valid marriage -- but they constitute the standard rules to 
which there may be controlled and specified exceptions.  Article 5 of the JLPS sets out 
the two requirements as follows: 
 Capacity for marriage requires that the fiancés be sane and that the fiancé has 
 completed his sixteenth and the fiancée her fifteenth year. 
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3.2.1   Sanity 
 
 The rule on sanity of parties to the contract needs no legal explanation, 
soundness of mind being a normal requirement for validity of contracts.  The exception 
to this rule is set out in Article 8 of the JLPS: 
 The qadi may permit the marriage of a person who is afflicted by insanity or 
 ‘imbecility’ (`uth) provided that it is established by medical report that 
 marriage is in that person's interest. 
 
 This provision is interesting from a theoretical point of view (no case material 
having been found on the subject), in its positive phrasing, as opposed to the negative 
terminology of its predecessor in the JLFR, where the following text was included at 
the end of a longer article dealing with permanent prohibitions on marriage: 
 No insane man or woman may be married unless there is a necessity; if the 
 necessity is there, then they may be married by their guardian with the consent 
 of the qadi. (Article 16). 
 
 The above JLFR text was taken from the OLFR (Article 9), which removed 
from the hands of the wali the absolute discretion in the marriage of an insane ward that 
lay with him under classical Hanafi law.  The JLPS, in its turn, makes no reference at 
all to the role of the wali and places the matter entirely in the hands of the qadi, with a 
beneficial interest having to be established by recourse to medical opinion, rather than 
the wali deciding that necessity requires such a marriage.  It has been, in short, an 
interesting progression towards judicial rather than familial determination of the 
interest of an adult person not competent to contract a marriage in his or her own right. 
 
 137 
 Samara notes that to some extent, the JLPS text conforms to the Shafi`i 
position, which included permission for the wali to marry an insane minor if there was 
a need (which could be established for instance by the testimony of two doctors) or if 
there was an interest for the ward in such a marriage.  The Shafi`i rule, however, differs 
according to which wali was involved and according to whether the ward was male or 
female, as well as between degrees of insanity.80 
 
3.2.2   Age 
 
 The introduction of minimum ages for a Muslim marriage in the Middle East 
began in 1917 with the OLFR. The majority position of all classical schools of law held 
that minors could be contracted in marriage by their guardians, although consummation 
was not permitted until the minor was physically ready to enter a sexual relationship.81 
The differences between the schools centre on the role of the wali, marriage guardian, 
which again depended upon the degree of relationship to the ward, the sex of the ward 
and the status of the female ward (single or divorced/widowed).82 
 
 Furthermore, the schools distinguished a ‘minor’ from a ‘major’ through 
physical phenomena, rather than by a set age, with the onset of puberty signalling the 
end of legal minority.83 Certain ages were, however, for the purposes of the law, 
identified as the minimum and maximum ages at which puberty was presumed to have 
been reached.  The majority held the minimum age to be twelve for a boy and nine for a 
girl, with the maximum at fifteen years for both; Abu Hanifa held the maximum to be 
eighteen for males and seventeen for females.84 These three sets of ages were to have a 
bearing on the development of the law on the relation of age to marriage competence.   
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 It seems likely that the marrying of minor wards was an established practice in 
Palestine, as elsewhere, before the twentieth century, although it is not possible to tell 
how broadly. Motzki, in his consideration of child marriage in seventeenth century 
Palestine based on the work of the Ramla mufti Khayr al-Din, concludes that marriages 
involving one or two minor parties were probably not uncommon, but similarly 
discerns, albeit tentatively, a comparatively high rate of breakdown of such marriages, 
and notes that the option of puberty was ‘commonly invoked’.85 He sees financial 
factors as involved in the practice, as does Shaham, who includes as factors 
encouraging the marriage of minor girls the motivation to preserve the integrity of 
family property and to relieve the natal family of the support of girls.86 Even as the 
momentum for change took hold, Badran notes that in early twentieth century Egypt, 
the establishment of a minimum age of marriage stood to benefit most immediately 
middle and upper class women, who had access to educational opportunities: this 
circumstance doubtless contributed to the problems she notes in enforcement of the 
Egyptian rules.87 
 
 It was upon the individual views of a few jurists, and citing various socio-
economic factors, that the Ottomans relied in making the ages of twelve for the boy and 
nine for the girl, already recognised as the minimum age of puberty, the minimum age 
of marriage in the OLFR.88 Article 7 of the OLFR states that: 
 
 No-one may marry a boy who has not completed his 12th year or a girl who 
 has not completed her 9th. 
 
 As well as the minimum age, an age of full competence for marriage was 
introduced: eighteen years completed by the male and seventeen by the female.89 The 
setting of these ages drew upon the maximum ages of puberty according to Abu Hanifa 
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and at these ages the parties attained full legal majority (rushd) (i.e. beyond puberty, 
bulugh) and were fully competent to marry.  For an adolescent between the minimum 
ages of twelve or nine and legal majority (eighteen and seventeen) marriage could be 
authorised by the qadi provided the party concerned had reached puberty and the qadi 
held them to be able to sustain such an undertaking; the female also had to have her 
guardian's consent.90 This discretion of the qadi age-zone between the minimum age of 
marriage and full legal majority was taken over into the personal status codes of several 
Arab states that emerged later in the century. 
 
 The introduction of provisions of substantive law laying down minimum ages of 
marriage was thus an Ottoman innovation, and the original OLFR text was also quite 
absolute.  Article 52 of the OLFR declared as irregular (fasid) a marriage where one of 
the parties did not fulfill the conditions of competence at the time of the contract; and 
Article 77 stated that it was ‘absolutely forbidden’ for parties to remain in an irregular 
(or void) marriage.  Later provisions modelled on the OLFR modified this rather 
absolutist position. 
 
 It has already been noted that when the British took over the administration of 
Palestine, they left in place the OLFR and its accompanying procedural legislation. In 
the Palestine Criminal Code of 1936, when carrying over from the Ottoman Penal Code 
the penalties stipulated for non-compliance with registration requirements, the British 
introduced changes in the age of marriage and of legal majority.  The latter was set at 
eighteen for both sexes, while officially there was a criminal sanction for anyone 
involved in the marriage of a girl under fifteen, the age of full legal majority according 
to the Majalla.   However, a ‘good defence’ to this text was provided to accommodate 
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the existing rules of the OLFR as the personal status law of Muslims, and no attempt 
was made to introduce such legislation in the shari`a courts or, it appears, to enforce it 
in general.91 During the same period, in Egypt, a different approach was being taken 
towards preventing the marriage of minors. One of the first demands of the Egyptian 
Feminists’ Union in 1923 was the establishment in law of a minimum age for marriage, 
at sixteen for females and eighteen for males; this was achieved the same year with a 
decree forbidding the registration of marriage where the parties were below these ages. 
By all accounts, this legislation was not particularly effective -- in Margot Badran’s 
words, it ‘demonstrated the limits of legal reform,’92 even when followed by 
subsequent legislation denying judicial remedy in the case of unregistered marriages. A 
major weakness appears to have been the lack of reliable means of establishing ages.93 
Some decades after the Egyptian legislation, the Jordanians followed the Ottoman 
precedent of setting a substantive minimum age, but used the procedural approach to 
add some flexibility into the provision. 
 
 The four articles in the OLFR on the competence of parties to the contract of 
marriage were condensed in the JLFR into a single one, Article 4: 
It is a condition in competence for marriage that the fiancé has completed his 
eighteenth year and the fiancée her seventeenth. 
 a) If an adolescent male who has not completed his eighteenth year wishes to 
 marry and has recourse to the qadi, the qadi may permit his marriage if he is 
 satisfied that he has completed his fifteenth year and is capable of taking on 
 marriage. 
b)  Similarly, if an adolescent female who has reached (root: balagha) her 
fifteenth year but has not completed her eighteenth has recourse to the qadi 
and requests him to permit a marriage with the consent of her wali, then if the 
qadi considers her to be capable of taking on marriage he may permit it. 
 
 The above article contained the same ages of full legal majority as the OLFR, 
set a new minimum age of marriage and provided for the discretion of the qadi in the 
 141 
age-zone in between.  There are two points of confusion in the article, the first 
noticeable in the use of the verb ‘reach’ (balagha) 'the female who has reached her 
fifteenth year’.  Elsewhere in the article, as indeed in the OLFR, the verb is either 
tamma or akmala, both meaning to complete or to finish.  The literal translation 
indicates that it was originally legal to marry females aged fourteen years and one day; 
given that according to Article 127 of the JLFR any mention of  ‘year’ indicated the 
lunar or hijri calendar, this in fact sanctioned marriage for a girl of under fourteen years 
of age according to the solar or Gregorian calendar. An amendment was swiftly 
introduced changing ‘fifteenth’ to ‘sixteenth.’94    
 
 The second point of confusion in the JLFR, again regarding the female, was 
whether she attained full competence, or legal majority, at the age of seventeen or 
eighteen.95 The first paragraph of Article 4 states the age of competence for the female 
as seventeen years completed (i.e. aged seventeen) while in 4(b) the discretion of the 
qadi age-zone for the female is identified as between fifteen (as amended) and the 
completion of her eighteenth year - that is, aged eighteen. Seventeen was of course the 
age set by Abu Hanifa as the maximum age of puberty for the female.96 On the other 
hand, Article 279 of the Jordanian Penal Code takes the upper limit, providing for a 
prison sentence of one to six months for anyone marrying or being involved in the 
marriage of a girl aged under eighteen without ascertaining that her wali agrees to the 
marriage.  
 At the bottom end of the discretion-of-the-qadi age-zone there is again a certain 
amount of variation.  In the majority of contracts in the survey where court consent was 
registered for the marriage of the bride, the age of the female is registered as sixteen, 
although there are some fifteen-year-olds and even brides of fourteen, who were 
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presumably fifteen by the lunar calendar. There was the occasional registration of the 
qadi's consent for the marriage of a male below the age of legal majority -- boys aged  
sixteen to seventeen.  
 
 In some cases, although the bride was clearly within the discretion-of-the-qadi 
age zone, no court consent was registered in the contract, despite having been in some 
cases included in the documentation upon which the contract was based; the practice of 
particular ma’dhuns serving certain outlying villages is clearly implicated in some 
repeat examples. The timing of the consent given by the qadi to the marriage of 
sixteen-year-old girls was ruled by the Amman Shari`a Appeal Court as constituting a 
case to answer on the grounds of lack of competence of a bride claiming the consent, 
registered in the contract, was given after the marriage.97 
 
 Very occasionally, the contracts revealed examples of registration of the 
approval of the qadi in implementation of Article 6 of the JLFR: 
 Neither the qadi nor his deputy shall allow a marriage where there is a 20 year 
 difference in age [between the spouses] before ascertaining the consent of the 
 youngest party and the fact that they consent to [the marriage] without force or 
 coercion, and that their interest is served thereby. 
 
 Anderson described this article as ‘the most interesting innovation’ peculiar to 
the JLFR.98 It appears to address the social phenomenon of older men taking sometimes 
very young women in marriage, often in a polygamous union.  Issues of fully voluntary 
consent may be complicated in many cases, but particularly so by such circumstances, 
combining the authority represented by the prospective bridegroom, the youth of the 
woman, and the financial benefits of such a marriage in the event of enthusiasm of the 
bride's parents for the match. The introduction of this provision in the JLFR, which has 
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no basis in classical law, provided for the consent of the woman to be given more than 
the usual scrutiny, and gave room for the discretion of the qadi to be withheld.  
However, by 1957, cases in the Amman Appeal Court had established that Article 6 
was to be interpreted as constrained by Article 4, and that the qadi's permission for the 
age difference was only needed where one of the spouses (clearly most usually the 
woman) were under the age of full competence (rushd)99 and so in any case needed the 
qadi's permission to marry.  Thus, in the majority of contracts in the sample contracts 
involving an age difference of twenty years or more, the approval of the court for the 
age difference was not explicitly registered.100 Variations on the theme of the Jordanian 
position were included in some subsequent Arab codifications of family law.101 In the 
meantime, in the 1976 JLPS, the equivalent provision confirmed the Appeal Court’s 
interpretation of the original article in the JLFR: 
 The contract [of marriage] may not be concluded for a woman who has not 
 completed her 18th year if her fiancé is more than 20 years older than her, 
 unless the qadi has ascertained her consent and choice and made sure that this 
 marriage is in her interest. (Article 7) 
 
 There are three modifications made by this article to its predecessor in the 
JLFR.  Firstly, the provision refers to the woman only, rather than to the ‘youngest 
party’.  The party concerned will probably always be the bride, so the JLPS is in this 
sense more realistic, particularly since a man in this position could always end the 
marriage by talaq.  However, it is in one way the exception, since elsewhere the JLPS 
adopts the approach of making provisions previously applicable only to the woman 
explicitly applicable to both spouses.  The second change is the use of the positive 
approach in instructing the qadi to ascertain the free consent and choice of the bride to 
such a marriage, rather than ensuring that she has accepted it ‘without force or 
coercion’, as under the JLFR.  Finally, and most significantly, the JLPS text restricts 
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these instructions to the qadi to those cases where the woman is under eighteen. The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the JLPS states explicitly that it was never intended that 
all marriages involving a twenty-year age difference should be prevented, as might 
have been deduced from the terms of the JLFR, but that protection in this matter 
should be given to the woman under the age of legal majority (rushd)102 Under the 
JLPS, once the woman has completed her eighteenth year, the qadi has no role to play 
in ascertaining whether in fact the marriage is in her interest and is being concluded 
by her own free will. This clarification did not meet with unqualified approval. In a 
memorandum to members of the Jordanian Parliament, the Amman-based Business 
and Professional Women's Federation recommended that Article 7 should be amended 
to provide that no marriage involving an age difference of twenty years or more 
should be allowed to take place at all, except in cases of  ‘serious emergency and clear 
benefit.’ A working paper by an Amman lawyer observes that the current provision 
appears to have forgotten that consent can be forced, and that ‘this is what happens in 
fact’; the law should therefore be stricter and return to the lines of the JLFR, making 
such marriages conditional upon a clear necessity, benefit to both spouses, and no 
coercion.103 As to the views of the commentators, Sirtawi approves of it as a 
legitimate exercise of siyasa shar`iyya, while Samara appears more hesitant.104 
 
 It remains to consider the provisions of the JLFR on breaches of the conditions 
of capacity. The law reproduced the OLFR article to the effect that a marriage was 
irregular if the parties did not fulfill the conditions of competence at the time of the 
contract105 and backed it up with Article 279 of the Penal Code which laid down a 
penalty of a prison sentence of up to six months for any person involved formally in a 
marriage that conflicts with the provisions of the relevant family law and for any person 
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involved in the marriage of a girl who has not completed her fifteenth year. On the 
other hand, the JLFR provided for such marriages in certain circumstances to be 
recognised, in effect, as valid, by setting claims for their dissolution outside the 
jurisdiction of the court: 
Claims of a marriage falling irregular due to the young age [of the spouses] 
shall not be heard if the wife has given birth or pregnancy is apparent, or if the 
two parties at the time of the claim being brought are competent according to 
the requirements of Article 4 [of this law]. (Article 30) 
 
This carried over into the current law, so that once again the conditions for competence 
set out in the JLPS are not in fact absolute.106 The only change made to the wording of 
the pre-existing texts in Article 43 of the JLPS is to deny the hearing of claims for 
irregularity of marriage where the woman is ‘pregnant’ as opposed to ‘where pregnancy 
is apparent’, which may have conceivably caused problems under the 1951 law, 
although there is no case material to suggest that this was in fact the case. Decisions 
from the Amman Appeal Court on the JLPS maintain the established position: that 
pregnancy of the wife means a claim for dissolution on the grounds of being underage 
cannot be heard, since ‘by pregnancy [it is clear that] the woman is capable of/ready for 
(ahlan li) marriage’.107  
 
 Thus, an action raised by the court or on behalf of the bride (usually the 
underage party) has to be instituted before the girl has completed her fifteenth year if 
the marriage is to be declared irregular and dissolved by the court. In 1980 the Amman 
Appeal Court heard a claim raised by a woman for the dissolution of her marriage on 
the grounds that she had been ‘in her fifteenth year’ at the time of the contract, rather 
than having completed it. The decision noted that previous to this she had also 
submitted in person a claim for maintenance against her husband; the court examined 
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the papers and found her now to have completed her fifteenth year, and dismissed her 
petition. The problematic implications of this include that the person who acted as wali 
for an underage bride is obviously unlikely to raise a claim on her behalf -- not least 
because he would be implicating himself in a criminal office. A 1977 Amman Appeal 
Court decision showed the bride’s mother recognised by the Court as the girl’s wasi 
(authorised agent) and claiming that her brother (the girl’s uncle) had married her 
twelve-year-old daughter off ‘in the Bedouin manner’ without her knowledge or 
consent. The 1996 JNCW-drafted suggestions for amendments to the JLPS propose to 
add a phrase to the effect that the court shall not hear these claims if the spouses fulfil 
the criteria of capacity at the time ‘and are content for marital life to continue’ - which 
would seem a useful recourse, at least in law, for girls illegally married before their 
fifteenth birthdays and unwilling to stay in the union.108 
 With the introduction of the JLPS in 1976, the rules on the minimum age of 
spouses were changed in two ways.  Article 5 of the JLPS, quoted in full at the 
beginning of this section, requires the fiancé to have completed his sixteenth year and 
the fiancée her fifteenth; the age of capacity for the girl thus remains fifteen, while the 
minimum age for males is raised a year to sixteen.109 These ages, according to Article 
185 of the JLPS, are to be calculated by the lunar calendar. Secondly, the JLPS 
effectively abolished the ‘discretion-of-the-qadi’ age zone, leaving assessment of the 
wisdom of a girl’s marriage before the age of full legal majority to her guardian, and 
only bringing in the qadi to give special consent if the wali is refusing,110 while no 
special scrutiny is required by law of the marriage of a boy under the age of rushd but 
over sixteen. 
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 On the face of it, the contract sample does not suggest that there was a tendency 
for the age of marriage to drop as a result of the ending of the need for the qadi's 
consent until the ages of seventeen/eighteen.  The mean age of the bride in the three 
years included in the sample contracts was the same, at eighteen, while that of the 
husband was twenty in 1965, 21 in 1975 and twenty in 1985. The age group within 
which the largest number of women married in the sample contracts remained the same 
for all three years: seventeen-nineteen. However, the contracts did show an increase in 
the percentage of females registered as marrying below the age of seventeen from 
14.5% of the sample in 1965 to 23.3% in 1975 and 24.3% in 1985. For males, the age 
group within which the majority married rose from the 20-22 range in 1965 and 1975 to 
the 23-25 age group in 1985.  
 
 The apparent rise in the percentage of females of sixteen or under being 
married, if borne out by a wider sample, might be at least partly attributable to the 
greater likelihood of the correct ages of the brides being registered.  The registration of 
births under the Jordanians was increasing in standardisation during the 1960s111 and in 
the West Bank was probably hastened also by the large population of refugees, for 
whom UNRWA provided shelter and relief supplies, requiring registration of family 
members.  After the Israeli occupation, birth certificates were also increasingly 
registered by non-refugees, such documentation providing the basis for the issuing, at 
the age of sixteen, of an ID card by the military authorities.112 It is increasingly unlikely 
that the age of an adolescent female will be testified to by her wali and/or elders of her 
village, a process which must be assumed to have led to many women being registered 
officially in the marriage contract as some months or years older (or, conceivably, 
younger) than they actually were, for the purposes of marriage. 
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 Earlier work by Ibrahim Ata (based on questionnaires) found that most females 
interviewed had married in the sixteen-twenty age group; the mean age of marriage for 
males included in his survey was 23.6 and for women 19.6.113 With specific regard to 
Ramallah, Fahoum Shalabi of Birzeit University reported similar findings, to the effect 
that over the years 1986-1989, the age group within which the largest number of 
women married was fifteen-nineteen, and for men it was 20-24; the average ages of 
marriage he found to be twenty for women and 25.5 for men.114 A wide-ranging 
demographic survey by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics published in 1996 
found the average age of marriage for men to be 23 and for women eighteen.115 An 
extensive study into early marriage carried out by the Women’s Affairs Centre in Gaza 
found that 41.8% of females in their survey married between the ages of twelve-
seventeen, with 13.3% marrying under the age of fifteen.116 The PCBS reports a rise in 
marriage age for both sexes between 1991 and 1995.117  
 
 In general, such figures support both the general impression that during the 
1970s and 1980s age at first marriage rose, and probably continues to do so, a 
phenomenon connected to higher and wider levels of education and increasing 
urbanisation, and a temporary rise in early marriage in the early years of the intifada.118 
At the same time, they give justification for the concern currently being articulated in 
Palestinian society at the extent of early marriage, particularly of girls. Following the 
election of the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 1996, the Women’s Affairs 
Technical Committee, an umbrella group representing various political women’s 
organisations, issued a statement identifying a number of issues that it suggested should 
be included in Palestinian laws and regulations to be promulgated by the Legislative 
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Council. These included a minimum age of marriage for women of eighteen, as a 
‘priority for lobbying.’119 The final session of the Palestinian Model Parliament: 
Women and Legislation held in Gaza in 1998 proposed an age of eighteen solar years 
for males and females, with circumstances in which exceptional cases would be 
allowed to marry below that age to be specified exhaustively; lawyer and rights activist 
Asma Khadr writes that there is a ‘quasi-consensus’ that the age of marriage needs to 
be raised, and proposes similar limits of eighteen years (solar) with permission for 
sixteen year olds to marry to be given by the qadi ‘where necessity requires it.’120 
 
 Final note might be made of developments in the Gaza Strip under the 
Palestinian Authority. In Gaza, the Egyptians had not introduced their own rules of 
the age of marriage but had left in place the rules from the OLFR, giving capacity to 
marry to males at eighteen and females at seventeen (lunar calendar) with no marriage 
allowed for a boy aged under twelve or a girl under nine, and the qadi’s permission 
needed for marriage of adolescents who had reached puberty but not the age of 
capacity.121 Research for the WCLAC study showed that in a sample of 259 contracts 
registered at the Rafah court in the years 1989, 1992-94, 21% of brides were 
registered as aged sixteen or under, while in the sample of 472 contracts registered at 
the Gaza City court the figure was 34%.122  In his first decision on substantive issues, 
the first Palestinian-appointed Qadi al-Quda, Shaykh Muhammad Abu Sardane, 
brought this part of Gazan law largely into conformity with that applying in the West 
Bank, setting the ages of competence at fifteen hijri for females and sixteen hijri for 
males. The text of the Qadi al-Quda’s decision, issued in December 1995 and in force 
as of January 1996, is worth citing in some detail: 
Having regard to the social, medical and humanitarian injury that 
results from the marriage of youngsters below the age of puberty as 
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occurs in the shari`a courts of the Gaza Strip; and given that the 
prevention of injury is in the public interest; and given that in 
matters of shar`i interpretation (ijtihad) the most appropriate of the 
views of the jurists is taken to realise the interest of the Muslims... 
1) the fiancée shall be competent for marriage if she has 
completed her fifteenth year, and the fiancé his sixteenth; the qadi 
shall not permit the marriage of persons below this age; 
2) if the fiancée has completed her fifteenth year (that is, 
fourteen years and seven months by the solar calendar) the qadi 
permits her marriage until she completes her seventeenth year, at 
which time she may marry without the qadi’s permission, having 
regard for existing requirements and after the court has completed 
the [necessary] procedures; and if the fiancé has completed his 
sixteenth year (that is, fifteen years six months by the solar 
calendar) the qadi permits his marriage until he completes his 
eighteenth year, at which time he may marry without the qadi’s 
permission, having regard for existing requirements and after the 
court has completed the [necessary] procedures; 
3) the hijri year shall be the basis for calculating age, and official 
birth certificates and other official documents shall be relied upon in 
ascertaining age. In the event that an official document gives only 
the year [of birth] and not the day or month, the fiancée or fiancé 
shall be held to have been born on the last day of the twelfth month 
of that year...123  
 
 Of particular interest in this decision is the re-institution of the ‘discretion-of-
the-qadi’ age-zone, which had already disappeared from the Jordanian law applied in 
the West Bank. Also instructive is the approach to official documents lacking full 
dates of birth -- to instruct the Gaza courts to assume the youngest possible age for the 
party involved, so that there may be no possibility (in law) of marriage below the age 
specified as the minimum.  The alacrity with which this decision was issued, and the 
interest in this area of law and practice among various sectors of civil society, might 
suggest it could be an early target for legislation by a Palestinian state. On the other 
hand, it is reported that the decision irritated some parts of the Gaza population, and 
as noted in the conclusion, leading members of the shar`i judiciary have yet to lend 
unequivocal support to a further rise in the minimum age of marriage. 124 
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3.2.3 The Role of the marriage guardian 
 
 The legal requirement that remains in the shari`a-based codes of many Arab 
states that women must have their guardian’s consent for their first marriage is a 
target for legal reform and activism on the part of various sectors of civil society in 
Palestine and elsewhere who see in the institution the continuation in law of 
patriarchal authority over women. 125  The identity of the wali is defined in Article 9 of 
the JLPS: 
 The wali in marriage is the paternal relative (`asabah) so qualified in the order 
 set out in the soundest opinion (ar-rajih) of the school of Abu Hanifa. 
 
This, then, is one matter in which the JLPS makes no changes whatsoever to classical 
Hanafi law.126  The Hanafi rules set at the head of the hierarchy the male descendants 
starting with the son, followed by male ascendants through the father and then 
continuing through full and agnatic brothers, nephews, uncles and cousins until the 
male agnates are exhausted.127 If there are no male agnates to act as wali for the female, 
one Hanafi view held that walaya (guardianship) passes to the ruler or to his delegate 
(the qadi). Abu Hanifa himself held that in such circumstances walaya passes to the 
mother, then the paternal grandmother, and so on, before passing to the ruler; this 
position is reflected in the Kitab al-Ahkam.128  
 
 No other school of law gave walaya in marriage to women guardians, and in 
support of the majority opinion Samara cites several hadiths.129 The JLPS does not 
address explicitly what happens if there is no surviving male agnate: Article 12 merely 
states that if the nearest wali is not available, guardianship passes to the next, and if the 
next closest is unavailable, in certain circumstances it passes to the qadi. The compiler 
of the collection of Jordanian shar`i legislation, Zhahir, refers the reader to Article 35 
of Kitab al-Ahkam, which deals with the `asabah; al-`Arabi, on the other hand, refers to 
Articles 35-37 of the same compilation, which include the provision for walaya to be 
transferred to female relatives.130 The law does not refer to gender when stipulating the 
requisite characteristics of the wali: 
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 The wali must be sane, past puberty (baligh), and a Muslim if the fiancée is 
 Muslim.(Article 10) 
 
 In the list of qualifications that Samara sets out in his commentary to this 
article, he cites sanity, puberty, liberty, being a Muslim, being just, and being male, 
‘because a woman can marry neither herself nor another.’ He considers that Article 9 
has required the wali to be male, through its reference to the `asaba, so that it is not 
significant that Article 10 omits this quality. Sirtawi, on the other hand, addressing the  
same point, does not include being male in his list of qualifications, making his 
required characteristics up to six with the inclusion of the Shafi`i condition of 
judgement unimpaired by illness or confusion. Both jurists note that the qualification of 
‘being just’ was disputed among the classical scholars.131  The case material examined 
for this study shed no light on whether or not a woman might assume guardianship 
functions under the terms of the JLPS. Historically, Tucker finds that in seventeenth 
and eighteenth century Palestine, ‘the muftis dealt with the mother-guardian as a normal 
phenomenon, and held her to the same standards as they would any male guardian’, 
although this appears to have been more commonly through having been appointed 
wasi by the deceased father than in the line of walaya.132  
 
 Having established his identity, the role of the wali is connected in law with 
issues of consent -- particularly the consent of young women to their marriage -- and, 
on the other side, of the fully autonomous legal capacity of adult women. The issue of 
consent recalls the pre-codification rules of all the classical schools allowing certain 
guardians to contract in marriage their minor wards who, by dint of being minor, were 
not in a position to give legally recognised consent. This form of ‘coercive 
guardianship’ extended to adult bikrs for the non-Hanafi schools, although it could be 
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exercised only by the father or in some cases the grandfather, and having the adult 
woman’s informed consent was recommended.133 Nowadays, since generally the law 
prohibits (and indeed criminalises) the marriage of minors, and states that coercion 
renders a marriage irregular, the issue addressed in shari`a-based codifications of 
family law is consensual guardianship over adult females: whether a woman past 
puberty (bulugh) or legal majority (rushd) has to have her wali's consent for her 
marriage. 
 
 Of the four Sunni schools, the majority opinion held that a woman always 
required the consent of her wali to her marriage:  ‘there is no marriage without a 
wali.’134  El `Alami notes in explanation that  
men are generally believed to be relatively more experienced than women; 
thus the basic reason for a guardian acting on behalf of a woman is to protect 
her interests and her honour and that of her family, it being improper for a 
woman to mix in male society outside her immediate family.135 
 
For his part, Samara insists that the fact that the wali's consent is a prerequisite for 
marriage is not due to some ‘inadequacy of reason’ of the woman, but because ‘the 
consequences of her marriage are not confined to the woman alone but [involve] her 
relatives in order to prevent dishonour.’136  
 
 The Hanafi jurists were divided on this issue. While some agreed with the 
majority position, Abu Hanifa himself differed and held that once past puberty a 
woman could choose her own husband and undertake the contract herself, without the 
consent of her wali.137 Walaya exists over the minor, according to this view, because of 
the inadequacy of the reason or judgement of the minor, which applies to both male and 
female wards in the Hanafi view, and which is overcome with the reaching of puberty; 
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thus, just as a woman may dispose of her property once she is of age, so may she 
dispose of her person in marriage.138 Both of these views have a history in the area, 
certainly in law and, at least on occasion, in practice. Imber points out that this was one 
of the very few areas of family law in which the sixteenth century Ottoman sultan 
Sulayman intervened, forbidding the marriage of women without the permission of 
their guardians. Fatwas from Ebu’s-su`ud insisting that judges in the Empire did not 
have the licence to act on alternative Hanafi opinions indicate that some were minded 
to do so, giving effect to Abu Hanifa’s view.139 In succeeding centuries, Tucker’s 
reading of fatwa collections establishes that the muftis consistently affirmed Abu 
Hanifa’s view, to the effect that a sane, adult woman could choose her own husband 
and make her own marriage arrangements, without having to establish the consent of 
her wali, and conversely, that she could not be married off without her freely given 
consent. The wali’s rights were protected through his ability to have his ward’s 
marriage dissolved in the event of his subsequent objection (on grounds of lack of 
kafa’a or dower) being established to be well founded. Tucker notes, however, that 
many of these fatwas  
pitted the jurists against irregular social practices, especially those whereby a 
family attempted to arrange a marriage without taking proper account of legal 
procedure and a young woman’s rights.140 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, Qadri Pasha selected Abu Hanifa’s view for 
inclusion in the Kitab al-Ahkam: 
 
Art. 34: The wali is a condition for the validity of the marriage of the minor boy 
and girl and those major persons who are not mentally competent. The wali is 
not a condition for the validity of the marriage of free, sane, major (past 
puberty) men and women -- rather, their marriage is executed without a wali.  
 
On the shar`i sources adduced for each of the two positions, the Egyptian jurist Abu 
Zahra concedes that Quranic citations validate the conclusion of her marriage contract 
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by a woman without her wali, but he observes that ‘it is preferable that her wali do the 
contract for her, or that he consent to it.’141 The combination of strong custom and 
prevailing attitudes on this issue, and the differences among the classical jurists, is 
reflected in a relative obscurity in the legal texts governing it in current Jordanian law, 
as illustrated by the differing views of the commentators. On the shar`i sources, Samara 
comes to the conclusion that: 
 the proofs adduced by the  majority for the condition of the wali in the 
contract  of  marriage, and that the woman does not possess it, are stronger and 
clearer  and this [position] should be the one on which to proceed.142  
 
 He goes on to observe that the JLPS has taken the view of the majority in 
making the wali a condition in the contract of marriage, while the hierarchy of walis is 
in accordance with the Hanafi school. Sirtawi, on the other hand, cites the evidence for 
the various views and concludes that the strongest (ar-rajih) is that of Abu Hanifa, 
which is the position taken up by the JLPS. Samara supports his position initially with 
reference to Article 9 of the JLPS, and subsequently also to Articles 10 and 13 as well; 
Sirtawi cites Articles 13 and 22 for his premise.143 
 Articles 9 and 10, as noted above, define the identity and qualifications of the 
wali; Article 13 provides that: 
 The consent of the wali is not a condition in the marriage of the sane thayyib 
 who has completed her eighteenth year. 
 
 Samara claims that although all are in accordance with or citing Hanafi law, 
these three articles indicate that in the case of the bikr, the JLPS has taken the Shafi`i 
view and requires the consent of the wali. He concedes that the law does not explicitly 
state the requirement of the wali in the contract of marriage, but argues that since the 
wali is explicitly not required in the marriage of a major thayyib, it is to be deduced that 
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the wali is required for the bikr, and that a bikr may not conclude her own contract 
without her wali.144   
 
 The above Article 13 is indeed the strongest indication in the JLPS that the wali 
is a requirement in the marriage of a major bikr.  It is a rephrasing of Article 34 of 
Kitab al-Ahkam, cited above, omitting the first sentence and changing ‘major man or 
woman’ to ‘thayyib’ in the second.  However, given that there is no explicit text with 
regard to the major bikr, an argument can be made for the recourse provided for in such 
circumstances to classical Hanafi position.145 Indeed, it is also arguable that the 
conclusion from Article 13 is simply that a thayyib under eighteen does need her wali's 
consent - which certainly is the case under the JLPS, and which conforms with the 
classical Hanafi position apart from the substitution of the age of eighteen for actual 
puberty.  This is Sirtawi's conclusion; he observes that Abu Hanifa's view is taken with 
regard to the major thayyib in Article 13, and with regard to the major bikr in Article 
22,146 which contains the rules on kafa'a and provides:  
 If the bikr or thayyib who has reached her 18th year denies having a wali 
 and marries herself [to a man], and a wali subsequently presents himself, 
 then if she married herself to an equal the contract stands.... 
 
 This article assumes that both the major thayyib and the major bikr can contract 
a marriage on their own behalf and without a wali.  However, it is nowhere near an 
explicit adoption of Abu Hanifa’s position on this. With regard to women under 
eighteen but above puberty, the JLPS is slightly clearer: the consent of the wali is a 
requirement, whether this be her actual wali or the court exercising its walaya on his 
behalf. Article 6 provides: 
 a)  the qadi has the right, upon petition, to marry the bikr who has completed 
 her fifteenth year to an equal in the event of the wali who is neither her father 
 nor her grandfather prohibiting it [root: `adala] without legitimate reason; 
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b)   however, if the prohibition [on her marriage] comes from her father or 
grandfather, then her petition shall be considered only if she has completed her 
eighteenth year and the prohibition is without legitimate reason. 
 
 Combined with Article 22, which states explicitly that a thayyib over eighteen 
does not need the consent of her wali to her marriage, it is clear that although the JLPS 
sets full competence for marriage at fifteen years completed for the female, it requires 
her to have the consent of a marriage guardian until she reaches the age of full legal 
majority (rushd).   
 
 Article 6 of the JLPS is interesting for several reasons.  It is, as noted above, 
clearly based on the classical Hanafi rules on the veto or prohibition of the wali to a 
reasonable marriage by his ward - however, the Kitab al-Ahkam article on this subject 
deals with the wali's veto on the marriage to an equal of a minor female ward, since 
major females according to the classical rules had no need of a wali in their marriage.147 
In addition, the classical rule as set out by Qadri Pasha made no exception for the 
prohibition by the father or grandfather, since the identity of the wali was relevant only 
in defining the right of a woman married as a minor to the ‘option of puberty.’  
 
 In 1951, the JLFR kept closer to the Hanafi position in that respect, by not 
distinguishing between the identity of the wali blocking the marriage, but implied 
even more strongly an adoption of the Shafi`i rules by stating in the parallel provision, 
Article 5, that: 
The qadi has the right, upon petition, to marry the bikr and the thayyib who 
has completed her seventeenth year to an equal, in the event of prohibition by 
the wali and his refusal to marry her. 
 
 This text strongly implied that both bikr and thayyib still needed the consent of 
a wali, either her family guardian or the qadi in his place, after reaching the age of full 
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legal majority. The JLPS text on the prohibition of the wali does not go this far; but in 
Article 6(b), it states that the qadi cannot over-ride the veto of the father or grandfather 
until the bikr has completed her eighteenth year, and then only if the veto is ‘without 
legitimate reason.’  The first implication is that in this case, walaya is transferred to the 
qadi, although this is not explicitly stated. The second implication is that this does not 
apply to the thayyib, and no explicit reference is made to the thayyib between 
completing her fifteenth year (when, according to classical Hanafi law, if she has 
reached puberty she no longer needs the consent of her wali) and the age of eighteen, 
after which according to Article 13 she clearly does not need the consent of a guardian 
to her marriage.  
 
 Summing up his interpretation of the prevailing rules on walaya, Samara states 
that: 
Our law of personal status stipulates that there be a wali, and in that it has 
deviated from  the Hanafi school to the view of the majority ... but there may 
be cases when a woman marries herself, claiming she has no wali [according 
to Article 22] ... and a contract concluded without a wali is not listed as 
irregular or void, unlike one involving parties who are under the age of 
competence. 148 
 
  Samara's phrase ‘that there be a wali’ uses the term wujud, existence or 
presence; in this case, it must be understood as meaning that there must be a wali to 
give permission, rather than that the wali must conclude the contract for the woman or 
indeed be physically present at the session in which the contract is concluded.  The 
latter position cannot be substantiated under the terms of the JLPS, where the issue is 
whether or not the wali's consent is required.149 Even under the JLFR, the Amman 
Appeal Court stressed that the law: 
 does not stipulate the presence of the wali in the session during which the qadi 
 gives his consent for the fiancee to marry [i.e. in the discretion-of-the-qadi age 
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 zone before full legal majority] but the wali's consent to the contract is  
 required... If his consent is given before the contract ... then the contract is 
 valid.150  
 
 The only reference to a marriage contract concluded without the consent of a 
wali being held irregular in the published case material involved a girl of sixteen whose 
spouse was fifty. The girl in any case had not reached the age of legal majority and 
today, in accordance with Article 6 of the JLPS, would need the consent of the wali.151 
 
 In the marriage contracts examined for this study, the practice of the West Bank 
courts was to register the consent of the bride's wali even where it is clearly not 
required by law. Nevertheless, the odd exception bears out the conclusion that the adult 
bikr can in some circumstances marry without the consent of a wali.  In the 10% 
sample of contracts, total 857, only eleven failed to record the consent of the wali: three 
in 1965, two in 1975, and six in 1985. Often the exceptions coincided with those where 
the women were not represented by a wakil, since these two functions are most 
commonly combined. Thus, the only contract in the 1965 sample from Ramallah that 
registered the consent of neither wali nor court involved an eighteen year old bikr 
marrying a man who although being from the same village was resident abroad. The 
groom was represented in the contract session by his wakil, who was the bride's father.  
The contract showed ‘the consent of the husband's wakil, and of the wife for herself.’  
Thus, even under the JLFR, it was technically possible for an adult bikr to give herself 
in marriage on her own authority; however, given the particular circumstances of that 
contract, the theoretical possibility was probably made practical use of because of the 
presence of the woman's father, who would normally be her wali as well as acting as 
her wakil, but who in this case represented the absent groom.  In the 1985 sample, one 
bikr was married without registering the consent of her wali or the court, but she was 
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from the United States and was registered in the contract as a Christian. This was not a 
consistent position as regards marriage to foreign women.152  
 
 A number of the other cases that are the exception rather than the rule shed no 
light on what the law does actually permit, but do indicate what some court officials 
think it either does or should not allow.  Thus, for example, the other contracts in the 
1985 sample that registered the consent of neither court nor wali were all thayyibs, 
ranging in age from their early twenties to their early forties.153 In one, in the section 
assigned to register the details of consent to the marriage, the ma'dhun has written ‘the 
consent of the wife for herself as she is a thayyib who is over eighteen years old in 
accordance with Article 13 of the JLPS.’ Another added the same in rather less detail:  
‘the consent of the wife herself as she is a thayyib’.  
 
 In the JLFR texts, as noted above, there was an ambiguity as to the  ability of 
the thayyib to marry on her own authority, and while the sample in 1965 did show two 
divorcées marrying on their own authority, other contracts showed examples of the 
court's consent being substituted for that of the family wali in such cases.  One was the 
contract of a North American thayyib which included ‘the consent of the qadi by his 
general walaya’; in another, a divorcée in her forties entered a polygamous union in a 
contract that registered ‘her own consent and the permission of the qadi by virtue of his 
general walaya.’ These extra phrases added by the marriage registrars attached to the 
court suggest that they are following an established practice, or are adding them in the 
belief that really the woman, even if an adult thayyib, should have the consent of her 
wali to her marriage.  The majority of women, as shown by the table, also conform to 
this practice.  Apart from these very few exceptions, all the divorcées and widows in 
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the sample, let alone adult bikrs, registered the consent of a family wali to their 
marriage, no matter what their age. Thus, the sample included the contract of a divorcée 
of 75 who registered the consent of her paternal cousin to her new marriage; and, in 
perhaps the clearest example of the triumph of custom that appeared in the sample 
contracts, a sixty-year-old widow entering into a polygamous union, who brought in a 
man described as her neighbour and landlord to act as her wakil and whose consent to 
her marriage was registered in the contract.   
 
  The only court action in the case material seeking the over-riding of the veto of 
a wali also involved circumstances where arguably the woman did not need her wali's 
consent in any case, and therefore was not subject to his veto. The case was raised in 
1975 by a woman whose paternal grandfather as her wali was opposing her marriage to 
her fiancé.  The woman was a widow of 32; the court heard that the dower agreed 
between the couple was a proper dower and granted the woman a ruling of ‘prevention 
of objection to her marriage’ against her grandfather.  In giving the ruling, the court 
cited Article 5 of the JLFR and Article 34 of Qadri Pasha's compilation, the latter of 
which states that the wali is not a condition in the marriage of sane, major women.153 
Whether or not in 1975 this woman could have in theory gone ahead with her marriage 
on her own authority, without going to court, under the JLPS she certainly could have 
done by law but might have still raised a claim to obtain shar`i support for over-riding 
custom. 
 
 This case also involved the final aspect of walaya in marriage that should be 
outlined here.  The woman's father had emigrated and in his absence the paternal 
grandfather became the wali. The records of the shari`a courts usually record in detail 
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when walaya is transferred to a more distantly related wali in the absence of her nearest 
male agnate; for example in Hebron in 1985, one contract formally registered the qadi's 
approval of transfer of walaya to the woman's paternal cousin.  Where it is possible to 
contact the first wali however, usually his consent is sent by written document certified 
in a shari`a court, and the woman is represented by another male member of her family 
acting as wakil; this is the usual practice where the wali lives in another Middle Eastern 
state with a shar`i system permitting such facilities.154  
 
 In the vast majority of contracts included in the sample, walaya over the woman 
was exercised by her father -- in 270 out of the 327 contracts in the sample which 
registered the wali's consent in 1985, 244 out of 281 in 1975, and 193 out of 238 in 
1965. Second in frequency was the woman's brother,155 with the remaining marriages in 
the sample being conducted with the consent of paternal grandfathers, paternal uncles 
and great-uncles, paternal cousins, half-brothers on the father's side, father's cousins 
and in one case a second cousin on the father's side. 
  
 From the sample, one could conclude that the practice of the courts follows 
standard Islamic legal principles in sanctioning local custom where it does not conflict 
with the law   - that is, in regularly registering the consent of male members of the 
family to the marriage of female members, whatever their age and personal status. At 
the same time, the distinct lack of clarity in the law recalls Dawoud el-`Alami’s 
observation in regard to the similar obscurity of Moroccan law (prior to the 1993 
amendments) on the consent of the wali: 
The impression given is that the law is in this way vague enough to be applied 
in different ways according to the parties and the circumstances and is therefore 
adaptable to the needs of both liberal and the more conservative elements of 
Moroccan society.156 
 163 
 
In this manner, it might be argued, the legislature has sought to maintain some of the 
flexibility and discretion available to the qadi in the administration of shari`a personal 
status law pre-codification.  
 
 In both the West Bank and in Gaza, a vigorous debate followed suggestions 
by, inter alia, the Women’s Model Parliament that the need for the wali’s consent to 
the marriage of an adult woman be dispensed with in law and left to the realm of 
social custom and family negotiation. Based on the finding of the FAFO survey, 
Rema Hammami discusses the finding that 80% of men and 76% of women surveyed 
felt that the choice of a girl’s husband should be ‘mainly the daughter’s choice’157 -- 
weighting the daughter’s opinion and choice while maintaining the deference to that 
of the family. In this sense the current position in Jordanian law could be seen as an 
attempt to provide for that balance in legislation. At the same time, while there 
appears to be consensus supporting the prohibition of forced marriage, this does not 
necessarily betoken an agreement on the meaning of ‘consent’ -- or, conversely, of 
‘coercion’. This issue is complicated by the apparent inadequacy of redress in the 
event of the marriage being registered, when the contract documents are taken as 
absolute proof of consent, as discussed below in Chapter Seven. The shar`i 
establishment in the West Bank seems for the moment to be holding fast to the 
position that requires the guardian’s consent, as discussed further in the Conclusion. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
VARIATIONS ON THE THEME: DOWER, STIPULATIONS AND 
POLYGYNOUS UNIONS  
 The subjects dealt with in this chapter are covered in different ways in the 
contract of marriage. The dower is, according to the majority of the schools and the 
JLPS, an inalienable effect of the contract, and the standard contract forms issued by 
the Jordanian and now the Palestinian authorities set aside special sections designated 
for the detailing of its various component parts. Another section is allocated to special 
stipulations inserted by either party which attach to the contract to modify or clarify 
various of the otherwise prevailing rules that govern the marriage in law. These 
stipulations were rarely used in the contracts examined for this study, so in contrast to 
the section on dower, which is invariably filled out, this section was most commonly 
left blank. Finally, the same contract document is used in the event of a man marrying 
another wife in a polygynous union, but existing requirements for insertion of the 
parties’ personal status (single, married, divorced, widowed) make it possible to 
identify polygynous contracts. In case of both stipulations and polygyny, the 
particular format of the contract document can make a substantial difference in the 
protection of certain rights of the wife; the new contract document issued in 1995 
under the Palestinian National Authority, however, makes no change in regard to the 
first, and in regard to the second appears to undermine the prospects of access to 
information provided by the pre-existing Jordanian document in use in the West 
Bank.  
 
4.1    Dower and Tawabi` 
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 The institution of dower is governed in law and in the courts by clear and 
unequivocal rules which may, at the same time, stand in contradiction to the rules of 
local custom which direct practice in the majority of cases; this is most likely to be the 
case regarding the wife’s sole and absolute entitlement to the dower. In other aspects, 
however, the law explicitly accommodates the rule of custom. A common illustration 
of the legal maxim ‘custom ranks as a stipulation’ is the standard (pre-codification) 
Hanafi position that in the event of the relative proportions of prompt and deferred 
dower not being specified, the court would rule according to local custom on this 
issue. Looking at how the shari`a court in a Jordanian subdistrict dealt with dower in 
the 1960s and 1970s, Richard Antoun finds mahr ‘an excellent example of the varying 
modes of reception, acceptance and accommodation of local custom.’1 
 
 While it is always the case that the picture of what is going on in marriage 
trends gleaned from the court material is a very narrow, incomplete one, this is 
particularly the case with the dower. Behind the facts and figures registered in the 
marriage contract lie a host of complex socio-economic expectations and transactions, 
inter-family perceptions and gender interactions that affect the level of dower, the 
nature of the dower (what is given), what happens to the dower, who actually gets it, 
and what the dower actually means. The clearest example is the value of the dower, 
which is, apparently, rarely accurately represented in the figures registered in the 
marriage contracts. Dutch anthropologist Annalies Moors, in her study on women and 
property in twentieth century Nablus, notes that the registration of an ordinary prompt 
dower bears ‘at least some resemblance to what is given’, while the more recent 
pattern of registering a ‘token’ prompt dower -- a symbolic single dinar, for example -
- creates ‘a complete break between the amount stated in the contracts and the gifts 
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received.’2 Fahoum Shalabi, in his study of marriage contracts registered in the 
Ramallah court, does not analyse the registered prompt dower because ‘for social and 
religious reasons the real value is not shown.’3 Furthermore, any consideration of the 
registered sums of deferred dower must be set in perspective of the fact that in the 
event of divorce, most women renounce their rights to these sums in a khul` 
settlement, as described in Chapter Six below. That said, what the contracts can be 
taken as showing is what, in particular socio-economic contexts, the parties agree to 
have registered as the dower; and to what -- in most cases -- the wife would be 
entitled by law, should she have recourse to the courts.  
 
4.1.1 Basic rules 
 The JLPS deals in standard manner with mahr. Sirtawi’s definition reflects the 
dual basis of the wife’s entitlement to dower as held by the classical jurists: 
 The property required from the man to the woman by reason of the contract of 
 marriage or by reason of his sexual intercourse with her.4 
 
 The fact that the right of dower arises in part from the mere existence of the 
contract is seen in the rules that provide that the wife is due mahr in a valid marriage 
even where none has been specified in the contract.  The other source of the right, 
consummation of the marriage, is reflected for example in the rules that give a dower 
entitlement to a woman who has consummated an irregular marriage, since the 
irregular contract itself has no value, and no dower is due unless consummation has 
occurred; and in the fact that if divorce occurs in a valid marriage before 
consummation, the woman is due only half the dower specified in the contract.5 
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 The JLPS also stresses classical principles when it states in Article 61 that the 
mahr is the property of the wife alone and follows up with Article 62: 
 Neither the wife's father nor any of her relatives may take money or anything 
 else in return for marrying or delivering her to the husband, and the latter may 
 claim back anything taken from him [in this manner] in goods if extant or in 
 value if perishables.  
 
 This, as noted already, is where the law insists on a position rather less than 
wholeheartedly upheld in practice. Writing on the ‘unwritten laws’ affecting women 
in Palestine in 1931, Canaan observed that although the shari`a gave women the right 
to take the whole mahr, ‘custom deprives her of the greater part of it.’6 There are 
indications that this custom continues in some areas of the West Bank: the author of a 
1979 article on marriage expenses in the West Bank identified as a factor in the 
inflation of dower in the West Bank the fact that in certain poverty-stricken sectors of 
the rural population, families with few income-earners would use the opportunity of 
the dower due a daughter on her marriage to get some extra funds for the family.7 In 
Hebron in 1987, when local religious and tribal leaders convened a meeting to draw 
up a document setting out aspects of marriage that they wished to see upheld in the 
local community, one of the points they included was ‘the fact that mahr is the sole 
right of the woman, and neither her father nor her husband may use or spend it unless 
she gives permission for that.’8 In 1994, advocate and WCLAC legal adviser Hanan 
Rayan reminded participants in a Tulkarim workshop that custom and tradition 
frequently pose obstacles to the implementation of laws aimed at protecting the 
position of women, citing specifically the fact that the bride’s wali frequently ‘gets 
hold of his ward’s dower one way or the other’.9  
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 However, the hold of this customary practice seems to be loosening. In 
Nablus, while Moors notes the long established custom of the father taking a 
proportion (a third, for example) of the dower of his daughter, she concludes that in 
general these days the bride is receiving either all of her dower or an increasingly 
large share of it.10 Antoun’s consideration of dower in Jordanian peasant society 
emphasises ‘the local belief that the mahr is the father’s right (or in his absence the 
eldest brother’s) to dispose of as he pleases.’ He too notes, however, that with the 
loosening of economic dependency on their families of many of the young men 
heading for cash wages in the Gulf from the late 1970s, changes in these expectations 
could be anticipated.11 
 
 Whether or not the woman gets all, most or some of her dower may give rise 
to claims, mostly against her husband and far less frequently against her father, as will 
be considered in the next chapter. The first article on dower in the JLPS provides that: 
The mahr is [of] two [types]: the specified dower which the two parties 
specify at the time of the contract, be it small or large, and the proper dower 
which is the dower of the wife and her peers from among her paternal 
relatives, and if there are none then her peers from among the people of her 
village. (Article 44) 
 
 The differentiation of specified dower and ‘proper dower’ (mahr al-mithl) is 
standard Hanafi law, reproduced in the JLPS in rather less detail than in the texts of 
the classical scholars.  The dower that is specified (i.e. in terms of amount) at the time 
of the marriage is these days documented under the signatures of the spouses or their 
wakils in the contract and is the norm. Proper dower falls due in cases where the 
specification of the dower is irregular, or where no dower has been specified at all.12 
This arises from the fact that dower is due in every valid marriage, but for the 
majority of the schools is an effect of the marriage contract rather than being a 
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condition for its validity.13 The JLPS thus reflects the position of the majority of 
classical jurists in holding that if the contract includes a stipulation to the effect that 
there is to be no dower, then the stipulation falls void, the contract remains valid, and 
the wife is due the proper dower.14  
 
 The Hanafis detailed the bases on which proper dower, when due, was to be 
assessed, summarised in the above Article 44.15 Classical Hanafi law identified a 
number of factors for the assessment of the individual woman and her peers, including 
age, beauty, intellect, virtue, virginity, wealth, learning and nobility of birth, with 
local customary levels and expectations probably playing the decisive role.16 The 
JLPS has a whole section of 22 articles devoted to mahr and still does not cover the 
entire range of circumstances in which, for  example, specification may be irregular, 
or proper dower may be due.17 However, although other claims do arise from the 
manner of specification of dower in the contract, as described in the next chapter, 
irregular specification by the ma’dhun did not feature in the case material examined 
for this study. In addition, although there were cases of dissolution of irregular 
marriages, in none of them was there an application for payment of a proper dower. 
That is, the case material provided no examples of the assessment of a proper dower 
under the current or the previous Jordanian law and in the cultural contexts of the 
West Bank. Nonetheless, both commentators on the JLPS are somewhat critical of the 
law’s less than exhaustive treatment of this institution.18 
 
4.1.2 Prompt and deferred dower 
 Apart from those articles already cited in this section, the only one really 
relevant to the dower at the contract stage is Article 45: 
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 The specified dower may be paid promptly, or all or some or it may be 
 deferred, provided that this is supported by written document; if deferral is not 
 explicitly stated, then the dower shall be held to be [payable as] prompt. 
 
     The presumption of specified dower is that it is payable before or on the 
conclusion of the contract of marriage, or before the wife moves to live with her 
husband in the marital home; this is ‘prompt’ payment. In practice, however, many 
communities have customarily divided the dower into part payable prompt and part 
deferred for payment at a later date, and the custom is sanctioned by law. The rules 
concerning valid deferral of all or part of the dower include the condition that the 
deferral date should not be an imaginary or absurd deadline - one example given in 
Article 46 of the JLPS is the deferral of the dower ‘until wealth’. Where the deferral is 
held to be invalid, the whole of the dower is payable as prompt. The prevailing 
custom, however, is for the deferred dower to be payable when the marriage is ended 
by divorce or the death of one of the parties.19 The standard contract form for the 
West Bank (and Jordan) thus allows space for the specification of the amount of 
prompt (mu`ajjal) and deferred (mu'ajjal) dower, the assumption being that the 
deferred portion is due on termination of the marriage by death or divorce.20 
 
 The variations of time and place affect not only the levels of dower but also 
the relative proportions of the registered cash value of prompt and deferred. As well 
as the reservations set out above regarding the extent to which these values reflect 
reality, the values are further complicated by the addition of the tawabi` (or ‘effects’) 
of the prompt dower -- goods with a specified cash value rather than a money 
payment -- and the recent emergence of the ‘token’ prompt dower. These are 
considered below. The isolation of the ‘cash’ prompt dower is thus reflective only of 
that, not of how much the full prompt dower actually costs the groom and his family, 
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or in many cases (given the registration of tawabi`) what value of ‘other’ goods is 
registered as part of the prompt dower in the contract. It is, however, interesting to 
compare even at this level the ‘how’ of the dower payment, with a decreasing 
emphasis on a cash prompt dower in proportion to the deferred dower. 
 
 The table in Appendix IV shows the result of the contract sample in this 
regard. The trend that emerges most immediately from the material is a sharp reversal 
of the older pattern of having the registered value of the cash prompt dower greater 
than the value of the deferred dower. In 1965, the prompt dower was higher than the 
deferred dower in 85% of the sample contracts from the three courts. In the 1975 
sample, this fell to 58%, and by 1985 the deferred dower was greater than the prompt 
in 70% of all the contracts in the sample. The regional differences are also interesting. 
Of the three courts, Hebron was the slowest to show the trend and compared to the 
other two, still had in 1985 a fairly large percentage of contracts (nearly 25% of the 
sample) where the prompt dower was greater. The sharpest shift in the sample came 
in Bethlehem from 1975 when 15.6% of the sample contracts registered a deferred 
dower greater than the registered prompt, to 1985 when 85.4% of the sample contracts 
did so. Ramallah, on the other hand, shows the most steady trend of the three courts, 
moving firmly from weighting the prompt to the deferred over the two decades. 
 
 This trend is supported by other researchers. In the Jordanian village of Kufr 
al-Ma’over the period 1960-1979 Antoun notes the same shift, from very rare 
registration of deferred dower in the early years to the registration of a deferred dower 
of equal or greater value than the prompt in all but one of the 34 contracts registered 
by the ma’dhun in the village in 1979. Antoun attributes the change at least in part to 
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the ma’dhun who ‘was advising the fathers of all brides to stipulate such a payment in 
order to provide against divorce.’21 From her study of contracts in Nablus up to 1990, 
Moors concludes that ‘the most striking and immediately visible change is the 
increased prominence of the deferred dower.’22 Finally, the results of research 
conducted for the WCLAC study in the shari`a courts of Nablus and Ramallah 
confirm this pattern in the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, the pattern appears to be 
basically the same but emerging more slowly, retaining generally a greater emphasis 
on the prompt dower than is the case in the West Bank, and more of a tendency to 
register equal levels of prompt and deferred dower.23 
 
 The increasing preference for having a higher deferred than prompt dower can 
be ascribed to a number of socio-economic factors. In a study of the proportions of 
prompt to deferred dower in Muslim Palestinian society inside the Green Line in 
relation to the level of education of the women involved, Aharon Layish found the 
higher the educational level, the more likely the deferred dower was to be greater than 
the prompt.24 This would accord with the increasing level of education among women 
over the period 1965,1975, 1985 in the West Bank and more generally in Palestine in 
the 1980s and 1990s as compared to earlier decades. However, this may have an impact 
more on an attitude towards the cash part of the prompt dower in and of itself, and the 
‘material’ side of marriage more generally, than on the level of deferred dower, as can 
be seen also by the increasing prominence of the token prompt dower. 
 
 The standard explanation for the registration of a high deferred dower is to deter 
the husband from unilaterally divorcing his wife in view of the costs he would thereby 
incur. Shalabi, however, concludes from his work in Ramallah shari`a court that there 
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is no particular relation between the number of talaqs and the amount of deferred 
dower registered in the contracts.25 Moors agrees that it is hard to say whether or not a 
high deferred dower does in fact work as a deterrent to talaq, but argues that at least in 
Mandatory times, it was the prospect of having the raise a new prompt dower for a new 
wife that served to restrain men from divorcing.26 She also concludes, from her 
conversations with women in the Nablus area, that women themselves do not generally 
regard deferred dower as a deterrent to talaq, but rather as a potential financial security 
in the event of divorce. Moors places the decrease in the proportion of prompt to 
deferred dower in the context of a growing emphasis on the husband-wife relation over 
and above kinship ties, and a shift in the perception of women in Palestinian society 
from production-based to consumption-based; women thus need property in the event 
of having to return to their father’s house after a divorce or as a widow, rather than 
when they get married. 27 
 
 Once again, it must be stressed that in the majority of divorces in both the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, women in fact renounce their legal right to deferred dower in 
khul` settlements. Such a settlement may involve the woman receiving a certain sum 
from her divorcer, but her waiving of her legal right means firstly that she cannot hold 
him to that commitment, and secondly that certainly she does not receive the whole 
registered sum. The implications of the increasing prominence of the deferred dower 
can be further examined with reference to the recent emergence of the token prompt 
dower, which illustrates most clearly the apparently growing reluctance to register a 
large cash dower.  
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4.1.3 The token prompt dower 
 In the contracts in the sample, the token prompt dower usually consists of one 
Jordanian dinar, although less frequently it may be five or ten dinars, and sometimes 
‘one gold lira,’ which, although still clearly symbolic, is worth rather more than a 
dinar, while not reaching the value of a normal prompt dower. Moors identifies the 
mid-1960s as the beginning of a trend towards registering a token prompt dower in 
Nablus, with the lead being taken by ‘highly educated professionals’ and spreading 
from the urban centre to village and camps, although its incidence remains highest in 
the city.28 In the sample contracts from the courts included in the present study, the 
emergence of the token prompt dower can be compared with the discarding of the 
token deferred. Thus, while there was one token prompt dower in the sample contracts 
from Bethlehem court, there were none in either the Ramallah or the Hebron samples, 
but either no deferred dower at all or a token deferred dower of up to five dinars was 
registered in 43% of the sample contracts in Hebron and in 13% of those in Ramallah. 
A number of these involved marriage between paternal relatives and registered a 
notably low prompt dower as well.29 In 1975, 8% of the Hebron sample had either a 
token or no deferred dower, and in 1985 this had fallen again to 6% of the sample. 
The rise in registration of the token prompt dower seems to have begun in these courts 
over the period 1975-1985, as shown by the table below:30 
 year  Bethlehem  Ramallah  Hebron 
1965  2%   0   0 
1975  2%   5%   0 
1985  75%   40%   40%  
Table 4:1  
Percentages of contracts in the sample registering a token prompt dower 
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 The WCLAC research found that 53% of the contracts from their 1994 sample 
in Ramallah court registered a token prompt dower.31 The Nablus sample showed a 
steady one third of contracts registering a token prompt dower, while the Gazan courts 
showed a much lower rate: under 4% in Gaza City, and 8% in Rafah, although 1994 
was the first year the Rafah sample showed any token prompt dowers being 
registered.   
 
 From its origins as the ‘invention of the modernising elite’, Moors tracks the 
increasing registration of token dowers through other social classes, as ‘an expression 
of modernity’. She points out that where a token dower is registered, the bride’s family 
might actually expect to receive more gifts than a regular prompt dower would have 
brought -- that is, the token dower would actually be more costly for the groom than a 
regular prompt dower; and she gives examples of cases where this expectation was not 
fulfilled.32 Other reasons cited by Moors for the emergence of the token prompt dower 
include a woman’s personal commitment to the groom, leading to a desire to de-
emphasise the prompt dower.  
 
 Whatever the motivation, and whether or not the token dower actually results in 
the groom spending more or less than would be involved in a regular dower, Moors 
points out that the result is reduced control by the bride and her family over the dower. 
This is the case both because the groom and his family control the value and the nature 
of the dower gifts, and because the wife cannot use any unpaid (and in the case of a 
token dower unregistered) dower to strengthen her position in the relationship. For 
Moors, in summary, ‘registering a token dower means taking a risk’.33 
4.1.4 Tawabi`  
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    The only mention of the tawabi` of the mahr in the JLPS is made in passing in 
Article 47, which provides for the wife's right to withhold ‘obedience’ until the 
prompt dower and its tawabi` are delivered into her keeping. In an unpublished part of 
an article partly serialised in a local newspaper, the then qadi of Ramallah noted the 
customary origins of the separate identification of the tawabi`, a custom now reflected 
in the marriage contract form in the West Bank.34 Section 5 of the form is headed 
‘Dower and Type [of Dower]’ and divided into three sections subtitled Prompt, 
Deferred and Tawabi`. The word tawabi` is derived from the verb taba`a, to follow or 
to attach to, and thus indicates addenda or supplements to the prompt dower. The 
tawabi` consist of items making up a specified cash value normatively additional to 
the prompt dower; the cash is either delivered to the wife for her to buy items of the 
kind specified or is used by the husband to purchase the items which are then 
delivered to the wife.  
 
 The registration of tawabi` appears to arise at least partly from an awareness 
on the part of the bride's family -- perhaps prompted by the local ma’dhun -- of the 
potential in protecting her right to items of property that might otherwise be disputed 
or 'held hostage' by the husband.  This may happen, for example, in the wife's claim to 
jihaz,  her ‘trousseau’.  Custom dictates that the bride is provided with gold jewellery, 
items of clothing and of household furniture to take with her to her new home when 
she goes to live with her  husband.  Classical Hanafi law holds the jihaz of the wife to 
be the responsibility of the husband, along with her maintenance and the preparation 
of a proper dwelling.35 Thus, although the woman may often use at least a part of her 
dower to buy items for her jihaz, there is no obligation upon her to do so, as 
emphasised by Article 61 of the JLPS: 
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 The dower is the property of the wife and she may not be  obliged to use it for 
 her jihaz. 
 
 
 Samara's comments on this issue serve to illuminate the connection between 
mahr, tawabi` and jihaz.  He discusses ‘money paid by the husband over and above 
the dower, for the jihaz of the woman's person and house’; he agrees that Article 61 
represents classical Hanafi law, but notes that it does not distinguish between the 
circumstance where the man pays money separate from the mahr for the purposes of 
jihaz, and where the mahr is paid without any sum being distinguished from it for use 
as jihaz. In the latter circumstance, Article 61 clearly applies, but Samara would argue 
that if a certain amount of money was provided by the husband separately from the 
prompt dower for the purchase of articles for her jihaz by the wife, then she must use 
it for that  purpose. Noting that the JLPS does not address the question of ownership 
of the jihaz and household items, he observes that it appears the Jordanian legislators 
felt it was sufficient for the wife to be able to register in the contract items of furniture 
and other items that are her property, and continues that ‘this is what people in the 
current age do, registering particular items of furniture in the name of the wife.’36  
 
 The tawabi` of the prompt dower, where registered, are usually the same as 
the items customarily included in the wife's jihaz (apart from clothes), but it is likely 
that the wife also takes other items as her jihaz not included in or indeed bought from 
the tawabi` of the prompt dower. Furthermore, it is obviously erroneous to assume 
that where no tawabi` are registered, no jihaz was provided for the wife by the 
husband; the gift of gold jewellery, at the engagement and perhaps at the contract as 
well as at the wedding, and of clothes for the wife is an established custom. The legal 
point of interest is the increasing tendency to register these items in the contract 
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document, paralleling the decrease in the proportion of prompt dower compared to 
deferred dower shown in the sample contracts,  as shown in the table below. 
 
court  total contracts  no. with tawabi` % with tawabi`  
1965 
Bethlehem 448   18   4 % 
Ramallah 708   63   9% 
Hebron1248   182   15% 
total  2404   263   11% 
1975 
Bethlehem 441   27   6% 
Ramallah 1040   102   10% 
Hebron1331   571   43% 
total  2812   700   25% 
1985 
Bethlehem 475   88   18.5% 
Ramallah 1038   181   17.5% 
Hebron1806   1416   78.5% 
total  3319   1685   51% 
 
Table 4.2 
Number of contracts registering tawabi` of the prompt dower, by court and year 
 
 The table shows a steady increase in the proportion of contracts registering 
tawabi` in Ramallah and Bethlehem, and a sharp increase in Hebron which 
considerably affects the overall totals. Other research confirms both the increasing 
tendency to register tawabi` in the contract, and the strong influence of local custom (or 
perhaps the preferences of the local court officials) on this institution. The WCLAC 
study shows a wide variation in local patterns, with the 1994 contract sample showing 
62% registering tawabi` in Nablus, 26% in Ramallah (a slow climb from the 1985 
figure), 22% in Rafah and a startling 97% in the Gaza City sample.37 It is probably also 
the case that the value of the tawabi` is becoming increasingly significant in the value 
of the prompt dower as a whole, given the emergence of the token prompt dower.38 The 
WCLAC research showed that in Gaza, both the average and the mode registered 
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values of cash prompt dower plus tawabi` were higher than the deferred dower, while 
in the West Bank courts of Nablus and Ramallah the average remained lower than the 
deferred. In Ramallah, in the 27% of contracts that had tawabi` registered in 1989, the 
mode value was equal (1000 dinars prompt dower, 1000 dinars the value of the tawabi` 
and 2000 dinars deferred); in 1994 the emergence of the token prompt dower as the 
mode in the Ramallah sample adjusted this balance, even though the mode tawabi` 
value had doubled to 2000 dinars and the mode value of deferred dower had risen to 
3000 dinars.39 
 
 In Nablus, Moors’ work revealed that the lead in registering tawabi` was taken 
by the urban lower middle classes, and moved up the social hierarchy. Combined with 
the emergence of the token prompt dower among the urban elite, this made a common 
combination in the ‘middle social categories’ of the token prompt dower with 
registration of tawabi`.40  She concludes however that despite the clarity of the 
emerging pattern, her interviews showed that ‘in practice the implications of this trend 
have remained rather limited.’ She adds that women may strengthen their position 
within the marriage by allowing the husband not to bring everything at once: ‘the 
importance of registering addenda then may well be that it makes it visible that the 
bride has refrained from claiming her rights.’41 This of course is just what the bride 
cannot do if she registers a token prompt dower and no tawabi': the latest available 
figures for Ramallah -- those from the WCLAC study -- show 53% in the sample 
registering a token prompt dower, but only 35% registering the tawabi` of the dower in 
the contract document. 
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 In the contracts registering tawabi` examined for the purposes of this study, 
the level of standardisation within particular communities was notable - both in terms 
of whether or not tawabi` tended to be registered, and if so, what items were involved. 
The main items registered as tawabi` were gold jewellery (masagh, haly) and house 
furnishings (athath bayt), as shown by the table in Appendix V. In 1965, when only 
10.9% of the contracts in the three courts had tawabi` registered, items of furniture 
were the items most commonly listed (76%).  This was often done in great detail, 
listing for example beds, mattresses, cupboards, bedlinen, pillows, sometimes a table 
and chairs, and occasionally a sewing machine, with a maximum value of 250 dinars. 
In Hebron, several contracts included the registration of a ‘complete bedroom’;42 
another, more unusually, listed a piece of land valued at 60 dinars. In 1975, items of 
furniture were still most commonly listed as tawabi` (73%) but an increasing number 
of contracts included also items of gold jewellery along with furniture (20%). 
Occasionally the contracts registered fridges, washing machines or televisions, as well 
as the more common bedroom and living room furniture. Two contracts included 
items of kiswa, the outfits of clothing traditionally bought for the bride as part of her 
jihaz. By the year 1985, the most frequent entry of tawabi` comprised both items of 
furniture and gold jewellery (53%) -- although this really reflects the Hebron figures, 
since registering only gold was more common in Bethlehem and furniture in 
Ramallah. Some of the amounts being registered were very high.  By way of example, 
in Hebron, one contract registered items of furniture worth 1500 dinars, together with 
gold jewellery to the same value; in Bethlehem there was a contract with a token 
prompt dower of one dinar, a deferred dower of 5000 dinars and tawabi` consisting of 
2000 dinars’ worth of gold jewellery and 3000 dinars in furnishings; and in Ramallah 
one contract showed a prompt dower of one dinar and 5000 dinars’ worth of 
 194 
furnishings as tawabi` of the prompt dower. In several contracts from the village of 
Halhul in the Hebron district, items of furniture were registered as the tawabi` and the 
prompt dower was given as gold jewellery rather than as a cash sum; others registered 
the gold in weight rather than by value. 
 
 In most cases, the tawabi` are clearly intended as additional to the cash prompt 
dower.  However, in Hebron in 1965 and particularly 1975, it was specifically stated 
in some contracts that the items registered as the tawabi` of the dower had been 
bought by the wife or her wakil from the prompt dower that had been received from 
the husband.  Thus, for example, one contract gave the dower as 1000 dinars prompt 
and 500 dinars deferred, and the tawabi` as 500 dinars’ worth of gold and 400 dinars 
of furnishings ‘from the prompt dower’. 
 
 Less clear are those contracts where the tawabi` are registered as having been 
‘bought from wife's own money’; for example, a dower of 450 dinars prompt and 300 
dinars deferred dower registered in Hebron with tawabi` of 250 dinars gold and 200 
dinars furnishings, ‘bought from the wife's own money.’ The prompt dower is, of 
course, the wife's own money, and in this example the cash values tally, but it cannot 
be conclusively deduced that she used her prompt dower to buy the items registered.  
Phraseology of this kind also appeared in Hebron contracts of 1975 under the section 
set aside for stipulations, rather than in the section reserved for dower and tawabi`.  A 
high total of 69 stipulations were registered in the contracts of Hebron that year, 54 of 
them being accounted for by ma'dhuns in three particular areas using the stipulations 
section to identify tawabi` of the prompt dower. The largest grouping of stipulations 
all came from the same village, and simply registered that the husband  
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‘acknowledged that the wife owns’ a certain amount of gold or furnishings as her 
property and as a right; none of them registered anything under tawabi` of the dower. 
Other stipulations identified items of gold, and sometimes clothes, as having been 
bought from the wife's prompt dower or as having been bought for her by the 
husband. A smaller group of contracts had stipulations to the effect that the husband 
should bring his wife items of furniture to a certain value, with gold jewellery 
registered as tawabi`, or vice versa. This last type of stipulation is likely to be of little 
legal effect in realising the aim of ensuring the wife's right to property. An Appeal 
decision from 1951 cited by al-`Arabi states that: 
 A stipulation made by the wife's wakil in the contract session to the effect that 
 the husband bring his wife a suite [of furniture] to the value of 40 dinars, to be 
 hers on talaq or death, and this being stated in the section of stipulations, has 
 no value so long as it is not stated in the section set aside for Dower and Type 
 [of dower].43  
 
 As far as the other stipulations are concerned, while the inclusion of the 
stipulation acknowledging the wife's ownership of certain items of property may 
assist in establishing ownership in the event of a dispute, their non-registration as 
tawabi` means that they cannot be claimed as a defence to an action for obedience by 
the husband, and if they are not acknowledged by the husband as being jihaz, then 
claims regarding the items will be heard in the regular rather than the shari`a courts. 
 
4.1.5 Receipt of the dower 
 
 The bases of potential complications in the event of future disputes can also be 
seen in the fact that the vast majority of contracts note that the wife's wakil 
‘acknowledges receipt’ of the prompt dower during the session in which the contract 
is concluded.  There are two points here that may arise in later disputes.  Firstly, 
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customarily it is not the wife but her wakil who receives the dower, and indeed by law 
the dower of the bikr must be received by her wali.44 As noted above, in the past at 
least it was not uncommon for the father or brother of the bride to hold on to all or 
part of the sum, although legally bound to deliver it all to the wife.  Secondly, the 
wife's wakil will often acknowledge receipt of dower that has not actually been paid, 
more as a formality and a show of good faith than as a legal acknowledgment of 
receipt.45 If the dower is never actually paid and a dispute arises, the wakil will have 
to deny his written acknowledgment of receipt in support of an action by the wife for 
payment of dower by her husband, as is described in the next chapter. The wakil's 
acknowledgment of receipt is however very much the rule, whether the prompt dower 
is a token dower or a sum in the thousands. There are some exceptions; in Hebron in 
1975 and 1985 it was not uncommon for the wife's wakil to acknowledge receipt of 
one portion of the prompt dower and to state that the rest was in the keeping (dhimma) 
of the groom; examples of this also occur in the 1985 sample of contracts taken in 
Ramallah. Occasionally, all or part of the prompt dower is actually paid over in the 
contract session. In Hebron in 1985, an interesting feature in several contracts 
appeared to combine the token prompt dower with the traditionally higher prompt 
dower, involving a dower of for example 1001 dinars prompt, 1000 dinars deferred 
and 1000 dinars tawabi`; the wife's wakil would acknowledge receipt of  one dinar. 
 
4.1.6 Dower, law and society 
 Of the many complex issues related to mahr, it has generally been the burden of 
the dower and the costs of marriage in general as perceived by the groom and his 
family that has received the most public attention -- at least in the press. Depending 
upon the general economic situation, this has been a common cause of complaint 
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throughout the region, but is not generally regarded as a matter for regulation by law -- 
only South Yemen set an upper limit on the amount of dower, and this was removed in 
the unified Yemeni personal status law.46 Enforcement of such a rule would be 
extremely difficult, and classical position that held a maximum could not be imposed in 
law has been little challenged.47 The tone of much of the discussion and writing on this 
issue is therefore not so much advocacy of a change in the law but one of exhortation to 
society, particularly the families of the brides, to take a different attitude, in recognition 
of the fact that it is custom that dictates conduct in this area of the law. 
 
 It is hard to identify a standard dower for a whole area, and on top of the 
dower one has to calculate the costs of non-registered gifts and other items of jihaz, 
and the associated expenses of the wedding celebration, to estimate what it would cost 
to get married in the West Bank. In 1965, the contract samples showed a typical 
prompt dower to be from 100-200 dinars, with some well below this amount.48 By 
1975, the contract samples showed most prompt dowers ranging from 300-600 dinars, 
with several over 1000 and sometimes having tawabi` of several hundred dinars also 
registered. In 1985, apart from those contracts with a token prompt dower, few 
contracts in the Bethlehem or Ramallah sample had prompt dowers of under 1000 
dinars, and  although prompt dowers in the 500-1000 dinar range were more common 
in Hebron, the large proportion of contracts registering tawabi` there gives a clear 
picture of registered costs of over 1000 dinars for the total prompt in most cases.  The 
highest prompt dower in the 1985 sample in Hebron was 5000 dinars, with tawabi` of 
gold to the value of 2000 dinars, followed by a prompt cash dower of 2000 with 
bedroom furnishings to the value of 2000 more as tawabi`. 
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 When the expenses of the wedding celebrations are added, the total amounts 
form the context to the concern articulated in various quarters in the 1970s and 1980s 
at the rising costs of marriage. The problem of inflated dowers was not peculiar to the 
West Bank; Hijab notes the impact on dowers in the Gulf of that region's rapid 
material development, and the inflation there undoubtedly also had an indirect effect 
in the West Bank due to number of ex-patriate Palestinians living and working in the 
Gulf and coming home to marry. Layish discusses the problem in Israel, al-Kurdi  in 
Syria, and articles in the Jordanian press voiced similar positions.49 In the West Bank, 
newspaper articles blamed society at large for allowing ostentation and competition to 
dominate the institution of marriage.50 The document drawn up by the Hebron elders’ 
meeting on marriage in 1987 also addressed this issue.51 The then qadi of Ramallah, 
in a newspaper article, pointed out that excessive demands in dower not only cause 
delay in the marriage of young men, but might encourage them to marry foreigners 
since little dower, gold or jihaz is required by such women on their marriage.52 In a 
sequel to this article, he observes that society has moved far away from the practice of 
the Prophet and his Companions, and that demands for  excessive dower are made for 
the wrong motives.53 
  
 The uprising that began in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in December 
1987 added to these general social and religious exhortations the expectations and the 
exigencies of the national struggle. The economic situation deteriorated severely, and in 
deference to the families of the martyrs and the prisoners, a period of ‘silent weddings’ 
marked the early years, substantially reducing the costs of the actual celebration. A 
relative reduction in dower expectations was reported during these intifada years, 
attributed in part by some writers to efforts by women’s groups ‘to decrease or 
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eliminate the mahr’ as a ‘burdensome custom'.55 By way of comparison, Badran notes 
Egyptian feminists campaigning to lower the mahr in the 1930s, (including leading by 
example) against the background of depression and economic crisis.56 In Algeria, 
Marnia Lazreg records attempts by the nationalist FLN to limit the maximum level of 
dower during the war of liberation against the French; despite feminists holding it ‘an 
antiquated custom that objectifies women’ she notes its persistence as a major feature 
of marriage, and the inexorable increase in its value over the years.57  
 
 Similarly, in Palestine, it does not appear that the decrease reported in the 
intifada years has been sustained, and weddings are once again big events, making 
marriage more immediately expensive. Nevertheless, the increase documented in the 
WCLAC sample of West Bank contracts does not support the perception of an 
insupportable inflation in dowers as was the case in the 1970s, and Moors points out 
that the devaluation of the dinar in January 1989 was often not fully compensated for 
by a proportional rise in the dower. She finds that for the groom and his family, the 
greatest financial burden of marriage these days may not be the dower but the cost of 
accommodation. The costs of housing have risen much more steeply than the relative 
value of the dower, and women’s expectations have also increased, with an emphasis 
on accommodation independent from the groom’s family house, as is illustrated also 
in the subjects addressed by women in special stipulations in their marriage 
contracts.57 In real terms, Moors finds that women may have a decreasing access to 
and control over property through dower than previously, with a less central role 
being given to the prompt dower and women more economically dependent upon their 
husbands in a societal structure that is increasingly emphasising the conjugal tie over 
kinship relations.58 The fact that under the terms of the current law, a husband can -- 
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in theory -- prevent his wife from working and that the gender-specific proportions of  
inheritance still apply (with the basic rule that women take half the man’s portion) 
keeps dower as a potentially critical element in the balance of rights and duties 
between the spouses. Beyond the law, as Hammami notes, dower ‘continues as an 
important social practice, although it may no longer provide a sustainable source of 
economic support for women.’59 
 
4.2 Special Stipulations in the Contract of Marriage 
4.2.1 Stipulations in law 
 The wife’s rights of dower and maintenance established by the contract are 
balanced in the classical rules by her duty of obedience to her husband. As explained 
further in the next chapter, this duty meant inter alia that the classical jurists gave her 
no absolute right to go out to work and required that she must move to live with her 
husband if he relocates to a different town or country. The classical rules also grant 
the husband the licence to contract marriage with up to three other women at the same 
time, and to dissolve the contract -- that is, end any marriage in which he is engaged -- 
with a simple unilateral repudiation (talaq) of the woman involved, a power which 
does not accrue to the wife by the simple fact of the contract. 
 
 However, these standard terms can be altered somewhat through attachment to 
the contract of special conditions. Leila Ahmed suggests that ‘spelling out the terms’ 
of marriage contracts was perhaps ‘not unusual’ -- at least so far as women of the elite 
were concerned -- in the early decades of Islam, possibly reflecting pre-Islamic 
practice and expectations.60 It is clear that practice has varied from place to place 
down the centuries, although the absence of written contracts complicates the 
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exploration of the extent to which such stipulations were used, by whom, under what 
circumstances and to what purpose. What is clearer, however, is the fact that whatever 
the expectations of the parties, and whatever function these stipulations played in the 
negotiation of their marriage contract and indeed their marital relationship, most of 
the jurists accorded a large proportion of such stipulations no enforceable legal value, 
unless phrased as a delegated divorce.  
 
 The classical jurists were of one mind in considering valid any stipulations 
that reinforced something already required by dint of the marriage contract - for 
example, a stipulation to the effect that the husband should treat the wife well, or that 
he should not take over her property.61 On the validity of stipulations that did not fall 
into this category, however, they differed.  The Shafi`is and Malikis classified 
stipulations into three categories: broadly, stipulations upholding the regular terms of 
the contract, which they held to be valid;   irregular stipulations which were cancelled, 
leaving the contract valid; and void stipulations which caused the voiding of the 
contract.62 The Hanafis recognise as valid only those stipulations that reinforced 
something already required by the contract and by marriage, or those that were 
expressly permitted; these were ‘enforceable’ only if remedies existed in the classical 
rules for the violation of the existing rule that was being reinforced.63 Any other 
stipulations were regarded by the Hanafis as having no legal value. They 
distinguished between stipulations that it was forbidden to fulfill, since they contradict 
the basic presumptions of marriage (such as that the wife should have no dower) and 
those that might be legitimately and voluntarily fulfilled - for example, not to take 
another wife for the duration of the marriage.  In the latter type, the Hanafis held that 
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while it would be lawful and indeed good of the husband to keep his word, there was 
no legal obligation for them to be fulfilled, and no remedy if they were broken.64 
 
 The Hanbalis were alone among the Sunni schools to give legal value to 
stipulations other than those reinforcing the standard rules arising  from the contract 
of marriage.65 The Hanbalis divided stipulations into valid and invalid and then 
subdivided according to nature and  effect.  Valid stipulations were those reinforcing 
the normal requirements of the contract and also anything that was not against the 
requirements of the contract or the fundamental intentions of marriage. This category 
included for example a stipulation that the man should not take another wife, or 
should not make his wife leave her home town.  The Hanbalis held these stipulations 
to be binding, in the sense that breach thereof constituted breach of the contract, and 
the injured party could seek dissolution of the marriage.66 
 
 Invalid stipulations were divided by the Hanbalis into those causing the 
voiding of the contract - principally, those that turn the contract into a temporary or 
mut`a marriage;67 and those stipulations which are themselves void but leave the 
contract intact. The latter are stipulations contradicting the requirements of the 
contract, such as that the woman should have no dower. 
 
 In 1917, the OLFR used the Hanbali position to justify a provision that 
allowed  the woman to stipulate that she would be divorced if her husband married 
another wife while still married to her.68 This was as much an extension of the Hanafi 
rules on delegated or suspended talaq as an adoption of the Hanbali position on 
conditions, particularly as it was so limited, but the emphasis on the form, as a 
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stipulation, was backed up by Article 61 of the OLFR, which stated that if stipulations 
inserted at the time of the contract for the benefit of one of the parties were not 
respected, the marriage was irregular. There was no clarification of what kind of 
stipulations would be allowed, nor of what the procedure would be in the event of one 
being  broken; nor indeed if this was in fact meant to be constrained by the earlier 
article. Nevertheless, it pointed the way for the selection (takhayyur) of the wider 
Hanbali position on this subject in many of the Arab codes of personal status law later 
in the century. 
 
 In 1951, the Jordanian legislators included in the JLFR the following Article 
21: 
 If in a contract of marriage a stipulation is made that is to the benefit of one of 
 the parties - for example, if it is stipulated that the bond of marriage is in the 
 hand of the wife, or that the husband will not take her out of the town in which 
 they have agreed to live, or that he shall not take another wife during their 
 marriage - then it must be observed, provided  that in the event of a denial, the 
 condition is registered in the marriage document; if the stipulation is violated, 
 then the marriage shall be dissolved (faskh) at the petition of the wife. 
 
 This provision sets out part of the Hanbali position in curtailed form: for 
example, it does not state explicitly that the stipulation must not violate the 
fundamentals of marriage or that the benefit must be lawful. Furthermore, although it 
does not identify the party who may make the stipulation, the provision ends by 
giving the recourse of an application for faskh in the case of violation to the wife only. 
The promulgation of the JLPS in 1976 gave the legislators the opportunity of 
expanding considerably upon the JLFR text, drawing in more of the original Hanbali 
distinctions and giving further examples.  The JLPS also makes the use of stipulations 
explicitly open to both spouses and details the effects on each spouse should the other 
violate a stipulation.  Article 19 provides: 
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 If a condition is stipulated in the contract that is of benefit  to one of the 
 parties, is not inconsistent with the intentions of marriage, does not impose 
 something unlawful and is registered in the contract document, it shall be 
 observed in accordance with the following: 
 
i)  if the wife stipulates something to the husband that brings her a benefit that 
is lawful and does not infringe upon the right of the other, such as if she 
stipulates that he shall not remove her from her town, or that he shall not take 
another wife during their marriage, or that he shall delegate to her the power to 
divorce herself, or that he shall settle her in a certain area, this shall be a valid 
and binding condition, and if the husband does not fulfill it, the contract shall 
be dissolved at the application of the wife and she may claim from him all her 
matrimonial rights; 
 
ii)  if the husband stipulates to the wife a condition that brings him a lawful 
benefit and does not infringe upon the rights of the other, such as if he 
stipulates that she shall not go out to work, or that she shall live with him in 
the area in which he works, this shall be a valid and binding stipulation, and if 
the wife does not fulfill it, the marriage shall be dissolved at the application of 
the husband and he shall be exempted from paying her deferred dower and 
maintenance during the `idda period; 
 
iii) if the contract is constrained by a condition that contradicts the intentions 
of marriage or imposes something unlawful, such as if one of the spouses 
stipulates that the other shall not live with him/her, or that they shall not share 
marital intimacy, or that one of them shall drink alcohol, or shall break off 
relations with their parents, then the condition is void while the contract 
remains valid. 
 
 The Explanatory Memorandum to the JLPS states that the Hanbali position 
has been adopted in the public interest (maslaha) and the stipulations provided for 
made binding (mulzim).69 Samara points out that the one omission from the Hanbali 
position in the JLPS article is the type of stipulation that the Hanbalis categorised  as 
causing the voiding of the contract, since the type of contract to which they give rise 
are voided under other sections of the JLPS.70 The detailing of the type of stipulation 
that is void while leaving the contract valid in Article 19(iii) is a tightening of the 
provision on stipulations in line with Hanbali rules. 
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 With regard to stipulations that are held to be valid, there are two standard 
Hanbali constraints: that the benefit obtained by the party inserting the stipulation is 
not something expressly forbidden by the shari`a, and that it does not affect the right 
of others.71 The examples of stipulations that a woman may legitimately make all 
imply a change in existing legal presumptions on what the wife shall and shall not do 
or be subject to; the stipulations that a husband may make, on the other hand, are 
illustrated by examples that reinforce the weight of presumptions that still exist to a 
large extent in law, but which are being challenged in practice as a result of more 
recent socio-economic developments -- it is no longer to be automatically assumed 
that the wife will be wholly engaged in non-waged domestic labour, or indeed that 
this is necessarily preferable to her participation in the wage-earning labour force, nor 
is it to be assumed that she will be willing to move wherever her husband goes.  
 
 The other advantage for the man in inserting such a stipulation, besides 
clarifying the terms of his marriage, is his ability in the event of the wife's non- 
fulfillment to have the marriage dissolved without being liable to pay his wife's 
remaining financial claims upon him -- her deferred dower and maintenance for the 
`idda period. This is one of the areas where the JLPS has taken the approach of  
‘balancing’ between the rights of the spouses, an approach which appears usually to 
benefit the husband rather than the wife since it gives him additional rights and 
recourses to those he already has. In the case of the wife's ‘disobedience’, for example 
by refusing a legitimate request that she come to live with him, the husband has 
always had the option of exercising his power of unilateral repudiation. However, 
while a wife divorced for reasons constituting ‘disobedience’ is not due maintenance 
for the `idda period, the only times she loses her right to deferred dower in classical 
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law are when she explicitly agrees to waive it in return for a divorce in a mukhala`a 
arrangement, or where she loses all or some of it as a result of the apportioning of 
blame by the arbiters in a claim for separation on the grounds of ‘discord and strife’. 
 
 Under the present law, if the husband were to insert a stipulation and divorce 
his wife by talaq upon her non-fulfilment thereof, he might in some circumstances be 
able to defend her claim for maintenance during the`idda period by establishing that 
her action constituted ‘disobedience’ under the terms of classical law and the terms 
agreed in their contract. In addition, a wife would probably be unable to claim 
compensation for arbitrary talaq if the husband could establish the grounds of his 
wife's violation of a written stipulation. However, were a man to choose to apply for 
faskh of the contract on these grounds, there would be no question of compensation 
for arbitrary talaq, and his wife would face the prospect not only of the end of the 
marriage and loss of maintenance, but also of her remaining right to deferred dower. 
 
 For the woman, the insertion of written stipulations in the contract of marriage 
offers the opportunity of protecting a certain degree of freedom of choice: choice of 
where she lives, or of participating in the waged labour force for example, without 
being penalised in financial terms for exercise of this choice.  However, in the case of 
the husband's violation of the stipulation, the choice ultimately is acceptance of what 
she has stipulated against (i.e. an unacceptable situation) or the ending of her 
marriage. Stipulations in the marriage contract are binding but not enforceable;  they 
do not prevent the establishment in fact or in law of the situation stipulated against, 
but give the wife a way out if her apprehensions are realised. Thus, if a woman wishes 
not to become involved in a polygynous marriage, for example, she may stipulate that 
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her husband shall not take another wife while still married to her; this stipulation is 
not enforceable in the sense that any subsequent marriage he may conclude is voided 
on the basis of the stipulation, but it is binding in that such an action constitutes 
breach of contract and she at least has the choice of not remaining in the polygynous 
union, through applying for dissolution of the contract. The final point to be made 
about the contents of Article 19 of the JLPS is that it clearly states that to be of legal 
value, the stipulation has to be in writing in the contract of marriage. While the JLPS 
has provided that documented changes to the terms of the contract in regard to dower 
(increase or decrease) attach to the contract itself, jurisprudence from the Amman 
Appeal Court has held that a stipulation agreed upon subsequent to the contract (a 
year later in the specific case examined) and duly registered at court in a ‘deed of 
acknowledgement’ (hujjat iqrar) was not covered by the terms of Article 19.72 
 
4.2.2 Incidence 
 
 The effect of the expanded text of Article 19 appears to have been minimal in 
terms at least of use made of stipulations in the West Bank. Writing just after the 
promulgation of the JLFR in 1951, Anderson noted that he had been informed that the 
insertion of stipulations ‘is today the rule rather than the exception among upper class 
families in Jordan, and increasingly common among all classes’.73 There is no 
evidence of this in the contracts examined in the West Bank; the following table 
shows that of the 8535 marriage contracts seen in the three courts, only 1.5% 
contained special stipulations: 
 
court  contracts number with stipulations % with stipulations 
1965 
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Bethlehem 448  8    1.8         
Ramallah 708  5    0.7 
Hebron1248  18    1.4 
total  2404  31    1.3 
1975 
Bethlehem 441  3    0.7 
Ramallah 1040  5    0.5 
Hebron1331  69    5.2 
total  2812  77    2.7  
1985 
Bethlehem 475  1    0.2 
Ramallah 1038  3    0.3 
Hebron1806  17    0.9 
total  3319  21    0.6 
overall totals 8535  129    1.5 
 
Table 4.3 
Number of stipulations registered in marriage contracts, by year and court 
 
 There is one major disruption in the figures in the table - the registration in 
Hebron in 1975 of stipulations in 69 contracts of marriage, constituting 5.2% of the 
contracts there for that year.  The large majority of these stipulations were of the type 
described in the previous section of this Chapter - that is, the use by ma’dhuns in 
certain areas of the Hebron district of the ‘stipulations’ section of the contract to 
register property, instead of the section set aside for tawabi` of the prompt dower.  
Thus, over 50 of these contracts would more properly have had nothing written in the 
stipulations section but would have shown entries in the tawabi` section.  An 
adjustment of the figures to eliminate this idiosyncrasy, which as noted earlier may in 
some cases have affected the woman's right to that property in an adverse rather than 
a positive way, would take the proportion of contracts with stipulations in Hebron in 
1975 to 1.1%, the overall proportion for the year to 0.8% and the proportion of 
contracts containing stipulations out of the total seen in the three courts over the three 
years to 0.9%. The WCLAC research covering the years 1989, 1992, 1993 and 1994 
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found only two stipulations registered in Ramallah in a total of 4643 contracts, 
although 2% of the contracts in Nablus over those years had stipulations.74 
 
 Nearly all stipulations in the case material were made by women. The 
extremely small number reflects the rather negative opinion of stipulations held by 
commentators.  The insertion of stipulations may arise from specific apprehension on 
the part of the bride's family vis-à-vis the groom - for example, if he is much older 
than the bride, or if they fear he is likely to emigrate, or if they do not know his 
family. Even so, many families are likely to shy away from making written 
stipulations in the contract session, and rather to obtain oral assurances.75 The 
disruption of such a traditional process as the conclusion of marriage by introducing 
demands for written conditions could be perceived as bad faith; insisting on unusual 
rights for a woman might be perceived as presaging trouble ahead. Marriage notaries 
may display aversion and be loath to register stipulations in the contract; qadis 
themselves may consider them inopportune and not necessary, and be discouraging 
about their use.76 Ziba Mir-Hossaini reports being told by some marriage notaries in 
Morocco that they would ‘never agree’ to draft in such stipulations as it ‘sets a shaky 
foundation for the union.’77 For all sorts of reasons, stipulations are not generally 
looked upon with favour. The woman herself  is therefore under pressure not to insist 
on something out of the ordinary being incorporated in a stipulation, and her 
negotiating position is likely to be weak.78 Two points are voiced in answer to queries 
on this matter: firstly, the shar`i position that the rights of women are fully protected 
by the shari`a and adequate remedies already exist for such grievances as she may 
develop later in her marriage; and secondly  that it is preferable for spouses to be able 
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to have mutual understandings on such matters (without it having to be in writing) and 
to talk about any problems as they arise.  
 
 Where the wife and her family do decide to take advantage of the opportunity 
offered by the possibility of setting special conditions for the marriage, they 
sometimes make two or three stipulations rather than just one: Article 19 of the JLPS 
sets no official limit to the number that can be made.  The number of stipulations 
made in the case material thus exceeds the number of contracts containing them, as 
shown in the following table which shows the subject matter of stipulations made by 
women and indicates the number made by men: 
 
Subject matter    1965 1975 1985 total 
place of wife's residence  7 5 3 15 
domestic accommodation of wife 3 2 9 14 
another wife    6 3 2 11 
general power of divorce (`usma) 3 2 1 6 
husband travelling abroad  3 1 0 4 
wife to do non-domestic work 0 2 6 8 
wife not to do non-domestic work 2 0 0 2 
disposal of wife's earned income 2 2 0 4 
property of the wife   3 56 0 59 
guarantors for dower   0 3 0 3 
wife's education   0 1 2 3 
children    3 0 0 3 
disease in man    0 1 0 1 
stipulations by men   1 0 2 3 
totals     33 78 25 136 
 
Table 4.4 
Subject matter of stipulations in the contracts 
 
 In 1965 and 1975, the subject about which women made most stipulations was 
the geographical location of residence -- where she was going to live; by 1985, this 
had shifted to domestic accommodation -- what kind of dwelling she was going to live 
in. The WCLAC work shows a similar concern in the material from Nablus in the 
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1990s, with ‘independent dwelling’ at the top of the list. It is followed, however, by a 
stipulation to the effect that the wife was to continue her studies, and then the 
geographical location.79  
 
 Stipulations made by women addressing the subjects indicated in the table 
above fall into two categories: those that provide a remedy, and those that do not. 
Both these categories can be subdivided. The type of stipulation that provides no 
remedy either appears as a clarification on a certain aspect of the marriage, 
strengthening the woman's defence against standard claims by the man, largely for 
‘obedience’; or as straight statements that the husband may not take a certain action.  
The latter type may serve a function similar to the ‘clarification’ type, but in some 
cases the legal value may be disputed.  Decisions from the Amman Appeal Court 
have held that the value of such stipulations is limited to seeking dissolution in the 
event of breach, and does not serve to enforce implementation of the content, which 
may in some cases be sought through other means. Thus, for example, in a 1993 case, 
the Court upheld a first instance decision that had rejected a woman’s claim for 990 
dinars based on a stipulation in the marriage contract that her husband would pay her 
30 dinars a month. The stipulation had not been honoured ‘which gives rise to [her 
right] to seek judicial dissolution (faskh)’ but not to a case for claiming the said sum, 
according to the Appeal Court.80 Further examples of this position are used to 
illustrate the potential value of the types of stipulations found in the case material 
below.  
 
 In the other type, the remedies reserved by the woman consist either of the 
power to divorce herself, or of a large cash sum to be paid her by the husband. Both 
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these are clearly intended to deter the occurrence of  the specified action by the man, 
but the second can act only as a deterrence rather than providing also a way out of the 
situation - except perhaps in that the husband might himself divorce the wife before 
taking the specified action in order to avoid having to pay the sum of money in 
addition to her financial rights on the end of the marriage by talaq. 
 
 The exception to these two types of stipulations, which both identify specific 
circumstances, is the assumption by the wife of the power of talaq, not linked to a 
particular action by the husband. In the contracts, as in the text of the JLPS, the 
phrasing of this condition is that ‘her power/affairs/protection be in her hand’ 
(`usmatuha bi-yadiha or `amruha bi-yadiha) to divorce herself from her husband. The 
phrasing is indicative of the fact that this is the standard Hanafi process of the 
delegation of talaq (tafwid at-talaq) to the wife by the husband; as such, the Hanafis 
always recognized this stipulation as valid, not regarding it however as a stipulation 
but as a delegation of talaq.81 Thus, the husband delegates his power of divorcing his 
wife to the woman, so that she divorces herself from him (rather than divorcing him). 
The process of delegation, and the precise phrasing in which such a stipulation must 
be couched in order to ensure that the intended objective is actually realisable, are 
discussed in further detail in Chapter Six. It should be noted here, however, that of the 
six stipulations in the material examined giving the wife the general right to divorce 
herself, at least two could in theory be denied legal value by the court, and three 
would be liable to revocation by the husband if the wife did try to register a talaq, 
leaving only one that would assuredly have the effect intended. 
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 Problems connected to the precise text of a stipulation arise less where the 
wife's right to divorce herself is tied as a remedy to the realisation of certain 
circumstances that she wishes to avoid; that is, when the stipulation suspends or gives 
rise to her power of talaq only upon the occurrence of a specific event, such as the 
husband taking a second wife.  Furthermore, this more specific approach poses less of 
a challenge to the assumptions underlying the basic structure of the marriage as 
presented in the classical rules than the assumption by the woman of the general 
power in unilaterally ending her marriage, as her husband can, without having to 
provide or prove a reason. In the Egyptian project discussed at the end of this section, 
the proposed stipulation that found least favour among the university students 
questioned was the general unrestrained delegation of talaq to the wife.82  
 
4.2.3 Stipulations against polygyny 
 In the contracts examined, the stipulations against polygyny included 
examples of those with and without remedies. Specific delegation of the power of 
talaq was stipulated in two of the contracts: in each case, the woman was marrying a 
man divorced from his current wife by a revocable talaq, and the new wife stipulated 
that should her husband exercise his right to revoke the talaq then she would have the 
power to divorce herself from him. One of them also reserved the right to talaq if her 
husband subsequently entered into a new contract of marriage with his ex-wife. 
 
 However, it was more common in the contracts reviewed for the woman to 
stipulate payment of a substantial sum of money in the eventuality of  her acquiring a 
co-wife.83 Three contracts contained stipulations by women providing for a cash sum 
if the husband revoked the talaq of his divorced wife, while others required payments 
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if the husband took another wife while married to the woman making the stipulation.84 
The Amman Appeal Court has dealt with two points in consideration of this particular 
type of stipulation. The first is that the cash sum will not be payable until the women 
has clarified whether or not it is intended as an increase in her dower; if so, the 
shari`a court could proceed, but if it was not intended as dower then it would transfer 
to the civil courts.85 Only one of the stipulations in the contracts examined specified 
explicitly that the sum (of a hundred dinars in 1965) would be paid as an increase in 
her prompt dower. The other point is one that would have applied to all six of these 
stipulations: that the sum is payable even if the husband establishes that the wife 
consented to his taking a second wife, since the stipulation did not condition payment 
upon her consent to his action,  but only upon the fact of his action.86  
 
 Of the remaining two stipulations in the case material dealing with the 
possibility of the wife having a co-wife, one is less clear in the potential effect that it 
could have.  It stated that: 
 The wife's wakil stipulated to the husband that he was not permitted (la yajuz 
 lahu) to take another wife without her consent. 
 
 The problem with this stipulation is the use of the verb ‘permit’. The phrase 
used in the JLPS, and before that in the JLFR and OLFR, is literally that the wife may 
stipulate that her husband ‘shall not marry on top of her’ (la yuzawwaj `alayha).  This 
was valid according to Hanbali law, which provided the remedy of dissolution if the 
husband proceeded to break the stipulation, while the Hanafis held it to have no value 
at all, although the husband was at liberty to keep to it if he so wished. Similarly, the 
Malikis placed such a stipulation in their category of ‘disapproved’ (makruh) 
stipulations which were not contradictory to the contract but which the husband did 
not have to fulfill; it was disapproved because it limited the husband's right.87 Stating 
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that her husband ‘was not allowed’ to take another wife might have been construed by 
a literal-minded qadi as seeking to constrain his established right to do so. It is 
certainly the case that a dissolution would be easier to obtain if the stipulation had 
given her the right to divorce if the husband took another wife; this is interpreted as 
not affecting his right to do so, yet giving her a remedy in response to his exercise of 
that right. 
 
 The other stipulation found in the contracts dealing with polygyny was 
recorded under the JLFR in 1965 and stated that: 
 The wife stipulated  to the husband that he divorce his [current] wife within 
 one year of the date of the [present] contract and if he did not divorce her 
 within that period then the prompt dower would increase by a hundred dinars.  
 
 For the Hanbalis, a stipulation by the wife that her husband divorce another 
wife was held void, while leaving the contract valid.88 The Hanafis held it to have no 
value while the man was free to fulfill it if he wished.89 The OLFR of 1917, 
purporting to take up the Hanbali position on stipulations in the specific area of 
polygynous unions, included this kind of stipulation as valid in relation at least to a 
future wife: 
 If a man marries a woman and she stipulates to him that he shall not marry 
 another wife and if he does then she or the second wife shall be divorced, then 
 the contract is valid and the condition is to be observed. (Art. 38 OLFR). 
 
 The JLFR did not reproduce the OLFR example but included nothing to 
clarify the validity or otherwise of such a stipulation. Given the Hanbali and the 
Hanafi positions, it is doubtful that a West Bank court would have given this 
stipulation legal value, whether under the JLFR or the JLPS.90 Dawud publishes 
extracts from a number of rulings by the Amman Appeal Court confirming the 
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dissolution of a marriage on the basis of stipulations that the husband would not take 
another wife, or would not revoke the talaq of his current wife revocably divorced by 
him.91 In a longer extract, he reproduces text from a ruling turning down a woman’s 
application for faskh based on a stipulation that her husband should not take another 
wife. The man had divorced his then wife but had revoked his talaq (‘in word and 
deed’) the same day; he had then married the woman petitioner in Kuwait, and three 
weeks later registered his revocation of the divorce against his first wife in the shari`a 
court in Amman. The petitioner sought a dissolution based on her stipulation, but the 
Appeal Court set out the sources to the effect that marriage is established by the ijab 
and qubul and that the revocation of a talaq does not constitute a new marriage; 
accordingly, the woman petitioner had the right to seek faskh if he married another 
woman but not in the current circumstances. The extract published by Dawud gives 
no indication of whether the marriage contract in Kuwait showed that the man was 
‘married’ or was described as ‘divorced’. The woman’s attempt to protect herself 
against ending up in a polygynous union (a desire clearly shown by her attempt to use 
the stipulation upon becoming aware of the circumstances) was in this case frustrated 
by the actions of the husband and the wording of her stipulation.92 
 
4.2.4 Stipulations on place of residence  
 The other two examples of stipulations that the wife might make given in 
Article 19(i) of the JLPS both concern the place of residence of the wife - that her 
husband not make her leave her home town or village, or that he settle her in a certain 
place.  The subject matter here is related to the husband's right to the ‘obedience’ of 
his wife, which includes his right to call her to live with him wherever he chooses, so 
long as he is to be trusted with her; the JLPS adds in this regard ‘and so long as there 
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is no stipulation to the contrary in the contract document’.  With the greater mobility 
of modern society, and in particular in areas of the West Bank with a high rate of 
emigration or at least of work abroad, there is an increased likelihood that the woman 
may find herself expected to move far away from her home area and therefore her 
own support network.93 
 
 Provision for the woman to stipulate where she wishes to live was first made 
explicitly in the JLFR and repeated with added detail in the JLPS. The Hanbalis 
considered it a valid stipulation, with the option of dissolution available to the woman 
if it were broken; the Hanafis and Malikis gave it no legal value.94 The Jordanian 
legislators followed the Hanbalis in stating that if such a stipulation were agreed to 
and broken by the husband, the marriage could be dissolved on the petition of the 
wife.  
 
 Leaving aside the stipulations concerning property - vastly inflated  in number 
by the approach in Hebron in 1975 - the place of residence  of the wife was the 
subject on which most stipulations were made in the contracts reviewed. All except 
one of the fifteen stipulations on this subject specified the woman's home town or 
village as the place where she desired to spend her married life; the one exception 
simply stated the woman's right to choose the place (‘to live in the place that she 
wishes to live in with her husband, by consent and agreement’), and in this sense may 
have been too general to be of much effect.  However, this exception was the same as 
the others in that no remedy was specified in the case of the husband breaking the 
agreement, and the nature of the stipulations thus appears to be that of clarifying the 
ground-rules for the forthcoming marriage for the sake of the parties. Several of the 
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stipulations employ phrasing such as ‘he shall not make her live anywhere apart from 
‘X’ without her consent.’ An Appeal Court decision of 1963 established that if she did 
move to live elsewhere than the place she had stipulated, she retained the right to 
withdraw her consent at any time and to ‘exercise her right in realising the 
condition’.95 
 
 However, quite what ‘realising the condition’ means in this context is not 
clear. When awards of ta`a (obedience) were enforceable, such a stipulation could 
presumably have been of effect in preventing the forcible implementation of such 
rulings by officers of the court. However, since 1976 there has been no forcible 
execution of a ruling for ‘obedience’ against the wife in any case, and it would seem 
that the stipulation would more likely be used as a pretext for not accompanying the 
husband rather than as grounds for dissolution after she has accompanied him. A 
decision from the Amman Shari`a Court of Appeal ruled rather anomalously in this 
regard in 1974 that in a claim for separation on the grounds of absence and injury, a 
stipulation to the effect that the wife would only move out of her home area by her 
consent would not serve to rebut a man's defence that he had asked her to come and 
live with him and she had refused. The Court argued that the provisions on judicial 
divorce on the grounds of absence and injury were absolute and unconstrained, and 
that the wife retained the right to raise other claims to implement the stipulation -- 
presumably by seeking maintenance to enable her to keep living away from him, since 
the Court agreed the stipulation could be of value in a defence to the husband’s claim 
for ta`a.96 Two years later, the JLPS specifically constrained the requirement for the 
wife to move to live with her husband in the event of there being a stipulation to the 
contrary.   
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 In practice, under the current law, it seems that a woman would use the 
stipulation to refuse to go with her husband; he might then refuse to pay her 
maintenance on the grounds that she is ‘disobedient’ or else call her to the ‘house of 
obedience’ in his new place of residence.  She could use the stipulation to establish a 
good defence to the ‘obedience' claim, continue to claim maintenance from him, and 
if he did not return to live with her, could either obtain separation for non-payment of 
maintenance if he defaulted, or arguably for desertion (hajr) or absence and injury if 
he did not, although given the previous Appeal Court rulings this might be disputed. 
On the other hand, the woman might specify place of residence in order to ensure that 
her husband take her to live with him, espeically if he is living abroad, rather than 
leaving her at home alone. In such circumstances it would be easier to establish a 
claim for dissolution, since the stipulation accords with the existing presumption in 
the law -- that the woman will move to live with the man -- and the choice would be 
either he moves her to live with him or she is entitled to dissolution. Two rulings in 
the published Amman Appeal Court decisions show women being (one living in the 
U.S. and the other in Kuwait) on the grounds of this type of stipulation.97  
 
 The JLPS also included place of residence as an example of stipulations that 
the husband might make, but no examples were found in the contracts examined for 
this study of a man stipulating that his wife live in a certain place with him. The 
WCLAC research found one example of a man stipulating that his wife should live 
where he does.98 
 
4.2.5 Stipulations on work 
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 The other subject area given as an example in the JLPS of stipulations that a 
husband might make was the employment of the woman in work outside the marital 
home. This matter was also addressed more by women than by men in the case 
material. The sense of the example in Article 19(ii), ‘that [the wife] shall not work 
outside the home’ is that the woman should not go out to work in waged, non-
domestic employment. However, two stipulations made by  women exempted the 
brides from being required by their husbands to work outside the house, one 
explaining this by the phrase ‘work of the village’. Both women were marrying 
farmers,  and it may be that the stipulation was intended to exempt them from 
agricultural work rather than from waged employment.99 
 
 Other stipulations made in the case material by women on the subject of work 
were positive, protecting their right to engage in non-domestic employment. Six 
teachers and one lawyer made such stipulations, and one woman whose profession 
was not recorded; all these examples came from the court at Hebron. Once again, 
most of the stipulations are of the‘declaratory’ type, without a remedy being 
stipulated, so that to realise the general remedy of dissolution for violation by the 
man, the woman would have to have been forcibly stopped from continuing her 
employment.  Short of this, however, the issue is again that of ‘obedience’; denying 
the husband the opportunity of establishing that his wife is being disobedient or is 
deserving of being divorced if she continues to go out to work, since the existence of 
this stipulation is evidence of his explicit consent to her doing so. In one case only, 
the woman gave herself an explicit remedy, stipulating that the husband ‘will not 
prevent her from working, and that if he does, she will have the right to seek 
separation in the shari`a court’.100 
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 In two other contracts both husband and wife addressed the issue of the 
woman's waged employment.  The contracts were concluded at the same time by two 
brothers marrying two sisters; the women, both teachers, stipulated that they should 
work in the area of their expertise and the men, accepting that condition, rejoined that 
their wives should undertake the bringing up of their children, a condition accepted by 
the women. The implication of the brothers' condition was that although they had no 
objection to their wives continuing to teach, when the couples had children, the 
women should stay with them rather than placing them with relatives or in daycare 
facilities in order to pursue full-time employment.101  
 
 A number of stipulations on the subject of the woman's right to work either 
added a clause concerning her income or assumed her continued work and focussed 
on her right to dispose of her income. Islamic law makes no provision for shared 
property rights, and gives the husband no claim to his wife's property, except in 
inheritance.  How the woman disposes of independently owned or earned property is 
thus legally a matter for her discretion alone, but the number of stipulations 
reaffirming this right both over income and other property belonging to the wife is 
indicative of customary practices that may infringe upon this position. Stipulations 
relating to the wife's income are clearly of the ‘clarifying’ variety, stating the wife's 
right to dispose of her income as she pleases. In some cases, an indication is made of 
the way she chooses to spend it; for example, the wife's father, acting as wakil in a 
1965 contract, stipulated to the husband that if his daughter continued to work, he (her 
father) would receive ten dinars a month from her income. Two other contracts gave 
half the wife's salary to one or the other of her parents. The value that attaches to such 
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stipulations arises purely from the wife's right to dispose of her property. If the 
husband tries to prevent his wife giving all or some of her salary to her parent(s), he 
can be ordered to stop;  but if the wife chooses to withhold the money,  her parents 
cannot use the stipulation made to the husband in the contract of marriage as a basis 
for a claim upon her salary, although it is likely that she would be exhorted to adhere 
to her undertaking. 
 
4.2.6 Stipulations on independent accommodation 
 
 Of the stipulations examples of which are not given in Article 19 of the JLPS, 
the most common constituted reinforcement of a right that already exists in Hanafi 
law - for the wife to live in ‘separate’ accommodation.  The rules on what constitutes 
a shar`i dwelling include that the wife is to have accommodation separate from either 
relatives (primarily her in-laws) or co-wives. Custom is moving from this being a 
separate room or set of rooms for the married couple in the man's family home to a 
separate dwelling, whether a flat built on top of the man's family home or an entirely 
different house, depending upon class, region and income levels. Although long 
established as a legal right, the fact that women are frequently dissatisfied with or 
apprehensive about the independence of their dwelling quarters is indicated both by 
claims raised in the courts and by  the relative frequency of stipulations on the subject 
in marriage contracts. The larger number of women insisting on separate 
accommodation in 1985 as compared to earlier years seems to indicate increased 
expectations in this regard. The majority of stipulations in the case material on this 
subject simply state that the wife is to live ‘by herself’ or ‘in an independent dwelling 
not shared with any other person’. Some, however, identify a specific concern, 
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stipulating for example that the husband may not make his wife live in the same house 
as her co-wife, or next door to where his own mother lives. The WCLAC research in 
the Nablus court, as noted above, also puts this subject at the top of the list in 
contracts in the early 1990s, and it also illustrates efforts made by men to establish 
ground-rules contradicting this trend, with five stipulations made by grooms to the 
effect that the wife should live with him in his parents family house, or with a co-
wife.102  
 
 In three of the stipulations included in the contracts examined for the current 
study, the women stipulated payment of a sum of money in the event of her husband 
breaking the stipulation and making her live with her co-wife. In the rest, no specific 
remedy was stated. The published Amman Appeal rulings include decisions that trace 
the progress of a claim made in 1981 by a woman for dissolution due to her husband's 
violation of her stipulation that she live by herself. The first instance court had turned 
down the woman's petition for dissolution, on the grounds that the stipulation was not 
one which had to be observed - the classical Hanafi position. The Appeal Court 
clarified that the stipulation in the contract required the man to accommodate her in a 
home on her own and that he had violated this by bringing a co-wife to live with her. 
The husband acknowledged the stipulation but claimed that the plaintiff had waived it 
and consented to her co-wife living with her. The case was referred back to the first 
instance court to take evidence on the husband's defence. The first instance court 
promptly dismissed the claim again on the grounds that the documented text of the 
contract did not include the fact that the stipulation was made by the wife, nor the 
husband's acceptance of it. The woman returned to the Appeal Court, which held that 
the man had acknowledged the existence and validity of the stipulation and his 
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acceptance of it during the course of the claim, and referred the case back for the first 
instance court to proceed with consideration of his defence again. The man was 
unable to prove his defence and the marriage was eventually dissolved.103  
 
 An independent dwelling is already the woman's right under Hanafi  law, and 
the remedy there is for her to refuse to live in the house on the grounds that it is not a 
shar`i dwelling; he will in this case have to continue paying her maintenance, but 
there is no way of actually obliging him to provide another dwelling. It would take a 
year of living apart from him, and establishing that the separation was legally his 
responsibility, for the wife to be entitled to seek separation on the grounds of 
desertion - grounds which of course were not recognised by the Hanafis. 
 
4.2.7 Other stipulations 
 
 In a contract in the 1965 sample, the wife attempted to shorten the maximum 
period of isolation from her husband to which she could be subjected by stipulating 
that if he stayed outside Jordan (understood by the courts as including the West Bank 
at that time) without a legitimate pretext (`udhr shar`i) for ten months, then she would 
have the right to divorce herself. This stipulation, if admitted by the shari`a court, 
would cut two months from the time the woman would otherwise have to wait before 
suing for separation on the grounds of absence and injury, or desertion, and could 
avoid the lengthy procedure of a separation claim. However, the inclusion of the 
words ‘without a shar`i reason’ might mean that the court would wish to notify the 
husband and elicit his reason from him, as in a separation claim, before proceeding to 
divorce the woman from him by talaq in accordance with the stipulation. 
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 Three other stipulations included in the contracts from Ramallah dealt with 
travel abroad by the husband.  One woman stipulated that the husband take her with 
him if he went abroad, while another simply stated that the husband should not travel 
to the United States, thus giving herself the right to refuse to accompany him; the 
third stated that if her husband travelled to the States, she would have the power to 
divorce herself. 
 
 Another precaution on a subject nominally covered by existing rules came in a 
stipulation to the effect that were it to transpire that the husband was afflicted with ‘a 
sexual disease’ then the wife would have the right to seek separation in the shari`a 
court ten months after the date of the contract. The classical rules expounded in the 
JLPS give the wife the right to seek separation if the husband has a contagious and 
dangerous disease such as syphilis, but with the proviso that if the disease is curable, 
the wife has to wait for at least a year to see if her husband responds to treatment;104 if 
there is no cure, the marriage can be ended immediately.  This would for example 
cover conditions such as HIV, but other, unspecified ‘sexual diseases’ might not be 
included. 
 
 Other extensions to existing rules contained in the contracts examined 
included three stipulations by women concerning their formal education - a subject 
holding second place in the more recent work from Nablus contracts in the WCLAC 
study. Two of the contracts in the material examined for this study stipulated that the 
wife would complete a university degree, and one added that her university education 
in North America would be financed by her husband. These stipulations would 
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probably be held to be binding in the sense that the husband could not with impunity 
demand that his wife cease her studies or accuse her of ‘disobedience’, and cease 
paying maintenance if she did not, and if he divorced her, she could claim 
compensation for arbitrary talaq.  As far as being liable for her expenses at university, 
the shari`a court might wish to ascertain that the woman was a successful student and 
not prolonging her studies unnecessarily, by analogy with the constraints upon the 
father's obligation to fund the further education of his male offspring.105 
 
 The rules on the maintenance of children would probably cause to be 
dismissed any claim brought on the basis of two stipulations made in 1985. The 
stipulations purported to oblige the husband to maintain children from the wife's 
previous marriage, in one case for a total period of fifteen years, and if he stopped 
maintaining them at any point during that period to be liable to pay a lump sum of 
money to the wife. The JLPS follows standard Hanafi rules on this subject: the 
maintenance of children comes first out of their own property, if they have any, and 
thereafter is the responsibility of their father, their mother and their father's ascendants 
in the relevant order.106 Thus, while the new husband could choose to pay for the 
maintenance of his wife's children from another man, it is unlikely that the shari`a 
court would oblige him to do so. The Malikis placed this kind of stipulation in the 
category of void conditions that contradicted the requirements of the contract and 
caused dissolution of the contract if the marriage was unconsummated.107 
 
 Another stipulation dealing with children from a former marriage required the 
husband to guarantee custody of the woman's child for the period of suckling. The 
intention would appear to be that her new husband was not to refuse to let the woman 
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keep the child with her until it was weaned; the realisation of this stipulation could be 
frustrated by third parties, since the rules on custody still provide for the child to be 
removed to the family of the father in the event of the mother marrying a man outside 
certain degrees of kinship to the child.108  
 
 A more standard guarantee was sought by a woman in 1975 through a 
stipulation that the husband's father act as guarantor for payment of her prompt dower 
and tawabi`.  Two other stipulations in the same year required the groom's father to 
act as guarantor for payment of the deferred dower when it fell due; in both cases, the 
deferred dower was unusually high by prevailing levels.109 The acceptance by the 
groom's father of the role of guarantor would bind him to pay the dower in the event 
of default by the husband. 
 
 Two of the three stipulations made by men in the contracts reviewed were 
registered, as noted earlier, in response to stipulations by the wife.  In the other, the 
husband undertook to treat his wife well and to increase her deferred dower by two 
hundred dinars if he mistreated her. The husband is required by the existing rules to 
treat his wife well, and all schools recognised a stipulation requiring him to do so as 
valid - although not in the sense of giving grounds for dissolution if he failed, since 
only in the Maliki school was ill-treatment or cruelty grounds for separation at the 
petition of the wife. The stipulation probably served the more immediate purpose of 
reassuring the bride's family through acknowledging their concern: she was sixteen 
and the second wife of the groom.110 
 
4.2.8 Stipulations, law and society 
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 Despite the possibilities for protection of rights or clarification of ‘ground 
rules’ for a marriage that the insertion of stipulations offers under the law currently 
applied in the West Bank, it is clear that it represents no more than an ad hoc, 
individual remedy that places the burden of initiative on the woman and is likely to 
arouse considerable adverse pressure. During discussions on a future Palestinian law 
of personal status, it has also been pointed out that for the legislature and for society 
as a whole, there is a question of national policy and social responsibility in leaving 
the protection — or clarification — of rights such as education and waged 
employment for women out of the law per se and subject to the knowledge, ability 
and initiative of the individual woman not only to insist on the insertion of a 
stipulation but to phrase it in a manner that gives it legal value. In the face of 
inadequate training or experience and possible personal (and/or institutional) 
antipathy on the part of ma’dhuns, the latter obstacle can be considerable. 
 
 On the other hand, the legal provisions allowing for the insertion of valid 
stipulations give a clear indication of the acceptability of the changing of the more 
traditional parameters of the marriage relationship.  In the course of debates 
elsewhere, it has been suggested that one expeditious, if interim, way of giving added 
protection to certain rights for women within the family would be for certain 
stipulations to be included in the text of the marriage contract itself: that is, for the 
standard, government department-issued form for the contract of marriage to list 
certain stipulations that will rule the contract. In this way, the woman's right to work, 
education and so on could be clarified at the beginning of the marriage in an 
appropriate manner that would be applicable to all those concluding the contract. 
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 In Egypt, research and debate on this approach have been going on for many 
years and have included the NGO sector, lawyers, jurists, and government 
departments. The idea of developing the contract document began as a project in 1985 
and was taken up by the national committee of NGO’s constituted to prepare for the 
International Conference on Population and Development convened in Cairo in the 
summer of 1994.111 These efforts found a certain resonance at the Ministry of Justice, 
where a project was underway with a view to expediting litigation procedure in 
personal status matters. The idea was that the form should include a list of stipulations 
that would be assumed to be part of the terms of the contract, and that in the event of 
their not wishing to include any particular stipulation in the contract document, the 
parties should strike them out. The effect here would be to reverse the burden during 
the negotiating process, away from the party (usually the wife and her family) seeking 
to have stipulations included and to the party (usually the husband) seeking to have 
them struck out.  The proposed agreements to which the parties would be invited to 
sign up included the wife’s right to education, to go out to work, to leave the country, 
and against her husband concluding a polygynous marriage.112 
 
 In a commentary on the developments proposed in the contract of marriage, 
Zulfiqar and Sadda stress the legitimacy of the proposed agreements under Islamic 
law, while setting the thrust of the project clearly in the effort to ‘encourage 
frankness, mutual understanding and dialogue’ between the spouses, reduce the need 
to have recourse to the courts in difficult and bitter litigation procedures, and ‘raise 
awareness of legal and shar`i rights and encourage people to exercise them.’ They 
point out that the list is neither exhaustive nor obligatory, and that even if adopted, it 
would not obviate the need for a review of both procedural law and substantive 
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personal law. They also report on a survey in response to the project among Egyptian 
university students: 77.7% of those questioned said that they would agree to be bound 
by some of the conditions, 16.8% by all of them and 5.5% did not agree with the idea 
of the project at all. The least favoured stipulation, according to the survey, was the 
right of the wife to divorce herself, with only 34.8% agreeing. The stipulation on the 
wife’s right to education was agreed to by 83.1%, while agreement on her right to 
work met with the approval of only 51%.113   
 
 Despite the efforts and longevity of the project, Ron Shaham deduces that it 
was ‘doomed to oblivion’ -- albeit temporarily -- following opposition from al-Azhar 
and a lack of coverage of the issue after the Beijing World Conference on Women in 
1995.114 In Palestine, pending legislative amendments to the substantive law on 
personal status, it was pointed out that this form of interim action was more or less 
immediately available, since it is more a matter of administration (the issue of 
administrative regulations altering the routine contract forms) than of legislation. The 
implementation by the national authorities of such routine protections would be 
substantially more indicative of an intention to strengthen women's position in the 
socio-economic sphere, as well as in personal life, than simply leaving the burden of 
initiative on individual women. Thus, when a new contract document was drawn up, it 
would have been possible to include a standardised delegation of talaq to the wife.115  
 
 In the event, the new contract document issued by the Qadi al-Quda for use in 
West Bank and Gaza Strip shari`a courts under the PNA did not exploit this 
opportunity, but rather followed the existing form by simply providing a section for 
registration of stipulations at the initiative of one or both parties. The problems here, 
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as noted above, include the obstacles of non-awareness and societal antipathy; in 
addition, a disregard for intention and a literalistic approach on the part of at least 
some members of the shar`i judiciary, combined with inadequate phrasing at the time 
of registration, mean that many stipulations may serve an extra-judicial function but 
fail to provide the anticipated protection if called upon in court.  
 
4.3 Polygyny 
4.3.1 Polygyny and the law 
 Classical Islamic law permits a man to be married to up to four women at any 
one time, subject to the constraints that he is able to fulfill his standard duty of 
maintenance with regard to each woman he marries, and that he treats them equally. 
The institution of polygyny, tu`addad al-zawjat, was regarded by the jurists as having 
been explicitly provided for in the Qur'an116 and endorsed by the Prophet. The two 
classical constraints mentioned above were regarded as binding upon the conscience 
of the individual man rather than as ‘legally’ enforceable.117 
 
 Over the course of the last hundred years or so, thinkers and jurists and 
women's movements in the Arab world have articulated a different view of the 
institution of polygyny. The debate has covered all aspects of the need for reform, 
both from a shar`i and socio-economic perspective. In Egypt, Fauzi Najjar notes that 
Muhammad `Abduh argued for the restriction of polygyny as well as unilateral talaq, 
followed in later years inter alia by Jamal `Utayfi and others; Margot Badran 
described the campaign by Egyptian feminists in the 1940s against polygyny as ‘a 
struggle against a dying institution’.118 In Tunisia in the 1930s, the abolition of 
polygyny was one of main arguments of the famous work by Tahir Haddad. In her 
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presentation at the 1994 conference in Jerusalem on Women, Justice and the Law, 
Tunisian lawyer Hafidha Chekir described how the subsequent debate in Tunisian 
society fed into what is still one of the most radical developments in Islamic personal 
status laws in the Arab states, the abolition of polygyny in Tunisia.119  
 
 In other Arab states, more limited efforts have been made in two basic 
directions in personal status legislation to constrain the institution of polygyny. The 
first is requirements and limitations that are to be enforced by the courts before the 
conclusion of a polygynous union. The second is the introduction of legislation 
reflecting the changing view of society towards the institution, effectively allowing 
that a woman may be injured by the simple fact of her husband's taking another wife, 
and that she may have cause to seek dissolution of her marriage accordingly. 
 
 With regard to prior requirements, the legislatures of various Arab states have 
basically expanded the two classical constraints upon polygyny and rendered their 
enforcement the business of the courts, rather than a matter for the man's conscience. 
Under classical Islamic law, the husband's duty of maintenance applies to each wife 
individually, and its components were analysed in great detail by the jurists. The 
second constraint, the requirement of treating wives equally, is classically interpreted 
as equality in material things -- ‘visible justice’ -- which would include maintenance, 
accommodation, gifts, nights spent with each woman and so on, but exclude ‘things of 
the heart’ or equality in the love and affection felt by the husband towards each 
wife.120 These two constraints were not interpreted as constituting enforceable 
conditions in the sense that a polygynous marriage wherein these conditions were not 
met was open to dissolution.121 A man could be exhorted to consider them before 
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contracting a woman in a polygynous union, but could not be prevented from 
concluding a marriage where the conditions were not met, and the marriage would 
still be valid.122  
 
 The history of the efforts of the legislatures of Arab states to reform the 
classical law on polygyny makes for extremely interesting reading. It reflects the 
approaches of modern nation-state governments to a very traditional feature of 
classical Islamic law. The reforming regimes were often impelled by the adoption of a 
‘modernist’ or ‘revolutionary’ agenda that included recognition of the role of women 
in the struggle for national independence, and of the role of women in building the 
new state, of which they were reminded by the women's movements becoming 
increasingly vocal on these issues. At the same time, they have justified their reforms 
on legal arguments and interpretations reconciling the changes in the law with the 
shari`a. 
 
 The legislation currently in force in the West Bank reflects none of the 
developments in neighbouring countries. When the Ottomans issued the OLFR in 
1917, they left intact the classical rules on polygyny. The only innovation the OLFR 
made in this regard was to adopt the Hanbali position on stipulations to allow the 
individual woman to protect herself against her husband taking another wife; it made 
no attempt to institute legal (i.e. state-regulated) constraints on the conclusion of 
polygynous unions per se. The only other article on polygyny in the OLFR restates 
the classical position, that a husband with more than one wife  must ensure justice and 
equality between them.123 The OLFR was quickly abandoned by those who 
promulgated it, with Turkey's adoption of a secular civil code that prohibited marriage 
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by a person already contracted in a valid marriage, and furthermore provided for the 
court to declare invalid a second marriage concluded in violation of that 
prohibition.124 In Palestine, however, as elsewhere in the Middle East, the OLFR 
remained for many decades the basis of family law. The British Mandate authorities 
issued a Criminal Code imposing a prison sentence for those contracting polygynous 
marriages, but the Code incorporated a ‘good defence’ to the charge for ‘non-Jews’ 
for whom polygyny was valid according to their personal law.  The exception clause 
covered most men in Palestine, the majority of whom were Palestinian Muslims.125 
 
 In 1951, the Jordanians added only one phrase in the JLFR to the pre-existing 
OLFR references to polygyny: the law required a man who had more than one wife to 
be just and treat them equally, and not to make them live together without their 
consent- the standard Hanafi rules.126 In their Criminal Code, the Jordanians 
maintained the same terms as the British, making the clause of exception the law that 
effectively applies to the vast majority of the male population in both Jordan and the 
West Bank:  
 Every person, male or female, who marries while their spouse is still alive, 
 whether or not the subsequent marriage is void or may be dissolved, shall be 
 punished by imprisonment for a period of from six months to three years 
 unless  it is established 
 a) that the previous marriage has been dissolved by the competent court or 
 religious authority; or  
 b) that the law of marriage applicable to the spouse at the date of the previous 
 or the subsequent marriage permits the husband to marry more than one wife. 
 (Article 280) 
 
 The regulation of polygyny in the West Bank thus remained in its classical 
state, unconstrained by enforceable limits. Elsewhere in the Middle East, constraints 
on the institution of polygyny were introduced in the legislation of Syria, Iraq, 
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Morocco and the Yemen,127 before the JLPS of 1976 confined itself to reproducing 
the terms of the JLFR on polygyny:128  
 Article 28: Any person who has four wives or mu`taddas may not contract 
 another woman in marriage until he has divorced one of them and she has 
 completed her `idda. 
 Article 40: The man who has more than one wife shall be just and equitable 
 between them and may not settle them in one house without their consent.  
 
 In these provisions, the Quranic requirement of equal treatment is presented in 
classical form, with the requirement of separate accommodation indicating the level 
of maintenance recognised these days as customary in the West Bank -- that is, that 
co-wives are entitled to separate houses, rather than simply separate rooms in a house. 
There is no suggestion that either constraint could be used to subject a polygynous 
union to the scrutiny of a court before its conclusion. This is despite the fact that 
already in 1951, the JLFR had introduced this method of pre-emptive scrutiny of 
motivation and appropriateness for certain types of marriages, through requiring the 
consent of the qadi to a marriage involving parties with an age difference of over 
twenty years. It remains the case that the only available protection for a woman 
against polygyny under the terms of the JLPS is the insertion of a stipulation in the 
contract of marriage. The same situation, coincidentally, applies in the Gaza Strip, 
under the Egyptian-drafted Family Rights Law of 1954.129 
 
 The absence of judicially-enforceable constraints prior to the conclusion of a 
polygynous marriage is matched by an absence of attention to remedies available to a 
woman whose husband takes another wife and as a result no longer wishes to remain 
in her marriage. The JLPS keeps to the classical Hanafi position of not making 
‘injury’ in and of itself grounds for separation at the petition of the wife. An 
interesting point in this regard was made by the then qadi of Ramallah, who pointed 
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out that the word for co-wife, durra, comes from the root darara (to injure, the same 
root as the word used for injury), indicative that the fact of marriage to a second wife 
by a woman's husband always causes injury to the first wife, not only because he is 
likely to give more attention to the new wife but also in that he will be spending 
money on the second wife and that his property (at inheritance for example) will be 
further divided.130 However, under the current legislation, the question of whether the 
marriage of a woman's husband to another woman constitutes injury will only be 
considered in the context of a claim for separation on grounds of ‘discord and strife’. 
In such a claim, the woman must establish the incidence of injury in order to institute 
the process of arbitration. The arbiters appointed by the court in such a claim may 
find, for example, evidence of injury caused to the wife or unequal treatment resulting 
in arguments and ‘strife’, and accordingly find the woman relatively blameless. On 
the other hand, since there is no presumption in the law that polygyny causes injury, 
they may in theory draw the conclusion that the wife was treated equally and received 
her full rights according to the law, and has herself created a problem out of an 
entirely legitimate second marriage by her husband; such a finding would cost her a 
large proportion of her remaining financial rights against her husband if the separation 
were effected.  
 
 So long as there is no legal presumption of injury by the fact of a second 
marriage by the husband, a woman who has inserted a stipulation against her husband 
marrying again in her marriage contract would do better to seek dissolution (faskh) of 
her marriage on grounds of breach of the condition, thereby safeguarding her financial 
rights, rather than seeking to use the stipulation in a claim for separation on the 
grounds of ‘discord and strife’. If no stipulation has been inserted, however, the 
 237 
separation claim may ultimately constitute a woman's only remedy to leave the 
marriage, and this is particularly serious given that for the duration of the polygynous 
unions, there appears to be no direct way of enforcing the requirements of equal 
treatment or even separate accommodation, beyond the objecting wife withdrawing 
from the marital home and claiming maintenance. Although the claims and defences 
from that point on may have a number of variations, they involve two fundamental 
premises: firstly, that neither a woman nor a court may prevent a man from marrying 
another wife, and secondly that this second marriage gives no direct right of divorce 
to the first wife, unless she has ensured such right by means of a stipulation at the 
time of the contract. 
 
 In the West Bank, in terms of procedure, the official forms for the contract of 
marriage issued by the Jordanian authorities provide two ways in which the 
conclusion of a polygynous marriage could be distinguished from a monogamous one 
by the courts. The first is in the registration, in the section of the marriage contract 
reserved for this information, of the man's status -- i.e. single, widowed, divorced, 
[already] married. The second is in the levying of a higher registration fee for the 
marriage contract. The original terms of the Jordanian Regulation on Shari`a Court 
Fees of 1951 levied a fee of one dinar for monogamous contracts of marriage, and ten 
dinars for a contract concluded ‘by a person who is still married to a living wife, 
without there being justification (mubarrir) for another marriage’; a 1983 amendment 
raised these to ten and fifty dinars respectively, and in Jordan a 1997 amendment 
raised them again to fifteen and sixty dinars respectively.131 
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 This procedural regulation is particularly interesting given the failure of the 
Jordanian legislature to introduce judicial scrutiny of the ‘justification’ for 
polygynous unions in substantive personal status law. The original Regulation cited 
above -- which preceded the JLFR, although issued in the same year -- clearly 
envisages that the court has a role to play in deciding whether there is a ‘justification’ 
for a polygynous union, and imposing the higher fee where they find none. 
Nevertheless, the Regulation remained unsupported by parallel references to a 
‘justification’ or a ‘legitimate benefit’ in the texts of either the JLFR or the later JLPS, 
or any indication as to by whom, when and how this should be assessed.  
 
 In practice, the higher fees appear to be routinely applied to any polygynous 
marriage without any formal decision as to the legitimacy of the justification for it. 
The only exception found in the contract sample is a demonstration of just how the 
Regulation has not been used:  in a contract from 1965, the groom was described as 
‘married to one wife’ but in the space reserved for showing the fee paid, the sum of 
one dinar was registered with an accompanying note in explanation that the man paid 
the lower fee ‘because of special circumstances, being very poor’. Bearing in mind 
the requirement that the man be financially capable of maintaining both wives, the 
fact that the court facilitated his marriage by lowering the fee may indicate additional 
circumstances not mentioned in the explanatory note.  
 
4.3.2 Incidence 
 The proportion of polygynous marriages in the West Bank appears to be well 
within the estimate of 10% or under for the Middle East in general. Muheilan's 
statistics from the shari`a courts in Jordan for 1985 indicate a proportion of 7.7% of 
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contracts there as polygynous.132 That rate is higher than the proportion of polygynous 
marriages in the contracts examined for this study, as set out in the table in Appendix 
VI, showing an overall rate of 5.6% in 1965 and 1975 and 4.9% in 1985. Of the three 
courts, the rate in Hebron was the highest of the three, with the highest rate of all the 
figures of 7.2% in 1975. Ramallah saw a particular decrease in the polygyny rate over 
the ten years 1965 (5.6%) to 1975 (3.8%), followed by 3.6% in 1985. 
 
 These figures compare with the results of a survey of contracts analysed by 
Professor `Ayyush of Bethlehem University for the years 1973-84.133 Over the twelve 
years, Professor `Ayyush found the average rates to be 6.6% in Hebron, 3.2% in 
Ramallah and 5.3% in Bethlehem.  The highest average rates in the West Bank he 
found to be in Jericho (10.3%), followed by Hebron and then Bethlehem, with 
Ramallah as the lowest.  His conclusion overall was that there was no particularly 
striking pattern or change, although the rates were slightly higher in the later years of 
his survey.134 In the 1990s, the WCLAC research found a rate of 4.5% for the West 
Bank contracts it included,135 with a rate of 3.8% in Ramallah.136 Since the contract 
forms used in the Gaza Strip for those years did not have the West Bank distinctions 
between monogamous and subsequent polygynous unions described above, the 
WCLAC study could not provide statistics on polygyny in the Gazan courts. 
However, the PBCS reports a rate of polygyny in the Gaza Strip of 4.4%, while it 
found the West Bank rate to be 3%, giving an overall rate of 3.5%.137 
 
 The proportion of polygynous marriages is thus quite low. Layish, among 
others, attributes the general decline of polygyny in the Middle East inter alia to 
greater educational opportunities, increases in dower and in economic expectations of 
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the spouses, and the ‘transformation of traditional society’ particularly with regard the 
role of women.138 The figures from the Gaza Strip can be compared with an overall 
rate of 4% in Egypt at the time of the National Assembly's discussion of the 1979 
personal status legislation. During the debate, one of the points raised by opponents of 
the constraints on polygyny proposed in the legislation was whether it was actually 
necessary, given the low rate of polygyny according to official statistics.139 The 
perception of polygyny as relatively rare and therefore not constituting a ‘pressing 
problem’ might also be part of the reason for the failure of the Jordanian legislators to 
address the issue.  
 
4.3.3 Polygyny, law and society 
 The defence of the institution of polygyny is set by some writers within the 
framework of a limited comparative evaluation of the ‘morality’ of  societies under 
Islam and ‘in the west.’140 For the jurists, other points raised range from the assertion 
of its legitimacy under the shari`a through a discussion of various particular 
circumstances seen to provide particular justification. Sirtawi gives a four-point 
analysis of the justification for polygyny, based on the principle that the shari`a is 
complete, for all people and all times. He refers to situations in which the wife is 
infertile, or unable to engage in sexual intercourse due to chronic or contagious 
disease, arguing that in such circumstances, the husband needs another wife, while the 
woman is unlikely to be able to marry again; and that it is better for her to have a co-
wife than to be divorced. In his view, polygyny also remedies a lack of men in the 
community, perhaps arising from wars, and helps in these circumstances to 
compensate the community for the numbers it has lost through allowing for a greater 
number of children.141 The jurist `Abd al-Hamid makes the same points, but stresses 
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in particular the ‘danger’ presented to society by a ‘surplus’ of women the familiar 
idea of ‘fitna’).142 
 
 By contrast to these authors, both Ma`ruf in Iraq and Shqeir in the Maghreb 
support the restriction of polygyny. Shqeir observes that the Tunisian legislation -- 
abolishing polygyny sets the spouses on a relatively equal footing; Ma`ruf makes a 
general case for the implementation of legislation that will ‘move towards a new 
conception of marriage as involving obligations and duties that cannot be fulfilled 
unless it is based on equality, stability and security’, and that will therefore involve 
the stringent control of polygyny.143 Lazreg notes that although polygyny is under 2% 
in Algeria, the fact that the institution remains in law is a ‘monument to the failure of 
the Algerian state to build a just and egalitarian society.’144 
 
 During the 1980s in Jordan, a number of recommendations were made in 
regard to ways in which polygyny could and should be constrained. In her pamphlet 
published in 1984, Jordanian lawyer `Atayat recommended that polygyny be 
subjected to judicial supervision, making the consent of the qadi a prerequisite for 
conclusion of a polygynous contract and conditioning this consent on the following: 
 a) that a ‘legitimate benefit’ be realised by the polygynous union; 
 b) that the husband provides a guarantee for his ability to support two 
 wives, either in the form of a financial guarantee or a person to act as 
 guarantor; 
 c) that the intended bride be notified of the presence of an existing wife 
 before the contract of marriage; 
 d) that the existing wife be notified of the consent given to her husband to 
 take another woman in marriage; 
 e) that there be an investigation of the reasons given by the husband for 
his intended marriage to a second wife and that requirements be imposed [as 
to the evidence of the legitimate benefit he is claiming] such as a medical 
report if the husband claims the illness of his wife, her inability to engage in 
sexual intercourse or infertility.145 
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 `Atayat's recommendations are worth quoting in full to demonstrate the way in 
which she selected her proposals from among those measures already adopted in other 
Arab states which, by dint of espousal by the legislators and practice in the courts, 
must be assumed to have acquired a certain amount of consensus and legitimacy. Her 
examples of what might constitute a ‘legitimate benefit’ for a court to approve an 
intended polygynous union are interesting not only for their addition of evidence 
requirements (notably, a medical report), but for their resonance with some of the 
particular justifying circumstances put forward by Sirtawi in his defence of the 
institution of polygyny, as summarised above. The infertility of the wife or her 
inability to engage in sexual relations -- both to be established by medical report -- 
were cited as the two circumstances in which the husband might gain permission to 
take a second wife in the South Yemeni law of the family in 1974.146 Earlier in the 
century it was these two circumstances that Egyptian feminists had demanded be 
recognised as the only ones permitting a man to marry polygynously.147 However, 
despite representations and studies by Jordanian women’s groups,148 no legally 
enforceable restraints are proposed in the various draft proposals to amend the JLPS.  
 
 In Palestine, meanwhile, the report of a discussion among Palestinian women 
on the reform of polygyny at the 1994 conference in Jerusalem on Women, Justice 
and the Law reflects differences between those participants who aspired to an absolute 
prohibition on polygyny, as in Tunisia, and others who sought reform and restriction 
of the institution. In the course of the discussion, the report notes that all agreed that 
the ‘right of polygyny’ must be restricted ‘lest it be abused.’ The particular 
restrictions that were cited combined notification requirements with judicial scrutiny 
(and, by implication, control) before the conclusion of a polygynous union, and the 
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establishment of a woman's right to divorce as a remedy.149 In 1998, the discussions at 
the Model Parliament in Gaza amended a proposed text that allowed for limited 
exceptions to the general assumption of monogamy, voting for a text that prohibited 
polygyny.150 
 
 However, by the time of the Model Parliament meetings, the new PNA form 
for the registration of the contract of marriage had been issued by the Qadi al-Quda in 
1995 for use in the shari`a courts of the West Bank and Gaza. in Gaza. The new form 
appears to give no formal space for the registration of the husband’s current social 
status: that is, whereas the Jordanian forms previously in use in the West Bank had at 
least required the husband to reveal whether or not he was already married to another 
woman, the new Palestinian form appears to reproduce the existing situation in the 
Gaza Strip: while the form provides for the woman to be identified as either bikr or 
thayyib, there appears to be no equivalent requirement for registration of the 
husband’s status. In illustration, a newspaper article in 1998 reported the story of a 
Gazan woman who had no idea she was the third wife of her husband.151 In effect, the 
contract form issued by the PNA stands to actually reduce the information available to 
both the bride and the courts under the previous Jordanian procedures. Given 
developments elsewhere, this requirement of disclosure and notification is the 
minimum that might have been expected from the PNA. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
MARRIED LIFE AND THE LAW: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES THAT 
THE SPOUSES BRING TO COURT 
 
5.1 Introduction and Non-Petitionable Rights 
 
 The conclusion of a valid contract of marriage gives rise to a range of effects 
that reflect the balance of rights and obligations on which the jurists constructed their 
vision of the family in Islamic law. One of the most obvious of these is the balance 
between the husband's financial obligations towards his wife, and her obligation of 
obedience to him, and it is around this basic concept that the claims arising within 
marriage and discussed in this chapter are built. The rights and duties discussed here 
are gender-specific: the wife’s duty of obedience is matched by the husband’s right of  
‘correction’, or ‘chastisement’, (ta'dib), in the case of her disobedience (nushuz). The 
husband's obligation of maintenance (nafaqa) complements his other financial 
obligation of dower, while the wife has the right to good treatment (hasan al-
ma'ashira) and, should she be in a polygynous union, to equal treatment (`adl). There 
are other mutual rights and duties arising from the contract, including lawful 
intercourse, the establishment of the impediment of affinity, mutual inheritance and 
paternity.1  
 
 In law, these rights arise directly from the contract, rather than from con-
summation of the marriage, but the obligations of the wife tend to be consequent upon 
the prior completion of the husband's obligations. Thus, the husband cannot require 
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the obedience of his wife until he has paid her prompt dower and has prepared a 
suitable dwelling for her that fulfils the shar`i requirements. The wife, meanwhile, 
can claim maintenance from the husband until his obligations towards her are met, 
provided she is ready to move to live with him. 
 
 The JLPS has made few changes to the classical Hanafi rules on this area of 
law, summarising the structure of marriage in Articles 35 and 39: 
 Article 35:  If the contract is valid then the wife is due maintenance and dower 
 from her husband, and mutual inheritance is established. 
 Article 39:  The husband shall treat his wife well and deal with her favourably; 
 the wife shall obey her husband in permitted matters. 
 
The basic approach of the law is in general supported by commentators on grounds of 
biological determinism, with reference to the ‘natural’ and distinct functions of men 
and women to which each is physically suited -- men for wage-earning in the public 
sphere, and women for childbirth, childcare, and domestic labour -- and to an 
assertion of the ‘predominantly emotional nature’ of women.2  In the absence of 
significant developments in the letter of certain areas of the law, it has therefore been 
the role of the shari`a courts, headed by the Appeal Courts, to adapt the application of 
the rules, where they see it as necessary, to the circumstances of modern-day life. 
 
 The claims arising within marriage and made in court by one spouse against 
the other fall into three categories: the wife's claims for maintenance; the wife's claims 
for prompt dower, the tawabi` of the dower and/or jihaz; and the husband's action for 
obedience against his wife. The other rights between the spouses are not actionable in 
the sense of having means of positive enforcement.  The wife's right to be treated well 
by her husband, for example, is defined by Samara as the husband's duty not to harm 
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her in word or deed, to prevent injury of her by others, and to ‘give her what she is 
due from him without delay’.3 Samara goes on to criticise the JLPS for not stipulating 
a penalty in the case of the husband mistreating his wife, unless the mistreatment 
should reach the point where ‘discord and strife’ (niza` wa shiqaq) is established, on 
which grounds the wife can seek separation. Samara notes that the Hanafi response to 
such ill-treatment is the rebuke of the husband, and asks if this is a suitable ruling for 
a court to make.4 In practice, the wife usually claims ill-treatment by the husband after 
she has left the marital home and in defence to an action for ta`a raised by the 
husband. If she proves the ill-treatment, she will be due maintenance and the action 
for ta`a will be dismissed; in some cases in the material examined for this study, the 
court did explicitly tell the husband to ‘improve his behaviour’ or ‘make things up’ 
with his wife. The qadi, when making such a ruling, will be aware that the only legal 
recourse available in the shari`a courts has been made, unless the wife later chooses 
to sue for divorce, and that the matter is thereafter entirely in the hands of the couple 
and their respective families. 
 
  The right of co-wives to equal treatment appears also not to be positively 
enforceable. The classical Hanafi rules on this subject are repeated in Article 40 of the 
JLPS:  
 The man who has more than one wife shall be just and equitable between them 
in his treatment, and may not settle them in one house without their consent. 
 
 The issue of the separate accommodation of co-wives is often raised in 
defence against an action for ta`a.  None of the cases studied however raised the issue 
of what constitutes unequal treatment, so the only definitions come from the jurists 
writing on the subject, in line with the classical positions. They agree that this equal 
treatment includes spending an equal number of nights with each wife, except where 
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the man is accompanied by one wife on a journey.5 It is agreed that each wife must 
have adequate maintenance for her needs, but there is dispute over whether one may 
be given more than the other.6 In general, ‘equality’ appears usually to be taken as 
meaning precisely equal treatment in all material matters.7 
 
 The husband's prerogative of decision-making as the head of the family and 
his right to the obedience of his wife in marital affairs in the home are also not 
enforceable through the courts.  It is only when the wife has physically left the marital 
home for no legitimate reason that he may have recourse to the shari`a courts to have 
her ordered to return to the ‘house of obedience’ (bayt al-ta`a).8 This is because 
within the marital home, the husband is presumed to be able to assert his will over 
that of the wife through his right of chastisement, which Schacht describes as a 
‘limited right of correction’9 and is sometimes translated as ‘discipline.’ The jurists 
expounded the rules of ‘obedience’ and ‘discipline’ as providing for three stages: 
verbal rebuke, withdrawal of physical intimacy10 and use of physical force. In the 
differing climate of the late twentieth century, some modern scholars of law appear to 
continue to endorse the use of ‘moderate’ force by husbands against their wives, while 
insisting that this is only allowed in certain circumstances, and emphasising the 
constraints placed upon it by the early jurists in their authoritative works -- thus, that 
the blow must be ‘non-severe’, in that there must be no wounding, no breaking of 
bones and no marks left on the flesh, and the husband may not use anything to strike 
his wife that would cause her dishonour, such as a shoe.11 Whatever these theoretical 
constraints, the sanctioning of any degree or form of physical force by men against 
women is one of the most controversial of the features of traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence maintained in modern times, and allows for a relativist approach to the 
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use of physical as well as other violence; in 1961, the Shari`a Appeal Court in 
Amman stated that ‘in evaluating injury and harm to the wife, custom and the classes 
of the spouses must be taken into consideration.’12 
 
 Samara notes that if the husband exceeds these limits, or abuses in any other 
way his right of chastisement, the wife may petition for separation.13 It should be 
noted in passing here, however, that divorce could only occur in such a situation 
through the filing of a petition for separation on the grounds of niza` wa shiqaq, as the 
JLPS does not provide for divorce for ill-treatment without the necessary process of 
arbitration and the apportioning of blame between the two spouses. Where physical 
abuse is established, the wife has a good defence to an action for ta`a; only rarely is 
verbal abuse without accompanying physical violence raised in court by wives 
defending ta`a actions. 
 
 Given the careful scheme of the rights and duties of the two spouses according 
to Islamic law, nearly every claim arising during marriage and discussed in this 
chapter will involve one of the others at some point. In petitioning for ta`a, for 
example, the husband may have to prove that he treats his wife properly, that he has 
paid her prompt dower and that he has prepared a suitable marital home for her; the 
wife filing for maintenance, on the other hand, may have to prove that she has not 
been disobedient in leaving the marital home. The exception to this is the wife's right 
to her prompt dower, which can be claimed during marriage by a valid contract 
without reference to any corresponding rights and duties. 
 
5.2 Mahr, Tawabi` and Jihaz 
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 The significant shift in relative proportions of prompt and deferred dower 
apparent from the contracts of marriage was noted in the previous chapter as 
corresponding with the rising registration of tawabi` and amounting to substantial 
financial obligations in the contract of marriage.  These trends do not however appear 
to have led to a proportionate increase in claims for dower or tawabi` over the years 
studied; such claims by the wife constituted 4.1% of all claims in the three courts in 
1965, 5.5% in 1975 and 7% in 1985.   
 
5.2.1 Classification as prompt or deferred 
 The type of dower-related claims submitted during marriage in the case 
material mostly revolved around the wife seeking to ensure payment of her prompt 
dower, but there are a number of other issues that also arise. One such is the 
distinction between prompt and deferred dower. The second article in the Chapter on 
Dower in the JLPS, Article 45, provides that: 
The specified dower may be paid promptly, or some or all of it may be 
deferred, provided that this is supported by written document.  If the deferral 
is not explicitly stated, then the dower shall be held to be prompt.14 
 
 The signature of the wife's wakil and/or the wife herself establishes her 
agreement to the deferral. The significance of the distinction between prompt and 
deferred dower during the continuance of marriage lies in the fact that non-payment 
of prompt dower and/or the tawabi` is a good defence to a husband's claim for ta`a: 
the wife may thus leave the marital home and claim maintenance from her husband at 
any point during the marriage without being held disobedient (nashiz) if any part of 
the prompt dower remains unpaid (Articles 37 and 47).  Non-payment of deferred 
dower does not give her the right to refuse or withdraw obedience, and the sum may 
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not be claimed until the arrival of the deferral date or the death of either spouse. Thus, 
Article 47 provides: 
If the wife receives her prompt dower and the tawabi` thereof, or consents to 
the total or partial deferral of the dower or tawabi` to a specified time (ajal) 
then she shall not have the right to refuse obedience, although this shall not 
prevent her from seeking that which is her right. 
 
 It is customary in the West Bank for deferred dower to be held to fall due 
when the marriage ends, whether by death or divorce.15 This is supported by Article 
46 of the law: 
If the date of the deferred dower (falling due) is specified, then the wife may 
not claim it before the set time has come, even if talaq occurs, while if the 
husband dies, then the delay lapses.  If the set time is absurd, such as ‘till 
wealth’ or ‘until demand’ (li-hayn al-talab) or ‘until the wedding procession’ 
(zifaf) then the set time is irregular and the dower shall be prompt.  If the set 
time is not specified, the dower shall be considered deferred until talaq or the 
death of one of the spouses.         
 
 The parallel article in the JLFR (Article 42) did not contain the middle 
sentence of the above article, regarding ‘absurd’ deadlines, and it is probable that this 
was included in the new law due to the experience of the courts.  In many contracts in 
Hebron, for example, the ma’dhuns added extra phrases to the formal statements of 
the contract; in 1965, many contracts bore the words ‘[deferred] to one of the two 
deadlines’ (li-ahad al-ajalayn) after the amount of deferred dower. This is 
unnecessary clarification, since the above Article 46, and its predecessor in the JLFR, 
makes it clear that the standard deferral is indeed to one of the two deadlines of either 
death or divorce. 
 
 More significant, however, were several examples of ma’dhuns including 
extra wording in the space for prompt dower. Several 1975 contracts add that the 
prompt dower, or that part of it not yet received, was ‘deferred until demand’ (li-hayn 
 261 
al-talab).  If the result of this was that what had been intended as prompt dower was 
changed into deferred dower, it would have removed the wife's right to claim her 
prompt dower at any time. A decision from the Amman Appeal Court in 1952 decided 
that Article 42 of the JLFR on deferral of dower (the forerunner of the JLPS article) 
did not apply to prompt dower ‘deferred until demand’ because this deferral was not 
specific. Hence, the wife in such a case did not lose her right to defend a ta`a claim on 
the ground of non-payment of prompt dower.16 The change in wording in the JLPS 
supports this principle.  In 1975, in Hebron, two actions (one for ta`a and one an 
accusation of nushuz made during the course of a maintenance claim) were rejected 
on the grounds of non-payment of prompt dower which had been ‘deferred until 
demand.’17  
 
5.2.2 Consummation and establishment of the right to full dower 
 
 Another issue that continues to arise in the courts is connected to the 
complications relating to the source of the requirement of dower, discussed in the last 
chapter: in Jordanian law, following Hanafi rules, dower is an effect of the contract, 
but there are also rules that make some connection with consummation.18 The 
complications in identifying the source of requirement of dower has led to apparently 
contradictory decisions on the part of the Amman and the Jerusalem Shari`a Courts of 
Appeal. In 1983, the Amman court dealt with a case where the wife in a consummated 
valid marriage was claiming the tawabi` of her prompt dower, consisting of house 
furnishings to the value of a thousand dinars.  The first instance shari`a court had held 
her claim to be established by the contract of marriage in which the tawabi` were 
registered. The Appeal Court stated that the contract established matrimony and the 
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tawabi`, but in order for the wife to be due all the specified dower, and for the first 
instance court's ruling to be correct, consummation of the marriage also had to be 
established.19 
 
 This position of the Amman court was relied on in a 1985 decision in the court 
of Ramallah, in a case concerning a claim for tawabi` made by a wife in an 
unconsummated valid marriage. The couple had been married for a dower of 1000 
dinars prompt, 1000 dinars tawabi` and 1000 dinars deferred, all registered in the 
contract. The wife's wakil had acknowledged receipt of the 1000 dinars prompt dower 
in the contract document; the husband failed to prove his defence that his wife had 
received the tawabi`, and did not ask for her to be sworn the oath of denial to this 
defence. Finding the wife's claim to be established, the Ramallah qadi awarded the 
wife 500 dinars, half the sum due, as there had been no consummation.  The decision 
quoted the Amman precedent in support. 
 
 The wife appealed this decision to the Jerusalem Shari`a Court of Appeal, 
which held that the Ramallah court had awarded her half the total dower due - that is, 
half of the total of 3000 dinars, given that she had already received 1000 dinars. The 
Appeal Court noted that if talaq occurs before consummation or valid seclusion, then 
the wife is due half the total specified dower and tawabi`. The court went on to 
observe that there was no mention of talaq in the claim, that the parties were still 
married, and that therefore the Ramallah court should have awarded the wife the full 
1000 dinars tawabi`, with the husband to choose between paying the value or 
delivering the items of furniture to that value. 
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 The Jerusalem decision corresponds to the classical position, that the wife is 
due all her prompt dower whenever she claims it, and should talaq occur before the 
marriage has been consummated, the husband can claim back anything he has paid 
over half the total dower. This is consistent with Articles 52 and 53 of the JLPS, for 
example, which provide that where divorce occurs on the initiative of or by reason of 
the wife, the dower lapses in its entirety and the husband can claim back anything he 
has already paid. The Amman decision may have relied solely on the lack of evidence 
for consummation, but it was nevertheless a decision that indicated the occasional 
difficulties that arise from the dual source of the requirement of dower. 
 
5.2.3 Amount of dower 
 Given that it seems the norm now for marriages to be registered, and that the 
dower is included in the contract, disputes on the amount of dower for which the 
contract was concluded are rare, and no examples were found in the case material.  
Article 59 of the JLPS addresses the possibility of such disputes: 
If the spouses dispute as to the dower for which the contract was concluded, 
the claim shall not be heard if it contradicts the contract document, unless 
there is written evidence showing agreement at the time of marriage to a 
dower other than that stated in the contract. 
 
 This article also addresses the problem of ‘secret’ and ‘public’ dowers 
discussed by jurists with regard to those people who, usually for reasons of social 
prestige, agree on one dower in secret and announce another one to the public.20 The 
JLPS article would appear to require the ‘declared’ dower, since the one registered in 
the contract is agreed upon publicly to be paid.  It is, however, qualified by Article 63, 
which provides: 
 264 
The husband may increase the dower after the contract, and the wife may decrease it, 
provided they are fully competent to act. This attaches to the contract if accepted by the 
other party in the session of increase or decrease.21 
 
 In practice, the only official documents (hujuj) on a change in the amount of 
dower found during fieldwork at the shari`a courts were those filed by the husband 
increasing dower.  The reasons behind some such increases may be surmised from the 
stipulations inserted in certain marriage contracts, whereby the husband undertakes to 
increase the dower if he marries another wife, or if he makes his second wife live with 
his first. At other times, the increase may be a measure of conciliation and 
reassurance.22 Samara suggests that a man might raise his wife's dower when revoking 
his talaq of her, in order to compensate for his treatment of her;23 it may also be a 
means of increasing his wife’s share of his estate beyond the proportion she stands to 
inherit under the law of succession. The increase in dower is registered in the 
miscellaneous records of the courts, and none of the studied case material involved 
any such documentation in later litigation. 
 
5.2.4 Non-receipt of prompt dower 
 Just as it is not possible to discern from the miscellaneous registers the reasons 
behind an increase in dower, so the reasons behind the wife submitting a claim for 
dower are not set out in the records of rulings. Obviously, the factor common to most 
such claims is disagreement or breakdown in communication between the wife and 
her husband and their respective families, to the extent that out-of-court negotiations 
and conciliation procedures have failed. In some cases, it may be that the wife, 
probably with the encouragement of her family, is using the claim for dower as a form 
of pressure on her husband and his family; thus the wife in an unconsummated 
marriage, for example, may submit a claim for dower to pressurise the husband into 
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calling her to live with him, entailing the preparation of a suitable marital home and 
so on. 
 
 Most claims for dower in the case material, however, were made by wives in 
consummated marriages, and concerned either all or the remainder of the prompt 
dower, some having been paid before the zifaf; these claims are presumably prompted 
by on-going problems between the spouses. In some cases, the husband acknowledges 
his wife's claim without offering any defence. In others, however, the cases become 
quite complicated through disputes over how much the wife has already received.  
These disputes and the procedures that apply to them are the same whether it is cash 
dower or the tawabi` that is being sought, and may therefore be considered jointly.  
Claims for jihaz are liable to produce rather different defences on the part of the 
husband. 
 
 In mahr claims, where there is no acknowledgement of receipt of the prompt 
dower in the marriage contract, the burden of proof is on the husband if the wife 
claims that some or all of her dower remains in his keeping (dhimma, literally 
‘protection’). If the husband is unable to prove that he has delivered the mahr to his 
wife, he has the right to ask that she be sworn the oath of denial to his defence. If she 
takes this oath, she will be awarded the sum she is claiming.24 
 
 The claim may become more complicated where the marriage contract 
includes an acknowledgement of receipt of the prompt dower and/or the tawabi`.  
Mostly -- as seen in the previous chapter -- this acknowledgement is made by the 
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wife’s guardian acting as her wakil in the contract. Indeed, the JLPS requires this to 
be so in most marriages:  
 The virgin (bikr), even if fully competent to act, has her dower received by her 
 wali if this is her father or grandfather.(Article 64)25  
 
Thus, a bikr of any age must by law have her dower received on her behalf by her 
guardian; if she is under the age of legal majority (rushd), although she can get a 
ruling against him for her dower, he cannot be obliged to actually hand it over until 
she is fully competent under the law.26  
 
 Where such an acknowledgement is made, there are two circumstances that 
may mean that the wife has not in fact received her dower. The first is that her wakil, 
usually her father, did receive the amount from the bridegroom, but did not pass it on 
to his daughter, whether in cash or in kind. Where this happens, the wife has the right 
to claim the amount from her father in court, but this is a right rarely exercised.27 In 
the court records studied, only one case was found (in the 1965 material) where a 
woman claimed her dower from her father who had received it as her wali and wakil. 
The father had passed on to his daughter less than half the dower he had received 
from the groom, and she went to court to claim the remainder. The case ended with an 
out-of-court settlement between the parties whereby the woman received just under 
half the amount outstanding - a recognition, at least implicitly, of lingering customary 
rights of the wali. 
 
 The other explanation for the wife seeking dower already acknowledged as 
received by her wakil is that the husband never actually paid it to her father; that is, 
that the wali/wakil made a false acknowledgement of receipt.  This is by all accounts a 
frequent occurrence, even where large sums are involved, as the good faith involved 
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in the contract of marriage, and the circumstances in which it is signed, militate 
against the bride's father denying that the groom has fulfilled his obligations and that 
he has received the dower. It is only a specific exception in the Law of Shar`i 
Procedure of 1959 that allows the wife to seek her dower despite a signed testimony 
of receipt on an official document. Article 89 of this law states: 
Where financial claims are based on documentation, then personal testimony 
shall not be accepted to defend such claims; excepted from this is the defence 
offered by one spouse against the other. 
 
In such claims, the father may be brought in as a third party.  If the wife fails to prove 
her father's non-receipt of her dower, the outcome of the case will depend upon the 
husband's willingness to take the oath. Two brief examples can illustrate the process 
of such claims. In one, from the 1965 material, the woman was claiming 75 dinars of 
a total of 100 dinars prompt dower, along with various articles of her jihaz. The 
husband produced the marriage contract in which the wife's father had acknowledged 
receipt of the full prompt dower of 100 dinars. The wife claimed that this 
acknowledgement was false and that her father had only received 25 dinars, but she 
was unable to prove her claim. The husband took the oath to the effect that her father 
had not been lying when he made the acknowledgement of receipt, and the claim for 
dower was dismissed. 
 
 The second case, from 1975, concerned a claim for deferred dower from a 
marriage that had been ended by talaq before consummation.  The marriage contract 
showed that the prompt dower was 500 dinars and the deferred 100 dinars, and that 
the wife's father had acknowledged receipt of 500 dinars.  The wife claimed that her 
father had not received the money and that his acknowledgement had been false. The 
husband was not present at the hearings and the court decided to bring the father in as 
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a third party. He stated that his acknowledgement had indeed been false. As the 
husband was of unknown whereabouts, he could not be sworn the oath, and so the 
wife and her father were both sworn the oath in support of their statements, and the 
wife was awarded the dower she was due. The receipt or non-receipt of the dower was 
significant in this case since the wife was due only half the dower (the marriage 
having ended before consummation). Had she received the 500 dinar prompt dower, 
she would actually have owed the husband 200 dinars; as it was, she was due a further 
200 dinars from him. 
 
 In an unpublished paper written in 1987, the then qadi of Ramallah takes note 
of this problem and suggests that if the husband were asked first whether he had paid 
the dower, rather than the wali/wakil whether it had been received, then the burden 
would shift to the husband, who might be expected to feel embarrassed in his turn to 
claim payment if in fact he has not paid it. This slight modification in procedure 
during the contract session could do much to prevent the problems currently arising 
from false acknowledgement of receipt.28  
 
5.2.5 Claims for tawabi` and jihaz 
 The issue of non-receipt also arises in claims on items of property as opposed 
to the cash value of the dower. There are however additional questions to be dealt 
with, including the identification of the articles, and whether or not they legally 
constitute tawabi`, or jihaz, or neither of the two. Some of the problems connected 
with claims made for these articles can be traced directly to the way in which the 
ma’dhun fills in the contract of marriage.  It has already been noted, in the last 
chapter, that the inclusion of property in the ‘stipulations’ space instead of the ‘dower 
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and tawabi`’ section of the contract may cause legal protection of the woman's right to 
that property to lapse. In addition, it appears that the contracting parties are not always 
clear on the meaning of tawabi`.  One case from the 1975 material shows that the 
husband at least held the tawabi` to be what would legally be held to be the jihaz.  
The wife claimed that the tawabi` of her dower were in his keeping, with an estimated 
value of 600 dinars, including a cupboard, bed, mattresses, bedclothes and gold 
bracelets, all registered in the marriage contract of the previous year. The husband 
claimed that these items were a part of the prompt dower of 700 dinars, not in 
addition to it, and that she had in fact bought the items from her dower. He stated that 
local custom in his village supported his defence, but could not prove his statement, 
and the court held that the wife was still due the tawabi`.29  
 
 Another common problem in claims of tawabi` results from the non-
specification of the tawabi` in the contract: for example, the phrase ‘house furnishings 
to the value of 250 dinars known to the two parties / agreed between the parties’. In 
the event of a later claim, a detailed breakdown of the items will have to be produced; 
the onus of proof here will be on the husband to establish that his wife had accepted 
these items as the tawabi` of her dower.30 In addition, there is a problem of what is to 
be awarded.  The Amman Shari`a Court of Appeal held in 1981 that in such a case the 
husband can choose between giving his wife the value or the items, while in 1983 it 
said he should give the items.31 In the West Bank, the husband seems usually to be 
given the choice where the goods have been specified.  Idrisi points out that in the 
event of such a dispute, a man may find his house emptied of furniture if his wife 
demands her tawabi`.32 
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 With regard to jihaz, claims are raised about the competence of the shari`a 
courts that do not arise with regard to mahr or tawabi`. Article 61 of the JLPS brought 
no change to the JLFR nor to Hanafi law when it stated: 
The dower is the property of the wife, and she may not be obliged to provide 
her jihaz from it.  
 
 While this is the view of the majority of classical jurists,33 Anderson is right in 
noting that its equivalent in the OLFR and JLFR threw some light on local custom.34 
The Hanafis held that the mahr is the sole property of the wife, while her jihaz is the 
responsibility of the husband, as in maintenance; thus, if she arrives at his house with 
little or no jihaz, even though he has paid her a large dower, he cannot ask her to buy 
anything extra. She can of course choose to buy herself items as jihaz from her dower 
if she so wishes; in the West Bank, the custom has been that the husband is 
responsible for furnishing the house, although some of the items may be registered in 
the wife's name as tawabi` of the prompt dower.35 Moreover, if her father buys her 
goods, whether from her dower with her consent, or as a gift from him, it remains her 
property and counts as jihaz if such was the intention. 
 
 One of the complications that arise in claims for jihaz is that of competence.  
Article 2(8) of the Law of Shar`i Procedure 1959 provides clearly that jihaz is in the 
competence of the shari`a court, but similar goods - clothes, jewellery, furniture - that 
are bought by the wife later on, or by the husband for the wife but not as jihaz, are 
under the jurisdiction of the regular courts in civil law property claims. The burden of 
proof is often therefore upon the wife to prove that specific items were indeed bought 
as jihaz.36 In his examination of the Jordanian legislature, al-Fakhani gives rules set 
down by the Jordanian Court of Cassation on this subject: 
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1.   If the wife buys something from her dower and brings it to the marital 
home to be her jihaz, then if a dispute arises between the spouses concerning 
the goods, the  dispute is over jihaz and shall be considered by the shari`a 
court. 
2.   The wife is not legally obliged to provide her jihaz from her dower, but 
that does not mean that goods bought from her dower with her consent to be 
her jihaz shall not be considered as jihaz.37 
 
 This rule was formulated in 1967 after a case in which the Court of Appeal 
had reversed a first instance decision and declared that jurisdiction lay with the 
regular courts. The Court of Cassation upheld the original first instance decision 
which had given jurisdiction to the shari`a court. The rule is that where the wife is 
explicitly claiming goods as her jihaz, competence will be awarded to the shari`a 
court if the husband bases his defence on the non-competence of the court to hear the 
claim. Where the wife fails to prove the goods she is claiming are part of her jihaz, the 
outcome of the case will rest upon the husband's willingness to take the oath.  Thus, in 
a 1985 case, the wife was claiming jihaz which she had bought from her own money 
and taken with her to the marital home in the zifaf, consisting of a cupboard, bed, 
dressing table and sofa. The husband acknowledged her claim to the sofa and denied 
the rest.  The wife failed to prove her claim, and was awarded the value of the sofa 
alone when the husband swore the oath of denial to the remainder of her claim.38  
 
 Claims for jihaz are often interesting for factors other than the legal 
procedures that accompany them in that it is possible, in some cases at least, to 
discover what the wife actually did with her prompt dower.39 In some cases, the 
individual items are detailed at great length, reaching 23 lines in one case from the 
1985 material, which included gold jewellery worth over a thousand dinars, clothing 
worth over 400 dinars and listing everything else down to a kohl pencil costing one 
dinar.40 Another example from the same year, where the wife claimed jihaz of nearly 
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1500 dinars bought from her prompt dower and taken to the marital home on the zifaf, 
lists six complete 'outfits' of different colours, woollen shawls, blouses, skirts, dresses, 
nightclothes, handbags, headscarves, slippers, shoes, housecoats; various kitchen 
utensils, blankets, sheets, pillow cases, cosmetics and perfume. The wife was unable 
to prove her claim to the goods, but her husband declined to take the oath of denial 
and she was awarded the items listed. Earlier claims listing items of jihaz include such 
items as rugs and a sewing machine for the wife. 
 
 In raising a claim for jihaz, the wife usually states that the husband has ‘taken 
over’ these goods (literally, ‘put his hand upon them’) and is refusing to give them to 
her. This seems often to reflect an attempt by the husband to pressurise his wife, 
sometimes in the context of wider family disputes, frequently by taking her jewellery.  
If the gold is bought as jihaz rather than registered as tawabi` in the contract, the 
burden of proof falls on the wife. The difference between the tawabi` of the prompt 
dower and the wife's jihaz, which she may or may not have bought from her prompt 
dower, is further shown by the different legal effects of the two. In the event of an 
action for ta`a made by the husband, the tawabi` have the same force as the prompt 
dower proper in serving as a good defence to ta`a if they have not been paid. The 
jihaz, however, cannot be used in this way, but if the wife can prove that the husband 
has indeed taken over her jihaz and is refusing to give her the items, she will still have 
a good defence to the ta`a action if he is found to be untrustworthy with her property.  
 
5.3 Maintenance 
5.3.1 Basic rules 
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 Article 167 of the JLPS lays down a basic principle of the Islamic law of the 
family: 
 The maintenance of every person comes out of their own property, except for 
 the wife, whose maintenance is the responsibility of her husband. 
 
 There are exceptions to this basic rule, for example in the case of poor and 
incapacitated parents, but the principle is clear. The husband is solely responsible for 
his wife’s upkeep and she has no financial obligation in law towards him or the 
upkeep of her person or the household. This theoretical position is followed quite 
strictly in the rules of fiqh and the writings of the jurists, however unlikely it is in 
practice. If a married woman goes out to work, she is not obliged to spend on herself 
or her family, and the law does not recognise her productive and reproductive labour 
in the house as contributing economically to the family. A consequence of this in law 
is that the classical rules recognise an extremely limited division of property on 
divorce, as will be discussed below in Chapter Eight. Another related part of family 
law is that females generally inherit half the share inherited by males under the 
traditional law of succession: a frequently cited argument in support of this classical 
position, still holding in the law applied in the West Bank (and Gaza) is that women 
have fewer financial responsibilities in law than men. Starting from the other 
perspective, some feminists argue that the law should not reduce the rights of women 
to maintenance and dower until it evens up inheritance, property during marriage and 
the man’s ability to prohibit his wife from going out to work.41 The many debates and 
positions on these issues are indicative of a lack of consensus marking this area of 
law, which in the West Bank and Gaza poses a real challenge to the PNA in its 
drafting of a law.42 In the meantime, a married woman forfeits her right to 
maintenance only when she is proved to be ‘disobedient’ (nashiz).  No maintenance is 
due the wife in an irregular or void marriage, which makes the relation of 
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maintenance to the existence of a valid contract clear and more consistent than that of 
dower, particularly as consummation or lack thereof has no effect on the requirement 
of maintenance. Nevertheless, there is still a debate as to whether maintenance is due 
the wife by the mere fact of the contract, or whether it is also connected to her 
seclusion in her husband's house under his ‘dominion’ (ihtibas). The JLPS, as the 
JLFR before it, has taken the majority view of the requirement of maintenance from 
the combination of a valid contract and the possibility of ihtibas - that is, that the wife 
is willing and able to go to her husband's house, whether or not she has actually 
moved there.43 Thus, Article 67 reads: 
Even where there is a difference of religion, the wife's maintenance shall be 
due from the husband from the time of the valid contract, even if she is living 
in her family's house, unless he has asked her to move and she has refused 
without shar`i right.  She has the right to refuse if the husband has not paid her 
the prompt dower, or has not prepared a shar`i dwelling for her. 
 
 This article has no predecessor in the JLFR, and was presumably included to 
settle questions that had arisen during application of the former law. The classical 
jurists went into many supplementary questions on this issue, mainly concerning 
ihtibas, which was taken to mean the possibility of the occurrence of legal intercourse 
between the spouses.44 The general consensus was that where this possibility was 
lacking for some reason on the wife's part, then she was not due maintenance, while if 
the reason was from the husband, then maintenance was payable. Thus, for example, 
as clarified in the JLPS, when the husband had not fulfilled his primary obligations to 
his wife (prompt dower and a shar`i dwelling) then he had to pay her maintenance.  
The JLPS does not deal with reasons from the wife's side, and Sirtawi notes that 
therefore recourse must be had to the majority Hanafi opinion, in which case such 
circumstances as an illness making it impossible for the wife to be moved will cause 
her right to maintenance to lapse.45 An Amman Appeal Court decision predating the 
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1976 JLPS made it clear that barring such obstacles, maintenance was due from the 
time of the conclusion of the contract.46 
 
 The other basic question on maintenance, besides what it actually covers, it 
how it should be assessed. The Hanbalis and the majority Hanafi view held that the 
wife's maintenance is assessed in the light of the circumstances of both spouses, while 
the Shafi`is and a minority Hanafi view considered only the circumstances of the 
husband. The JLPS followed the JLFR in adopting the minority Hanafi and Shafi`i 
view in Article 70, making the wife's maintenance dependent upon the status of her 
husband, be he rich or poor, provided that it not fall below a basic minimum of food 
and clothing.47 
 
 Article 66(a) of the JLPS sets out the items for which the husband is 
responsible in his wife's maintenance: 
 The wife's maintenance includes food, clothing and accommodation, medical 
 treatment to a reasonable amount, and service for the wife whose peers have 
 servants. 
 
 In this article, the last part, referring to the provision of a servant, is a standard 
Hanafi rule, and as such reflects the majority view of the consideration of the status of 
both spouses rather than, as in the JLPS in general, the husband alone. No case 
material was found on this aspect of maintenance, but it must be assumed to be 
subject to the general standard of the husband's circumstances, so that even if a wife's 
peers had servants, the husband could not be obliged to provide her with one if he 
could not afford it.48 
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 The requirement of food, clothing and accommodation is also standard; by 
accommodation is meant the shar`i dwelling which the husband must prepare as the 
marital home. The absence of a shar`i dwelling is a good defence to a husband's 
action for ta`a and the wife can continue to live away from him and claim 
maintenance until he provides one. Whether she can submit a positive claim for a 
maskan shar`i, as she can for mahr and for maintenance in general, seems dubious, 
although it is clear that she cannot seek separate accommodation expenses from him 
unless the marriage has ended and she is seeking it in order to undertake custody of 
his children in the dwelling. 
 
 With regard to food and clothing, the JLPS does not go into details, but one of 
the texts sometimes referred to in maintenance claims, Article 288 of the Kitab an-
Nafaqat, gives an idea of the basic minimum: 
 The types of maintenance necessary for the wife are those things that are 
 necessary for life according to custom (`ada), such as flour or bread, water for 
 drinking, washing oneself and washing clothes, salt, wood, millet, candles, 
 soap, a comb, clothes and a dwelling, and if the husband is wealthy, a type of 
 fruit.  As for such things as coffee and tobacco, the husband is not obliged to 
 provide them.  
 
 It is however accepted that such items vary according to time, place and local 
custom.49 Article 229 of the Book of Maintenance states this explicitly with regard to 
the wife's clothing expenses, noting however that in all cases the husband is obliged to 
provide different clothes for summer and winter.50 Necessary furnishings are also 
included in this category, including mats, rugs, mattresses, seats and curtains, blankets 
and so on.51 Sirtawi and Samara both also consider various cosmetic items as due, 
such as kohl, oil, henna and perfume if the husband likes his wife to make use of such 
items.52  
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 The obligation of the husband in Article 66(a) to pay the cost of his wife's 
medical expenses was not included in classical Hanafi rules, and its inclusion in the 
JLFR was approved by Anderson as a timely expansion of the concept of 
maintenance.53 Both Samara and Sirtawi approve of this provision in their 
commentaries on the JLPS, pointing out that the husband may be obliged to bring a 
servant for the wife who is used to such treatment, and that provision of a doctor or 
medicines to preserve life is obviously of greater priority.  Sirtawi adds that the cost 
of doctors and medicine is far more expensive now than in the past, and that had the 
classical jurists lived in modern times, they too would have included these in the 
husband's obligations. The majority of classical jurists held that the wife had to pay 
her own medical costs,  although those related to childbirth could be claimed from the 
husband.54 Samara points out that usually the wife is preoccupied with domestic work 
and childcare rather than with waged labour, often has no property of her own, and is 
not supposed to leave the house without her husband’s permission, all of which may 
mean that she cannot pay medical expenses herself. The Amman Appeal Court has 
however clarified that it is the husband’s prerogative to determine the choice of 
treatment (which doctor, which hospital). The example cited by Dawud concerned a 
man objecting to the level of expenses awarded to his wife, who had given birth in a 
private hospital which was considerably more expensive than the one he had chosen. 
The Appeal Court held that the first instance court was to assess the expenses 
according to the ‘birth expenses of the peer (mithl)’.55 In addition, Article 82 of the 
JLPS obliges the husband to pay the expenses of the shrouding and burial of his wife's 
corpse after her death should she predecease him. This is a new provision, and Samara 
makes an analogy with the duty of clothing the wife during her lifetime in order to 
show why this obligation would fall within maintenance.56  
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 In practice, most of the claims for maintenance submitted during marriage are 
for the one sum that covers all the wife's shar`i requirements. The exceptions to this in 
the records studied are those claims submitted for expenses to do with childbirth and 
children. One claim was found in the 1965 material where medical expenses were 
sought for something other than childbirth; the wife was awarded the sum she was 
claiming for treatment she had undergone in the husband's absence. 
 
5.3.2 Claims 
 
Maintenance claims, including those by the wife, ascendants and descendants, 
comprised well over half the caseload of the shari`a courts examined for this study.   
In the earlier years, 1965 and 1975, claims for maintenance were often combined with 
other claims, for example for dower, or for fees to do with childbirth, or combined 
with a simultaneous action for ta`a raised by the husband.  In 1985, compound claims 
were much less frequent, with a tendency to submit separate claim sheets for separate 
claims.  This tendency probably stems from greater centralisation and standardisation 
in the shari`a courts with regard to the form of claims and general bureaucratic 
procedures. There appears to have been a decrease in the proportion of cases 
including maintenance claims in the total caseload of the courts studied, from 75% in 
1965 to 65% in 1975 to 59.5% in 1985. A factor in this of course is the introduction of 
new claims, such as compensation for arbitrary talaq, but also for example the 
possibility of claims being made by men that were previously restricted to women.  
However, the same material shows the numbers of these new claims submitted to be 
rather low as a proportion of the total caseload. With the circumstances of occupation 
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since 1967, the frustration of claims at the Execution Offices, and the number of 
husbands inaccessible due to absence abroad or imprisonment is likely to have had 
some part in this decrease. 
 
 Once a maintenance award has been made by a court, it can only be altered by 
a new court order, even when the reason for its imposition has disappeared - for 
example, if the wife has come home to her husband.  In some cases a period of several 
months or even years may go by before the spouses reconcile their differences to the 
extent that the wife returns to the marital home.  In others, the parties may actually 
become reconciled during the progress of the claim through the court, or immediately 
after the award has been made, with no time at all between the wife appearing as 
claimant in her own action and then as respondent to acknowledge her husband's 
subsequent action to rescind the award.57 The following table shows the distribution 
of claims according to the beneficiaries, and as to whether the maintenance is being 
sought or increased, or rescinded or decreased: 
 
 1.   Awards and increase: beneficiaries 
 year   wife   wife and  ascendants   descendants   collaterals   total 
              children 
 
 1965   88        74         59            40            2          263 
 1975   86        66         35       49            1          237 
 1985  114        99         40            62            3          318 
 
 2.   Rescission and decrease: beneficiaries 
 
 1965   72        19         9  22            -          122 
 1975   45        29         4            22            -          100 
 1985   32        22         1            12            -           67 
Table 5.1 
Claims in the case material including claims for maintenance, by year and 
beneficiaries 
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     The table shows that the vast majority of claims for maintenance are made by the 
wife, whether for herself alone, or including claims for the maintenance of her 
children.   The majority of maintenance claims are won; if the husband acknowledges 
that the wife is not living in his house and that he is not paying her maintenance, the 
only shar`i defence he can offer to her maintenance action is to establish that she is 
nashiz and has therefore lost her right to maintenance. If he cannot prove this, or if he 
acknowledges her claim, the parties are asked to agree upon an appropriate sum. If 
they cannot agree, ‘expert witnesses’ (khubara’) are appointed by the court from 
among people put forward by the parties, on condition that they are familiar with the 
financial circumstances of the husband.  The khubara’ decide upon a sum, and the 
qadi will be guided by their advice; if the husband feels it is too high, he must prove 
the basis of his objection. The maintenance award is executed through the Execution 
Office attached to the regular courts, and the final threat of imprisonment can be held 
against a husband persistently refusing to pay.58  
 
 The JLPS has taken the Hanafi view in the second part of Article 70 regarding 
the period for which past maintenance can be claimed: 
 Maintenance is imposed either by agreement between the two spouses upon a 
 certain amount, or by a ruling by the qadi.  Maintenance for the period 
 preceding the agreement or application to the judge lapses.59 
 
 This position can cause injustice to the claimant, notably when the wife's 
claim is dismissed due to a technicality such as a mistake in the filing of her claim, or 
in the notification of the respondent; since she has to submit the claim again, the wife 
will lose the maintenance she is due for the previous period. In addition, it is clear that 
many women delay going to court until the last possible moment: a court case, it is 
often felt, would only exacerbate the problems that already exist.  These women again 
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lose the maintenance for the period before they eventually find themselves having to 
have recourse to the court. On the other hand, Article 72 of the JLPS takes the view of 
Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusef in making the husband unable to claim back from his wife 
maintenance that has been paid in advance, should the grounds for its requirement 
lapse.60 
 
 Once a maintenance award has been made, it cannot be increased or reduced 
until six months have passed, ‘unless there are exceptional emergency circumstances 
such as a rise in prices’ (Article 71). In the case material, the wife's actions for 
increase are frequently made well over six months after the original award, sometimes 
years later, and usually plead inflation, a rise in the cost of living and the consequent 
inadequacy of the original award.  The husband usually acknowledges her claim, 
although where he can prove that he cannot afford the increase, the wife's action will 
be dismissed.61 The case material showed examples of the husband obtaining a 
reduction in maintenance levels by reason of a change in his circumstances after 
imposition of the award. 
 
 Maintenance in the case material of 1985 was invariably assessed in monthly 
instalments, although the law does not provide explicitly for this. In 1965 and to a 
lesser extent in 1975, many awards were made on a daily assessment. The levels 
generally awarded to women are not only indicative of socio-economic circumstances 
but support the assumption that a woman who has left her marital home for a legal 
reason is usually expected to return to her own family rather than live alone. The 
exceptions to the generally low level of awards tend to be those made against absentee 
husbands. In such cases, the wife has to establish the existence of matrimony and 
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swear the oath to the effect that her absent husband has not left her any maintenance, 
that she is not nashiz and that she is not a divorced woman whose `idda is over.62 The 
level is set by khubara’ and the wife has recourse to the Execution Department for 
execution of the award if her husband has money somewhere in the area, or from a 
debtor if he has one; if not, she may borrow from other persons, who then have the 
right to claim back what they have paid from the husband when he returns.63 In 
practice, the wife usually either finds work to support herself, or is supported by her 
family or perhaps his.64 The difficulty of executing maintenance orders against 
absentee husbands can cause real hardship, and was addressed in Jordan during 
consultations on draft modifications to the JLPS. Suggestions included the 
improvement of liaison between the Jordanian Ministry of the Exterior and the courts, 
in order to facilitate execution of maintenance awards against ex-patriate citizens, and 
the establishment of a special fund for the temporary relief of needy wives, to be 
funded from the zakat contributions and an extra fee levied on contracts of marriage 
and deeds of divorce.65 
 
 During the intifada, there was discussion in the West Bank shari`a courts of the 
idea of establishing a special zakat fund for the advancing of cash to needy women 
based on maintenance awards in the courts that for whatever reason could not be 
enforced.  Now that the Palestinian Authority is in place a similar initiative might be 
expected from the legislature, and Palestinian women have already turned their 
attention to the wider issue of social security funds.66 
 
 However, in some claims made against the absentee husband, it appears that 
the aim is not so much maintenance, but separation, which will be applied for once 
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the wife has proved that she is unable to gain execution of the award.  It is here that 
the higher levels of maintenance are significant, justified on the higher financial 
capabilities of the husband who lives and works abroad, for example in the USA.  
Thus in 1985, for example, an exceptional award of 150 dinars per month was made 
against a husband of unknown whereabouts; others had rates of 45, 50 and 60 dinars 
imposed on them, all well above the average level for the time. In at least some of 
these cases, it may be expected that the wife would allow the maintenance to 
accumulate for a few months before raising an action for separation for the non-
payment of maintenance, so that the accumulated amount would be too much for 
family or friends of the husband living locally to pay, preventing them from 
frustrating her claim for separation. 
 
 
5.3.3 Disobedience and disqualification from maintenance entitlement 
 The oath that must be taken by the wife claiming maintenance from an 
absentee husband is designed to establish that she is actually due maintenance - that 
is, that the marriage is still in existence (established by the contract of marriage and 
the oath that she is not a divorcée whose `idda has expired) and that she is not nashiz, 
disobedient. The disobedience of the wife disqualifies her from the right to 
maintenance for so long as her disobedience continues.  Moreover, the wife who is 
divorced by her husband while she is disobedient is not due maintenance during her 
`idda period (Article 81). A talaq in such circumstances would probably be 
considered justified and thus any claim by the wife for compensation for arbitrary 
talaq could be dismissed.  In addition, if the wife raises a claim for divorce for  niza` 
wa shiqaq, disobedience on her part will be taken into account by the arbitrators in 
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their assessment of the proportions of blame of each spouse, and may well cause her 
to lose most, if not all, of her remaining financial rights if divorce follows. 
 
 The establishment of the wife's nushuz thus has effects beyond the lapse of the 
right to maintenance, and the jurists discussed in detail the situations in which the 
wife was held to be nashiz.  The Hanafis held the wife to be disobedient in three 
situations: 
if she refuses to move to his house without right; if she refuses to travel with him 
wherever he wishes; or if she leaves his house or is absent from it without his consent 
and without shar`i justification.67 
 
 The Jordanian legislator kept very much to this view in defining nushuz in 
Article 69 of the JLPS: 
 If the wife becomes nashiz then she is not due maintenance.  The disobedient 
 wife is she who leaves the marital home without a shar`i excuse, or prevents 
 the husband from entering her house if she has not requested him to move her 
 to another.  Among the legitimate reasons for her leaving the house are the 
 husband's injury of her by beating or ill-treatment. 
 
The jurists agreed that the husband's injury and ill-treatment of his wife provided a 
good defence to the charge of nushuz. Other acceptable reasons for leaving the marital 
home, or not moving to it in the first place, include the house failing to fulfil shar`i 
requirements. The jurists also agreed that she might leave the house without his 
consent to visit her parents once a week, and other relatives once a month or once a 
year.68 The wife may refuse to travel with her husband, but if he moves to live 
elsewhere, she must move with him; this is provided, as stipulated earlier in the law, 
that the husband can be trusted to treat her properly, and that there is no stipulation in 
the marriage contract to the contrary.69 
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5.3.4 Maintenance, disobedience, and the wife who goes out to work 
 
 A similar reference to a contrary stipulation might have been expected in the 
provision regarding the paid employment of the wife. Here, however, the text of the 
JLPS is staunchly classical in its content. Article 68 reads: 
 No maintenance is due the wife who works outside the house without the 
 consent of her husband. 
 
 This article had no predecessor in the JLFR, but without further explanation of 
‘consent’, for example, represents the classical doctrine of the majority of jurists, who 
held that the husband could forbid his wife to go out to work at any point in the 
marriage, even if he had previously consented to her paid employment outside the 
home.70 Article 156 of the Kitab an-Nafaqat puts the classical view: 
If the wife has delivered herself (i.e. to the ihtibas of her husband) by night 
and refuses by day, or delivers herself by day and refuses by night, then she is 
nashiz.  For example, if the wife is a professional woman who works by day in 
her own interests and comes back to the husband by night, she is not due 
maintenance.71  
 
 The logic behind this principle lies in the connection between maintenance 
and the ihtibas of the woman in her husband's house. If she leaves the house without 
his permission, she is no longer in his ihtibas and has therefore forfeited her right to 
maintenance. If on the other hand she leaves with his consent, he has willingly waived 
his right to ihtibas for the time she remains outside; and if she leaves for a shar`i 
reason although without his consent, then the possibility of ihtibas has been frustrated 
by failure on the husband's part to fulfill some or all of his legal obligations towards 
her. 
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 The reason why the woman's work under the classical rules is not held to be a 
legitimate reason to leave the house is that the husband alone is responsible for his 
wife's maintenance; she has in theory no legal obligation to spend anything on herself 
or the house, since everything she actually needs is supposed to be provided by the 
husband.  At the same time and in the same logic, Islamic law gives the husband no 
say whatsoever in the manner in which the wife disposes of her income if he agrees to 
her going out to work. The husband's absolute responsibility for her financial 
maintenance, however, means that the wife does not have an unqualified right to work 
within the logical equation of rights and obligations established in the shari`a: there is 
no absolute right nor absolute prohibition on women's work outside the home. 
 
 In their commentaries on the JLPS, Samara and Sirtawi do not discuss the 
practical application of this article of the JLPS in light of the socio-economic changes 
that have affected the area since the 1960s. Community interest in these phenomena is 
however high, and articles on the changing role of women, especially with regard to 
their entry into the wage-earning labour force, frequently appeared in popular 
magazines and daily newspapers, as well as in scholarly studies and articles in the 
1980s when the fieldwork for this study was being carried out.72 In the West Bank and 
Gaza, a variety of civil society-based efforts were undertaken -- notably by the 
Women’s Committees in the 1980s -- to facilitate the participation by women in 
income generating projects.73 At a ‘government’ level, the PLO preceded most Arab 
governments in ratifying the 1976 Arab Convention on Working Women, reaffirming 
the right of women to engage in all areas of economic activity.74 It is a fact, 
nevertheless, that even bearing in mind all the difficulties associated with defining 
and documenting ‘work’ for statistical purposes,75 women’s participation in the labour 
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force is low both in Jordan76 and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 1998, the 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics published a report on gender and the labour 
force, noting that ‘Palestinian women’s labour force participation ranks amongst the 
lowest in the world.’77 The FAFO study found that support for women’s right to work 
outside the home varied according to the type of work (with business and the 
professions most approved) as well as according to the gender and age of the 
interviewee.78 
 
 As for the judiciary, where called upon to rule on the question of nushuz and 
women's work, the shari`a courts have developed the original principles beyond the 
apparent meaning of the text in Article 68 of the JLPS. Even before the JLPS was 
promulgated, development of the idea of the husband's consent was occurring in the 
courts, as shown by published decisions from the Shari`a Court of Appeal in Amman.  
The second volume of al-`Arabi's collection of decisions, covering the years 1973-
1983, contains a number of apparently contradictory principles which nevertheless 
can be shown to represent a consistent development in the treatment of the issue.  
 
 The first principle on the matter published by al-`Arabi quotes the afore-
mentioned Article 156 of the Kitab an-Nafaqat, and supports this by a reference to 
Syrian principles on personal status, that a woman who works by day is not due 
maintenance.79 No Amman decision is quoted in support. The second decision 
published, however, also a Syrian one, shows an emphasis on the positive prohibition 
by the husband: 
 The wife's work outside the house by day does not cause her maintenance to 
 lapse so long as it is not preceded by a prohibition from the husband and the 
 establishment of this prohibition.80 
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The requirement that the husband positively prohibit his wife from working, and 
establish this in court, is taken up in the first Amman decision quoted: 
The work of the wife does not entail nushuz unless the husband establishes 
that he has a shar`i dwelling and has called her to ta`a therein, and that she has 
failed to respond.81  
 
 The second Amman decision quoted in al-`Arabi tackles the problem from a 
moral and social point of view, noting that some jurists had held that the wife engaged 
in a professional occupation, such as teaching or clerical work, was due maintenance 
whether or not she had her husband's consent to her work, and observed that this view  
suits the developments of the age in which we live, where women share with 
men the burdens of life; we would be injuring her if we took the first 
(contrary) view and deprived her of gaining the fruits of her study and of her 
right to work,  which she has won in practice ... this is in addition to the 
current shortage of workers and (the fact that we would be) taking away from 
the husband an income that may help him, especially in these days in which 
inflation and economic depression are rife...82 
 
 In 1979, a further Appeal Court decision focussed on the issue of stipulations in 
the marriage contract with regard to work: 
 If the wife claims that she stipulated to her husband that she would go out to 
 work and he accepted this condition, that is a legitimate defence to a claim for 
 [cutting] her maintenance, even if [the stipulation] is not registered in the text 
 of the contract [of marriage].  This is because while Article 68 of the JLPS is 
 general, Article 19 stipulates that such matters be registered [in writing] [only] 
 for [purposes of] claims for dissolution of the contract of marriage on the basis 
 of [breach of] the said stipulation.83 
 
 A decision in the Hebron court as early as 1975 had put the burden of 
stipulations regarding the wife's work squarely on the husband. The wife had applied 
for maintenance, and her husband's defence was that she was nashiz, as she was 
working as a teacher without his consent. The court rejected this defence and awarded 
the wife maintenance ‘because the claimant was a teacher before her marriage, and 
her husband knew that and did not stipulate in the marriage contract that his wife 
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should not go out to work...’. In other words, it would seem to be the case, in court 
practice if not in the text of the applicable laws, that if the husband knows of the 
wife's work before her marriage and accepts it, then the wife can challenge his 
objection if he later tries to prevent her working, even if she has not inserted a 
stipulation in the marriage contract ensuring her continuance in her job.84 In practice, 
the burden of proof appears to be falling on the husband rather than the wife; in the 
event of a dispute, the husband will be required to demonstrate the validity of his lack 
of consent to his wife’s paid employment outside the home, and when and why his 
prohibition was voiced, if he did not actually insert a stipulation in the contract of 
marriage stating that his wife was not to go out to work. This is of course particularly 
the case if at the time of the marriage the wife was employed in such an occupation. 
In such circumstances, the default position (or the ‘norm’) would appear to be that in 
the absence of a registered stipulation to the contrary, a woman will be considered to 
have gained her husband's implicit consent to her going out to work.85 
 
 With regard to the nature of the employment in which the woman is engaged, 
court decisions stating that women working in the professions are due maintenance 
from their husbands are no doubt rendered less problematic by the fact that they deal, 
for the most part, with the ‘professions’. Teachers and clerical workers are the 
examples given, both being positions of some prestige and respect in society.  Shalabi 
reports that over half the women registering a waged occupation in their contract of 
marriage in Ramallah court 1986-89 were teachers.86 For his part, the then qadi of 
Ramallah Shaykh Hiyan Hilmi al-Idrisi states that if a woman's occupation is 
honourable (sharif), involving no damage to her reputation or emotional or physical 
harm, nor causing her to neglect her husband or her children, then she has the right to 
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engage in this occupation and since no reasonable objection could be raised by the 
husband, he may not forbid her to work;  Idrisi's premise is that a man must be able to 
establish a ‘good reason’ if he wishes to forbid his wife going out to work. The issue 
that becomes more at stake is then the professional (and socio-economic) hierarchy in 
the establishment and protection of the woman’s right to go out to work. That is, 
while a woman teacher, lawyer and doctor may find their right to work defended, the 
same may not apply less prestigious jobs, since the courts are likely to find similarly 
to society in ‘preferring’ the professions. 
  
 In summary, the courts in both Jordan and the West Bank have developed the 
applicable texts relating to maintenance, ‘disobedience’ and a woman’s right to go out 
to work beyond the more restricted position suggested in the law in force. It is also a 
fact that, at least in the West Bank, very few husbands seem to bring to court their 
objections to their wife's work.88 Indeed, many maintenance claims are extremely 
straightforward, with the husband offering no defence but rather acknowledging his 
wife's claim. In other cases, however, the husband will defend the claim on the 
grounds of nushuz, in which case he will be charged by the court to prove this 
defence, which must include his establishing that he has a shari`a dwelling, and that 
he has asked his wife to return and she will not come. In many cases, the husband 
claims that his wife is nashiz because she ‘left the marital home without legitimate 
reason and without his permission’, fails to prove this defence and then demands that 
his wife swear the oath of denial. If the wife declines to take the oath, he can then take 
the oath in support of his defence and her maintenance claim will be dismissed. In 
some cases the wife simply acknowledges his defence of nushuz and thus loses her 
claim. If, on the other hand, the wife takes the oath of denial or the husband fails to 
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prove his defence and does not ask for her to be sworn the oath, the maintenance 
claim will be found to be established. In challenging allegations of nushuz, the women 
in the case material used defences based on the non-fulfilment by the husband's 
maskan of the shar`i requirements, the husband's non-payment of prompt dower 
and/or tawabi`, the husband's physical ill-treatment of her, and the fact that the 
husband did actually give his consent to her leaving the house.89  
 
 The defences the wife may make to her husband's charge of disobedience in 
response to her maintenance claim are naturally similar to those she makes against a 
petition by the husband for a ruling of ta`a against her. A dismissal by the court of her 
maintenance claim on the grounds that she is nashiz does not however automatically 
give rise to a ta`a ruling, which has to be applied for separately by the husband. Nor, 
conversely, does a ta`a ruling automatically mean that the wife loses her right to 
maintenance; this only arises after the wife has refused to comply with the ta`a ruling 
despite the efforts of the husband to implement it. 
 
5.4 The ‘House of Obedience’ 
5.4.1 Basic rules 
 Ta`a claims consist of the husband calling his wife to bayt at-ta`a, ‘the house 
of obedience’; a husband can have recourse to this action only when his wife has 
physically left the marital home and is therefore no longer under his ihtibas. The 
general duty of obedience is placed upon the wife in Article 39 of the JLPS: 
The husband shall treat his wife well and deal with her favourably; the wife 
shall obey her husband in permitted matters. 
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 The words ‘permitted matters’ indicates that the classical jurists imposed strict 
conditions on the husband's right of ta`a, and these conditions are stressed by modern 
writers, who may be sensitive to criticisms made of the principle of ta`a.90 The 
conditions are threefold according to Abdul Hamid: i) that the orders made by the 
husband concern marital affairs (not, for example, the wife's personal financial 
affairs);  ii) that they accord with the shari`a; and iii) that the husband has himself 
fulfilled his shar`i obligations towards his wife.91 Within these limits, obedience is 
due, and ‘the obvious manifestation of this obedience is that the wife lives in the 
marital home which the husband has prepared for her’.92 Article 37 of the JLPS sets 
out in more detail the conditions for obedience: 
After receiving her prompt dower, the wife shall obey her husband and live in 
his shar`i dwelling, and shall move with him wherever he wishes, even outside 
the Kingdom, provided that he can be trusted with her (amin ``alayha) and that 
there is no stipulation to the contrary in the marriage document.  If she refuses 
obedience, then her right to maintenance lapses. 
 
 This article contains more than may be immediately apparent from the 
translated text.  Firstly, the change of one word in the JLPS from the parallel article in 
the JLFR has effectively ended forcible implementation by the Execution 
Departments of a ruling for ta`a.  Under the terms of the JLFR, a hukm for ta`a could 
be executed against the will of the wife by officials from the Execution Office - that 
is, she could be escorted back to the marital home, theoretically with the help of 
police officers if necessary; awards for ta`a included the word jabran, meaning by 
force or forcibly. This was provided for in JLFR Article 33, the equivalent of JLPS 
Article 37, which stated that after receiving her prompt dower, the wife ‘shall be 
obliged (tujbir) to live in her husband's house’.  The JLPS article simply states that the 
wife shall live there. The ending of the possibility of executing ta`a awards in this 
manner followed the Egyptian precedent of 1967.93  
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 Thus, when a ta`a claim is granted to a husband in the West Bank now, the 
husband takes a delegation of relatives with him to his wife’s family’s house to seek 
her return.94 If she refuses, he may take the award to the Execution Department and 
the officials there will notify the wife officially of the decision that she must return.95 
If she again refuses to comply, at this point the husband can have recourse to the court 
to cut any maintenance award the wife may have gained against him previously, and 
if she applies in the future, no award will be made so long as the ta`a ruling stands. 
No further measures of legal enforcement of a ta`a award are possible, and progress 
will depend in all probability upon family conciliation.96 
 
 The second point of significance about Article 37 is that it mentions three 
major rights of the wife, the absence of any of which will cause a ta`a claim to be 
dismissed: the payment of her prompt dower and/or tawabi`, the provision of a shar`i 
dwelling by the husband, and the perceived trustworthiness of the husband with the 
person and property of his wife. 
 
5.4.2 Defence based on dower 
 The classical jurists were all agreed that the wife has the right to refuse to 
move to her husband's house before she has received her prompt dower. Opinions 
differed, however, if the wife agreed to consummation of the marriage and to live in 
her husband's house before she had received her dower.  Within the Hanafi school, 
Abu Yusef and Muhammad Shaybani held that the wife had thereby waived her right 
to withhold obedience, and could no longer use non-payment of dower as a good 
defence to ta`a should she subsequently leave the house. Abu Hanifa himself held that 
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the wife's right to refuse obedience continued as long as her prompt dower remained 
unpaid, whether before or after consummation, and this is the view taken in the 
Jordanian law.97 
 
 In the case material from the West Bank, the non-payment of prompt dower or 
tawabi` was commonly used by the wife as a defence to an action for ta`a.98 In some 
cases the husband acknowledged this defence, while in others the establishment of 
either dower or tawabi` being in his keeping involved the same complications that 
have been described with regard to claims for these goods by the wife. Particular rules 
apply when the tawabi` registered in the marriage contract include furnishings, since 
the wife in theory may remove them from the marital home and if he seeks ta`a when 
the furnishings are still in his house, he will not be considered to have delivered the 
tawabi` to her and so will not be awarded ta`a.99 An examination of the reasons for 
the dismissal of ta`a claims in the case material showed that defence on the grounds 
of non-payment of dower and/or tawabi` accounted for 16-18% of dismissals, with no 
significant rise over the three years. In the later WCLAC material, the figure was 
20%.100 
 
 Items bought by the wife from her dower or elsewhere as jihaz, on the other 
hand, cannot be used to defend a ta`a claim in the same way as tawabi` and prompt 
dower. In a claim for ta`a in 1965, the wife began her defence by claiming that the 
remainder of her prompt dower was in the dhimma of the husband; she then 
acknowledged his response, to the effect that he had paid it in full, and claimed 
instead that her tawabi` were in his dhimma, consisting of a cupboard, a bed and six 
chairs. The husband once again replied that she had received these items and she 
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acknowledged his statement. The court therefore decided bara’at dhimmat az-zawj - 
that is, that the husband had fulfilled all his obligations with regard to the prompt 
dower and tawabi`, and that nothing remained in his keeping. The wife then went on 
to claim that the husband had in his dhimma gold bracelets shown by the marriage 
contract to have been bought by the wife from her prompt dower.  The court declared 
that ‘the wife may not refuse (obedience) because of these (bracelets) because they 
are not part of the tawabi` of the prompt dower, but were bought by the wife from her 
dower ...’ An examination of the dwelling found it to be shar`i, so the husband won 
his action for ta`a. An Appeal Court ruling from Amman in 1982 is cited by Dawud 
supporting the position that the husband being in possession of his wife’s jihaz does 
not serve as dower and tawabi` in rebutting his claim for ta`a.101 
 
5.4.3 Defence based on untrustworthiness of husband 
 In the last case described above, the wife's final defence was not valid because 
she made no suggestion that the husband had taken over her property, or that he was 
refusing to give it to her.  Had this been the case, she could have had a valid defence 
in claiming that he was not trustworthy with her property. This defence can apply to 
all items of jihaz and all other property belonging to the wife, for example if he takes 
from her without her consent the wages she earns by going out to work. In another 
case, the wife defended her husband's action for ta`a by stating that he had taken away 
her gold bracelets and was therefore not trustworthy with her property. The wife's 
defence was established by the husband's acknowledging that the Magistrate's Court 
in the town was at the same time hearing a case against him on these same grounds, 
and the ta`a claim was dismissed.102  
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 The defence of the untrustworthiness of the husband, also referred to in Article 
37 of the JLPS, includes both the person and property of the wife. Article 69 of the 
law explicitly provides that ‘legitimate reasons for the wife leaving the house include 
the husband's injury of her by beating or ill-treatment’. One 1974 Amman decision 
held that a first instance court had been wrong in dismissing a ta`a action on the 
grounds that the husband had acknowledged that he hit his wife because she had left 
his house without his permission; the Appeal Court held that the court should have 
looked into the husband's claim that the blow ‘did not injure the wife.’ Later 
published decisions hold similarly that a simple acknowledgement of an isolated 
instance of physical violence does not serve in and of itself to rebut a claim for ta`a, 
without further investigation by the first instance court.103 Clearly the ‘relative’ 
assessment of injury and the acceptance in the traditional interpretation of some 
degree of physical force as the final stage of domestic ‘discipline’ may add to the 
complications of establishing the incidence of domestic violence against the wife. 
However, where physical injury is established, the ta`a claim will not be awarded, and 
there were claims in the case material where the wife proved her defence by the fact 
that the husband had previously been sentenced by the local Magistrate's Court on 
criminal charges for actual or threatened physical assault against her.104 The defence 
of ill-treatment was also proven by the testimony of witnesses where they could 
testify to specific incidents. Where the wife failed to prove her defence, the court 
usually tried to establish the husband's treatment of her. Thus, in a claim in the case 
material from 1965, the wife failed to prove that her husband beat her, and the 
husband was awarded ta`a. The wife appealed the award, and in examining the case 
file the Appeal Court found that the wife had also stated that her husband regularly 
drank alcohol and gambled and generally was of a bad moral character, and that his 
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house was frequented by people of the same type. The Appeal Court noted that the 
first instance court should have checked with the neighbours with regard to the 
husband's behaviour, but these claims by the wife did not in the end have to be 
investigated since the dwelling on which the first instance court carried out its 
investigation was found to be not in fact where he lived, so the ruling was overturned. 
 
 Other forms of ill-treatment less commonly found to be established in 
published shar`i decisions include illegal forms of sexual intercourse, which can be 
proved by a doctor's report and testimony105 and false accusations on criminal matters 
made against the wife by the husband.106 In addition, an award for ta`a will not be 
made if the court is satisfied that the wife will suffer injury if it were given. One claim 
in the 1965 case material was dismissed because the court found that the husband had 
absented himself from his wife for seven years, and now was calling her to ta`a 
elsewhere in the Middle East, far away from her own family; the court held that the 
husband intended injury of his wife given the attendant circumstances.107 
 
 This was the least relied upon of the three defences to a ta`a action, 
accounting for only 10% of dismissals in the case material, and only 2% in the later 
WCLAC material. 
 
5.4.4 Defence based on the matrimonial home 
 
 The place in which the house is located must also be discussed in the context 
of the third and most common defence to an action for ta`a -- the lack of shar`i 
legitimacy of the dwelling in which the husband is calling his wife to obedience.  
Article 38 of the JLPS provides that: 
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The husband shall prepare the dwelling (maskan) containing the shar`i 
requirements, according to his status, and in the place of his residence and 
work.  
 
 The maskan is part of the wife's maintenance, and the JLPS is therefore 
consistent in requiring it to be appropriate to the financial circumstances of the 
husband.108 The jurists agree that the required characteristics of the maskan change 
according to time, place, the dictates of local custom and the social status of the 
husband. Three social classes are recognised - rich, middle class and poor - and 
differences are made according to whether the dwelling is in a town, a village or a 
Bedouin encampment. To these classical differentiations, necessity has added refugee 
camps in the West Bank.109 These requirements refer to the physical characteristics 
and content of the dwelling, which are determined by an investigation (kashf) carried 
out by the qadi or the Chief Clerk to the shari`a court110 accompanied by another 
clerk of the court to record the proceedings of the investigations. This team, together 
with the wife or her lawyer if they wish to be present, go to the maskan in which the 
husband is calling his wife to obedience. The physical characteristics and contents of 
the dwelling are recorded, and three local people are chosen as khubara’, to give 
expert testimony as to the husband's status in the area and whether this particular 
maskan is considered appropriate by local customary standards. Details that are 
recorded may include the exact location of the dwelling, the names of the neighbours 
and where their houses are, the floor space of the various rooms, windows, doors, 
locks, outside yard, all items of furniture, fittings (including whether or not the house 
is provided with running water and electricity), domestic utensils, crockery and 
cutlery, foodstuffs, bedding and clothes. When the court deputy has completed his 
examination, the woman's lawyer may ask questions of the husband or the experts, 
and can ask to have the answers recorded. The details are written up as a report and 
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placed in the case file. In a subsequent session at court, the report is read out by the 
qadi and the litigants may use its contents to try to establish the legitimacy, or lack 
thereof, of the maskan. The final decision on the dwelling belongs to the qadi. 
 
 The kashf of the maskan does not depend upon the wife requesting that it be 
undertaken, or explicitly denying the legitimacy of the dwelling. Where no other 
defence is offered, the kashf must be carried out unless the wife has explicitly 
acknowledged the legitimacy of the maskan.111 This is because the maskan shar`i is 
the right of the wife in law, and the qadi cannot award a ruling for her to go to a 
‘house of obedience’ if that house itself does not fulfil the shar`i requirements.  In 
other words, the legitimacy of the maskan is a condition in any award of ta`a. 
 
  The kashf is carried out by the shari`a court with jurisdiction over the area in 
which the maskan is located, while the ta`a action must be raised in the court of the 
wife's area of residence. Thus, the court in Hebron, for example, considering an action 
for ta`a against a wife resident there, may ask the court in Tulkarim in the northern 
West Bank, to carry out a kashf on the husband's maskan in that area. After the 1967 
occupation, the courts on the West Bank were unable to arrange for a kashf to be 
carried out under the auspices of a shari`a court anywhere outside the West Bank. 
Hence, a 1975 ta`a action presented in Ramallah was dismissed because the wife 
challenged the legitimacy of the maskan, which was in Amman, and because of the 
circumstances of occupation prevailing in the West Bank ‘the husband was therefore 
unable to prove that the maskan was shar`i’.112 
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 While the characteristics of a maskan shar`i may vary enormously according 
to place, time, local custom and the class of the husband, there are some basic rules 
that apply to all; for example, the wife cannot be obliged to live in a house that is on 
the point of collapse, or built on land illegally obtained,113 and there must be ‘good 
neighbours, able to assist the wife in her religious and material interests, and to 
prevent the husband oppressing his wife if such is his intention ...’114 A maskan 
located in an isolated area with no nearby neighbours is not likely to be held to be 
shar`i, and the Amman Appeal Court has also ruled that the wife will not be ordered 
to ta`a in a non-Muslim country with non-Muslim neighbours.115  
 In classical law, the maskan does not necessarily denote a ‘house’, as can be 
seen from the following Article 280 of the Kitab al-Nafaqat, a text still occasionally 
referred to in ta`a actions: 
[T]he noble wealthy wife must have an independent house; the middle class 
wife must have a room with an independent lock and facilities (marafi`), that 
is, toilet and kitchen; but the maskan shar`i for the poor wife is a room with a 
lock and a shared toilet and kitchen.116  
 
 In practice, the ‘facilities’ of the maskan were often the reason given in the 
case material for the dwelling being found to be non-shar`i; the toilet being outside 
and lacking a proper lock, for example, or having only a woollen curtain for a door.117 
The other ‘facility’ besides the kitchen that can cause a dwelling to be held non-shar`i 
is the yard in which it is customarily expected that the wife will hang out the washing, 
beat the mattresses and so on.  If the yard is unacceptably open and exposed, so that 
she can be seen performing her household chores by all and sundry, or if for example 
it is used by other people as a passageway, the house is likely to fail to meet shar`i 
requirements in many parts of the West Bank. 
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 Whatever the class of the husband, the maskan must contain separate 
mattresses and blankets for each spouse118 and the other items set down as necessary 
for basic living as regards foodstuffs, fuel and water. In 1975, two claims for ta`a in 
the case material were dismissed because the maskan lacked certain essentials: in one, 
rice, sugar, soap and needles and thread, and in the other soap, salt, sugar, combs, a 
lufa, needles and thread, a cupboard or chest for clothes, a separate mattress for the 
wife, and any form of heating device. Another wife challenged the legitimacy of the 
maskan on the grounds that it lacked an oven (tabun), a mirror, and a wardrobe, and 
had no good lock on the doors.119  
 
 Other objections that the wife can legitimately make to the maskan in order to 
defend herself against a claim of ta`a arise not from the house itself, but from where it 
is, and who else lives in or around it.  Article 38 of the JLPS provides that: 
The husband may not settle his family and relatives or his children of 
discriminating age with him in the maskan he has prepared for his wife unless 
he has her consent so to do. Excepted from this are his parents if they are poor 
and incapacitated and  he cannot afford to maintain them separately - they can 
be with him, provided this does not obstruct married life. Similarly, the wife 
may not have her relatives or her children from another man to live with her, 
unless she has the husband's consent. 
 
 In this article, the JLPS has gone back to the original Ottoman and classical 
Hanafi rule regarding the husband's children from other wives.  The JLFR had stated 
that such children could not stay with him if they had reached the age of puberty, but 
the JLPS limits this to the earlier age of discrimination.120 Sirtawi does not approve of 
this alteration, arguing that the principles of love and compassion inherent in the 
Muslim family require that the husband's children should be accommodated in the 
maskan so long as marital life is not thereby prevented.121 Samara notes that the 
article does not deal with the possibility of the wife being injured by the presence of 
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the husband's parents, and that she cannot legitimately refuse to live with them if they 
do not actually obstruct marital life.122 It seems that Samara is right in assuming that 
recourse must be had in this issue to the majority Hanafi opinion, which holds that the 
wife does have the right to refuse to live with the husband's family if they are hostile 
to her, or injure her in work or deed.123 In practice, the wife will not be ordered to ta`a 
in the same house as her in-laws if they cause her harm. This applies not only to a 
shared house, but also to the separate room (bayt) within a family house (dar) which 
the husband of a poor class could otherwise claim as a maskan shar`i especially where 
the custom prevails for married sons to remain in the family house. 
 
 The terms of Article 38 of the JLPS reflect the assumption of patrilocal 
residence of the couple after marriage, as was noted by Layish with regard to the 
OLFR rules inside Israel.124 Nevertheless, women are increasingly objecting to having 
to live with their in-laws, as shown by the number of stipulations in marriage 
contracts providing that the wife shall live alone. In some ta`a actions in the case 
material, the wife obtained dismissal of the claim by her husband acknowledging that 
the home was shared with his family, usually his mother or both his parents, but 
sometimes his sons and once his brother. In other cases, the wife refused to return to 
an independent maskan because it was next door to her in-laws, who ‘harmed her by 
their proximity’. 
 
 In two cases in the 1985 material, the maskan was found to be not shar`i 
because the husband had both his second wife and his family in the same dwelling. 
Article 40 of the JLPS provides that the husband may not settle co-wives in one house 
without their consent. The article changed one word from the parallel provision in the 
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JLFR (Article 36) which used the word bayt for ‘house’, whereas the JLPS uses dar.  
Although both words can be used to mean 'house', in context they have clearly distinct 
meanings, as shown for example in Article 184 of Kitab al-Ahkam:  ‘..the wife must 
be settled in a house (dar) by herself if she is rich, and if not then by herself in a room 
(bayt) in a house (dar)...’. Samara refers to this when he criticises the article for not 
stating whether co-wives can be settled in separate rooms (still called a bayt in local 
usage in this context) in one house, as the Hanafis say, or if every wife is now entitled 
to an independent house.125 The exact position is not entirely clear from the records, 
since the one ta`a action dismissed for this reason in 1985 stated that the maskan was 
shared with the co-wife.  Nevertheless, even in the material from earlier years, a wife 
was able to have a ta`a claim dismissed because of her refusal to live in the same 
building as her co-wife, where they had to share facilities although having separate 
rooms. It would seem that these days a wife could legitimately insist on living in an 
entirely separate building from her co-wife. 
 
 The final consideration in the assessment of the legitimacy of the maskan is its 
geographical location.  Article 37 of the JLPS sets out the classical duty of the wife to 
move with her husband, adding to this ‘even though this is outside the Kingdom’, and 
also adding ‘provided that there is no stipulation to the contrary in the contract 
document’. It has already been noted that given the political situation, no award of 
ta`a will be made in a maskan outside the West Bank, due to the impossibility of 
having a kashf undertaken to ascertain whether or not the dwelling is shar`i. The 
frequency of stipulations in the marriage contract regarding where the wife is to live 
has also been noted. In addition, there is the principle that an award for ta`a will not 
be made if the wife will suffer injury from it. These three factors combine to give the 
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wife significant grounds for refusing to move from her own family and support 
networks in her home area if she does not wish to leave.126 Furthermore, the ta`a 
action will be dismissed if it is established that the husband himself works and lives at 
some distance from the dwelling in which he is calling his wife to ta`a. This can be 
illustrated by a 1975 case in Ramallah, where the husband first called the wife to ta`a 
in Amman, where he worked, and she refused to go, so he then submitted a claim for 
ta`a in a maskan in the Ramallah area. The wife refused to live alone in this house 
with the husband absent more often than present, and the court upheld her objections. 
The same may apply when the husband lives permanently with one wife in one town 
and calls the other wife to ta`a in an independent maskan in another town; this is held 
to constitute injury to the wife.127 In all these cases, the wife is therefore able to 
continue living with her own family and claim maintenance from her husband. 
 
 Challenges to the legitimacy of the husband's maskan accounted for the 
majority of dismissals of ta`a claims in the case material; well over 50% of all the 
ta`a claims in the material were successfully defended on grounds of the non-
legitimacy of the maskan, and in 1985 this proportion had risen to 80%. It accounted 
for 73% of dismissals in the WCLAC material, and the Gazan judges seemed in that 
material to find more dwellings acceptable by the standards of local custom -- 
possibly due to particular problems of housing for many of the Strip’s refugee camp 
population.128 
 
5.4.5 Procedural matters 
 On the procedural level, the wife usually obtained dismissal of the ta`a action 
against her if it was made in a court other than that with jurisdiction over the area in 
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which she resided. However, after the 1967 occupation, the Amman Appeal Court 
allowed courts in Jordan to hear claims for ta`a by husbands resident there against 
wives resident in the West Bank, because the political situation meant that the 
husband might not be allowed into the West Bank to present his claim; this was in 
exception to the procedural rule that claims for ta`a must be raised in the jurisdiction 
of the respondent.129 The obstacles to a West Bank wife getting a maintenance claim 
executed against a husband resident in Jordan may in any case have reduced 
motivation to seek ways of getting to Jordan to defend such a claim. 
 
 A final defence available to the wife in the event of an action for ta`a by her 
husband is to claim the existence of niza` wa shiqaq (discord and strife) between 
herself and her husband. This leads to immediate suspension of consideration of the 
ta`a action while the wife's claim is being investigated by the court: arbitrators are 
appointed with a view to reconciling or separating the spouses.130 If that claim fails, 
the ta`a action may be resumed. 
 
5.4.6 Claims in the case material  
 In the table below, procedural reasons for dismissal of actions for ta`a are 
included in the ‘other’ category, along with such reasons as the change of the maskan 
halfway through the case.  The table shows the reasons for the dismissal of the 101 
rejected ta`a actions in the case material:  
year  maskan non-payment husband not  other           total     
  not  of dower or trustworthy 
  shar`i  tawabi' 
 
1965  20  6   3  5         34 
1975  26  7   6  3         42 
1985  20  4   1  -         25 
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total  66  17   10  8        101 
Table 5.2:  
Successful defences to ta`a actions in the case material, by year and defence  
 
 The above table has a further significance when the ‘cases dismissed’ are 
compared to those won or dropped. The range of defences open to the wife means that 
in each year studied, more claims were dismissed than were won.  Many of those that 
were won were awarded because the wife acknowledged the husband's claim or 
offered no defence, although some were won by the husband proving that contrary to 
the woman's defence, the maskan was shar`i according to the husband's status.131 The 
general picture however shows that in the claims followed through, a husband had 
only a one-in-three chance of winning a ta`a action. In 1985, only 20% of all ta`a 
actions raised in the three courts ended with the husband being awarded ta`a. 
 
year  won  dropped dismissed total    
1965  32  15  34  81 
1975  9  4  42  55  
1985  7  2  25  34 
total  48  21  101  170 
Table 5.3:  
Actions for ta`a in the case material by year and result 
 
 The increase in the number of ta`a actions that are dismissed is probably 
partly due to increasingly rigorous standards in the courts, particularly with regard to 
the maskan, and partly due to the increasing recourse had to lawyers. The claims that 
are dropped by the husband are usually those where the parties have in the meantime 
become reconciled, either in or out of court; the husband drops the ta`a action, the 
wife drops the maintenance action if she has raised one, and both return to married 
life in the marital home. In ta`a claims, as indeed in most others, the qadi will try to 
reconcile the parties when they come before him, and in some cases the case record 
includes an exhortation by the judge to the husband to try to reconcile the differences 
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between himself and his wife.132 Nevertheless, the act of submitting a claim for ta`a 
often indicates the failure of procedures of reconciliation (sulh) between the 
respective families.  
 
 It is also clear that by no means all women are aware of their rights in the face 
of a ta`a claim by their husbands, and may not be aware that the award cannot be 
forcibly executed. In the late 1980s in Jordan the al-Sha`ab newspaper ran a women’s 
supplement once a week, with a section of legal advice for those writing in with their 
problems. In one month in 1987, three of these weekly columns included advice 
dealing with letters concerned with ta`a. In two of the three cases, the correspondent 
claimed she had been physically abused by her husband’s family and wanted to know 
if she had the right to refuse to live with them. In the third, the woman stated that her 
husband was taking her wages for his own use, and in addition had beaten her so 
badly that he had cracked her skull.133 Any and all of these circumstances, once 
established, would have served as a valid defence against an action of ta`a, but the 
letters suggested a lack of awareness both of these rights and of the non-enforcement 
by the courts of the awards.  
 
 The proportion of ta`a claims in the case material as a percentage of the 
caseload of the courts showed a decrease in 1985, following the removal of 
enforcement procedures in the 1976 law; societal trends and changing attitudes may 
also account for some of the decrease. In 1965, ta`a actions accounted for 16% of the 
total caseloads of the three courts; in 1975 they represented 11% and in 1985 5.3%. In 
1998, a Palestinian woman whose husband had filed an action for ta`a after her claim 
for divorce had been rejected by the Gaza court, started a national campaign to ‘strike 
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the house of obedience off the statute books’ in Palestine.134 Despite the lack of 
forcible execution, the implications of the institution of ta`a go beyond the (now) 
ultimate sanction of the withdrawal of maintenance for a wife who has left the marital 
home.  
 
 309 
ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE 
 
1. Sirtawi, 1981, 128, includes ‘good treatment’ in his list of rights shared by the 
two spouses, while Samara, 1987, 247, categorises good treatment as a right of the 
wife against the husband, and is supported in this by Article 39 of the JLPS. 
 
2. Samara, 1987, 251; Sirtawi, 1981, 130. The view of women’s emotional 
nature is also cited as an argument against giving the wife the power to divorce 
herself. See also Abu Zahra, 1957, 221. 
 
3. Samara, 1987, 247. 
 
4. Samara, 1987, 250. 
 
5. Abu Zahra, 1957, 226. Samara, 1987, 248 (who details the exceptional rules 
that apply when a virgin is first married.) 
 
6. See Samara, 1987, 248. 
 
7. The classical Hanafi rules on equality are set out in Kitab al-Ahkam Articles 
152, 153, 154, 157. 
 
8. Kitab an-Nafaqat, Article 174.  
 
9. Schacht, 1979, 166. 
 
10. Hajr, defined as ‘not spending the night with her on the same mattress.’ Abdel 
Hamid, 1984, 118; Sirtawi, 1981, 131. See Qur’an 4.34. 
 
11. Sirtawi, 1981, 130-131; Samara, 1987, 253-254; see also Abu Zahra, 1971, 
221. 
 
12. `Amr 1990, 250, 11667/1961. Compare Shaham, 1997, 92-93 and 131-132, on 
a similar approach by Egyptian judges in the material he studied.  
 
13. Samara, 1987, 253. 
 
14. This article reproduces its parallel in the JLFR Article 41, apart from the last 
sentence, which is presumably introduced for purposes of clarification. 
 
15. Samara, 1987, 173. See also Abu Zahra, 1971, 233. 
 
16. Al-`Arabi, 1973, 293, 7495/1952. 
 
17. In one, the husband claimed that the phrase ‘until demand’ had been inserted 
by deceit and that what had been intended was li ahad al-ajalayn, to one of the two 
deadlines, making it a deferred dower. He brought no proof to support his defence, 
and the court noted duly that he had not claimed forgery of the document, which 
would have required transferral to the regular court system, and rejected his action for 
ta`a. 
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18. See for example Sirtawi, 1981, 134; Samara, 1987, 173, and above, Chapter 
Four.. 
 
19. Al-`Arabi, 1984, 276, 24027/1983. 
 
20. Discussed by Hodkinson, 1984, 137; and Shaham, 1997, 29-30. Sirtawi, 1981, 
163-164; Samara, 1987, 182-184. 
 
21. This article was not included in the JLFR and follows the opinion of Abu 
Yusef and the Hanbalis in making the increase attach to the contract itself. Thus if 
talaq occurs before consummation, the wife will be due half the dower as amended. 
Abu Hanifa and Muhammad Shaybani held that such an increase lapsed altogether if 
talaq occurred before consummation, while the Shafi'is would give half the dower in 
the contract plus the increase as a gift. Samara, 1987, 205; Sirtawi, 1981, 163. 
 
22. It may be, for example, that dower may be increased voluntarily by the 
husband in order to help reconcile a first wife to his taking a second. Increase in 
dower may be seen as a form of insurance for the future of the first wife. 
 
23. Samara, 1987, 105. 
 
24. For example, in one 1985 case, the wife claimed 500 dinars as the remainder 
of her prompt dower. She stated that she had asked her husband for the sum and he 
had refused. The husband claimed he had paid her 220 dinars, and acknowledged the 
remaining 280 dinars to be in his keeping. When he could not prove this defence, he 
asked for his wife to be sworn the oath, and upon taking it the wife was awarded the 
full 500 dinars. 
 
25. Contrast Article 95 of Kitab al-Ahkam, which restricts application of this rule 
to minors. 
 
26. The consent of the bikr to her wali's receipt of the dower is considered to be 
given by her silence as well as by her explicit agreement - that is, she must explicitly 
forbid him if she does not want him to receive the dower. The consent of the thayyib 
must be explicit: Samara, 1987, 207. He notes that the woman does not have to be 
present when her dower is received, ‘as the custom has prevailed that fathers receive 
the dowers of their daughters in order to purchase their jihaz’. He criticises the JLPS 
for not tackling such questions as what happens if the dower gets lost, or from whom 
she can seek it if she does not receive it. An Amman Appeal decision from 1981 
points out that so long as the woman has not reached the age of rushd, her father 
remains her wali and is obliged to receive the dower, and cannot be ordered to pay it 
over to her until she achieves majority, unless she shows cause why he should deliver 
it to her immediately; al-`Arabi, 1984, 351-352, 22167/1981. 
 
27. Granqvist, 1934, 50, notes that ‘[i]t is ... a vital necessity for a married woman 
that her connection with her father's house is never completely severed. [A] woman in 
her husband's house is wholly dependent on the esteem she enjoys and the support she 
can still count upon in her father's house.’ 
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28. Idrisi, 1987 (‘Dower and Marriage Expenses’, Part 3)  
 
29. The original claim was an action for maintenance raised by the wife, which the 
court combined with a ta`a action raised by the husband. The wife's claim to tawabi` 
came as defence to the husband's charge of nushuz. The ta`a claim was dismissed and 
the wife awarded maintenance. 
 
30. See al-`Arabi, 1973, 284, 12840/1963 and 1984, 281, 18084/1974. The use of 
expressions such as ‘1000 dinars’ tawabi` consisting of  furnishings agreed upon 
between the spouses’ may indicate that the specifics were yet to be agreed. 
 
31. Al-`Arabi, 1984, 282, 22067/81 and 23823/1983. 
 
32. Idrisi, 1987 (‘Dower and Marriage Expenses’, Part 4); he seems to consider 
that practice in current times is not in accordance with the original intention of 
registering tawabi`. 
 
33. The only differing view was held by the Malikis, who say that the jihaz is 
bought by the wife from her dower to the extent that is customary among her peers. 
See Abu Zahra, 1971, 289, and Samara, 1987, 200. 
 
34. Anderson, 1951 (‘Further Points’), 188. 
 
35. See Samara, 1987, 198; Idrisi, 1987 (‘Dower and Marriage Expenses’, Part 4). 
In the West Bank, the wife or her father often buys items from her dower such as gold 
and clothes, some of which is indicated by the earlier marriage contracts. 
 
36. See Appeal decisions in al-`Arabi, 1984, 171, 20113/1978 and 172, 
18323/1975, and 1973, 286, 15927/1969. 
 
37. Court of Cassation decision 475/1967, in al-Fakhani, 1975/6 (IV) 58. 
 
38. Similarly, in a 1975 case, the wife claimed furnishings, kitchen utensils and 
jihaz to the value of 180 dinars -- 50 dinars for bedding bought by her from her 
dower, plus ‘her jihaz worth 130 dinars’. The bedroom items were registered as 
tawabi` in the contract and the husband could not prove he had handed them over to 
her, so she took oath to her claim and won the award. She could not prove that the 
other items were in fact jihaz, so he took the oath and she lost that claim. 
 
39. Compare Layish, 1975, 51. 
 
40. The wife could not prove her claim, but her husband declined the oath and 
when she was offered the oath in affirmation she took it, and was awarded the items. 
On the evaulation of the descriptions of articles being claimed as jihaz, see al-`Arabi, 
1984, 37, 18481/1975. 
 
41. Compare Badran, 1995, 134 on the lack of feminist consensus in the Egyptian 
debates in the early twentieth century. 
 
42. See Khadr, 1998, 185; Nashwan, 1998, 18. 
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43. See Abu Zahra, 1971, 297; Fakhani, 1975/6, III, 20; and Article 136 of the 
Kitab-an-Nafaqat. 
 
44. Sirtawi, 1981, 188. 
 
45. Sirtawi, 1981, 190. He also discusses the positions of the jurists where the 
wife is menstruating or is ‘otherwise incapable of intercourse’, and where she is in 
prison or kidnapped. See also Abu Zahra, 1971, 297-298 and Samara, 1987, 214-215. 
Samara himself appears to incline to the minority view of Ibn Hazm, that maintenance 
is due purely from the existence of matrimony (qiyam al-zawjiyya). Articles 136 and 
167 of the Kitab an-Nafaqat set out the classical Hanafi view. 
 
46. Al-`Arabi, 1973, 312, 11550/1961. The decision stated that stipulations that 
the maintenance of the wife should be delayed to the time of zifaf did not form a legal 
defence to an action for maintenance, ‘because maintenance is due the wife whether 
stipulated or not...’ This position is similar to that taken on dower, i.e. that the wife is 
due the proper dower even if she and her husband stipulated in the contract that there 
be no dower. In both cases, the stipulation would be held invalid and the contract 
would stand. 
 
47. Sirtawi; 1981, 113 and 182. Abu Zahra, 1971, 305, notes that the majority 
Hanafi view was applied in Egypt until Law no.25/1929 established the minority 
view. On Egypt, see also al-Jundi, 1978, 1086, principle 27. Samara, 1987, 223, on 
the other hand, states that the majority Hanafi view was for assessment according to 
the husband's status, while the minority took both spouses into consideration. In Kitab 
al-Ahkam, it is clear in the articles on food, clothing, and accommodation that the 
wife's maintenance is to be assessed according to the circumstances of both spouses 
(Articles 173, 181, 184). 
 
48. Sirtawi, 1981, 186, ascribes the provision of a servant to part of ‘good 
treatment of the wife if she is of the type who does not serve herself’. See also Abu 
Zahra, 1971, 308. Sirtawi, 1981, 187, supports the Maliki view that if a wife is not of 
such a type then the housework in the marital home is her duty i.e. baking bread, 
cleaning and making the beds etc.. Samara, 1987, 211-212, ascribes to the Hanafis the 
view that a wife who does not have servants must perform the ‘service’ herself - that 
is, baking bread, cooking, sweeping and washing, but not activities that constitute a 
trade, such as milling, weaving, or spinning. 
 
49. Samara, 1987, 224; Sirtawi, 1981, 184. 
 
50. See also Samara, 1987, 223. 
 
51. Article 237, Kitab an-Nafaqat; Sirtawi, 1981, 184.  
 
52. Sirtawi, 1981, 184-5; Samara, 1987, 212. 
 
53. Anderson, 1951 (‘JLFR’), 200; he notes it had ‘no parallel in either the 
Ottoman or Egyptian legislation’ but observes (at note 43) that in practice the 
Egyptian courts would make a husband pay for essential medical treatment for his 
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wife. It was formally introduced in the 1985 legislation in line with Maliki law --  see 
el-`Alami, 1996, 122. 
 
54. Sirtawi, 1981, 185. Layish, 1975, 92, states that inside Israel the classical 
concept of  maintenance has been widened to include medical treatment. Samara, 
1987, 212, states that the Shafi'is, Hanbalis, and Malikis held medical expenses not to 
be the responsibility of the husband, while the Hanafis did not discuss the matter. The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the 1979 Egyptian legislation, on the other hand, stated 
that medical expenses were required by the Zaydi school and by some Maliki jurists: 
text in Badran, 1981, 220.  
 
55. Samara, 1987, 213. 
 
56. Samara, 1987, 242; compare the 1943 Egyptian Law of Inheritance - 
Anderson, 1952 (‘Intestate Succession’), 140. 27895/1987, Dawud, 1999, I, 56. 
Dawud (at 55) is clear that this principle (based in his exposition on the traditional 
interpretation of qawama, males having authority over females) extends to the choice 
of doctor in general. 
 
57. Two cases from the 1965 material serve as examples, the first on 29/3/65 for 
the maintenance of wife and child, the second on 1/4/65 for the rescission of this same 
award. In another example in the 1965 material, an award made in the first case for 
the wife's maintenance was rescinded in a second case the next day. 
 
58.  Jordanian Law of Execution no.31 of 1952. Kitab al-Ahkam Article 176; Law 
of Shar`i Procedure, Articles 84 and 85. See also Abu Zahra, 1971, 310. Meron, 1982, 
362, states that the data provided by the Execution Offices for 1977 showed that 
nearly 75% of all judgements executed for the shari'a courts were maintenance 
claims. 
 
59. The Shafi`is and Malikis held that it could be claimed from the date it stopped 
being paid, regardless of whether or not there had been an agreement or a ruling. 
Sirtawi, 1981, 195. Compare Layish, 1975, 107. Egypt allows arrears of up to one 
year to be claimed: Shaham, 1997, 70. 
 
60. For example if she dies, or she returns to his house, or she becomes 
disobedient and is therefore no longer due maintenance. The Shafi'is, Malikis and 
Hanbalis said the husband could claim back sums paid in advance in such 
circumstances. Samara, 1987, 226; Sirtawi, 1981, 196. 
 
61. For example, in a claim in the 1985 material the wife sought to increase the 
level of the award made originally in 1983, pleading a rise in the cost of living. 
However, she acknowledged that her husband could not afford the increase and the 
court dismissed her claim. 
 
62. Article 76 JLPS. See also al-`Arabi, 1984, 311, 18645/1975. 
 
63. Article 77. Samara, 1987, 232-233, observes that the JLPS does not discuss 
the problem of whether real estate belonging to an absentee husband can be sold for 
the support of the wife, and notes that the Hanafi view is that it cannot be sold. 
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64. Compare Layish, 1975, 92. 
 
65. Memorandum (‘tawsi’at `ala qanun al-ahwal al-shakhsiyya’ - 
recommendations on the Law of Personal Status) prepared in 1986 by the Federation 
of Business and Professional Women in Amman. 
 
66. See al-Haq, 1995, 64-71 for the report of the workshop on Women, Work and 
Social Security. 
 
67. Samara, 1987, 218-20: he discusses the positions of the other schools. See also 
Abu Zahra, 1971, 301. 
 
68. Article 207 of Kitab al-Ahkam sets out the Hanafi opinion as once a year for 
other relatives. See also Sirtawi, 1981,193; Abu Zahra, 1971, 222/3; Badran, 1981, 
220. Different rules apply if the wife's parents are aged and ailing, and have nobody 
besides her who can see to their needs. No cases were found debating this point in the 
material studied. See also Kitab al-Ahkam Article 216.  
 
69. Article 208, Kitab al-Ahkam; Article 181, Kitab an-Nafaqat; Article 37, JLPS. 
Samara, 1987, 245. 
 
70. Sirtawi, 1981, 193; Samara, 1987, 219; Abu Zahra, 1971, 302. 
 
71. Compare Article 169, Kitab al-Ahkam: ‘[As for] the working wife who is out 
of the house by day and with the husband by night, if he forbids her to go out and she 
disobeys and goes out, she is not due maintenance for so long as she is outside.’ 
 
72. For example in Jordan: article on ‘The Role of Jordanian Women’ by Dr. Aida 
al-Mutlaq, Ar-Ray daily newspaper, 9/4/88; ‘Education and Work for Women’, Nur 
al-Huda ad-Dauliyya, Ar-Ray, 10/4/88; ‘Supervision of Working Women’, Mihka'il 
Jam'an, Ad-Dastur newspaper, 24/4/87; and ‘Attitudes of University Students towards 
Working Women: the Case of Jordan’, Barhoum, 1983, 369-376. In the West Bank, 
see for example the work by Maysun Wahidi, Fathiyya Nasru and Mona Rishmawi 
cited in the bibliography. 
 
73. See Chapter 10 in Wahidi 1986, 185-187; Nasru 1985 and 1986, Hijab, 1988, 
158-160. 
 
74. Hijab, 1988, 83; by the end of 1986, the Convention had been ratified only by 
Iraq and the PLO. 
 
75. See Ovensen, 1993, 207, on the definition of ‘work’ and its application to 
women’s work in Palestinian society 
 
76. Jordan’s 1997 report to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against women (CEDAW/C/JOR/1 10 November 1997, 14-15) gives 
the percentage of economically active women out of the total female population of 
working age (defined as 15-64) at 6.4% in 1979 and 12.7% in 1990. For earlier 
figures, see Barhoum, 1983, 369; Zaghlal, 1984, 57. Brand, 1998, 131, puts Jordanian 
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women as 15% of the formal workforce in Jordan in 1995 and notes a rise in female 
unemployment.  
 
77. Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics,  data sheet on ‘Women and Men in the 
Palestinian Labour Force,’ June 1998; it noted a UNDP survey that found an average 
of 25% of women in the Middle East participating in the labour force, compared to an 
average 39% in developing countries, while in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, female 
participation rates were 11-12% of the working age female population in the years 
1995-1997 (compared to the male rate of 67-70%). Women were 13-14% of the total 
Palestinian labour force, and  unemployment rates were high, as were those of men, at 
18-22%. See also PCBS 1999, 120-121. 
 
78. Ovensen 1993, 209-210, who notes also a very high labour force participation 
rate among divorced and separated women ‘who are usually accorded low social 
status.’ See also Hammami, 1993, 305, who notes that 86% of women interviewed for 
the survey stated that they would like their daughters to hold professional positions: 
and Heiberg, 1993, 134, on the lower support levels among men in the FAFO survey 
aged fifteen to nineteen and over 60 for the principle of women going out to work. 
 
79. Al-`Arabi, 1984, 307. 
 
80. Loc. cit.. 
 
81. Al-`Arabi, 1984, 308, no.18664/1975. 
 
82. Al-`Arabi, 1984, 306, 18900/1976, and `Amr, 1990, 256. The decision refers 
to an earlier Amman decision, no.11667 of  1961, as supporting this view; the earlier 
decision is not published in either collection. 
 
83. `Amr, 259, 20876/1979. Compare al-Jundi, 1978, 150-151. 
 
84. See `Atayat, 1984, 3-4. 
 
85. An amendment proposed in 1987 to Article 68 of the JLPS suggested that the 
text be changed to read: ‘No maintenance is due the wife who goes out to work 
without her husband’s consent, be this implicit or explicit, even if this consent is not 
registered in the marriage contract; however, if the agreement is given after the 
contract, then it has to be in writing, whether it be given on a permanent or temporary 
basis.’  
 
86. Shalabi, 1992 (‘Marriage’) 24. Only 1.5% of women registered an occupation; 
93.7% described themselves as housewives and 4.8% as students. 
 
87. Idrisi, 1986 (‘Marital Disputes’ part I). Shaykh Taysir al-Tamimi, then qadi of 
Hebron court and by 1999 acting Chief Islamic Justice, also referred to an 
unpublished Amman Appeal Court decision to a similar effect; the text was 
unavailable and I am grateful to him for the information. 
 
88. The Hebron case mentioned above was the only one of its kind found in the 
case material.  
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89. In this last regard, Article 178 of the Kitab an-Nafaqat is of some interest: 
‘If the wife is in her family's house by permission of her husband, then he must pay 
her maintenance. For example, if she asks permission to go to her family's house and 
he says to her ‘if you come back before a year is over then you're divorced’ and she 
goes, then he has given her permission to live there for a year, and must pay her 
maintenance.’ Regarding nushuz and maintenance claims, compare Layish, 1975, 101. 
 
90. For example Idrisi, 1986 (‘The House of Obedience’): ‘Some people think that 
ta`a means the monopoly of power by the husband, but this in itself is contrary to the 
aims of marriage. Ta`a is the right of the husband, but he may not abuse this right or 
be arbitrary in his use thereof... Ta`a is not meant to be used to humiliate women ... It 
is a right in return for the wife's right of maintenance...’ See also Samara, 1987, 252, 
who describes the limits on ta`a. 
 
91. `Abdel Hamid, 1984, 116. 
 
92. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the 1979 Egyptian legislation: Badran, 
1981, 214. 
 
93. Najjar, 1988, 319-344 notes a feeling in Egypt that forcible execution of 
rulings for obedience had beomce increasingly inappropriate with the changing times. 
Compare the article by Dr. Jamal Utayfi in al-Ahram 6/3/67 (reproduced in Collected 
Writings, 355-359) quoting shar'i scholars in Egypt voicing similar sentiments. Utayfi 
claims that forcible execution contradicts the general principles of the Egyptian 
Constitution regarding personal freedom and respect for the family. See also on 
Egypt, Sa'adawi, 1980, 198; Shaham, 1997, 83, who notes women hiding from police 
who came to execute the rulings; and Badran, 1995, 131-132 on early protests against 
the institution. The forcible execution of ta'a orders in Egypt was cancelled by 
ministerial order on 13/2/67. With regard to Israel, Layish (1975,101-102) notes that 
there is similarly no forcible execution of orders there; nevertheless, claims for ta`a 
continue, and Layish observes that ‘it seems that more than in the past, the husband in 
recent times has resorted to legal action to get his wife to obey him’. In Algeria, 
compare Lazreg, 1994, 103, on women forced back to the marital home under the 
colonial regime. In Jordan, Dawud, 1999, I, 710, quotes from one Appeal Court ruling 
in 1977, correcting a first instance ruling for ta`a by removing the phrase ‘forcibly’ 
(bi’l-jabr) in accordance with the then recently issued JLPS: 19348/1977. 
 
94. Antoun, 1980, 458, notes the convergence of legal procedure and custom here. 
 
95. 143. See Idrisi, 1986 (‘The House of Obedience’) and al-`Arabi, 1984, 226, 
21257/1980. 
 
96. Granqvist, 1935, 218, refers to the wife who becomes ‘hardane’ (literally, 
offended or angry) and goes away to her father's house. This word is still used in the 
West Bank with reference to wives in this situation, usually without a ta`a action 
following, if family conciliation (a sulha process) as described by Granqvist is 
successful in reconciling the parties. 
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97. The former view was also held by the Malikis, Shafi`is and some of the 
Hanbalis and thus constituted the majority view. Sirtawi, 1981, 142-143; Samara, 
1987, 176-178. Note that Samara identifies Article 47 as having adopted the majority 
view, and is presumably here referring to the other point in Article 47, that if the wife 
agrees to deferral of dower she cannot then refuse obedience. Both the Kitab an-
Nafaqat and Kitab al-Ahkam take the view of Abu Hanifa in this. (See Articles 213 
and 214 Kitab al-Ahkam and Article 175 of Kitab an-Nafaqat). 
 
98. Compare Layish, 1975, 49 and 93. 
 
99. Idrisi, 1987 (‘Dower and Marriage Expenses’ part 4). In addition, the husband 
is responsible for furnishing the house, and if he cannot prove that the wife consented 
to the use of her property in the marital home, the maskan may be liable to be held 
non-shar`i. See for example al-`Arabi, 1973, 215, 11473/1961 and 16147/1969.  
 
100. Welchman, 1999, 129, table 6.3. 
 
101. 23112/1982, Dawud, 1991, I, 718. 
 
102. An Appeal Court decision on precisely this situation is in al-`Arabi, 1973, 206, 
14370/1966. 
 
103. Al-`Arabi, 1984, 228, 18092/1974; and Dawud, 1999, I, 717 and 738, 
22823/1982 and 38123/1994. 
 
104. Compare Layish, 1975, 97-98 and 116 note 57. 
 
105. Al-`Arabi, 1973, 207, 13861 and 14236 of 1965. 
 
106. Al-`Arabi, 1984, 309, 21330/1980. 
 
107. In another claim, noted above, the husband lived near Amman but had 
prepared a dwelling for his wife in the West Bank, far away from his place of 
residence. The claim was rejected and included among the reasons was that ‘good 
intentions are lacking on the part of the husband as this would cause the wife injury’. 
 
108. Article 279 of the Kitab an-Nafaqat and Article 184 of Kitab al-Ahkam require 
the maskan to be appropriate to the status of both spouses. 
 
109. Idrisi, 1986 (‘House of Obedience’). 
 
110. According to Article 73 of the Law of  Shar`i Procedure, 1959. 
 
111. In one 1975 claim, the wife acknowledged her husband's claim to ta`a and 
declared herself ready to return to his maskan. The court ruled accordingly. The 
Appeal Court abrogated the decision and returned the case to the first instance court 
for a kashf to be carried out, as the wife had not explicitly acknowledged the 
legitimacy of the maskan. The kashf showed that the maskan was not shar`i and the 
ta`a ruling was therefore overturned. In another case, by contrast, the wife explicitly 
acknowledged that the maskan was shar`i, and agreed to comply with her husband's 
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action for ta`a and no kashf was therefore undertaken. See also al-`Arabi 1984, 225, 
21149/1980. 
 
112. By comparison, ten years previously, a ta`a action was made against a wife 
living in Hebron, obliging her to go to her husband's maskan in Amman, which had 
been shown by a kashf to be shar`i. 
 
113. Kitab an-Nafaqat Articles 177 and 179 respectively. 
 
114. Article 281 of Kitab an-Nafaqat. See also Article 207 of Kitab al-Ahkam. 
Sirtawi, 1981, 203 and Samara, 1987, 243; al-`Arabi 1973, 212, 8663/1955, 
9723/1957 and 12185/1962. 
 
115. Al-`Arabi, 1973, 212, 11689/1961 and 11824/1961. In the 1985 case material, 
one petition for ta`a was dismissed when the husband admitted the maskan had no 
neighbours. The non-Muslim state in issue in the example was Germany; presumably 
this had the effect of entitling the woman to remain in Jordan claiming maintenance. 
21440/1980, Dawud, 1999, I, 715-716. 
 
116. The article adheres to the majority Hanafi view of assessing maintenance 
according to the status of both spouses. 
 
117. In 1975, a claim was dismissed because the maskan was held not shar`i  
because it had no [indoor] kitchen or toilet, and in the view of the court, the husband 
was ‘a member of the more comfortable class, and people of the same class as he in 
that village do have kitchens and toilets’.  
 
118. Al-`Arabi, 1973, 214, 11876/1961 and 14147/1965. 
 
119. From this, it can be understood that the husband had been judged to be 
‘middle class’, since a cupboard or wardrobe at that time was required in a middle 
class house (al-`Arabi, 1973, 224, 17349/1972) and a private tabun (oven) was  not a 
condition in a poor household (al-`Arabi, 1973, 214, 11752/1961). 
 
120. JLFR Article 34; Anderson, 1951 (‘JLFR’), 197; see also Article 185 of Kitab 
al-Ahkam. While puberty is judged to begin not later than age 15, the age of 
discrimination occurs at seven for both sexes. Hooper, 1936, 100, defines an 
undiscriminating minor as ‘a young person who cannot distinguish major 
misrepresentation from minor misrepresentation’ in accordance with the Majalla 
Article 943. 
 
121. Sirtawi, 1981, 204. The principle on the husband's parents on the other hand, 
has his approval. 
 
122. Samara, 1987, 245. 
 
123. Samara, 1987, 243; Abu Zahra, 1971, 306.  
 
124. Layish, 1975, 93; compare also 95. 
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125. Samara, 1987, 248. 
 
126.  'Ata, in his study of the West Bank Palestinian family (1986, 114) found that 
one of the factors seen as problematic by wives at the beginning of their marriage was 
their removal from their home areas. See also Abu Zahra, 1971, 300, on how the 
position of the jurists has changed on this point. Samara, 1987, 245. 
 
127. For example, in a 1975 case, the husband acknowledged that he had sent his 
wife to live in a maskan in his home town (to which she was refusing to return) while 
he himself lived with his second wife in Bethlehem, where he worked. See also appeal 
decisions on this in al-`Arabi, 1973, 210, numbers 7539/1952, 9201/1956, 
11873/1961 and 13977/1965. 
 
128. Welchman, 1999, 130. 
 
129. Decision no.17578/1973 in Amman, unpublished. The normal principle, that a 
ta`a action must be raised in the jurisdiction of the respondent, is published by al-
`Arabi, 1973, 161 and 208, 13035 and 13331 of 1964. 
 
130. See al-`Arabi, 1984, 227, 18906/1976. 
 
131. For example, in one 1975 case there were two rooms with no facilities, in the 
other one a single room with no facilities, but the peers of the husbands in their 
villages all had similar houses, as both were judged to be of poor class. In a 1965 
claim, the wife was refusing to return to her husband's tent (bayt sha`ar)  in a Bedouin 
encampment, but the kashf found it to be shar`i by local customary standards and the 
husband was awarded ta`a. 
 
132. Compare Layish, 1975, 103. 
 
133. Al-Sha`ab newspaper (Amman), 6,13 and 20/4/87. In the last described case, 
the husband had already obtained a ta`a award against his wife which she stated had 
been heard without her being properly notified, and she was therefore seeking advice 
on grounds for objection in appealing this award. 
 
134. See Welchman, 2000. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
GETTING DIVORCED: DEEDS AND PROCESSES OF TALAQ AND KHUL` 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 The provisions of the JLPS on divorce maintain the broad patterns of classical 
fiqh, while including various modifications widely introduced across the Arab world. 
The way in which most marriages are terminated is through the pronouncement by the 
husband of a talaq, which occurs without litigation, and under the current law can 
take place outside court and be registered subsequently. This chapter deals with both 
talaq and khul`. Talaq is the unilateral divorce or 'repudiation' of the wife by the 
husband. A khul` divorce is where the talaq is pronounced as part of a mutually 
agreed arrangement which involves a financial consideration from the wife in 
exchange for the divorce. In the shari`a court records of the West Bank, khul` is 
routinely (and more accurately) described as talaq muqabil ibra’, a talaq [by the 
husband] in exchange for a renunciation [of her remaining financial rights by the 
wife]. Other forms of dissolution occur only in court and after litigation. These are 
judicial divorce or 'separation' (tafriq/tatliq), which may be sought on a number of 
specific grounds primarily but not only by the wife, and judicial dissolution (faskh) 
which in the JLPS terminates an irregular marriage. Litigious divorces are examined 
in the following chapter.  
 
 Since the beginning of this century, the changes that have been taking place in 
the family laws of Arab states have had a major impact on the characteristics of all 
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forms of dissolution of marriage. There has been a broad tendency to widen the 
grounds on which the wife may seek dissolution while restricting the  unilateral power 
of talaq held by the husband. Jordanian law has generally conformed to this pattern. 
The vast majority of marriages that are terminated before the death of one of the 
spouses, however, continue to end through one of the non-litigious forms of divorce; 
that is, either by unilateral talaq by the husband or by khul`. In the three courts 
studied, these forms of divorce accounted for an average of 90% of all terminations, 
with judicial divorce and dissolution accounting only for 10%.1 In the later WCLAC 
material, the overall proportions in the case material studied in six courts in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip was 93% talaq/khul` to 7% litigious divorces.2 Socio-legal 
explanations for this include the technical complexities of the court actions for 
divorce as compared to a mere registration procedure for talaq and khul`; the social 
opprobrium attached to court cases within the family; the shame attached to disclosing 
the intimacies of a failing marriage in court; and the comparative lack of awareness of 
the grounds on which separation may be claimed in court, particularly by the wife. 
 
6.2 Talaq and Khul` Compared 
 
 The 90% of divorces that are achieved without court litigation are registered in 
one sijill, the sijill at-talaq. This register contains deeds of talaq performed by the 
husband in court, usually (in the case material) in the absence of his wife, or an 
acknowledgment by him of the incidence of a talaq outside court (iqrar bi-talaq), and 
of talaqs pronounced by the husband  as part of a khul` divorce, at which the wife -- 
or a person duly delegated to act for her -- must be present and indeed be an actively 
participating party to the divorce. The figures from the West Bank case material show 
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that divorce by mutual consent -- by khul` -- is the most common form of divorce. 
With one exception (Ramallah 1975) in each court in each year more deeds of khul` 
than of talaq were registered, with an overall proportion of 60% khul` to 40% talaq.3 
In terms of marriages ended by these deeds, the proportion ended by khul` is even 
higher than this, since a khul` is immediately final, while it may take up to three 
unilateral talaqs to irrevocably end one marriage within a certain time period, and 
since the JLPS was promulgated in 1976, each talaq has to be registered in a separate 
deed in the court register. Regional specificities illustrated in the court records show a 
relatively high proportion of talaq in Ramallah in 1975 and 1985 (52% and 45% 
respectively), which is at least in part attributable to the registration of consecutive 
talaqs terminating marriages to foreign residents in an area of high emigration.4  
 
 Divorce rates are hard to define from the material available (including a 
reckoning of multiple deeds of divorce relating to a single marriage; unregistered out 
of court divorce; and revocation of registered divorce) but in his statistical survey of 
marriage and divorce in the West Bank courts over the years 1973-83, `Ayyush 
analysed each district separately and noted a general rise in the divorce rate in most 
areas.5 A similar tendency in Jordan in the 1980s was noted by Barhum in a study on 
talaq commissioned by the Federation of Business and Professional Women in 
Amman.6 He attributes this rise to a variety of factors, including changing socio-
economic circumstances and the increasing participation of women in the workforce,7 
emigration, industrialisation and the spread of education. Both Barhum and Ayyush 
draw conclusions on the relationship of talaq with the age of the spouse, the number 
of children in the marriage and the length of marital life. Barhum examines also such 
factors as the length of the engagement before the marriage, the way the spouses were 
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introduced to each other, their educational levels, professions, and the age difference 
between them. Barhum concludes that in Jordan at least, the major reason for divorce 
is interference by in-laws, especially by the husband's family; in Egypt, Shaham notes 
that studies have stressed the significance of inter-familial disputes as a cause for 
divorce.8 
 
 The court registers, however, give no indication of the reasons for the 
termination of the marriage.9 One statistic that stood out in the WCLAC material was 
that 26% of all deeds of talaq and khul` recorded in the six courts studied over the 
four years recorded a divorce before the marriage had been consummated.10 In 
practice this means the couple never set up home together. In many cases it is likely 
that with the period between concluding the contract and the zifaf functioning as an 
‘engagement’ period (although not in law), the couple discover they are not suited to 
each other, or differences arise between their families, either exacerbating or causing 
problems between them. The absence of children from the marriage means fewer 
complications in such a divorce.11 That the overwhelming majority of such divorces 
are agreed between the spouses (and their families) is shown by the fact that of the 
divorces before consummation in the WCLAC material, 92% were effected by khul` 
and only 8% by unilateral talaq. 
 
  There remains a strong social stigma attached to divorce in Palestinian society 
which is compounded by a lack of economic support available to divorced women. 
The FAFO study, noting this stigma, found only 1% of the female sample in the 
survey to be divorced.12 For men, although the social consequences are likely to be 
lighter, restraining factors include not only the respective families but also the 
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financial costs involved, not only or necessarily the costs of divorce but those 
involved in a new marriage.13 In the West Bank shari`a courts, although the function 
of conciliation is not detailed in the law as it is elsewhere,14 in practice, the qadis take 
seriously the opportunities the court can afford to encourage reconciliation between 
the spouses. 
 
6.3 Talaq 
6.3.1 Basic rules 
 
 In traditional Sunni law, the husband 'possesses' three unilateral talaqs which 
can be pronounced against his wife anywhere and at any time, without need for any 
legal proceedings. The form of talaq most approved by the jurists15 is a single 
revocable talaq followed by the `idda or waiting period, usually of three months,16 
during which the marriage continues and the talaq may be unilaterally revoked by the 
husband without the consent of the wife. If the talaq is so revoked, the marriage 
continues.17 If the `idda period expires without the husband revoking his talaq, the 
talaq becomes 'final', terminating the marriage, and if the couple wish to renew their 
relationship, they must conclude a new marriage contract, with a new dower for the 
wife.18 The termination of the marriage in this way is known as the 'lesser finality' 
(baynuna sughra), and applies to termination by the first or second talaq between the 
spouses. 
 
 A single talaq can in some cases give rise immediately to the 'lesser finality' - 
that is, be final (ba'in) upon pronouncement, rather than revocable (raja`i), so that the 
marriage ends immediately, the husband cannot revoke the talaq during the`idda 
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period, and any renewal of the relationship requires a new contract and dower. This is 
the case in talaq before consummation of the marriage, talaq in return for a financial 
consideration by the wife (khul`), and certain other ancient forms of talaq.19 The 
termination of the marriage by the 'greater finality', the baynuna kubra, is occasioned 
by the third of three talaqs; such a talaq is immediately final and the couple cannot 
remarry until the wife has concluded and consummated a marriage with another man. 
Only when that marriage has been terminated by death or divorce and the completion 
of her `idda period can the woman return, by a new contract, to her former husband. 
 
 During the course of the 20th century, efforts in various Arab states to restrict 
the husband’s wide power of unilateral talaq resulted in the constraining and in a few 
isolated cases invalidating of extra-judicial or unmitigated unilateral talaq.20 The 
current Jordanian law follows more common, less controversial patterns in modifying 
the classical rules in three ways: by restricting the incidence of talaq under certain 
circumstances related  to the husband's physical and mental states and to the formula 
of talaq employed; by imposing procedural and administrative registration 
requirements backed up by penal sanctions for non-compliance in  the criminal law; 
and by allowing for extra financial obligations to be placed upon the husband in the 
event of talaq. 
 
6.3.2 The restriction of talaq in Jordanian legislation 
Article 91 of the JLPS provides that: 
 
If a man divorces his wife before the qadi, voluntarily and of his own choice, 
while in a state considered shar`i, or acknowledges a talaq [that occurred] 
when he was in such a state, no claim made by him against this shall be heard. 
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 The physical and mental condition of the husband when the talaq is 
pronounced was taken into account by the classical jurists, and only slight 
modifications are made to Hanafi rules in the JLPS, following up those previously 
included in the JLFR. Article 88 of the JLPS discounts any talaq pronounced by a 
man who is drunk, in a swoon, or asleep, is an imbecile or is under duress.21 Also 
discounted is the talaq of the madhush ('overwhelmed'), defined  in Article 88(b) as 
'the man who has lost his discrimination through anger or rage or whatever, and does 
not know what he is saying'.22 The JLFR had discounted only the talaq of a man 
under duress, drunk or madhush.23 Thus, when a man comes to divorce his wife in 
front of the qadi, or to acknowledge the occurrence of a talaq outside the court, he is 
asked about his state of mind at the time of the divorce, and the standard phrase 'while 
in a state considered shar`i, not madhush, not under duress, and of my own free will...' 
or a variation thereof, is incorporated in the text of the deed of talaq.  
 
 The validity of a talaq that has occurred outside court can be challenged by 
either spouse on the grounds that the husband was not in a shar`i state when he 
pronounced it.  Such claims sometimes occur in the course of cases raised to prove the 
occurrence of a talaq (ithbat talaq), a petition brought usually by the wife. Thus in the 
1985 case material, a wife's action to prove the incidence of a talaq was dismissed 
when her husband established that extreme anger, rendering him madhush, was a 
personality trait of his, and that he was in this state at the time of the alleged talaq. In 
another case, the qadi ruled that a talaq was to be cancelled when the wife produced a 
medical report establishing that her husband was mentally unstable at the time and 
had in fact been admitted to a psychiatric clinic a few days after recording the talaq. 
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 Connected with the rules on the mental state of the husband are those 
concerned with his intention in pronouncing the divorce. The JLPS provides that 
explicit formulas of talaq cause divorce to occur whether or not this was really 
intended, while 'obscure' expressions that could bear the meaning of talaq or of 
something else have to be supported by clear intention of divorce.24 Similarly, oaths 
including the formula of talaq (`alayya at-talaq/al-haram) are discounted along the 
lines provided for in the JLFR, and now give rise to talaq only where the phrase 
explicitly includes an address or allusion to the wife.25 The colloquial use of these 
expressions is often closer to a suspended talaq, intended to persuade somebody to do 
or refrain from doing something, or to emphasise the veracity and significance of a 
point being made or fact being conveyed by the speaker. It was in this latter form that 
the Syrian law removed the validity of such expressions as a form of talaq.26  
 
 The Jordanian law maintains previous modifications to classical law in 
discounting a conditional talaq that is pronounced in order to make somebody do or 
not do something rather than with the actual intention of talaq.27 Thus, if a man 
threatens to divorce his wife if her brother does not leave the house immediately, and 
the brother stays, the talaq will be discounted if the intention was really to get rid of 
the brother.28 Otherwise, suspended and conditional talaqs are still valid under the 
JLPS, and cannot be revoked once  pronounced by the husband.29 
 
 Another way of restricting talaq used in the legislation of Arab states -- led by 
Egypt in the 1920s -- is to limit to a single revocable talaq the effect of certain forms 
of talaq that under Hanafi law would give rise either to a single final talaq or a triple 
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repudiation leading immediately to the 'greater finality'. Article 94 of the JLPS 
provides that: 
Every talaq falls revocable except the third of three, talaq before 
consummation, talaq for property, and such talaq as is stipulated in this law to 
be final. 
 
This is backed up by Article 90: 
Talaq accompanied by a number in word or sign and talaq repeated in one 
session give rise only to a single talaq. 
 
 The first modification to classical law contained in Article 90 is a standard one 
in the personal status legislation of Arab states; classical Hanafi law holds the 'greater 
finality' to be caused by a man saying, for example, 'you are divorced three times'.  
The marriage would thus be irrevocably terminated on the spot by the ‘greater 
finality’, and the partners unable to remarry until the wife had undergone an 
intervening marriage.30 Under Jordanian law, such a divorce is a single revocable 
talaq.  The case material in all years showed instances of a man coming to court to 
register the incidence outside court of a talaq by his saying to his wife 'you are thrice 
divorced' (anti taliq bi-thalath) and being informed by the court that he has caused 
one revocable talaq to occur.31 
 
 The second modification in Article 90 limits to a single revocable talaq the 
effect of 'talaq repeated in a single session', and represents a change to the previous 
Jordanian law.32 The emphasis on one talaq in one session (majlis) is also to be found 
in Article 85 of the JLPS:  
    The husband possesses against his wife three separate talaqs in three 
sessions.33 
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 This means that the action of repeating the talaq three times also counts as 
only one revocable talaq. The Explanatory Memorandum to the JLPS condemns the 
use of such a triple repudiation as leading to the wanton destruction of the family, and 
attributes the amendment of the law to certain of the Prophet's Companions, and to the 
fourteenth century jurist Ibn Taymiyya.34 
 
 The effect of this particular modification to the law can be seen clearly in the 
records of talaq. In the pre-1976 sijills, there are many instances of men coming to 
court and pronouncing two or three divorces one after the other, immediately 
effecting the irrevocable termination of the marriage by the baynuna kubra, with the 
talaqs being registered together in the record of that one session in the court.35 In 
1985, however, three separate deeds of talaq, representing three talaqs in three 
separate sessions, are needed to effect the baynuna kubra. Furthermore, the practice 
by the qadis appears to be to allow only two separate talaqs to be pronounced on the 
same day. The ending of one session in court and the beginning of a new one allowing 
another talaq to be pronounced is easily marked by the registration formalities and by 
the husband leaving the qadi's room and then coming in again for the next one. 
Outside court, a session is closed by any decisive movement, such as a change of 
location, as illustrated in the case material -- for example, in two different rooms of a 
house. 
 
 Once three talaqs are pronounced in three sessions, the marriage is 
immediately ended and remarriage of the couples forbidden under the rules of 
temporary prohibition.36 Article 100 of the JLPS describes how the prohibition 
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occasioned by termination by the 'greater finality' is removed, allowing the couple to 
remarry if they choose: 
The baynuna kubra is removed by the marriage of the  woman concerned, the 
`idda of her final divorce from her former husband being over, to another man, 
without the intention of legitimising (tahlil) [her marriage to her former 
husband], provided that the [second] husband consummates the marriage.  
After her divorce from the [second] husband and the end of her `idda, she may 
legitimately marry the first man. 
 
 This article follows the OLFR and the JLFR in providing that the wife's 
intervening marriage must be free of any conscious intention of rendering legitimate a 
later marriage to her former husband.37 This is the Maliki position; the Hanafis did not 
hold such intention to affect the legality of the tahlil process, provided that the 
intervening marriage was consummated.38 No cases on the question  of  intention 
were found in the case material or in the published decisions.39 
 
 Note should also be taken of an administrative regulation that seeks to limit 
the incidence of the third of three talaqs giving rise to the ‘greater finality.’ In 1979, 
an administrative circular was sent out by the Qadi al-Quda in Amman to the heads of 
the shari`a Courts of Appeal in Jerusalem and Amman, for distribution to the qadis. 
The circular instructed the qadis not to register the incidence of the third of three 
talaqs until the relevant papers had been sent to and approved by the Qadi al-Quda. A 
husband being informed of this when coming to court to pronounce the third talaq is 
not only likely to have the gravity of his intended action suitably impressed upon him, 
but will have rather more time to reflect upon it, while waiting for the papers to 
return.40 
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6.3.3 Registration and out-of-court talaq 
 The first legislation requiring the registration of talaq in the shari`a courts in 
this area took the form of the Marriage and Divorces (Registration) Ordinance which 
was issued by the British in Palestine on the basis of Ottoman regulations drawn up 
along with the OLFR but not applied in the area.41 The JLFR followed in requiring the 
husband to register his divorce at the shari`a court. Furthermore, the JLFR provided 
that: 
Claims of talaq [made] by the husband shall not be heard unless [the talaq] 
was registered before the qadi; however, the wife's evidence of a talaq 
occurring other than before the qadi shall be admitted.42 
 
 Thus, under the terms of this provision, while a wife could raise a claim to 
prove the incidence of an unregistered out-of-court talaq, a husband could not for 
example raise an unregistered out-of-court talaq as a defence to his wife's claim for 
maintenance.  The JLFR set no time limit within which the husband had to register his 
talaq through the normal procedures. However, Article 77 was clearly aimed at 
encouraging the husband to register his talaq, and in Coulson's opinion, 'a step had 
been taken in the direction of making divorce by repudiation [talaq] a judicial 
proceeding'.43  The above article of the JLFR was not carried over into the JLPS; the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the JLPS gave no explanation for the omission, but it 
would appear that there were objections on the basis that the JLFR provision had been 
seriously flawed in shar`i terms, since in certain circumstances it all but denied the 
validity and effect of an unregistered talaq -- a direction from which, by 1976, the 
Jordanian legislators seem to have drawn back. Other Arab legislators have 
maintained a certain momentum in this direction, including the Egyptian legislation of 
1985 which maintained the amendments of 1979 despite objections from parts of the 
shar`i establishment.44 By contrast, the JLPS keeps to a fairly standard position -- that 
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of imposing time-specific registration requirements backed up by penal sanctions in 
the event of infringement, without suggesting that a non-registered talaq is invalid, or 
at least of no legal value as a defence for the husband. Article 101 of the JLPS 
requires the husband to register any out-of-court talaq within fifteen days of its 
occurrence, and the Jordanian Penal Code (Article 281) provides for a fine or a 
maximum of a month's imprisonment to be imposed on any man who does not comply 
with the registration rules of talaq. 
 
 As is the case in other areas of the law, these penal sanctions ceased to have 
practical effect under the direct Israeli occupation after 1967. In the case material, the 
timing of an acknowledgement of an extra-judicial talaq varied from the day after to 
weeks or months after the event but still within the `idda period, to in some cases 
months or years later. In cases of late registration, there was no mention of transfer of 
the husband for prosecution in the Israeli-administered regular court system. 
However, it remained possible for the wife herself to have recourse to the regular 
court system to raise an action against her husband for the late registration of a talaq. 
 
 It was noticeable however that the case material showed the majority of 
registered talaqs to have taken place in court. In a more detailed examination of this 
aspect, the later WCLAC material showed a proportion of 4% of talaqs registered by 
iqrar in Ramallah and 26% in Nablus, as compared to the rest undertaken in the court 
itself.45 The Nablus figures were shaped by the statistics from 1993, which showed 
38% of unilateral talaqs registered by iqrar, compared to the other years (12%, 20% 
and 22% in 1989, 1992 and 1994 respectively). In Ramallah, the 4% of registered 
talaqs having taken place out of court must be read with the higher proportion of 
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repeat talaqs registered in that court (see below); and in both cases it must be 
remembered that the figures for extra-judicial talaq represent only those that have 
eventually been registered, and not the total number of talaqs that have taken effect; 
others will have been pronounced and not yet been registered, while some may never 
be. However, it may well be the case that the situation reflected in the court records is 
a fair representation of current practice in the areas of the West Bank covered by these 
courts, in that most talaqs are, eventually, registered, and that it is already the norm 
for the husband to go to court to pronounce a talaq rather than to do so in an extra-
judicial procedure.  
 
6.3.4 Points in practice 
 
 The majority of talaqs recorded in the shari`a courts of the West Bank are 
registered by the husband in the sijillat at-talaq, whether he pronounces it at that time 
in front of the judge, or acknowledges the incidence of a talaq out of court. Some, 
however,  are recorded as a result of an action brought by the wife to prove the 
incidence of a talaq outside court not registered by her husband, or by the husband in 
the course of his defence of a claim (primarily for maintenance) by the wife.45  
 
 An action by the wife to prove the incidence of a talaq involves proceedings 
of such complexity that the first instance court's decision, which must be submitted to 
the Appeal Court in a process of automatic review,46 is often returned by the latter for 
correction. The complications involve the exact wording of the formulae used for 
talaq, the testimonies of the witnesses thereto, the investigation of the husband's 
defence (for example, that he was madhush), and the precise wording and content of 
an oath of denial by the husband and at what point it should be sworn.  Thus, the 1965 
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case material included a claim by a woman seeking to establish the incidence of a 
triple repudiation, while her husband claimed that there had been two revocable talaqs 
and a revocation in the `idda. The case involved three separate rulings on this one 
action by the court, the first two of which were sent back by the Appeal Court for 
further steps to be taken by the first instance court. 
 
 The wife may also raise an action to establish talaq when her husband 
divorces her by letter. Article 86 of the JLPS allows talaq to be by written or spoken 
word.47 However, in order to have such a talaq recorded, the wife must establish to 
the court that the letter is indeed from her husband; if she cannot prove this, and he 
cannot be contacted for the administration of the oath, she may be asked to take the 
oath in support of her claim. In one claim in the case material, a woman produced a 
letter apparently sent by her husband, who was resident abroad and could not be 
contacted by the court. The letter announced the divorce of his wife and was signed 
by the husband and two other Muslim men as witnesses, whom the court was also 
unable to contact. The wife was held unable to prove her claim and an announcement 
was placed in the local newspaper requiring the husband to take the oath of denial.  
When he did not come at the appointed time, nor ask for a delay, he was held to have 
declined the oath, and the court decided to swear the wife the oath in support of her 
claim. The wife for her part declined to support her claim with the oath, and the case 
was dismissed. 
 
 However, the normal procedure for registration of a talaq is for the husband to 
come before the qadi, nearly always in the absence of the wife, to fill in the necessary 
forms48 and then to go through the pronouncement of the talaq in front of the qadi.  In 
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the vast majority of cases in the case material, this took place in the absence of the 
wife. The text of the talaq includes the names of the spouses, the fact that the husband 
is in a suitable state to pronounce the talaq, the formula of talaq and mention of 
whether it is first revocable and so on; the qadi ends the text by explaining to the 
husband the effect of the talaq, the `idda requirement for the wife and, if the talaq is 
revocable, the husband's right of revocation, and the instruction that the talaq is to be 
communicated to the absent wife.49 Sometimes the husband was himself absent from 
the session, having officially delegated another man, usually a paternal relative, to 
perform the talaq on his behalf.50 The qadi will usually attempt to dissuade the 
husband from pronouncing the talaq, and the circular sent round by the Qadi al-Quda 
in 1979 reinforced this by instructing the qadis to encourage the husband to delay the 
registration of the first and second talaqs for a period adequate for the husband, or 
both spouses, to reconsider. In practice, the qadi will often simply tell the husband to 
fill in the necessary forms and come back in a few days in order to pronounce the 
talaq - which, of course, he may fail to do.51 
 
 When talaq occurs in court, the standard formula is 'I have divorced my wife'. 
When the husband acknowledges in court a talaq pronounced out of court, the most 
common formulae found in the case material were 'you are divorced' (anti taliq), or 
'you leave divorced' (turuhi taliq). Sometimes this is accompanied by the phrase 'three 
times', or is repeated three times in one session, in which case these days the qadi 
records one revocable talaq, in accordance with the law. In one exception in the 1985 
case material, the text recorded that a man came to acknowledge the incidence of a 
talaq that had occurred out of court some weeks before by his directing to his wife a 
phrase roughly translating as ‘you leave thrice divorced, without revocation, 
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whenever you become lawful [to me] you are [again] prohibited [to me as a wife], nor 
shall any law in the world bring you back.52 The qadi explained to the man that he had 
caused the termination of his marriage by the baynuna kubra, and that he and his ex-
wife could never re-marry -- that is, even if she underwent an intervening marriage. 
The reasoning behind this exceptional ruling was that the phrase 'whenever you 
become lawful [to me] you are [again] prohibited' meant that every time the woman 
became able to marry him, notably after an intervening marriage, she was instantly 
divorced again. Discussions with different officials of the shari`a court system in the 
West Bank suggested alternate rulings: it might for example have been argued that 
talaq can only be pronounced by a man against a woman to whom he is validly 
married according to Article 84 of the JLPS, and that once the marriage is entirely 
over due to the incidence of the baynuna kubra, a prior pronouncement of talaq 
against her no longer had any effect and could not be 'carried over' once she had 
married another man. Or, again, this phrasing could be held to constitute a talaq 
suspended on the realisation of the baynuna kubra (rather than on a condition) which 
would mean that the baynuna kubra was effected but the couple could remarry after 
an intervening marriage by the wife. Either ruling might more closely reflect the 
intention of a man using this phrase to divorce. Reference to the same phrase of talaq 
is made in a number of published Amman Appeal Court decisions, although they do 
not set out a position on the consequences, and it thus appears that although rare, this 
type of phrasing remains in limited use.53 
 
 Apart from that case, all the phrases of divorce used in one session in the case 
material from 1985 were held to cause the incidence of one revocable talaq.  Together 
with the types of divorce registered in 1965 and 1975, this gives the breakdown of 
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talaq a very different appearance to that observed by Layish in the shari`a courts in 
Israel in the late 1960s, where he found revocable talaq to represent only about 3% of 
all divorces other than judicial ones, and a particular frequency of triple repudiation in 
one session.54 The impact of even the earlier JLFR provision in rendering into a single 
revocable divorce a talaq accompanied by a number (‘thrice divorced’) thus becomes 
clear. The table below shows the breakdown of the case material of talaq according to 
type; in the table, the talaq classed above as 'other' is that discussed above where the 
ruling was lifetime prohibition between the spouses, the description ‘three in one’ 
indicates three separate talaqs in one session, the phrase ‘two and three in one’ 
indicates the second and third talaqs occurring in one session, and ‘rev.’ indicates 
revocable. 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
  type Bethlehem  Hebron Ramallah 
  65 75 85 65 75 85 65 75 85 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1st rev. 8 6 13 40 50 39 35 25 40     
2nd rev. 0 0 2 1 1 6 0 6 23 
3rd of 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 20 
1st final 0 0 3 8 4 1 3 1 0 
3 in 1   1 1 0 2 0 0 1 36 0  
2 & 3 in 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 
suspended 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
other  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
total  12 7 18 55 55 48 41 72 83                                         
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Table 6.1 
Unilateral Talaqs in the case material by type, year and court 
 
 
 The first point to note about the table above is the overall predominance of 
single revocable talaqs, even in those years (1965 and 1975) when it was still possible 
to pronounce more than one in one session. The predominance of single revocable 
talaq is particularly noticeable in Bethlehem and Hebron, where first revocable talaqs 
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accounted for an average of 80% of all the unilateral divorces registered in the courts.  
Similarly in Ramallah in 1965, first revocable talaqs accounted for 85% of all the 
unilateral talaqs registered. In 1975 and 1985 in Ramallah, however, the picture is 
very different and the changes can probably be directly attributed to the comparatively 
high rate of emigration in that area, particularly as of the 1970s.55 In 1975, there was a 
marked rise in the number of triple repudiations registered in one session, coming to 
half the total number of unilateral talaqs registered in the court that year. Of these, 29 
were pronounced against non-Palestinian women of foreign nationality resident 
abroad, primarily in the Americas, and the remaining seven by locally resident men 
against Palestinian women with foreign nationality. In 1985, when the husband or his 
wakil could no longer register three talaqs in one session, seventeen of the twenty 
terminations by baynuna kubra were carried out in quick succession to two preceding 
talaqs, all three usually coming within two or three days. All seventeen of these 
involved women resident abroad. The special situation in which the court in Ramallah 
has found itself because of the high emigration rate has been recognised by the 
Jerusalem office of the Qadi al-Quda. Following the Amman circular noted above, 
the Ramallah qadi sent a memorandum to the Acting Qadi al-Quda in Jerusalem 
seeking clarification on the registration procedures for the baynuna kubra. In reply, 
the Acting Qadi al-Quda informed the qadi of Ramallah that: 
The matter dealt with in the circular concerns treatment of ordinary registered 
talaq. As for the émigré (literally, the person who has gone West) who wants 
to divorce his foreign wife who lives abroad, there is no objection to this talaq 
being registered without permission being obtained.56 
 
 The divorce rate in Ramallah is also pushed up in various indirect ways as a 
result of the emigration rate. `Ayyush’s figures show a rate of 21.9% in 1979, 
 339 
compared to a maximum rate in Bethlehem during the period of his survey of 15.8%, 
and in Hebron of 9.4%.57  
 
 The suspended talaqs recorded in Hebron and Bethlehem in the case material 
are an interesting variation to the normal procedures of either unilateral talaq or khul`, 
but although registered as 'suspended talaq', they are in fact one of the two parts of a 
khul` process, with the talaq suspended upon the wife's payment of a certain amount 
of money within a specified time period, usually a year, in addition to renouncing any 
remaining financial rights.58 Otherwise, the JLPS allows the suspension of talaq on a 
condition, or the postponement of talaq to an future date,59 but none of the latter type 
were discovered in the case material, and suspended talaqs also appear to be rare, at 
least in so far as they are brought to the attention of the court. For a suspended talaq 
to be valid, the intention must be the divorce by talaq, rather than the influence of 
another person's actions, and the condition must be realisable not absurd. In his 
compilation of Hanafi rules, Muhammad Qadri Pasha gives the example of a man 
telling his wife to go to her family's house and that if she returns within a year she is 
divorced; in this case, he has in effect given her permission to live with her family for 
a year and must pay her maintenance, unless she chooses to return to his house and 
therefore cause the talaq to occur.60 Examples of suspended talaqs in the case 
material include ‘if you go to the house of [folan] you are divorced’ and ‘you are 
divorced if I eat and drink from you [i.e. anything you give me] again.’61 
 
 
6.3.5 Revocation of talaq 
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 Just as he may divorce his wife in or out of court, so the husband may revoke a 
revocable talaq either by coming to court and declaring his revocation and asking the 
court to inform his absent wife; or by approaching the wife directly out of court and 
revoking the talaq 'in word or deed', later notifying the court of this. In earlier years, 
deeds of revocation were registered in the sijill at-talaq, but nowadays they are 
entered in the miscellaneous register. To give an example of numbers in the case 
material: in Hebron there were 55 unilateral talaqs and nine revocations, while in 
1985 there were 48 unilateral talaqs and fourteen revocations. Some of the 
revocations take place very quickly after the registration of the talaq; others take 
longer, and this may indicate the protracted nature of negotiations taking place 
between the spouses and their families, albeit in law the revocation is not dependent 
upon the wife’s consent. 
 
 After a revocable talaq, the husband remains financially responsible for his 
wife until the end of the `idda period62 and if they resume marital relations during that 
period, the talaq is revoked ‘by deed.’ This revocation is facilitated by the shar`i 
assumption, backed up by the terms of the JLPS, that the wife will remain in the 
marital home during the `idda of a revocable talaq.63 However, customarily it is 
common for a woman to return to her natal family’s house when she is divorced, so 
that the husband may not actually have access to her. A case from the court records 
illustrates the situations to which this may give rise. The husband had told his wife 
‘you leave divorced’ and she left his house, in the early months of pregnancy, and 
went back to live with her family. The talaq remained unregistered. During the course 
of her pregnancy, the husband twice sent male relatives to her father’s house with a 
message that he wanted to revoke the talaq, but the wife refused to come back to his 
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house. After the birth, however, she returned to the marital home with the child, and 
the couple resumed marital relations. A few months later they came to court to 
register the incidence of one revocable talaq and its revocation during the `idda 
(which ended with childbirth.) The qadi, however, noted that revocation does not 
occur by the husband stating his intention or desire to revoke the talaq, and none of 
the witnesses could testify to the text of an actual revocation (‘I have taken back my 
wife’). The court therefore ruled for the incidence of a revocable talaq that had 
become final with the expiry of the `idda period by childbirth without revocation of 
the talaq. He ordered the couple to separate, and if they wished to resume relations to 
conclude a new marriage contract including a new dower for the wife. 
 
6.3.6 Delegation of talaq to the wife 
 
 Article 87 of the JLPS provides that as well as appointing another person to 
carry out the divorce of his wife on his behalf (i.e. by tawkil, deputising), the husband 
may also delegate to the wife the power to divorce herself (by tafwid, delegation).64 
All the Sunni schools held that such delegation was permissible, and the only addition 
the JLPS makes to the classical rules is to stipulate that this be in writing.65 The other 
reference in the JLPS to tafwid at-talaq comes in Article 19 regarding special 
stipulations in the contract of marriage. The phrase used in Article 19, ‘that her affairs 
be in her own hand’, along with the phrase that ‘her protection be in her hand’, is the 
standard formula for the delegation of the power of talaq from the husband to his 
wife.66 Procedurally, however, the wife must raise a claim to establish her talaq or 
have the qadi effect a divorce in court by faskh. Furthermore, the rather literalistic 
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approach of courts in the West Bank to the text of the delegation means that the 
woman may find that the delegation has no legal value.  
 
 One of the problems that may arise is the question of when the wife may use 
her power. As a general principle, it is held that if the delegation is absolute and 
unconstrained, then the wife may exercise this power only in the same session it is 
delegated to her. That is, if the husband says 'divorce yourself', or 'your affairs are in 
your hand,’ then the wife must respond immediately, since the power ends with the 
end of the session. The is confirmed by a number of decisions from the Amman 
Appeal Court. The decisions distinguish, however, between the type of divorce being 
sought by the woman on the basis of such a stipulation. Thus, in a 1993 case, the 
Court overturned a decision from a first instance court giving the woman a judicial 
divorce by a final talaq based on a stipulation (al-`usma bi-yadiha) in the marriage 
contract. The Court held that she could have applied for judicial dissolution on this 
basis in accordance with Article 19 (on stipulations), but that the text of her delegated 
talaq did not give rise to repetition (i.e. of the talaq) and could only be exercised in 
the session of delegation, which had ended with the end of the contract session. If, on 
the other hand, she had applied for a faskh, the first instance court would have been 
correct to grant the dissolution.67 If, however, the delegation is suspended upon a 
condition, such as if her husband takes another wife or goes to live abroad, then the 
woman may exercise the power if and when the condition is realised, or has the 
choice of seeking a faskh from the court.68  
 
 The delegation of talaq to the wife may also be ‘suspended on a 
generalisation’, with the use of such phrases as ‘whenever you wish’, in which case 
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the delegated power may be used at any time by the wife.69 Here, the problem also 
arises as to whether the wife’s talaq falls revocable, as would the husband’s, leaving 
open the possibility that her husband could revoke it. Samara, in discussing the 
suspension of talaq, lists the words that may be used in phrases of suspension as 
comprising ‘if’ (in, idha) ‘when’ (matta) and ‘anytime/whenever’ (kullma), and 
observes that only the last-mentioned gives rise to the right to repeat the talaq.70 That 
is, if any of the other words were used, the wife would be able to use her delegated 
power of talaq only once. If this talaq were considered revocable, the husband could 
then revoke it and the wife would not have gained the protection she had envisaged by 
the original delegation. With the use of ‘whenever’, however, the wife could, if she 
chose, repeat her talaq until the husband could no longer revoke it (that is, three 
times) and thus end the marriage by the baynuna kubra. 
 
 Al-`Arabi reviews a few decisions that appear to support Samara’s position. 
One holds that if the wife stipulates that ‘her affairs are in her hand’ and then comes 
to court to establish that she has divorced herself, it will fall revocable. Another case 
involved a woman stipulating that if her husband drank alcohol, she would have the 
power to divorce herself from him when she wished (matta sha’at). He subsequently 
did drink, the woman divorced herself from him; he revoked the talaq and they 
resumed marital relations. The court ruled for the incidence of one revocable talaq 
and a revocation. On the other hand, as indicated above, under current jurisprudence it 
would appear that the court would grant a woman’s application for faskh on the basis 
of the range of wording employed in stipulations, leaving the husband unable to 
revoke it.71 
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 The only case in the case material where a woman sought to exercise her 
power of delegated talaq illustrates a rather literalistic approach by the Jerusalem 
Shari`a Court of Appeal. The woman had been married some months previously to a 
man who had since left the country before the marriage had been consummated. The 
contract had included the stipulation that the wife had the power to divorce herself 
when she wished (matta sha’at). The wife accordingly raised a claim for tatliq 
(implying the qadi would pronounce the talaq for her) and the qadi registered the 
incidence of a single talaq which fell immediately final because it was before 
consummation. Upon review in the Appeal Court, however, this ruling was corrected 
and the talaq not given, because firstly the text of the wife’s stipulation in the contract 
did not include the phrase ‘and the husband agreed to this stipulation’; and secondly 
in the final text as a whole, set out in full above the signatures of the parties, the 
stipulation was not mentioned in the ijab or the qubul. In this latter position, the 
Jerusalem Appeal Court followed earlier rulings to this effect of the Amman Appeal 
Court published by al-`Arabi.  However, a later ruling under the JLPS from the 
Amman Court (in 1987) held that even though the stipulation had not been included in 
the text (sigha) section of the contract, it had been registered in the stipulations 
section in accordance with Article 19, and the husband had acknowledged this fact. 
The Court held that his claim that he had accepted the stipulation ‘in order not to 
disrupt the contract session’ had no effect on his acceptance in law, and returned the 
file to the first instance court (which had turned down the woman petitioner’s 
application) to proceed accordingly.72  
 
 The rare use of the delegation of talaq in the West Bank seems to lead also to 
inadequacies of phrasing, as has been noted in regard to stipulations in general. It has 
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already been noted (in Chapter Three) that of the six stipulations that were found in 
the over 8000 contracts examined for the purpose of this study purporting to give a 
general delegation of talaq to the wife, two could in theory have been denied legal 
value by the court and three would, by some arguments, have been liable to 
revocation by the husband. It is doubtful that either the ma’dhun or the parties 
concerned were aware of the implications of the phrasing they employed in these 
cases, or that the woman would have known that in the event of seeking a divorce on 
the basis of the stipulation it would generally be safer to seek a faskh from the court 
rather than seeking to ‘divorce herself’ from her husband. 
 
 Shaham notes similar discussions among Egyptian qadis in the material he 
examined, although in at least some cases, the Egyptian courts appear to have adopted 
a less literalistic approach.73 In a case summarised by al-Jundi, the court held that the 
expression tutallaq nafsha matta sha’at was customarily believed to give the wife the 
power to end the marriage just as the husband could, so that the intention was clearly 
that either it should fall final, or she should be able to repeat it.74 A proposed 
modification to the JLPS that would have required a woman to establish a delegated 
talaq through a court action and rendered it final was justified in the draft Explanatory 
Memorandum of 1987 along similar lines of intended benefit, adding that this would 
give the woman time to think over her action and to reconsider her decision during the 
court proceedings -- just as a man has the `idda period of a revocable talaq to reflect 
on and potentially reverse his action.75 
 
 Although much is made of the potential of ‘evening up’ the balance of the 
power of divorce embodied in the institution of the delegation of talaq to the wife, the 
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fact that it is so infrequently included in contracts of marriage indicates what appears 
to remain a societal antipathy, popularly expressed in views on the ‘emotional’ nature 
of women as compared to the ‘rational’ nature of men. In the survey of attitudes 
among Egyptian university students carried out in the course of the project on the new 
marriage contract, the least favoured stipulation was that granting the wife the power 
to divorce herself.76 
 
 
6.4 Khul` 
 
 In Jordanian law and West Bank practice, a divorce by khul` (or mukhala`a) is 
concluded by a single final talaq pronounced by the husband in exchange for 
(muqabil) the wife's renunciation (ibra’) of some or all her financial rights against 
him, primarily the dower and maintenance; if the direct exchange is not explicitly 
stated, then the talaq falls as a single revocable talaq accompanied by a voluntary 
waiving of rights by the wife; and similarly if it is explicitly stated that there is to be 
no consideration then the ruling is for a single revocable talaq.77 The pronouncement 
of the talaq and of the renunciation can be performed by the spouses themselves, or 
by wakils appointed by them for this purpose and, as in talaq, can take place in front 
of the qadi or out of court.  In the latter case, the spouses come to court to 
acknowledge the occurrence of the khul` out of court. The major difference between 
the registration of talaq and of mukhala`a is that the wife or her wakil must be present 
to pronounce the renunciation of her rights in the same session.78 
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 Unlike unilateral talaq, which depends upon the will of the husband, the 
process of mukhala`a requires the consent of both spouses; under the Jordanian law 
the husband cannot be obliged to pronounce the talaq or have it pronounced for him 
by the court, nor the wife the renunciation of her rights. It is not therefore a case of the 
wife having a guaranteed 'right' to obtain a talaq from her husband by giving up her 
financial rights, unlike the rules on ‘judicial khul`’ established by court decision in 
Pakistan and, more recently, in Egyptian legislation.79 
 
 
 In procedural terms in the West Bank, a mukhala`a agreement starts with the 
wife announcing that she has renounced her rights in exchange for a single final talaq 
'by which she possesses herself'; her husband then responds with the talaq in return 
for release from his financial obligations towards her. The word used in the West 
Bank by the wife is ibra', (absolution, release) and the mukhala`a agreement is 
registered in the sijill at-talaq as talaq muqabil al-ibra’.80 The marriage is ended 
immediately  (by the incidence of the baynuna sughra) and a new contract is needed 
for them to resume their relationship. This kind of divorce was recognised by all the 
schools of law. The JLFR contained no provisions on khul`, thus by default leaving 
the classical rules intact. The JLPS does cover khul`, although most of the relevant 
provisions are declarative of the classical law, with only a few modifications 
introduced. 
 
 The JLPS provisions on this subject appear to have been modelled largely on 
the 1953 Syrian Law of Personal Status. This is clearly the case in the first 
modification made to classical law, regarding retraction of the offer of mukhala`a.  
According to Hanafi law, if the husband pronounces the offer (ijab) then he cannot 
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retract it until the woman has made her response (qubul), while if it is the woman who 
makes the offer, she may retract before the husband has answered. In the JLPS, the 
Shafi`i position is adopted when either party is allowed to retract their offer before the 
response of the other: this provision was an innovation in the Syrian law.81 
 
 As in talaq, to conclude a mukhala`a agreement, the husband must fulfill the 
normal conditions of legal competence and the woman must be contracted to him in a 
valid marriage.  The only difference is that if the woman is under the age of legal 
majority (rushd), then the khul` is not valid unless her legal guardian (wali al-'amr) 
gives his consent to her renunciation of her rights.82  
 
 According to the JLPS, the 'exchange' (badl) for the talaq can be anything that 
is binding according to the shari`a. Samara explains this as being anything that is 
shar`i and that can be assessed in monetary terms.83 There was some discussion as to 
whether or not the wife could renounce more than the husband had actually given her 
by way of dower and so on - that is, whether it was valid if the 'renunciation' became 
what Layish calls a 'compensation' divorce, whereby the wife renounces her rights and 
in addition pays the husband a sum of money on top.84 All four schools hold that such 
a divorce is valid, although  disapproved.85 Thus, for example, in exceptions in the 
1975 case material, sums ranging from 250-400 dinars were paid by women in 
addition to renunciation of all their remaining financial rights: this is often likely to 
represent the return of the received portion of the prompt dower.86 
 
 Most deeds of mukhala`a in the case material, however, show a standard ibra’ 
and do not include extra compensation. The JLPS takes Abu Hanifa's view that if the 
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mukhala`a is undertaken for something other than the dower, then all other rights 
(primarily the dower and maintenance) are also automatically renounced,87 while if no 
specification at all is made (for example, if the mukhala`a is on the basis of a 'general 
absolution', (ibra' `amm) then ‘both parties are cleared of obligations towards the 
other as regards dower and maintenance’.88 However, in contrast to Abu Hanifa's 
view, the JLPS makes an exception of maintenance for the `idda period following the 
divorce, which it holds to be waived only by explicit renunciation in the mukhala`a.89 
On the other hand, any maintenance due the wife from before the mukhala`a, whether 
or not ordered by a ruling from the court, and however much it may amount to, is 
included in a general renunciation. 
 
 Also valid as exchange for a talaq in a mukhala`a divorce are the fees due 
from the husband to the divorced wife in connection with her continuing care of a 
child from their marriage. These consist of the fees for suckling the child and for 
undertaking custody. In addition, the wife can take upon herself other expenses 
related to the child that would otherwise be the responsibility of the husband if the 
child itself had no independent income. These consist of the child's maintenance, and 
the cost of its accommodation. Article 109 of the JLPS allows all these to be included 
as exchange in a mukhala`a divorce.90 The article also provides, in accordance with 
standard Hanafi law, that where the wife does undertake to waive these fees and/or to 
maintain the child herself for a certain time, then the husband can claim back from her 
the expenses for the time remaining if the wife remarries a man outside the prohibited 
degrees of relationship to the child and consequently loses her rights of custody, or if 
she or leaves the child or dies. However, the article adds, in exception to the dominant 
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Hanafi view, that if the child dies, the father cannot claim anything back from the 
mother.91 
 
 The JLPS stipulates that these expenses and fees should be renounced for a 
specific period ('a known time'), an issue not discussed in the case material, although 
according to the Jordanian Shari`a Appeal Court, if the period is not specified, then 
the ibra' is not valid.92 The principle here is that the mukhala`a must be for something 
the value of which can be assessed in monetary terms; if the period is not defined, no 
such assessment can be made.93 In most cases found where these fees and expenses 
were included in the mukhala`a, the specification of the time period would probably 
not satisfy the rules of ‘a known time’: for example, the wife waiving the fee of 
custody for ‘so long as I retain custody’, or ‘until the child reaches the age of 
puberty’. By contrast, a phrase such as ‘until the child reaches the age of fifteen’ 
would be a valid specification of the time period.94 However, in the deeds of 
mukhala`a in the case material involving a renunciation by the wife of these fees and 
expenses, the rights to dower and maintenance were also renounced, so that the 
mukhala`a was not dependent upon the validity of the period specification for the 
suckling and custody fees. The main effect of an invalid time specification would then 
be to prevent the husband from claiming anything back from the wife should she 
cease to care for the child. 
 
 While no litigation was found regarding the fees of rada` (breastfeeding) or 
custody after a mukhala`a divorce, there were cases on the child's maintenance. The 
JLPS provides that if the mother becomes poor after the divorce and is unable to fulfil 
her undertaking to maintain their child, then the father is obliged to maintain the child 
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and this will be held a debt against the mother.95 This is standard Hanafi law, and is 
illustrated in a claim from the earlier case material resolved under the JLFR. The 
mother had undertaken in the mukhala`a deed to maintain their child and had waived 
her fee for custody, but her circumstances had changed and finding herself 
impoverished she had gone back to court. The court awarded her maintenance for the 
child against the father, on the condition that the father could claim back what he had 
paid once the mother became financially able to support the child herself; however, 
her petition for reinstatement of her fee for custody was dismissed. This is because the 
fees for hadana and suckling are rights of the wife and once renounced cannot be 
claimed; the child's maintenance, however, is the right of the child, and must be 
discharged by the father if the mother becomes unable to meet the obligations she 
took on herself. 
 
 The same principle applies to the right of custody over a child from the 
marriage.  Article 111 of the JLPS provides that: 
If the man stipulates in the mukhala`a that he shall keep the child with him 
during  the period of custody, then the mukhala`a is valid but the condition is 
void, and the legal custodian may take the child from him. 
 
 This is again a restatement of standard Hanafi law, and has been upheld in 
Appeal Court decisions in Jordan: only the Malikis allowed a mukhala`a to stand on 
the wife's renunciation of her right of custody over children from the marriage.96 
Under the classical interpretations of the sources, while the father is regarded as the 
natural guardian (wali) of his children, the mother is considered the best person to 
have custody of them until they reach the age where they 'can dispense with the care 
of women', at which point they return to their father.  The schools set the end of the 
period of custody at various ages; Hanafi law sets it at seven for boys and nine for 
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girls. The JLPS raises this to puberty in both cases, provided that the mother fulfills 
certain conditions. If the mother fails to fulfill these conditions of competence for 
custody, then the right of hadana passes according to the Hanafi rules to the maternal 
grandmother and then to various other female relatives.97 At all times, however, 
custody, and the correct identification of the custodian, is primarily the right of the 
child.  Thus, while the mother may renounce her own rights, she cannot renounce the 
right of her child to be cared for by the person held by law to be its best custodian. 
 
 However, after the promulgation of the JLPS, with this explicit provision 
repeating the classical Hanafi position, there were still examples in the case material 
of women agreeing to forego any claim to custody of their children in exchange for 
the talaq from their husband, along with all other rights. Annelies Moors illustrates 
the circumstances in which this may come about in a case from Nablus; it may be a 
combination of pressure from the husband and his family, or a reflection on the likely 
prospects for remarriage for a single woman with young children.98 
 
 In practice, however, the vast majority of mukhala`a deeds registered in the 
case material involved various combinations of the prompt and deferred dowers, 
tawabi` and maintenance. By way of example, in the 1985 registers, the standard 
formula in 42% of the deeds was the renunciation of prompt and deferred dower and 
maintenance for the `idda period (98 out of 234 deeds), while a further 16% (38) 
added tawabi` of the prompt dower. Some 22% (51 deeds) reflected the equivalent in 
a khul` before consummation (half the prompt and deferred dowers, with a similar 
proportion including tawabi`). The remaining 20% either omitted maintenance for the 
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`idda period or explicitly added in outstanding maintenance due from before the 
divorce, or fees related to the children (suckling or custody). 
 
 In regard to the standard text, it should be noted here that when the wife 
renounces rights to 'both dowers', this does not usually mean that she has to pay back 
such prompt dower as she has received from him; it will merely prevent her making 
subsequent claims for any amount outstanding. Reading from decisions in the 
Jordanian Court of Cassation, Fakhani points out that the standard formula, 'I release 
my husband from all that which I am due from him of my prompt and deferred 
dower...etc.' is absolution of rights outstanding, and so does not include goods handed 
over to her before the date of the absolution.99 In practice, it seems that the wife only 
actually pays back such dower as she has received in those cases where a sum of 
money is stipulated to be paid to her husband on top of the renunciation of financial 
rights. 
 
 Some deeds in the case material indicate the possibility of pressure being 
exerted on the wife, with the mukhala`a divorce being undertaken in the wife’s `idda 
from a revocable talaq by the husband. In such cases the talaq becomes final with the 
khul`, but the `idda is calculated from the date of the first unilateral talaq. In some of 
these cases, it may be that the wife has agreed to a mukhala`a in response to the 
husband threatening to revoke his talaq and therefore keep her in a marriage that she 
no longer wants. This type of conduct by the husband was specifically condemned by 
the then qadi of Ramallah, Shaykh Hiyan al-Idrisi, in a newspaper article in 1987.100 
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 The more general problem of wives possibly being pressurised into 
renouncing their rights in order to be released from a marriage is one that has been 
acknowledged by both classical and modern writers. Barhum suggests that wives may 
be unaware of their rights and may waive their dower and other rights when they 
could in fact obtain relief in other ways.101 Samara notes that the Shafi`is, Hanbalis 
and Malikis held that if the man obtains the wife's renunciation of her rights through 
oppressing her and beating her, then the renunciation is not valid as it occurs under 
duress, and the mukhala`a becomes an ordinary talaq.102 This is not however the 
Hanafi position, but the introduction of various rules from the other Sunni schools, 
primarily the Maliki, allowing the wife to seek separation (tafriq) for absence and 
injury, desertion (hajr), discord and strife and the non-payment of dower, means that 
she can seek relief from the court in the event of certain kinds of injury. It is, 
however, clear that in many cases, the prospect of long drawn-out litigation, the 
outcome of which cannot be guaranteed, encourages the woman to opt instead for the 
simple registration process required for mukhala`a and an immediate, final divorce 
from her husband, with minimum court exposure. The alternatives -- divorce through 
litigation at court -- are considered in the following chapter. 
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220 discounts the talaq of a man asleep, and a man who is insane, an ‘imbecile’, 
mentally ill and so on. The OLFR (Articles 104 and 105} discounted talaq by a man 
who is under duress. See Schacht, 1979, 180, on the origins of the rules on talaq 
under duress; Layish, 1975, 158, on intoxication, and Anderson, 1951 (‘The 
Dissolution of Marriage’), 271, on these restrictions as a whole. 
 
22. The Explanatory Memorandum to the JLPS (3) accredits this rule to the 
Hanafis. See Anderson, 1951 (‘JLFR’), 201, and 1955, 38, on the meaning of 
madhush. In the West Bank shari`a courts, madhush seems to be used synonomously 
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with al-ghadban, indicating excessive anger. In 19637/1977, the Amman Appeal 
Court set out the procedure required if a man makes such a defence to his wife’s 
claims to establish a talaq by letter: ‘the court must charge the wife with establishing 
that [the husband] was [fully] aware/conscious (i.e. not madhush) and if she does then 
the court rules for the talaq; if she does not then the court charges the husband with 
proving his defence, and if he does not but takes the oath, or if he does [in fact] 
establish it then the claim of talaq is rejected, while if he cannot prove it and declines 
the oath then the talaq is established.’ Dawud, 1999, II, 804. 
 
23.  JLFR Article 68. 
 
24. See Layish, 1975, 133 and 173/4 on this in the OLFR. Kitab al-Ahkam, Article 
227, gives examples of explicit phrases of divorce, and Article 229 of ‘concealed’ 
phrases. 
 
25. JLPS Article 92, JLFR Article 71. See Layish, 1975, 138, on such oaths in 
Israel, where talaq is held to occur as the OLFR provisions are still valid. Compare 
Article 228 Kitab al-Ahkam, where `alayya at-talaq is counted as one revocable talaq. 
 
26. SLPS 1975 Article 90. The 1987 draft of proposed amendments to the JLPS 
proposed to follow this position, with the Explanatory Memorandum noting 
disagreement among the jurists as to whether they were in fact oaths. Draft Amended 
JLPS, Article 87. Explanatory Memorandum, point 17.  
 
27. Article 89 JLPS; Article 70 JLFR. Compare Article 251 Kitab al-Ahkam. 
 
28. Compare Layish, 1975, 128, 137 and 184-185. The OLFR did not discount such 
a talaq. The Explanatory Memorandum to the JLPS (3) attributes this modification to 
`Ali, Ibn Hazm and Ibn Taymiyya inter alia. Samara, 1987, 280, noting this is against 
the dominant opinion of all four Sunni schools, attributes it to Ibn Hazm. 
 
29. Article 96 JLPS. The corresponding provisions in the JLFR, Articles 75 and 76, 
made no reference to the permissibility of revocation of a suspended or conditional 
talaq, but Samara, 1987, 279, notes that this is the standard view of the majority of the 
classical jurists. Compare also OLFR Articles 106 and 107. See Shaham, 1997, 105 
for examples of suspended repudiation in the published Egyptian material. 
 
30. See Kitab al-Ahkam Article 239. Anderson, 1951 (‘The Dissolution of 
Marriage’), 276, details the first introduction of modifications to this traditional rule 
in an Egyptian law of 1929, followed by Jordan, Syria and Iraq. See also Ma'ruf, 
1985, 18. This kind of talaq is considered ‘disapproved’ but valid by the classical 
Sunni jurists, although it is not recognised by the Ithna`ashari Shi`a. 
 
31. In a rather different claim from the 1975 material, a woman raised a claim to 
prove the incidence of an out-of-court talaq by her husband saying ‘taliqa bi-thalath, 
ma biddi iyyaha’ (she is thrice divorced, I don’t want her). The husband claimed his 
words had been ‘turuhi taliqa bi-saba`a’ (you leave seven times divorced) and 
claimed he was madhush at the time. He was unable to prove his defence and one 
revocable talaq was registered. The phrase ‘seven times’, or ‘by the seven schools’, is 
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apparently in colloquial use in certain areas of the West Bank. Since the 1951 JLFR 
both phrases would give rise only to a single revocable talaq. 
 
32. Compare JLFR Article 72: ‘talaq accompanied by a number in word or sign 
gives rise to only a single [talaq]’.  Mheilan (1986, 77) notes this development in the 
law. 
 
33. Compare Article 69 JLFR, ‘The husband possesses three talaqs against his 
wife.’ See also OL.FR Article108 with the same text. This JLPS innovation is backed 
up in Article 30, prohibiting marriage between a woman and a man who has divorced 
her ‘three separate times in three sessions’, until an intervening marriage has taken 
place. 
 
34. Explanatory Memorandum to the JLPS, 3. See Schacht, 1979, 196-197. The 
triple repudiation was held by the Hanafis to be disapproved but valid. Rulings from 
the Amman Appeal Court establish that even if the wife and husband both agree that 
his repeated talaqs happened in one session, rendering the result one revocable talaq 
under the revised terms of Article 90 of the JLPS, the court must hear any witnesses 
to the event, and if the witnesses testify to a plurality of sessions (rather than a 
plurality of talaqs in a single session) then their word is taken by the court over that of 
the spouses, in deference to haqq allah. 19890/1977 and 21361/1980, Dawud, 1999, 
II, 806 and 812. 
 
35. Contrast Layish, 1975, 210 on Israel. 
 
36. Article 30 JLPS. 
 
37. OLFR Article 118; JLFR Article 82. 
 
38. See Article 224, Kitab al-Ahkam. See Haq, 1943, 86 note 1, on Ibn Taymiyya's 
insistence on the absence of such intention, and on the past practice of avoiding the 
rules on baynuna kubra by marrying the wife to a slave and then giving the slave to 
her the next day, so that the marriage was automatically annulled and the wife free to 
remarry her former husband. Imber, 1997, 200-201, notes opinions from Ebu's-Su`ud 
to the effect that penetration must occur but 'seminal emission is not necessary' in 
support of the Hanafi position allowing the intervening marriage to be to a very 
elderly man or a twelve year old boy. 
 
39. In the 1987 draft text of amendments to the law (Article 96), the Jordanian 
legislature proposed to return to the original Hanafi position by removing the phrase 
‘without the intention of tahlil’. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft JLPS, 
point 18, justifies the proposed change on the grounds of the strength of the Hanafi 
and corresponding Shafi`i arguments.  
 
40.  Doc. no.31912826 of 23/7/79. See also `Atayat, 1984, 4. 
 
41.  Layish, 1975, 135 and 222 note 96. 
 
42. Article 77 JLFR. Anderson, 1951 (‘JLFR’), 201-202, called this a ‘sound and 
beneficial’ provision. 
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43. Coulson, 1964, 173-174. 
 
44. The aim of the Egyptian legislation in Law no.100/1985, according to the 
Explanatory Memorandum, was to ‘prevent the injury without constraining the 
husband's right of talaq’ and the method was to delay the start of the `idda period 
until the time of the husband's acknowledgement of his talaq. In the event that the 
husband has 'concealed' the divorce from his wife, the law (Article 5 bis) provides that 
'the effects (inheritance and other financial effects) shall arise only from the date of 
her being notified thereof.'  Text of Explanatory Memorandum and report of the Joint 
Committee on the draft law reproduced in Hassan and Wahhab, 1987, 39-52. Najjar, 
1988, 320-323, summarises the People's Council's debates around this provision. The 
Iraqi amendment of 1978, the Algerian law of 1984 and the Moroccan amendments of 
1993 are other examples. In South Yemen the pre-existing rules of the PDRY Law of 
the Family were replaced in 1992 by a unified law which restored the validity of 
extra-judicial talaq. In Tunisia, extra-judicial talaq has had no validity since 1956.  
Rendering divorce a strictly judicial matter remains an aspiration for many of those in 
Jordan and Palestine interested in legal reform. The JNCW memorandum on its 1996 
proposed amendments to the JLPS is an example. In Palestine, the text voted on at the 
Model Parliament in 1998 provided that ‘no talaq is established except by a court 
ruling and after attempts at reconciliation.’ Nashwan, 1998, 26. 
 
45. In illustration of another circumstance, related to succession, the 1965 case 
material included a case of ithbat talaq raised by two men in a case naming 15 
respondents; the claimants were seeking to prove the incidence of a talaq pronounced 
against a dead woman by her husband, an agnatic relative of the men bringing the 
claim. The court dismissed the claim.  
 
46. Article 138 of the Law of Shar'i Procedure; the same applies to rulings for tafriq 
and faskh. 
 
47. Or by a known sign from the person who cannot speak or write.  
 
48. Since 1979 standard forms have been used in all court documentation under the 
Jordanian law: Mheilan, 1986, 95. The Palestinian Qadi al-Quda Shaykh Muhammad 
Abu Sardane standardised forms in Gaza and the West Bank for the Palestinian 
Authority shortly after this appointment in 1994: see above, Chapter Two. 
 
49. According to Article 101 JLPS, the wife has to be informed within one week of 
the incidence of a talaq in her absence. 
 
50. In this event, the reference of the document of wakala will also be given in the 
text. In examples in the case material, such deeds were usually issued by the 
Jordanian Consulate in the husband's country of residence in cases where he was 
resident abroad. 
 
51. Compare Layish, 1975, 333. 
 
52. ‘turuhi taliq bi’l-thalath bala raja`a kullma tuhalli tihrami wa la yuruddik la 
shar` wa la far`’. `Arif al-`Arif, 1933, 133, notes the first half of this expression as an 
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expression of talaq used among the Palestinian Bedouin although not among other 
communities. For example of the second half of the formula, see below note 61. 
 
53. Al-`Arabi, 1973, 243, 10601 and 10309 of 1959 and others - there are eight 
cases referred to, showing that the phrase may not be that unusual. 
 
54. Layish, 1975, 174-175.  
 
55. `Ayyush, 1985, 81 and 91. Graham-Brown, 1984, 242 quotes the Israeli 
newspaper Ma’ariv (16 May 1978) as estimating that between 1975 and 1977 alone, 
some 5000 Ramallah residents left for the Americas. 
 
56. Doc.no.QQ/38/73 of 27 January 1980.  
 
57. `Ayyush, 80-81. See also al-`Awdah, no.17, 1983, for rates of marriage and 
divorce in the Ramallah district 1967-1982. 
 
58. In one case the husband had registered the suspended talaq in Jordan and the 
court registered its incidence when the wife's father paid the specified sum in the West 
Bank court. 
Compare Layish, 1975, 139. 
 
59. JLPS Article 96; JLFR Articles 75 and 76; OLFR Articles 106 and 107; Kitab 
al-Ahkam Article 251. 
 
60. Kitab al-Ahkam, Article 178. 
 
61. The text and handwriting were unclear. An example of an invalid suspension is 
given in al-`Arabi, 1973, 243, 14156/1965. The text of the talaq was ‘turuhi taliq, la 
yuhillik shar` wa la far` illa tidhbahi bintik `ala sidrik, which would appear to 
translate as ‘you leave divorced and no law in the world shall make you lawful again 
[to me as a wife], unless you slaughter your daughter upon your breast.’ 
 
62. Unless she has been divorced in a state of nushuz. 
 
63. Samara, 1987, 288. JLPS Article 146. Samara, 1987, 307, notes that one of the 
differences between revocable talaq and mukhala`a is that in the latter case, the wife 
does not spend her `idda period in the matrimonial home, while after talaq she does. 
 
64. See Samara, 1987, 276 on tafwid to the wife and wakala to others. Ma`ruf, 
1985, 18, notes that the Syrian and Iraqi laws, in their definition of talaq, state that it 
can occur from the husband or from the wife, thus reminding the wife of the 
possibility of being delegated the power of talaq. 
 
65. There was no equivalent provision in the JLFR. However, in Article 21 of the 
JLFR, on stipulations in the contract, the law provided that the stipulation had to be in 
writing to stand in the event of a denial.  
 
66. Respectively, yuj`al ‘amraha bi-yadiha, and takun `ismatuha bi-yadiha. Layish, 
1975, 153, distinguishes between these two phrases, saying that the first is the more 
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serious in effect, ‘since it entails irrevocable or triple repudiation’. There was no 
indication of such being the case in the West Bank, and Samara, 1987, 273-276, does 
not mention such a distinction in his consideration of this issue. He gives three 
possible texts for delegation of talaq; tallaqi nafsaki, ikhtari nafsaki, and ‘amruki bi-
yadiki, (in colloquial usage, these would transliterate as: tallaqi nafsik, ikhtari nafsik, 
and ‘amrik bi-idik). He cites Ibn Abdin in support of his statement that standard 
Hanafi rules would hold the first phrase to be explicit and the other two implicit, and 
that if a woman divorces herself explicitly (i.e. using the first phrase) the talaq falls 
revocable, while if she uses an implicit phrase (one of the other two) it would fall 
final: Samara, 1987, 275, and note 3. Compare Kitab al-Ahkam Article 260, which 
states that with delegation of talaq, the wife can ‘make her choice’ (ikhtiyarha) or 
‘have her affairs in her hand’. Article 261 of Kitab al-Ahkam uses the same phrase, 
stressing it must be exercised in the same session as the delegation. 
 
67. 35304/1993, Dawud, 1999, I, 377-378; see also 16490/1970 and 16701/1971, 
Dawud, 1999, I, 368-369 and al-`Arabi 1973, 183. An example of a faskh granted on 
the basis of a general stipulation of delegated talaq come in 29407/1988, Dawud, 
1999, I, 375. 
 
68. Compare Layish, 1975, 154. See also al-`Arabi 1973, 225, 9583/57. 
 
69. See Kitab al-Ahkam Articles 260 and 261; al-`Arabi 1973, 183, 16490/70; 
Samara, 1987, 274-275. 
 
70. Samara, 1987, 277. 
 
71. Respectively, al-`Arabi 1973, 183, 16490/70; and 233 and 206, 19240/77; and 
45891/1998, Dawud, 1999, I, 381. The first ruling also noted that if the wife raised a 
claim for judicial divorce on the basis of the general delegation of talaq, the qadi 
should rule for a faskh. 
 
72. 28095/1987, Dawud, 1999, I, 374. Earlier Amman Appeal Court decisions state 
that for a stipulation on the delegation of talaq to be valid, the wife must begin the 
formula of marriage including the stipulation in the text, followed by the qubul by the 
husband. If the husband begins the ijab, or he makes it a condition on himself, it is not 
a valid delegation. See al-`Arabi, 1973, 183, 11181/60, 9583/57 and others. The 1987 
decision focussed on the phrase ‘registered in the contract document’ as the legal 
requirement under the JLPS. 
 
73. Shaham, 1997, 147-148. At 106-107 he also notes a similar scarcity of cases 
dealing with delegated divorce in the Egyptian material he studied. 
 
74. Al-Jundi, 1978, 710 (Tanta 3170/30). 
 
75. Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Amended JLPS 1987, point 5, on article 
23 of the proposed revised version. 
 
76. Zulficar and al-Sadda, 1996, 251-259; only 34.8% of the sample said they 
would agree to be bound by such a stipulation in the contract.  
 
 362 
77. Article 107 JLPS. Article 94 specifies that talaq for mal is final. The difference 
between talaq and mukhala`a is illustrated in a set of divorces in the case material 
recording talaqs registered by paternal relatives acting as the wakils for a group of 
male cousins all at that point resident abroad. In most cases the wakil pronounced a 
talaq, and the wife then declared her renunciation of all her matrimonial rights, but 
without the key phrase ‘in exchange for’. The renunciation was therefore held to be 
voluntary, not in exchange for the talaq, and the qadi registered in each case the 
incidence of a single revocable talaq. By contrast, in one related case, the wife 
pronounced the ibra’ explicitly in exchange for the talaq, and this was therefore 
registered as a final talaq (i.e. in a khul` divorce). 
 
78. Unless the khul` is performed as a talaq suspended on renunciation within a 
certain time. See al-`Arabi, 1973, 234,14335/66 and previous examples from the case 
material in this chapter. 
 
79. In Pakistan, the courts have established that a 'wife is entitled to a dissolution of 
her marriage without the consent of her husband if she would otherwise be forced to 
maintain a hateful union... If the wife desires this she must repay what she has 
received from her husband during the marriage, the final decision as to what she must 
return lying with the court ...', Khurshid Babi vs. Baboo Muhammed Amin, PLD 
1967, S.C.97; see Hodkinson, 1984, 228-230; Hinchcliffe 1968; and Carroll, 1996. In 
Egypt, Article 20 of Law no.1/2000 Regulating Certain Procedures of Litigation in 
Personal Status Matters allows the court to rule for a divorce if the spouses fail to 
agree on khul` and the wife ‘ransoms herself and divorces (khal`at) her husband by 
waiving all her shar`i financial rights and returns to him the dower that he has given 
her.’ This is provided that the court has tried to effect conciliation through two 
arbiters for a period of up to three months and that the wife has explicitly stated that 
she ‘loathes life with her husband,’ that the marriage cannot continue, and that she is 
afraid that she will not be able to live ‘within the limits of Allah’ if forced to remain 
married to him. Official Gazette no.4 29/1/2000. I am grateful to Aziz Dajani for a 
copy of the text. A similar provision in Libyan legislation preceded this (Article 14(b) 
of Law no.176/1972) but was amended slightly in the subsequent legislation (Law 
no.10/1984, article 49(b)). The Draft Unified Arab Law of Personal Status (Article 
116) allowed for this arrangement only for divorce before seclusion or consummation. 
The Quranic reference is 2:229.  
 
80. See Samara, 1987, 298, on other words that might be used. Compare Shaham, 
1997, 103, who notes the general use of the term talaq `ala mal in Egypt; c.f. Article 
94 JLPS. 
 
81. JLPS Article 103; Kitab al-Ahkam, Article 279; Samara, 1987, 296 and 298, and 
Anderson, 1955, 40. 
 
82. Article 102(b) JLPS. In the Draft JLPS from 1987 (Article 99) this is expounded 
by the addition of the phrase ‘that is, eighteen years’ to explain what is meant by the 
woman reaching the age of legal majority. The Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Draft Law (point 19) notes that this is to make it agree with Article 189 of the Draft 
Law which makes the solar year the basis of all calculations. 
 
83. JLPS Article 104; Samara, 1987, 299. Layish, 1975, 160. 
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84. Layish, 1975, 160. 
 
85. Samara, 1987, 303. 
 
86. Compare Ghani, 1983, 362. Shaham, 1997, 107, similarly notes that most khul` 
divorces in the Egyptian material he examined were renunciation rather than 
compensation. 
 
87. JLPS Article 105. This is noted by Samara, 1987, 303-304, as being the view of 
Abu Hanifa, as opposed to that of the Shafi`is, Hanbalis and the Two Companions, 
who held that the other rights were only lost if certain explicit formulas were used. 
 
88. JLPS Article 106. 
 
89. JLPS Article 108. Samara, 1987, 304. The 1975 case material (under the JLFR) 
showed an example a husband winning a claim to cut his wife's maintenance and not 
to pay the maintenance of her `idda period on the basis of a khul`, the text of which 
showed a general ibra’ `amm without specifying the maintenance of the `idda  period. 
 
90. On the fees, see Articles 152 and 153 JLPS. These can only be claimed after 
divorce; see below Chapter Eight. See also JLPS Article 159. The recent Egyptian 
legislation (Law no.1/2000, Article 20) appears to preclude inclusion of child 
maintenance as valid exchange for a talaq in a khul` divorce.  
 
91. Compare Kitab al-Ahkam Article 286. In some earlier mukhala`a deeds, and 
indeed in some registered under the 1976 law, the woman specifically stipulates that 
she will waive all these fees and expenses provided that if the child died before the 
end of the period of custody, the father should not have the right to claim anything 
back from her. See also Samara, 1987, 299. 
 
92. Al-`Arabi 1984, 21683/80. 
 
93. See Samara, 1987, 300. 
 
94. Under the JLPS, the mother's right to custody lasts ‘until puberty’ (Article 162). 
Compare the fatwa from Khayr al-Din al-Ramli cited in Tucker, 1997, 127. 
 
95. JLPS Article 110. In their 1986 Memorandum, the Amman-based Federation of 
Business and Professional Women recommended that Articles 109 and 110 be 
changed so that the husband cannot claim back fees and expenses for the period after 
the wife remarries, or the child's maintenance if she becomes poor; they pointed out 
that a new marriage is the wife's right, and that it was enough for her to lose the right 
of custody of her children by such a marriage, without having to pay back money to 
their father. 
 
96. Samara, 1987, 300. Al-`Arabi, 1973, 184, 9527/57. Compare Kitab al-Ahkam 
Article 288 and al-`Arabi, 1973, 184, 9527/57; and also Khamlishi, 1994 Volume I, 
363-364 on the Maliki rules.  
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97. JLPS Article 154; Kitab al-Ahkam, Article 384. On custody in the WCLAC 
material see Welchman 1999, 201-220; and see in general Zahra and Malek, 1998. 
 
98. Moors, 1995, 211. Compare Layish, 1975, 159. Mir-Hosseini, 1993, 151, found 
in Morocco that when negotiating a khul` divorce, women felt they had to either forgo 
their right to keep their children or to assume total responsibility for their maintenance 
and upkeep; post-divorce arrangements for the children therefore tended to be entirely 
centred around the divorced woman and her family.  
 
99.  Fakhani, 1975/6 (IV), 60 (from Court of Cassation decisions, no.19169). 
 
100.  Idrisi in Al-Quds,  23 November 1987. 
 
101. Barhum, 1983, 24. Compare Carroll,1996, on practice in Pakistan. 
 
102. Samara, 1987, 302.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 365 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
LITIGATING DIVORCE: CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES FOR TAFRIQ AND 
FASKH 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 The termination of a marriage by judicial divorce (tafriq) or by judicial 
dissolution (faskh) is performed by the qadi after litigation in the shari`a court on the 
initiative of one of the two spouses, usually the wife, or, in the case of faskh, of a third 
party. Judicial dissolution is mandatory whenever an invalid marriage contract is 
concluded or when a previously valid marriage becomes invalid through the actions of 
one of the parties, since the parties to an irregular (fasid) or void (batil) contract of 
marriage may not legally remain together.1 Termination of the marriage by judicial 
divorce, on the other hand, is an option granted to one or both spouses in certain given 
circumstances; the spouse may choose to exercise this option and apply for judicial 
divorce or may opt to continue in the marriage. The one exception to this 
generalisation is dissolution by the qadi of a marriage based on the petition of one 
spouse due to breach of a legal stipulation by the other which is a choice made by the 
spouse petitioning (the breach having been the choice of the other spouse) and occurs 
in a marriage where, although the contract has been broken by one spouse, it has not 
become irregular or void in legal terms. 
 
 Judicial divorce by the qadi in most cases gives rise to a single final talaq2 
which is counted in the number of talaqs directed by the husband to the wife should 
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the parties later remarry.  Dissolution (faskh) by the qadi does not enter into the talaq 
calculation. Under Jordanian procedural law, all rulings by the first instance shari`a 
court for judicial dissolution or judicial divorce are subject to mandatory review by 
the Shari`a Appeal Court thirty days after the ruling is issued, unless an appeal has 
already been submitted by the litigants.3 
 
 The Hanafi rules on the grounds on which the wife might seek judicial divorce 
are the most restrictive of the four Sunni schools. These grounds have been 
substantially expanded by the codified legislation issued this century, but the number 
of claims for judicial divorce is still very low compared with the number of 
terminations by unilateral talaq and by mukhala`a, due at least in part to the practical 
difficulties and necessary public exposure involved in going through a public court 
case.4 The table below shows the number of claims made for judicial divorce and 
judicial dissolution in the case material, not all of which resulted in the termination of 
a marriage. 
 
claim     65 75 85 total 
 
tafriq for absence and injury  27 13 8 48 
 
tafriq for non-payment maintce. 1 7 16 24 
 
tafriq for discord and strife  8 11 4 23 
 
tafriq for a prison sentence  1 2 0 3 
 
faskh     3 4 2 9 
 
total     40 37 30 107 
Table 7.1: Bases of applications for judicial divorce and dissolution in the case 
material      
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 The table shows that overall in the case material, most claims for judicial 
divorce were made by the wife on the grounds of absence and injury, followed by 
non-payment of maintenance and then discord and strife. There is a distinct change in 
the pattern, however, in 1985, when most claims were submitted on grounds of non-
payment of maintenance. The later WCLAC material from the West Bank courts 
shows the pattern established in 1985 to be maintained, with non-payment of 
maintenance the most common ground, followed by absence and injury and then niza` 
wa shiqaq.5 There is a certain amount of regional variety between the West Bank 
courts in the distribution of claim types, discussed below in the relevant sections.6 In 
the Gaza Strip, the WCLAC material showed a different pattern, with most claims 
submitted on grounds of absence (or desertion) and injury, followed by non-payment 
of maintenance and then imprisonment in the claims examined in the Gaza City and 
Rafah courts.7 The table above also shows an apparent decrease in the number of 
applications for tafriq overall, another trend borne out in the later WCLAC material.  
 
7.2 Judicial Divorce (Tafriq) 
 
7.2.1    Discord and strife 
 
 The application for judicial divorce on the grounds of ‘discord and strife’, 
niza` wa shiqaq, represents a limited adoption of Maliki rules on this area of divorce 
law, and was first made part of the applicable family law in the West Bank area in the 
OLFR of 1917.  The phrase ‘discord and strife’ refers to severe abuse by either one or 
both parties to the extent that marital life cannot possibly continue. Once such strife is 
established to the satisfaction of the shari`a court, if the qadi himself fails to reconcile 
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the spouses, he transfers the matter to two arbiters, who in their turn exert efforts to 
effect reconciliation. If this arbitration process fails, the spouses will be separated by 
the qadi on the recommendation of the arbiters, with each spouse paying or forfeiting 
financial dues in proportion to the relative amount of blame attributed to them by the 
arbiters. 
 
 The original text in the OLFR permitted either spouse to apply for judicial 
divorce on the grounds of niza` wa shiqaq, while the JLFR of 1951 restricted it to the 
wife only.8 Article 132 of the JLPS returned to the original position by allowing either 
spouse to make such an application: 
If discord and strife appear between the spouses, each of them may apply for 
judicial divorce if claiming injury (idrar) by the other in word or deed to the 
extent  that marital life cannot continue... 
 
Under the JLFR, it was theoretically possible for the wife to deliberately cause 
problems within the marriage until the husband unilaterally divorced her to save 
himself and his family from further embarrassment.  In this event, the husband would 
have to pay his wife all her remaining financial rights. Under the terms of the JLPS, 
however, the husband may have recourse to the court in such a situation, and if he can 
establish the abuse by his wife, may obtain judicial divorce with the wife forfeiting an 
amount of her remaining financial rights in proportion to the blame attributed to her 
by the arbiters. In the case material, of four cases in the three courts under the JLPS in 
1985, only one was submitted by a man. The Explanatory Memorandum to the JLPS 
justified the extension to the husband of the right to seek tafriq on the grounds of 
niza` wa shiqaq by reason of the equality it afforded to the spouses as well as 
referring to the original position in the OLFR.9 
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 There is an established connection between the rules on ta`a (including the 
husband’s power of ‘discipline’ over his wife) and processes of arbitration between 
the spouses that may end in tafriq. Samara begins by summarising the three stages of 
correction for nushuz, and notes that if all the means of correction have been 
employed without result, the husband may seek arbitration in applying for judicial 
divorce for niza` wa shiqaq, while if the husband exceeds the limits of correction the 
wife may apply for the same.10 It has already been noted in Chapter Six that 
consideration of the husband's action for ta`a will be suspended if the wife defends 
the action by claiming the existence of niza` wa shiqaq.11 In the case material, 26% of 
the actions for judicial divorce on the grounds of discord and strife involved a ta`a 
action by the husband at some point or other, while 13% were raised by the wife 
directly in defence to a ta`a action. 
 
 Although in this and other respects the OLFR followed Maliki fiqh in 
introducing tafriq for discord and strife, it did not wholeheartedly embrace the body 
of Maliki rules on the subject and nor has the subsequent Jordanian legislation.  In 
Maliki law, arbitration and judicial divorce for niza` wa shiqaq is closely connected to 
the wife's right to judicial divorce on the grounds of ‘injury’ (idrar) or cruelty. 
According to the Malikis, the establishment of injury or cruelty will give the wife the 
right to judicial divorce from her husband,12 while if she cannot actually prove 
specific injury, but the discord continues, arbiters will be appointed and if 
reconciliation fails the spouses will be separated on the grounds of niza` wa shiqaq. 
These rules apply in the Law of Family Rights applied in Gaza. In the Jordanian law, 
however, even where severe injury is established, the court can only attempt 
reconciliation and then transfer the matter to two arbiters, who must similarly attempt 
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reconciliation before finally recommending judicial divorce.13 The first two clauses of 
Article 132 of the JLPS provide: 
 a)  If the application (for judicial divorce) is from the wife, and she 
establishes the husband's injury of her, the qadi shall do his utmost to effect 
reconciliation between them; if he fails, then he shall warn the husband to 
improve his behaviour with his wife and shall postpone the claim for a period 
of not less than one month, and if reconciliation has not occurred, then the 
matter shall be transferred to two arbiters. 
 b) If the application is from the husband and he establishes the existence 
of  niza` wa shiqaq, the qadi shall do his utmost to effect reconciliation 
between them.  If he fails, he shall postpone the claim for a period of not less 
than one month in the hope of improvement, and after that, if the husband 
insists on his claim and reconciliation has not occurred, then the qadi shall 
transfer the matter to two arbiters.14 
 
 These clauses show the derivation from the Maliki rules on judicial divorce by 
requiring an application from the wife for injury (idrar), whereas the husband must 
prove the existence of discord and strife in his relations with his wife, rather than her 
injury of him. Establishment of injury does not give rise to a right to judicial divorce 
according to Hanafi opinion; the Hanafis held that the wife could only ask the qadi to 
restrain her husband's actions and to rebuke him for his injury of her.15 Samara notes 
that while this part of the JLPS article is in line with the majority of the classical 
jurists who, unlike the Malikis, held that there was no tafriq for injury without 
arbitration, the JLPS gives no penalty that may be imposed on the husband for 
inflicting injury on the wife.  Such penalties are now in the hands of other judges in 
the regular jurisdiction.16  
 
 Once the existence of injury or discord and strife has been established, and the 
qadi himself has failed to reconcile the spouses, the claim is always postponed for at 
least a month, in accordance with the above clauses, in the hope that the situation will 
improve.17 If it does not, at the end of that period, the qadi will appoint two arbiters to 
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perform the task of arbitration between the spouses. In the OLFR and the JLFR, this 
pair were referred to as the ‘family council’, since if possible they are chosen from the 
spouses' families. Article 132(c) of the JLPS provides that: 
The arbiters shall be men who are just and able to effect conciliation, one of 
them being from her family and one from his so far as this is possible, and if 
not then the qadi shall appoint them from among men of experience, justice 
and ability to effect conciliation. 
 
 The characteristics thus required in the arbiters are fairly standard, although 
Samara points out that the law should have included that they be Muslims since 
arbitration is a form of litigation, and `Abdel Hamid notes in general that the Shafi`is 
required them to be males by dint of established practice rather than law.18 The 
arbiters must attempt to reconcile the spouses, but if they fail, they shall recommend 
to the qadi that the spouses be separated with financial responsibilities according to 
the proportion of blame attributed to each by the arbiters as a result of their 
investigation of the discord.19 The ability of the arbiters to recommend judicial 
divorce, rather than merely to attempt reconciliation, was the Maliki view, which was 
not accepted by the Hanafis, and which found only scattered support from the Shafi`is 
and Hanbalis. The JLPS requires the arbiters to set out their investigations and 
conclusions in a signed report to the court, and makes the following provisions 
(Article 132 (e) and (f)) in the event of failure to reconcile the spouses: 
e) If the two arbiters fail to effect conciliation, and it appears to them that all 
the wrong is from the wife, they shall decide on judicial divorce between the 
spouses for such compensation (`awd) as they consider appropriate, provided 
it be not less than the dower and tawabi`. If the wrong is all from the husband, 
they shall decide on judicial divorce between the spouses by a final talaq, 
provided that the wife may seek from him all her marital rights, just as if he 
had divorced her himself. 
 f) If it appears to the two arbiters that the fault is from both spouses, they shall 
 decide on judicial divorce between them for a portion of the dower in 
 proportion to the fault of each.  If the matter is unclear, and they cannot assess 
 the proportion of blame, they shall decide on judicial divorce with such 
 compensation as they see fit to take from the spouses. 
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 The use of the phrase ‘judicial divorce for compensation’ here, as in the JLFR, 
replaces the use of the term mukhala`a in Article 130 of the OLFR, since it is held by 
all the classical schools that the divorce process of  mukhala`a can be effected only by 
the husband of his own free will. While the result is the same, there is a distinct legal 
difference between the husband's pronouncement of a final talaq in exchange for the 
wife waiving all or some of her financial rights, and the pronouncement of a final 
talaq between the spouses by the qadi acting on the report of the arbiters, for 
compensation to be paid by the wife in the form of all or part of her dower. Similarly, 
Article 132(g) of the JLPS refers to the decision (qarar) of the arbiters which is acted 
on by the qadi, rather than the arbiters’ ‘ruling’ (hukm) as in Article 130 of the OLFR. 
While the qadi has to act on the decision of the arbiters, so long as the process leading 
up to such  decision is in accordance with the law, it is he who makes the formal 
ruling for judicial divorce (JLPS Article 132(i)). 
 
 The remaining clauses of Article 132 of the JLPS add procedural clarifications 
to the culmination of the arbitration process. Clause (h) provides that where it is the 
wife seeking tafriq and the arbiters award compensation against her to the husband, 
the wife must guarantee payment of the sum before the formal submission of the 
decision to the court.20 Clause (g) deals with the eventuality of the arbiters being 
unable to agree on their report, providing that the qadi may either appoint new 
arbiters or add a third to their number and permit the decision to be by majority. 
 
 Article 132 is the longest article in the JLPS, and its length is indicative of the 
complexity of the progress of claims made under its terms from initial registration to 
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completion. The complications begin with the necessity of proving the existence of 
injury or niza` wa shiqaq where the other spouse denies it. A breakdown of the case 
material shows that of a total of 23 claims over the three years, seven failed at this 
first hurdle.21 
 
 Niza` wa shiqaq may be established on the basis of word or deed; 
psychological or emotional cruelty is, in law, equally admissible with physical abuse 
as grounds for an application for judicial divorce. In the Gaza Strip, where the Maliki 
rules on divorce for injury (without the court appointment of arbiters) are part of the 
law, the kind of injury that constitutes grounds for a woman to seek divorce for injury 
under the terms of the Law of Family Rights has been described as including her 
husband ‘robbing her, beating her, or harming her in any intolerable manner, or 
forcing her to do something forbidden in word or deed.’22 Dawoud el-Alami defines 
injury by a man of his wife in the Maliki view as ‘any wrongful action toward her 
which is considered deviant according to society and about which the wife 
complains.’23 The rules of custom (time and place) thus clearly affect the legal 
definition of injury, and it is also apparently relative, according to the nature and 
personality of the spouse, so something that may constitute injury to one may not be 
considered injury to another. In the West Bank, Idrisi gives as general examples of 
injurious behaviour by the husband physical cruelty and violence, verbal insults, 
neglecting his responsibilities towards his wife, and bad habits such as drinking 
alcohol and gambling; any of these characteristics, in his opinion, can cause niza` wa 
shiqaq between the spouses.24 The main form of non-physical abuse referred to in the 
claims in the case material was insults by the husband, but this was almost always 
accompanied by claims of physical abuse as evidence of injury.25 Other claims 
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included references to hajr, (sexual) desertion, considered further below. In the only 
claim that made no accompanying reference to physical abuse, discord and strife was 
established by a charge of theft made against the wife by the husband in progress in 
the regular court system. 
 
 Where physical abuse is claimed by the wife, there may be problems in 
proving it. Hearsay evidence by witnesses is not admitted, and where there are 
witnesses, they will be asked to testify to specific occasions, dates and times.26 The 
wife is often unable to prove the injury and may have to ask for her husband to be 
sworn the oath of denial.27 In two claims in the case material, the wife’s claim was 
supported by evidence from the regular courts where the husband had been convicted 
and sentenced to prison for physical assault on his wife. 
 
 The other situation in which niza` wa shiqaq might be established by the wife 
is in the course of marital disputes arising after her husband has taken a new wife. The 
JLPS does not take the position that a subsequent marriage by the husband without the 
consent of his first wife will necessarily be considered an injury to the first wife.28 
The woman would have to establish this in court, and no examples in the case 
material or in available published decisions indicate how the courts would evaluate 
such a claim in the current day West Bank. The fact that only one case was found 
where the husband applied for judicial divorce on these grounds also made it difficult 
to assess the incidents a man might bring forward to prove the existence of niza` wa 
shiqaq. In the one case where the husband applied, he was unable to expound the 
details of his claim when asked to do so by the qadi, and his claim was therefore 
dismissed. However, if a man fails to establish the existence of discord and strife, but 
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continued to return to court to repeat the same claim, the qadi might eventually hold 
niza` wa shiqaq to be established by the fact of this repetition. While no case material 
was found on such cases, this is in line with the original Maliki rules on tafriq for 
niza` wa shiqaq where injury has not been established. The jurisprudence of the 
Amman Appeal Court has however established that it is not enough for a woman to 
repeat her claim; she is bound to establish that she has suffered injury, placing 
inevitably a greater burden on the female petitioner.29 
 
 Once injury or discord and strife have been established, the qadi must himself 
try to reconcile the spouses and then postpone consideration of the claim for a month 
in the hope that reconciliation may occur in the meantime. In previous times, it was 
possible for the husband to persuade his wife to attempt reconciliation (sulh) and 
thereby cause her claim to lapse, since it was held that the possibility of reconciliation 
contradicted the initial claim that continued marital life was impossible. An Amman 
Appeal decision of 1980 dealt with this position, and held that reconciliation had to 
have actually taken place before the claim was dismissed.30 
 
 If reconciliation does not occur, as was the case in all the claims in the case 
material, then the qadi asks the spouses to nominate persons from their families who 
would be suitable arbiters.31 In some cases, the lawyer of each spouse will object to 
the arbiter nominated by the other, so the court appoints others of its choice; in other 
cases, the proposed family arbiters may be appointed. However, in none of the claims 
studied did the arbiters succeed in reconciling the spouses; and it may be that in at 
least some cases, once informal mechanisms of sulh have failed and the court appoints 
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arbiters, their role in assessing relative proportions of blame is of greater immediate 
significance than their court-endorsed sulh function. 
 
 When the arbiters come to assessing where the blame lies, it is uncommon for 
them to find that all the fault lies with one spouse. Of the thirteen claims in the case 
material where judicial divorce was made on the grounds of niza` wa shiqaq, in only 
two was the wife held to be blameless, and in two other cases the wife had to pay the 
husband compensation on top of forfeiting her dower, indicating that she had been 
found entirely to blame. In the remaining nine cases, the wife was held to be more at 
fault than the husband in four cases, to be equally at fault in two and to be less at fault  
but still blameworthy in three.32 
 
 The process of arbitration is lengthy, and added to the difficulties in 
establishing niza` wa shiqaq and then the month’s postponement by the qadi, means 
that completion of a claim for judicial divorce on these grounds may take up to six 
months or more from the time of registration. In addition, since the wife usually ends 
by having to forfeit at least some of her dower, situations that could theoretically be 
the basis of a claim for judicial divorce on the grounds of niza` wa shiqaq may give 
rise rather to a mukhala`a divorce. It seems that an application for judicial divorce on 
grounds of niza` wa shiqaq will usually only be resorted to by a woman where the 
husband is refusing to agree to a mukhala`a agreement at all or to reasonable terms 
for such an agreement.  
 
 The complications of a claim for judicial divorce on the grounds of niza` wa 
shiqaq derive from the fact that these grounds are not ‘objective’, such as in the case 
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for example of judicial divorce for non-payment of maintenance or for a physical 
condition or disease. The uncertain outcome, inevitable exposure of the details of the 
couple’s intimate relations, and the length of time needed to process the claim 
combine to pose potential obstacles to those seeking a divorce from the outcome of 
the claim. Of the three areas included in the study, applications for this type of 
judicial divorce were most common in Hebron, where customary tribal arbitration (al-
qada’ al-`asha'iri) is still a common method of dispute settlement.33 By way of 
comparison, the WCLAC research in the Gaza Strip courts found no claims submitted 
on the grounds of niza` wa shiqaq, and also none on the grounds of injury.34  
 
7.2.2     Absence and injury 
 Maliki rules are also drawn on in the JLPS provisions on judicial divorce for 
absence and injury, although in one respect the Hanbali view is followed. The specific 
injury caused by the husband’s prolonged absence was first made grounds for judicial 
divorce in the West Bank area in the OLFR of 1917. The Ottoman provisions were 
considerably modified in both the JLFR and the JLPS. Closely connected to the 
concept of judicial divorce for absence and injury are those of hajr, desertion, and of 
the missing person (mafqud).35 The rules governing judicial divorce for absence and 
injury are set out in Articles 123-125 of the JLPS: 
123. If the wife proves her husband's absence (ghayba) from her or desertion 
of her (hajr) for a year or more without reasonable excuse, and his place of 
residence is known, the wife may apply to the qadi for judicial divorce if she 
has been injured by his distance from her or abandonment of her, even if he 
has property from which she may obtain maintenance. 
124.  If it is possible for letters to reach the absentee, the qadi shall grant him a 
respite and warn him that he will divorce his wife from him if he does not 
come to live with her, or move her to live with him, or divorce her; then if the 
period passes and he has done none of these things and there is no reasonable 
excuse, the qadi shall separate the spouses by a final talaq after swearing the 
wife the oath. 
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125.  If the husband is absent in a known place but letters cannot reach him, or 
his place of residence is unknown, and the wife proves her claim with 
evidence and swears the oath in accordance with her claim, the qadi shall 
divorce her from him with no warning being given or respite being granted; if 
she is unable to prove her claim or declines to take the oath, the claim shall be 
dismissed. 
 
 The absence of the husband for a year or more and the wife's resulting injury 
have become fairly standard grounds for judicial divorce in the legislation of Arab 
states. The JLPS provisions make only one substantial modification (adding hajr) to 
the former provisions of the JLFR, where a position wider than the original OLFR 
provisions had been adopted.36 
 
 It seems likely that the JLFR provisions were modelled on Egyptian 
legislation, specifically Law no.25/1929 which contained the same provisions. With 
regard to the Egyptian rules, Abu Zahra makes an observation that applies equally to 
the Jordanian texts: that rules are not entirely Maliki, since the Malikis made no 
distinction between absence for a good reason and absence without such reason.37 It 
was the Hanbalis who made this distinction; in their opinion, if the absence was for a 
good reason and therefore free of any intention of injury, it could not be grounds for 
judicial divorce. Thus, absence necessary in the cause of jihad, commerce, education 
and the like, where it was not possible for the wife to accompany her husband, would 
not give rise to grounds for judicial divorce. The Malikis did not distinguish between 
the reason for the absence since the effect on the wife was the same; the West Bank 
courts (and the Amman Appeal Court) insist on clarification that the absence was with 
no reasonable excuse.38 Besides this point, however, once the fact of the absence is 
established, the injury to the wife is more or less taken for granted by the jurists; 
references are made to the awkward social situation of the wife left ‘suspended’, 
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neither really married nor divorced, and the threat that is perceived to be posed to the 
morality of a woman left alone over a prolonged period.39 This assumption is also 
raised in discussions on the reason for granting judicial divorce for hajr.  
 
 This assumption of injury means that in practice it is not difficult for the wife 
to prove her claim for judicial divorce. However, in the shari`a courts of the West 
Bank, if in submitting her petition the wife omits to state that she has been injured by 
her husband’s absence, her claim will be dismissed. The text of the claim must state 
that the absence was for no good reason and without her consent; if it is proved that 
she agreed to the husband's absence, her claim will be dismissed. Furthermore, the 
wife must make it clear that her husband left her, and not she him; thus, if the spouses 
were together abroad, and the wife returned home to the West Bank but the husband 
did not follow, she could not then petition for judicial divorce for absence and injury, 
nor yet if she has in fact consented to his absence.40 The claim must also clarify 
whether the husband's whereabouts is known or not. If the wife or her lawyer was 
careful in the wording of the application regarding the above points, and she had 
competent witnesses to support her statements to the court (necessary in the absence 
of the husband), the progress of her claim through the court was, in the case material, 
fairly straightforward. Of a total 48 applications in the case material, 42 were granted, 
five were dismissed, and one was dropped. Of the five claims where tafriq was not 
granted, two were dismissed because the wife had left the husband rather than he 
her,41 one because the requisite year had not yet passed, and two because of 
inadequacies in the wording of the claim and the testimony of the witnesses.42 
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 In most cases, the wife submitted the claim after an absence by the husband of 
one to four years, but there were exceptions where the wife waited between ten and 
eighteen years before applying for judicial divorce. In none of the claims was there 
mention of the husband being contacted and a respite being granted, and the vast 
majority stated explicitly that the absent husband was ‘of unknown whereabouts’ 
somewhere abroad - that is, outside Jordan in the 1965 material, or outside the West 
Bank after the Israeli occupation. While Article 123 of the JLPS does not state that the 
‘absence’ must be abroad, this appears to be a general assumption.43 However, the 
JLPS did introduce into its provisions on absence and injury one major addition to the 
JLFR articles, which allows the woman to seek judicial divorce if the husband is even 
in the same town as her - that is, the grounds of hajr, when the husband stops 
physically living with his wife. Hajr can be translated as desertion, but it carries a 
clear sense of sexual desertion. Commenting on the difference between ghayba and 
hajr, Abu Zahra notes that in the 1929 Egyptian legislation, ghayba means absence 
abroad, while ‘if the husband is in the same area and leaves his wife for this period, 
then judicial divorce in this case will be for [...] injury, since this is hajr and involves 
intentional injury to the wife.’ On the other hand, an early decision from the Amman 
Appeal Court noted that hajr could occur in or out of the marital home, suggesting 
that sexual desertion within the home does indeed count as grounds in this regard.44 
Shaham notes that hajr al-firash (‘abandoning the [marital] bed’) was a ‘typical form 
of injury’ included in applications for divorce in the Egyptian material he examined. 
As with the absence of the husband abroad or in a different area, there is the sense of 
the risk to a woman’s morality (in terms of her social and sexual conduct) in such 
circumstances, particularly in the case of young women.45 
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 A claim for judicial divorce on the grounds of hajr in the Jordanian legislation 
has the same requirement of injury as that for ghayba, and the presumption of the 
injury involved in these circumstances is based on the same premises. Proving 
physical desertion by a husband who is present in the area may however be more 
difficult than establishing his physical absence in terms of ghayba. Certainly claims 
for hajr are very rare; none were found in the case material studied, and `Ayyush’s 
survey shows that there was only one claim for judicial divorce made on the grounds 
of hajr in each of the three courts in the years covered by his survey after the 
provision was introduced (i.e. 1976-1983).46 
 
 Although rare in practice, there are a number of not uncommon situations in 
which grounds for an application for judicial divorce on the grounds of hajr wa darar 
might arise. Idrisi for example notes that if the husband had sought ta`a but been 
refused because his dwelling was found to be non-shar`i, then if he had not prepared a 
suitable maskan for his wife within a year, the wife could raise a claim for judicial 
divorce on the grounds of hajr; certainly the Amman Appeal Court has established the 
other side of this principle -- that a claim for tafriq is suspended if the husband applies 
for ta`a, since if it is established that the man wishes to move her at his expense to 
live with him, and that the dwelling is shar`i, and that there is no shar`i obstacle to an 
award of ta`a, then there remains no scope to hear the divorce petition and it would 
therefore be thrown out.47 Logically, these grounds might also be available to a 
woman who has stipulated that she should live in a certain area and whose husband 
subsequently moves out of that area, or to a woman who has stipulated that she is to 
live in a house separate from her in-laws in the case of her husband not preparing such 
a house; consideration of this has been made above in Chapter Four. 
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 It remains to note the connection with the concept of the missing person 
(mafqud). This connection is seen clearly in the OLFR provisions of judicial divorce 
for absence and injury. While Article 126 of the OLFR allowed the wife to seek 
judicial divorce where her husband was absent or missing and she could not obtain 
maintenance from him,48 Article 127 of the OLFR dealt with claims raised by the wife 
of an absentee where maintenance was available, postponing the application for 
divorce for four years from the date the qadi ‘despaired’ of getting any news of the 
absentee, or one year after the return of the armies if the man went missing in time of 
war.49 In both cases, on getting the divorce, the wife was to perform the `idda of the 
widow. 
 
 The JLFR, while introducing clearer separate provisions on judicial divorce 
for absence and injury, added to the article regarding judicial divorce from a missing 
person a requirement that the wife be injured by the situation, and postponed the 
claim for a period of four years from the date the application was made to the court, 
rather than from the time the qadi despaired of finding news of the missing man.50 
The JLPS separates even more clearly between the ‘absentee’ (gha’ib) and the 
‘missing person’ (mafqud), and postpones the claim from the date of the missing 
person's disappearance, for four years in times of stability, and one year ‘in 
circumstances where the death of the missing person seems probable, such as when he 
disappeared in battle or after an air raid or earthquake or such-like...’ (Article 131). 
Samara calls this ‘judicial divorce for faqd (loss/disappearance)’ and notes that it is 
normal Maliki law.51 
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 In contrast to the OLFR and the JLFR, the JLPS makes no reference to the 
`idda to be performed by the wife who obtains tafriq under the terms of Article 131 -- 
leaving it, by default, the `idda of divorce -- nor does it discuss the possibility of the 
missing husband returning after his wife has obtained judicial divorce on the grounds 
of his disappearance and has remarried. The OLFR and JLFR both explicitly stated 
that should such an eventuality occur, the wife's subsequent marriage was not to be 
dissolved.52 In the final Chapter of the 1976 law, provisions are included regarding a 
decree of death made upon a missing person, which involve the same terms regarding 
circumstances of the disappearance and the relative time postponements (Article 177). 
The following articles (178 and 179) provide that when such a decree is made, the 
wife shall perform the `idda of death, and that if she then remarries and it 
subsequently turns out that her first husband is in fact still alive, her later marriage 
shall be dissolved only if it has not been consummated. A strict separation is thus 
made in the JLPS between the passing of a death decree on a missing man, requiring 
his wife to perform the `idda of death, and the application of the wife of a missing 
man for judicial divorce on the grounds of his disappearance, followed by the normal 
`idda of talaq.  
 
 There were no claims for tafriq on the grounds of faqd in the case material 
(nor in the later WCLAC material), but there were two claims submitted in 1985 by 
descendants seeking a decree of death on a missing man according to the terms of 
Article 177. One concerned a man who had left for Egypt in the 1950s and had never 
been heard of since, and the other a man who had left for Amman in 1970, the time of 
the ‘Black September’ battles in Jordan. Both claims were granted, enabling the 
estates of the missing men to devolve upon their heirs. 
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7.2.3  Non-payment of maintenance 
 
 Judicial divorce on the wife's initiative for the non-payment of maintenance by 
an absent husband was first made available in the area by a special decree issued by 
the Ottoman Sultan in 1915, followed two years later by inclusion in the OLFR.53 The 
JLFR and JLPS widened the basic Ottoman rules to provide a recourse also for the 
wife whose husband is neither absent nor missing but still will not or cannot pay 
maintenance. In contrast to the Hanafis, the Malikis, Shafi`is and Hanbalis all allowed 
the wife to seek judicial divorce for the non-payment of maintenance, although with 
significant differences in the detailed rules between the schools.54 Although the 
provisions of the JLPS largely reproduced those in the previous law, the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the JLPS nevertheless repeated the reasons for their inclusion: the 
rejection by the Hanafis of judicial divorce in this case led to husbands delaying the 
payment of maintenance to their wives and thus gave rise to injury, and it was 
therefore to the benefit of the wife that the opinion of the majority of the classical 
jurists was adopted in Articles 127 and 128 of the Jordanian law.55 
 
 The Explanatory Memorandum did not detail which rules were taken from 
which school and while the general picture is a Maliki one, in some of the details 
Shafi`i and Hanbali opinions have been adopted.  This is seen, for example, in the fact 
that the law does not discuss a situation where the wife married her husband without 
knowing of his poverty, or consented to remaining with him in poverty when it 
occurred later on. In such a situation, the Malikis did not allow judicial divorce, while 
the Shafi`is and Hanbalis on the contrary held that such knowledge or consent did not 
remove the wife's right to judicial divorce.56 Various factors that were considered by 
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all the schools include whether the husband is prosperous (musir) or poor (mu`sir) - 
that is, able or unable to pay maintenance; whether he has property on which a 
maintenance order can be executed; and whether or not he can be contacted. 
 
 The following article of the JLPS sets out the current position in Jordanian law 
with regard to the husband who is in the same country as the claimant wife: 
Article 127: If the husband fails to maintain his wife after a ruling has been 
made against him to do so, then if he has property on which the maintenance 
order can be executed, such shall be done. If he does not have such property, 
and did not state whether he is poor or prosperous, or said that he is 
prosperous but persists in not paying maintenance, then the qadi shall divorce 
her from him immediately. If he claims he is unable to pay it, but does not 
prove this claim, she shall be immediately divorced from him. If he does prove 
his inability, he shall be granted a respite of not less than one month and not 
more than three, and if he has not maintained her, she will be divorced from 
him after that. 
 
 The only major amendment made by the JLPS to the parallel provision in the 
JLFR was to extend the respite given to the poverty-stricken husband, which in the 
1951 legislation was a maximum of one month.57 With regard to the absentee 
husband, the law makes the same provision for maintenance to be obtained from 
property, but where there is no such property, the rules are similar to those governing 
judicial divorce for absence and injury. Where the husband can be reached by letter, 
the qadi gives him an ultimatum of either sending her maintenance or coming to 
maintain her in person, and if he does neither then the qadi separates him from his 
wife. If the husband cannot easily be reached by letter, or is of unknown whereabouts, 
and it is proved that he has no property on which a maintenance order could be 
executed, the qadi separates the spouses without giving the husband the ultimatum.58 
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 In setting out these rules, the Jordanian legislator made a difference between 
the man who cannot pay maintenance, and the man who is able to but refuses to fulfill 
his obligations to his wife. The Hanbalis and Shafi`is had not provided for judicial 
divorce in the latter case; Samara notes that the result for the wife is the same, and 
that in his opinion the option of judicial divorce is even more fitting than in the case 
of inability since the man's refusal to pay involves intentional injury to the wife.59 
Abu Zahra takes a different position, observing that the prosperous husband can be 
forced to pay maintenance by the qadi, so tafriq should not be available; as for 
inability to pay, he appears critical of women who would seek separation simply 
because their husbands had fallen upon hard times.60 
 
 In contrast to other forms of judicial divorce performed by the qadi, judicial 
divorce for the non-payment of maintenance constitutes a revocable talaq if it occurs 
after consummation; if it occurs before consummation, then like a normal talaq it falls 
final. These are the Maliki rules; the Hanbalis and Shafi`is hold that the qadi's ruling 
for judicial divorce constitutes faskh, judicial dissolution.61 Unlike unilateral talaq, 
however, the revocation of the talaq pronounced by the qadi for the non-payment of 
maintenance is conditional upon the husband establishing that the reason for the 
judicial divorce (i.e. the injury suffered by the wife due to being deprived of her 
maintenance) has ceased to exist.  Article 129 of the JLPS provides that: 
The talaq pronounced by the qadi for the non-payment of maintenance falls 
revocable if it occurs after consummation, but final before consummation. If 
the talaq is revocable, the husband may bring his wife back during the `idda if 
he establishes his prosperity by paying three months' worth of the back 
maintenance that has accumulated, and by being prepared actually to maintain 
her during the `idda. If he does not prove his prosperity by paying the 
maintenance and is not prepared to maintain her, then any revocation of the 
talaq is invalid. 
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 The JLPS made revocation more difficult than it had been under the terms of 
the JLFR, which had required the husband only to prove his ability to pay and actually 
to maintain his wife during the `idda.62 
 
 The submission by the wife of a claim for judicial divorce on the grounds of 
non-payment of maintenance begins with the obtaining of a maintenance award 
against the husband, since it is a prerequisite in the claim for judicial divorce that she 
establish that she obtained such a ruling but that the Execution Offices have been 
unable to execute it.63 Once the maintenance award is obtained, the wife will usually 
wait for a number of months to prove non-execution, and to ensure a larger 
accumulation of back maintenance, before submitting her claim for judicial divorce. 
The only defence a man may make to the judicial divorce claim is that his wife is not 
due maintenance - that is, that she is nashiz.64 In none of the claims studied was this 
defence made. 
 
 The majority of applications for judicial divorce on the grounds of non-
payment of maintenance in the case material were made against absentee husbands of 
unknown whereabouts.65 In such a claim, the wife must produce her marriage 
certificate and swear the oath to the fact that she is neither nashiz nor divorced, to 
show that she is due maintenance; she must also produce the maintenance award that 
she has obtained against her husband and has been unable to execute, and state 
explicitly in her claim, to be proved by witnesses, that the husband has no property 
from which she could obtain maintenance.66 In the case material, of a total of 24 
applications, 21 were granted and three dismissed. The reasons for dismissal were 
various. In one, the husband defended the claim by stating that he was willing to pay 
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the maintenance claimed by his wife, and although he failed to attend later sessions, 
the claimant declined to state categorically that he did not have property from which 
she could obtain maintenance. Another claim was dismissed when the husband came 
to the court session and paid three months of the accumulated maintenance due his 
wife. The third claim was initially granted by the first instance court but returned for 
further consideration by the Appeal Court due to inconsistencies in the testimony of 
the witnesses. Procedural irregularities, such as mistakes in the notification process, 
the wakala appointing the woman's lawyer, or the wording of the oath were 
responsible for dismissals of other claims seen in the court records but not included in 
the case material. 
 
 The increase in the number of applications in the case material for divorce on 
these grounds, as compared to those on grounds of absence and injury, was due 
almost entirely to the startling rise in such claims in the Ramallah shari`a court, 
which nearly doubled from 1975-1985 (from seven to thirteen claims). `Ayyush’s 
study shows that this was the most common basis for applications for tafriq in the 
Ramallah court over the period 1973-198367 and it appears to be linked to the large 
numbers of men who left the Ramallah area to seek work abroad over that and the 
subsequent period. A man might marry in the West Bank before leaving to seek work 
aboard, or marry on one of his return visits; the case material showed claims from a 
number of women married in such circumstances, who had either been left by their 
husband in his family’s home and tired of waiting for him to return, or had gone with 
their husband and returned alone, no longer willing to live abroad with him.68 In the 
latter case, the wife could not seek tafriq for absence and injury since technically it 
was she who had left her husband.  
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 For a dissatisfied wife intent on seeking tafriq, a major advantage of a claim 
made on these grounds over one for absence and injury is the shorter amount of time 
needed to obtain a divorce. Judicial divorce for ghayba wa darar requires a 
continuous absence of at least one year, while tafriq for non-payment of maintenance 
against an absent husband can be obtained as soon as the wife can prove non-
execution of a maintenance order. The case material for 1985 shows some claims for 
tafriq being granted within three months of the wife first obtaining the maintenance 
order against her absent husband. The increase in the number of claims must also be 
put in the context of circumstances arising as a result of the occupation; after 1967, 
the speedier procedures against an absent husband applied to all men outside the West 
Bank, including those in Jordan or holding property in Jordan on which previously the 
court could have ordered a maintenance award to be executed.69 
 
7.2.4     Other grounds for judicial divorce 
 The JLPS identifies four other grounds on which tafriq may be sought from 
the qadi: the existence of certain diseases or physical conditions in either husband or 
wife; the insanity of the husband; the husband's being sentenced to a period of three 
years or more in prison; and the husband's inability to pay the prompt dower. 
 
 Applications for judicial divorce on any of these grounds are relatively rare. 
`Ayyush lists only the third of the above grounds, the husband's imprisonment, which 
he found to constitute just 1.4% of all litigious divorces in the West Bank shari`a 
courts 1973-1983.  Similarly, the case material examined for the purpose of this study 
revealed three claims on the grounds of the husband's imprisonment, but none on the 
other three grounds listed above. Observations on the practical application of the 
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provisions relating to these types of judicial divorce are therefore drawn only from the 
collected Appeal decisions and from discussions with shar`i court personnel in the 
West Bank. 
 
Certain Diseases and Physical Conditions  
 Although claims for tafriq on these grounds are extremely rare, the rules are 
extremely detailed and specific, and consequently both the Jordanian legislator and 
modern-day jurists spend a disproportionate amount of space on clarification of the 
principles involved.70 Included among the aspects that are discussed in the 
commentaries are the various types of diseases and physical conditions that give rise 
to grounds for tafriq, the distinction between curable and non-curable conditions, 
proof of the disease or condition, and the effects of a dissolution under these 
circumstances.  
 
 Dominant Hanafi opinion provided only for the wife to claim judicial divorce 
on the grounds of her husband's total inability to consummate the marriage - that is, 
because of a permanent condition of impotence or castration.71 In 1915, the Ottoman 
Sultan extended the Hanafi rules to include diseases in the husband that endangered 
the wife, and the OLFR expanded it further.72 The current provisions in the JLPS are 
basically the same as those in the OLFR and JLFR, except that under the 1976 law the 
option of judicial divorce is offered also to the husband for physical conditions in the 
wife preventing consummation or diseases that endanger his health.73 The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the JLPS notes that the other Sunni schools allowed 
either spouse to seek tafriq if the other were so affected, and thus justified the  
inclusion of the articles providing for judicial divorce on the husband's initiative. The 
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conditions by which a claim for tafriq on these grounds was constrained by the 
classical schools are repeated in the JLPS: that the claimant did not know of the 
other’s condition before the contract and has not consented to remaining despite the 
condition thereafter, that the claimant is free from such a condition, and, in the case of 
immediate tafriq, that there is no cure. Where a cure is possible, the claim will be 
postponed for one year for the respondent to undergo treatment for the condition.74 
 
 Samara notes that the Malikis specified thirteen diseases or conditions that 
could be the grounds for judicial divorce, the Shafi`is and the Hanbalis seven, and the 
Hanafis only two.75 The seven conditions agreed on by all but the Hanafis were: 
castration (jubb)76 and impotence (`inna) in the man (with which the Hanafis agreed), 
ratq and qarn77 in the woman; leprosy (jadham) and white leprosy (burs) and insanity 
in either spouse.78 The JLPS mentions all these diseases, adding pulmonary 
tuberculosis (sill), which was included in the OLFR79 and syphilis (zahri) which was 
not.80 Moreover, the JLPS provisions list these conditions as examples, rather than an 
exhaustive list. 
 
 In some matters, the current Jordanian law is closer to the Maliki view: thus, 
while the wife may seek tafriq on the grounds of such diseases present before 
consummation or occuring thereafter, the husband may only apply on the grounds of 
those existing before consummation. On the other hand, the view of the Shafi`is and 
Hanbalis was adopted in considering the qadi's ruling for judicial divorce to be a faskh 
rather than the final talaq of the Malikis and Hanafis.81 
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 All the schools of law, and following them the JLPS, make a certain exception 
of the condition of impotence, which is regarded as temporary and curable, and as 
being potentially a result of the particular sexual relationship (i.e. with this wife) 
rather than a condition inherent in the husband. Thus, Article 115 of the JLPS 
provides for the postponement of the claim for a year ‘in cases that can be cured, such 
as impotence’, and Samara observes that a man cannot obtain dismissal of his wife's 
claim for judicial divorce on the grounds of his impotence by proving that he has 
achieved full sexual intercourse with a woman other than the claimant.82 The other 
exception in the JLPS as regards impotence, set out in Article 114, is also along 
classical lines: 
If the wife was aware before conclusion of the contract of this condition in the 
man that prevents consummation, or consented to it thereafter, she loses her 
right to seek judicial divorce, except in the case of impotence, where, even if 
she knew of this before the contract was concluded, she does not lose her right 
to seek judicial divorce. 
 
 
 This principle displays the same underlying premise - that it is fair for the wife 
to believe that although the husband has been impotent with other women, he may not 
be so with her.  Sexual intercourse with her husband is, however, the wife’s right83 
and should the husband prove to be impotent with her, she has the right to seek 
judicial divorce, which will be granted only after the year's postponement, in which, it 
is hoped, the husband may yet succeed in consummating the marriage.84 
 
Insanity 
 The classical schools included insanity in the list of diseases permitting an 
application for tafriq, but the OLFR and the Jordanian laws have treated it in a 
separate provision. Article 120 of the JLPS provides that: 
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If the husband becomes insane after the contract of marriage and the wife 
seeks tafriq from the qadi, the divorce will be postponed for a period of one 
year, and if the insanity continues during this time and the wife persists in her 
claim, the qadi shall rule for tafriq.85 
 
 Clinical insanity has to be proved by the written report of a qualified doctor, 
supported by his/her testimony in court.86 The claim is postponed for one year from 
the date that the current insanity is first established, and further medical reports and 
testimony are required after the year's postponement to establish that the insanity has 
not ceased.  Thus, in a 1986 case in a West Bank court, it was stated that the husband 
had been insane for over ten years, but when the wife finally submitted her claim for 
judicial divorce, the court still ordered the postponement of the claim for one year 
from the date the insanity was first established in the shari`a court. Similarly, if a 
ruling for judicial divorce on the grounds of insanity fails to be verified by the Shari`a 
Appeal Court, and is returned to the first instance court for correction and completion, 
the husband has to be taken for fresh medical examinations in case he has recovered 
his reason in the time between the abrogation of the ruling and the renewed litigation 
in the first instance court.87 
 
Imprisonment 
 Judicial divorce on the grounds of the husband's imprisonment for three years 
or more was first introduced in the area in the JLFR of 1951. The principle came 
originally from the Hanbalis as an extension of the rules of absence and injury and the 
mafqud, and the close connection between these two grounds is shown by the 
juxtaposition of provisions on absence and injury and missing persons with those on 
judicial divorce for imprisonment in the law, and of explanation thereof in the 
commentaries.88 Article 130 of the JLPS provides that: 
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The wife of a man in prison who has received a final sentence of three years or 
more imprisonment may seek a final talaq from the qadi after one year has 
passed  from the date of his imprisonment and the restriction of his freedom, 
even if he has  property from which she may obtain maintenance. 
 
 The Explanatory Memorandum to the JLPS acknowledged the Hanbali origins 
of the above article, comparing the situation to an absence of one year after which the 
wife can seek judicial divorce if she has been injured by the absence.89 The JLPS 
article, however, removed a reference to injury in the JLFR article that it replaced.90 
An Amman Appeal Decision of 1960 emphasised the fact that the wife must state that 
she has suffered injury by her husband's imprisonment when making her claim,91 but 
more recent published decisions seem to shed no light on the position under the JLPS. 
Whether or not the wife therefore has to mention injury in her claim before the court 
for it to be correct under the terms of the JLPS is a question that cannot be resolved by 
the case material for this study, since the three claims that were found were made 
under the JLFR. The rarity of claims made on these grounds is confirmed by the 
findings of `Ayyush, who located a total of eleven claims in the whole West Bank 
over the eleven years 1973-1983.92 
 
Non-payment of dower 
 The Explanatory Memorandum to the JLPS observes that the non-payment of 
dower leads to problems between the families and injury to the spouses, with the zifaf 
and consummation of the marriage being delayed along with the dower.93 Since the 
Hanafis offered no solution for this problem, the Memorandum continues, for the sake 
of the public interest, the Shafi`i rules allowing faskh of the marriage for failure to pay 
dower before consummation were adopted in Article 126 of the JLPS:  
If it is established before consummation, by the husband's admission or by 
evidence, that he is unable to pay all or part of the prompt dower, the wife may 
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seek dissolution from the qadi. The qadi shall grant him a respite of one 
month and if he has not paid the dower when the month is over, the marriage 
shall be dissolved. If the husband is absent and his address is unknown, and he 
has no property from which the dower can be obtained, the marriage shall be 
dissolved without respite. 
 
 The JLPS did not actually make any significant amendment to the existing 
terms of the 1951 legislation on this issue.94 Although the Explanatory Memorandum 
specifically alludes to the Shafi`i school as the origin of the provision, the Hanbalis 
and the Malikis also allowed for tafriq on these grounds, and Samara's opinion is that 
the Jordanian legislation inclines to the Maliki rules, since the husband’s inability has 
to be proved and a delay of one month is granted to give him a chance to pay it.95 The 
Shafi`i (and Hanbali) rules are however in evidence in that the qadi’s ruling is 
described as a faskh, whereas the Malikis held it to be a final talaq. 
 
 The wife’s right to judicial divorce for the non-payment of dower ends on 
consummation of the marriage.96 After consummation, the wife may at any time 
withdraw from the marital home on the grounds of non-payment of her prompt dower, 
and cannot be obliged to return unless she receives her rights; it should theoretically 
then be possible for her to claim judicial divorce on the grounds of hajr if he has not 
paid the dower within a year. 
   
 
7.3 Judicial Dissolution (Faskh) 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 Judicial dissolution (faskh) of a marriage occurs after a claim is raised in court 
and a ruling for termination is made by the qadi.97 The dissolution ends the marriage 
immediately. The court action may be raised by one spouse against the other, or by a 
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third party, usually the Chief Clerk of the shari`a court acting in the interest of al-
haqq al-`amm al-shar`i, the public shar`i interest or right.  As in the case of tafriq, a 
ruling for faskh is subject to automatic review by the Shari`a Appeal Court if not 
appealed by the litigants within 30 days.98 
 
 A marriage is subject to dissolution when it is either irregular (fasid) or void 
(batil), whether it was invalid at its conclusion or has become so since. In practice, 
most dissolutions seem to arise from irregularities at the time of the contract: these 
may involve the competence of the spouses and witnesses, infringements of the 
permanent bans on marriage between spouses within prohibited degrees of 
relationship through blood (nasab), affinity (musahira) or breastfeeding (rada`), and 
infringement of the temporary bans. In some cases, however, the irregularity arises 
during the marriage. This can be through one of the spouses changing religion so that 
the marriage becomes illegal, or committing some act with a relative of their spouse 
that raises the bar of affinity.99  In addition, stipulations inserted in the contract of 
marriage give grounds for faskh if they are violated; the applications for faskh in such 
circumstances have already been considered above in Chapters Three and Six and no 
further consideration is made in the current section. 
 
 The irregularity (fasad) of the marriage may be discovered by the court 
employees during the routine checking of the contract documents submitted by the 
ma’dhun, or it may be revealed by third parties informing the court, or by the bringing 
of an action by one of the spouses. The incidence of faskh in the West Bank is low.100 
In the case material used for this study, a total of nine actions for faskh were located 
in the three courts, which constituted nearly 7% of all the litigious divorces found. Of 
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these, five were related to the age of one or both spouses at the time of the contract, 
one to the impediment of suckling, one to religion, one to the wife remarrying in her 
`idda, and one to the illegal representation of the bride during conclusion of the 
contract.  The following discussion considers these grounds for dissolution and also 
has brief reference to applications on the grounds of coercion. No attempt is made to 
review all the possible grounds for judicial dissolution under the JLPS. 
 
7.3.2  Age of spouses 
 
 Three claims of dissolution due to the age of the parties to the contract were 
found in the case material of 1975, raised by the Chief Clerk of the court against the 
spouses within days of having received the contract documents. Two of these 
concerned the husband, who was under the age of eighteen and had not obtained the 
qadi's permission for his marriage as required by the JLFR. The third claim concerned 
a bride of under seventeen by the lunar calendar, whose contract of marriage had been 
concluded without permission being obtained from the qadi. The one dissolution on 
grounds of age in the case material for 1985 involved a bride who was under fifteen 
by the lunar calendar at the time of the contract.101 
 
 The case material also revealed one dissolution, under the JLFR, on the 
grounds of the failure to obtain the court's permission for an age difference of over 
twenty years between the spouses. The application for dissolution was made in 
defence to an action for ta`a raised by the husband. The husband claimed that he had 
called his wife to the zifaf in order that the marriage might be consummated, and as 
she had refused, he came to court to obtain a ta`a order.  The wife's lawyer stated that 
 398 
at the time of the contract, the wife had been under fifteen, and the husband was just 
over 35. The wife had obtained permission to marry from the qadi, as required by the 
JLFR, but the husband had not produced his birth certificate and the court had not 
investigated the matter of his age. The husband argued that the wife's own 
acknowledgement of the marriage prevented her subsequently challenging its validity, 
and pointed to the consent of the qadi given for her marriage. The court responded 
that permission for marriage given to a woman under seventeen did not include 
permission for the age difference, and that the wife's acknowledgement of the 
marriage had no bearing on the validity of the contract due to the lack of such 
permission. The husband's ta`a action was dismissed and the marriage dissolved as 
irregular, in line with Appeal Court decisions from Amman.102 
 
 
7.3.3    The impediment of rada` 
 
 The existence of the impediment of rada` is proved by the testimony of two 
men or one man and two women, or by the acknowledgement of the two spouses.103 
In the one dissolution made on these grounds in the case material, the suckling 
relationship was acknowledged by the wife after her husband raised the claim.  The 
husband stated that his wife’s mother had breastfed him with his wife's sister during 
their infancy; he said that he had known that he could not therefore marry his wife's 
sister, but had not realised that the prohibition extended also to his wife. The court 
dissolved the marriage.104 
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7.3.4    Illegal remarriage by the wife 
 
 The court records showed one example of dissolution (in 1965) on the grounds 
that the woman involved in the contract was already the wife (or in this case 
mu`tadda, a woman in her `idda period) of another man. The claim was raised by the 
first husband against his wife and her second husband. The claimant stated that he had 
divorced his wife in a mukhala`a agreement when she was in the early stages of 
pregnancy. A few months later, still pregnant, the woman married her second husband 
and consummated the marriage.  She was still in the `idda of pregnancy from her first 
husband at the time of the court claim. The court dissolved the wife's second marriage 
and transferred the case to the Public Prosecutor for consideration of criminal 
proceedings against the woman, her second husband, the wife's father (her wakil in 
the subsequent marriage) and all those who signed the marriage contract. 
 
 In a claim involving similar circumstances resolved under the 1976 JLPS, only 
the ma'dhun who drew up the contract was to undergo disciplinary measures (i.e. 
within the shar`i system), since by then the liaison between the regular and the 
shari`a court system had been interrupted. Another claim from the 1980s involved 
rather different circumstances, but again made no mention of criminal proceedings. 
The claim was raised by the Chief Clerk of the court against the spouses, who had 
been married for a number of years but divorced in the 1960s. When her `idda ended 
without revocation, the woman married a second husband. This man subsequently left 
the country and news of his whereabouts stopped coming: he became, for his wife at 
least, a missing person. Some years later, therefore, she remarried her original 
husband, co-respondent with her in the court claim. Clarifying that no decree of death 
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had been formally passed on the second, missing husband, nor had the woman 
obtained tafriq for absence and injury, nor had that marriage been terminated in any 
other way, the court found her current marriage to have been irregular, dissolved it, 
and declared her still married to the missing man. 
 
 
7.3.5  Requirements of religion 
 
 It is unlikely that a Muslim marriage would be contracted in violation of the 
rules governing the religion of the partners, but it is possible for a marriage to become 
void by a change in religion of one of the spouses during the marriage. Thus, for 
example, if a Muslim man converted to Christianity, his marriage to a Muslim wife 
would become void, as would be the case if the Christian wife of a Muslim man 
became a polytheist. 
 
 In practice, however, it seems that where these cases arise, they mainly 
involve the same circumstances as those obtaining in the one claim found in the case 
material - that is, a Christian woman converting to Islam and finding herself 
consequently in a void marriage with her Christian husband.105 According to Article 7 
of the Law of (non-Muslim) Religious Communities 1938, personal status claims 
involving non-Muslim and Muslim parties must be heard in the regular court, unless 
all parties agree to the jurisdiction of the shari`a court. The claim for faskh from the 
Bethlehem case material was dismissed because the woman's Christian husband 
refused to accept shar`i jurisdiction.106   
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 On another issue, Dawud includes an extended extract from a 1979 Amman 
Appeal Court ruling on dissolution for apostasy by the wife, which arose when the 
husband petitioned the first instance court for tafriq for discord and strife, including in 
his grounds that his wife used to ‘insult his religion’.107  This was backed up by 
witnesses, and the court charged the Chief Clerk to investigate in the name of al-haqq 
al-`amm al-shar`i. Finding the allegations established, the court held that the woman 
had committed apostasy and dissolved the marriage accordingly by faskh. The 
husband then appealed, insisting that his ex-wife had not intended to insult religion or 
to commit apostasy. The Appeal Court agreed with the first instance court in that if 
apostasy occurred the marriage was dissolved,108 but questioned the manner in which 
the charge had been established and the contents of what she was supposed to have 
said: ‘Did the wife saying [this] to her husband, in a situation of argument and anger, 
and in their environment, and their class, -- did this really constitute apostasy?’ The 
Court quoted a large number of sources insisting on the benefit of the doubt being 
given in such cases and held that she had been ignorant of the implications and not 
fully in control of what she was saying, even if were indeed established that she had 
uttered the alleged words. It ended by agreeing with the husband’s petition, 
overturned the finding of her apostasy and returned the file for the first instance court 
to proceed with the original claim for divorce for niza` wa shiqaq.  The case is 
interesting for the insight it gives into the position taken by the Appeal Court judges 
and the consideration they showed to the probable lack of understanding of the 
implications of colloquial blasphemies, while upholding the gravity of the 
allegations.109    
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7.3.6   Technical irregularities 
 
 A marriage will be held to be irregular if the rules surrounding its conclusion 
are infringed, regardless of the capacity of the two spouses. The example in the case 
material involved the dissolution of a marriage because the wife was not legally 
represented at the conclusion of the contract. The wife was a resident in Jordan, and 
her father had sent another man as his wakil in the marriage of his daughter, rather 
than as the wakil of the wife herself. Another example of this kind of dissolution is to 
be found in the collected Amman Appeal decisions, where a Jordanian couple who 
were married in Britain had their marriage declared fasid and dissolved because the 
two witnesses, one Muslim man and one Christian woman, did not fulfil the shar`i 
requirements.110 
 
 
7.3.7    Coercion 
 
 Article 34(3) of the JLPS lists as irregular a marriage concluded under duress 
or coercion (ikrah). The concern among certain sectors of Palestinian society at the 
phenomenon of early -- and in some cases legally underage -- marriage suggests that 
informed and freely given consent, particularly of young women or girls, may be 
lacking in a certain proportion of marriage contracts, despite the safeguards of the law 
intended to prevent any phenomenon of ‘forced marriage.’111 Published rulings from 
the Amman Appeal Court include a number responding to claims of coercion in 
marriage which give an indication of the difficulties involved in remedying such a 
situation under current law and practice. Firstly, it appears that if the petitioner drops 
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the petition for faskh, the court is not expected to undertake its independent 
investigation of the alleged offence, because this ‘not a matter that implicates the 
public right and the petitioner can withdraw [the allegation] and the contract can 
[stand as] lawful even if [coercion] occurred’.112 This is in contrast to what the court 
would do if it was claimed that the spouses were forbidden by a rada` prohibition, for 
example -- it would pursue the matter even if the original petitioner sought to drop the 
case, as the parties are forbidden to remain together. Secondly, the Amman Court has 
held that the various documents registered by the official ma’dhun in the process of 
documenting the contract of marriage includes explicitly the consent of the woman in 
appointing her father as her wakil in her marriage ‘without force or coercion’. In 
accordance with Article 75 of the Law of Shar`i Procedure, such documents provide 
‘absolute evidence’ on the matter to which they pertain and can be challenged only for 
forgery.113 In effect this makes it possible for claims for dissolution on the grounds of 
coercion to be made only by those whose marriages have not been registered in 
accordance with the law, and renders the position of ma’dhun of critical importance in 
investigating the reality of the ‘consent’ given, for example, by a very young woman 
in the contract session and in the appointment of her wakil. 
 
 The case material showed no claims for faskh based on coercion, but in the 
late 1980s a West Bank shari`a court was presented with such a claim raised by a man 
in defence to a maintenance claim by his wife. The couple had been married after the 
woman was found to be pregnant and had identified the man as the father. Under the 
Jordanian Penal Code, a man who has seduced a bikr by promising marriage and has 
then abandoned her is liable to a prison sentence of three months to a year. However, 
the criminal proceedings are halted, or the sentence if already passed suspended, if the 
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man then marries the woman. The Public Prosecutor retains the right to proceed with 
the case against him or to have the sentence carried out for a period of three years 
following the crime, should the marriage be terminated by talaq ‘without a legitimate 
reason’.114 In this case, the man acknowledged his seduction of the girl, and they were 
married, but the relationship was problematic and the girl returned to her father's 
house and raised a claim for maintenance. The husband’s lawyer responded to the 
maintenance claim by stating that the marriage was irregular due to its having been 
concluded under coercion. If the marriage were dissolved on these grounds, it would 
not constitute talaq for no legitimate reason, and the prospect of criminal proceedings 
and a prison sentence would not arise. The husband’s lawyer stated that his client had 
been under duress when offered the choice between marriage and a prison sentence, 
and was therefore coerced into concluding the contract. The wife’s lawyer pointed out 
that the man had willingly and knowingly committed the act that would have led to 
the prison sentence, according to his own confession, and that marriage as an 
alternative to a prison sentence wilfully incurred could not be considered coercion. 
The qadi was spared having to rule on the case when it was settled out of court after 
extensive `asha’iri proceedings; although the straightforward position would have 
been to affirm consent proven through the documentary processes of the contract, as 
in the other cases cited above. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
WHEN IT’S OVER: CLAIMS BY DIVORCÉES AND WIDOWS 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
 The basis of the claims described in this chapter once again invokes the 
‘balance’ of rights and duties of the spouses prescribed by the law. In this case, the 
balance is presented as involving most immediately the husband's right of unilateral 
dissolution of the marriage through talaq and his financial duties during marriage and 
towards his wife in the event of his exercising this power. Important in the idea of the 
balance is that the financial implications of divorce act as a restraint on the husband’s 
use of talaq. Writing in 1934 on the subject of ‘Marriage in Palestine’, the 
anthropologist Granqvist noted that ‘it has not been sufficiently noticed that there is a 
great difference between the formal facility of divorce and the practical results 
accompanying, which are for the husband of such a serious economic nature that he 
avoids expressing the decisive words.’1 The ‘formal facility’ is of course also 
balanced, in society, by strong family and community interest usually directed at 
preserving marital relations and discouraging divorce. 
 
 The financial results of divorce do however vary considerably according to the 
individual case and in fact may not, under certain circumstances, be particularly 
onerous. Of the financial claims that the wife can make discussed in this chapter, the 
only ones imposed as obligatory by the classical schools are the payment of 
maintenance during the `idda period and fees for the wife's suckling and/or custody of 
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children from the marriage. The fees are not generally intended to enable a woman to 
live independently with her children, and as to maintenance, the `idda period in most 
cases lasts only three months. However, the increasing tendency in all sectors of 
society to register a large deferred dower, documented earlier in this study, raises the 
potential level of financial obligations of the man in the event of death or divorce. In 
addition, the JLPS has followed Syria in allowing the court to award a woman 
financial compensation against her ex-husband in the event of an ‘arbitrary’ divorce, 
as an additional penalty for abuse of his right. Deferred dower as registered in the 
marriage contract is due every woman in the event of divorce, unless she has 
specifically waived it in a khul` settlement or she has been held to have forfeited it as 
a result of blame attributed to her in a separation for niza` wa shiqaq, or the marriage 
has been dissolved before consummation due to a disease or sexually disabling 
physical condition in the wife. Compensation, on the other hand, may be claimed only 
under specific provisions in the law and under the JLPS is due only where an arbitrary 
talaq is involved. 
 
 Claims that may arise after the marriage has been terminated depend for their 
timing upon whether or not the `idda period has ended. Thus, for example, the wife's 
maintenance for the `idda period is the responsibility of the husband (unless she was 
divorced in ‘disobedience’) and in order to claim it in court, the wife has to establish 
that she has not completed her `idda period. Conversely, the husband raising a claim 
to have a previous maintenance order rescinded must establish that the `idda period is 
over so that the wife is no longer due any maintenance. A claim for deferred dower or 
compensation must be made by the wife after the marriage has finally ended - that is, 
it may be made in the `idda period of a final talaq, but not until the end of the `idda 
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following a revocable talaq.  This chapter will first consider the `idda period and then 
the claims that arise after dissolution of the marriage. 
 
8.2 The `Idda Period 
 
 The `idda is a waiting period after the end of marriage by death or divorce, 
during which the ex-wife or widow may not remarry. During the `idda of a revocable 
talaq, the husband may revoke the talaq, in which case the couple's marriage 
continues.  A woman in the `idda of a final divorce (including the `idda following 
judicial separation or dissolution) may not marry either her former husband or any 
other man until the `idda is over. Two reasons are usually given as demonstrating the 
‘wisdom’ (hikma) of the `idda period; firstly to establish whether or not the divorced 
woman is pregnant by the man from whom she has been divorced, so that the 
paternity of the child may be correctly attributed, and secondly, in the case of the 
`idda following a revocable talaq, to give the husband adequate opportunity to 
reconsider his decision and to choose to continue the marriage through revocation of 
the talaq.2  
 
 Since the requirement of the `idda period is set out in some detail in the 
Qur'an,3 there are only minor differences between the various schools of law on its 
implementation in practice.  The rules of `idda that apply to the individual woman 
depend on whether her marriage has ended due to the divorce or death of her husband; 
whether the marriage was valid, irregular or void; and whether it was consummated or 
not. The issue of consummation is further divided into ‘actual’ and ‘presumed’ 
consummation, the latter being taken to occur if ‘valid seclusion’ (khalwa sahiha) 
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takes place between the couple.4 In the case of the husband's death, the widow must 
perform the `idda whether the marriage was consummated or not.  In the case of 
divorce, a wife contracted in a valid marriage must perform the `idda if 
consummation took place or if there was valid seclusion. 
 
 Where the `idda period is required, the majority of jurists, including the 
Hanafis, hold that it begins from the time of the death or divorce, even where these 
occur without the knowledge of the wife.6 The Jordanian law has taken this majority 
position in Article 141 of the JLPS.  Thus where a man acknowledges the incidence of 
a talaq out of court at some past date (iqrar bi-talaq) by registering it in the sijillat at-
talaq, the deed of talaq expressly records that the wife's `idda is to be calculated from 
the day of the talaq.5 In an example in the 1965 case material, a woman seeking to 
establish the incidence of an out-of-court talaq told the court that her former husband 
had divorced her out of court in 1940 and that they had not had marital relations since 
that day.  The ex-husband, also in court, acknowledged her claim. The court ruled that 
the single revocable talaq had become final upon the termination of the `idda period a 
quarter of a century before. 
 
 Once begun, the duration of the `idda period depends on how the marriage 
was terminated (i.e. by death or divorce) and on whether the wife is pregnant, 
menopausal or neither of these two, in which case its duration may depend upon the 
pattern of her menstrual cycles. The jurists divide the calculation of the `idda period 
according to whether the duration is assessed ‘by months, by birth or by blood’ - that 
is, in calendar months, by the end of a pregnancy, or by menstrual cycles. The 
standard `idda period for a divorcée who is not pregnant and is of an age between 
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puberty and the menopause is three menstrual cycles. In Jordanian legislation, the 
calculation ‘by blood’ is combined with a monthly assessment. Article 135 states that 
the `idda is three full menstrual cycles, and the court shall not accept any claim that 
the `idda period has been completed before the passing of three months.7 The 
minimum `idda thus becomes three calendar months. 
 
 For pregnant women, whether widows or divorcées, the `idda lasts until the 
pregnancy ends by childbirth. If the woman miscarries, the JLPS takes the classical 
view that the `idda is over if the foetus is sufficiently formed to the extent that it is 
‘recognisably a human being’.8 If not, the `idda will be calculated in months from the 
end of the marriage, according to whether the woman is a widow or a divorcée.   
Although the case material contained a number of examples of the termination of an 
`idda period by childbirth, there were no cases regarding the issue of miscarriage and 
the extent of formation of the foetus. 
 
 The classical jurists set two calculations for the `idda by months; the first, four 
months and ten days, applies to all widows except those who are pregnant. If the 
husband divorces his wife by a revocable talaq and then dies, then the time that has 
been spent in the `idda of talaq is cancelled and the widow begins the longer `idda of 
four months and ten days from the date of her husband's death. If, on the other hand, 
the talaq was final, or the marriage was ended by judicial separation (with the 
exception of tafriq for the non-payment of maintenance) then the widow has only to 
complete the `idda of divorce, since the marriage is already over.9  
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 The second period calculated by months is three months, in cases where the 
woman is neither a widow nor pregnant, but for some reason does not menstruate and 
cannot therefore calculate the `idda period by cycles. This applies for example to 
women in the menopause. If the woman begins the `idda period by calculating 
according to menstruation and then enters the menopause, then she must perform the 
three-month `idda as of the day she became menopausal, without regard for the period 
spent in `idda before this.10 Other women to whom the three-month `idda period 
would apply are girls under the age of puberty -- who, according to the current law, 
may not lawfully be married-- and to women from a consummated irregular (fasid) 
marriage.11 
  
 The major area where the JLPS differs from classical Hanafi rules on the 
subject of `idda is in the setting of a maximum period by calendar calculation. Under 
classical Hanafi law, if a woman was divorced by her husband, being neither pregnant 
nor menopausal, then the `idda of three menstrual cycles was the period she had to 
wait, however long this might take. That is, if for any reason her periods stopped after 
she had menstruated once or twice, then she continued in the `idda period until either 
she completed three full cycles or reached the menopause.12 The Malikis, however, 
set a maximum limit of one year to the `idda period in such circumstances. 
 
 The need to set a limit to the maximum duration of the `idda period, addressed 
by the Ottomans in 1917, is usually attributed in major part to the fact that so long as 
the wife continues in the `idda, she is due maintenance from her husband; and it was 
acknowledged that it was possible for a woman who was prepared to perjure herself to 
continue for years denying she had ‘seen blood three times’ and so to claim financial 
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support long beyond that envisaged by the classical rules agreed upon by the jurists.13 
The same rules bound a woman to an `idda of uncertain duration due to circumstances 
beyond her control, and unable in the meantime to remarry. In Egypt, the 1929 law 
provided that claims for maintenance for the‘idda period were not to be heard for a 
period exceeding one year; `Abd el-Hamid explicitly attributes this to the legislators’ 
intention to reduce ‘excessive’ maintenance claims, while Badran describes the 
adverse reaction to this ‘shrinking `idda’ of some Egyptian feminists at the time.14  
 
 Approaching the same issue, the OLFR adopted the Maliki rules regarding the 
maximum `idda period in these circumstances, but an apparent mistake in the wording 
of the article meant that in fact it provided for a maximum `idda of nine months.15 
This mistake was carried over into the JLFR of 1951but the erroneous text was 
corrected by the Amman Shari`a Appeal Court, which consistently held that ‘the 
divorcée who sees only one period (and then stops menstruating) must wait nine 
months to ensure her womb is clear and then three months, completing the year’.16 
The position was not as clear in some of the cases in the first instance courts. In a 
West Bank case in 1975, the record reads that the woman was neither menopausal nor 
pregnant and usually menstruated, but had not had a period since the divorce, and that 
therefore she had to continue in `idda for nine months from the date of the talaq. The 
legislative slip was corrected in Article 136 of the JLPS, the Explanatory 
Memorandum to which notes that the maximum limit follows normal Maliki law and 
that such a provision is in the interest both of the woman and of the husband who 
must maintain her.17 
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 The practical application of the rules on `idda came into play in the case 
material in claims for maintenance, compensation, and deferred dower. The most 
common claim involving the `idda is a claim by the wife for maintenance during the 
`idda period, or by the husband to have a maintenance award rescinded on the 
grounds that her `idda period is over. Thus, in the Ramallah material, a woman raised 
a claim for maintenance against her husband, changing it to maintenance for the `idda 
period when she added the claim that he had pronounced a talaq after she had raised 
her original claim. During the court's consideration of the claims, it was established 
that the husband had pronounced one revocable talaq at the end of April, and 
subsequently registered a talaq in Jerusalem at the end of July. In October he 
registered a revocation in Jerusalem. The court characterised the registration of talaq 
as a second talaq that had occurred during the `idda of the first (unregistered April) 
one and that the `idda following the unregistered talaq had been completed before the 
man registered his revocation in October. The Ramallah court therefore postponed its 
consideration of the maintenance claim, submitting the question of the validity of the 
out-of-court talaq to the Jerusalem Appeal Court for verification, so that the date 
when maintenance for the `idda fell due could be correctly specified. The Appeal 
Court verified the ruling, the revocation was held void and the Jerusalem court 
amended the registration of the July talaq from a first to a second revocable talaq. 
 
 If the talaq is revocable, the husband may revoke it at any point during the 
`idda period. If the talaq is final, or the marriage terminated by separation or judicial 
dissolution, then the woman cannot marry anyone, including her former husband, 
until her `idda is over. Marriage by the wife during her `idda renders the marriage 
irregular.18 No such restrictions apply to the husband, who may remarry immediately 
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after the divorce, provided that he does not already have three other wives or 
mu`taddas; in this case, he must wait until the `idda of one wife is completed until he 
can marry again.19 The court records in the West Bank show a number of examples of 
women contracting irregular marriages during their `idda period. In one example, the 
Shari`a Appeal Court in Jerusalem heard an appeal made by a husband against a 
maintenance order granted to his wife by a first instance court. The basis of the man's 
appeal was that his marriage was irregular, since the couple had married in the 
woman's `idda period following termination of her marriage to a former husband, and 
no maintenance is due in an irregular marriage. The court called in the former 
husband as a third party and established that the woman's first husband had divorced 
her by a final talaq for ibra'  (khul`) in 1978, when she was pregnant. She married her 
second husband early the next year, while still pregnant. A child was born some 
months later and a birth certificate issued under the name of her second husband. The 
court held that the child's father was actually the first husband and that the woman's 
marriage to the second man was irregular. The Appeal Court therefore cancelled the 
maintenance award issued to the woman by the first instance court against her second 
husband, dissolved their marriage, and instructed that the child's birth certificate be 
changed to show the name of the woman's previous husband. 20 
 
 Besides having consequences for paternity in such cases as described above, 
the `idda is closely associated with the maximum period of gestation, the rules on 
which determine the legitimacy or otherwise of a child born after the separation of its 
parents. The classical jurists agreed on a minimum period of gestation of six months, 
but differed inter alia as to its maximum length, with limits ranging from two years 
according to the Hanafis up to four according to the majority view of the other three 
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Sunni schools. The view of one Maliki jurist was that the maximum gestation period 
was one lunar year.21 The Egyptians were the first to introduce this last view, using 
the same approach as they employed to set a maximum limit to maintenance for the 
`idda period: in 1929, they provided that courts were not to hear claims of disputed 
paternity where the child was born a year or more after the last physical contact 
between the couple.22 In 1953, the Syrians set a maximum gestation period of one 
solar year as a matter of substantive law23 and in 1976 the JLPS took this up, although 
the calculation in the Jordanian legislation is by lunar years.24 Thus, paternity is not 
established under Jordanian law where the wife gives birth a year or more after the 
death of her husband or their legal or physical separation.25 The JLPS thus corrected 
something of an anomaly in the JLFR, whereby the maximum `idda for non-pregnant 
women was one year, while the maximum gestation period remained the classical 
Hanafi period of two years. 
 
 The final point to be made here is that the woman in the `idda of death or of a 
revocable talaq is required by law to spend the `idda period in the matrimonial home.  
The widow may leave the house to attend to whatever legitimate business she might 
have, while the divorcée is supposed to leave it only ‘in case of necessity’. Neither is 
supposed to spend the night outside the marital home. Other divorcées (for example, 
by a final talaq, by separation) are not subject to this rule, in exception to the classical 
Hanafi position.26 In the case of a revocable talaq, the presence of the wife in the 
marital home is intended to facilitate the revocation of the talaq by word or deed by 
the husband. In practice, the woman is just as likely to return to her natal family once 
divorced, placing her family as intermediaries if he seeks access to her.27  
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8.3 Claims 
8.3.1 Maintenance for the `idda period 
 The classical rules difer as to which mu`tadda may claim maintenance during 
her `idda. The Malikis end the right to maintenance with the end of the marriage, 
except where the mu`tadda is pregnant; that is, a woman in the `idda of a revocable 
talaq could continue to claim maintenance from her husband, while a final divorce or 
the death of the husband gives no rights of maintenance, but a pregnant woman, 
whether a widow or a divorcée, could continue to claim. The Hanafis, on the other 
hand, give divorcées, whether from a final or revocable talaq, the right to claim 
maintenance, but hold that a widow has no rights of maintenance whether pregnant or 
not.28 The Shafi`is and Hanbalis hold variations on these two positions involving 
limited rights to accommodation.29 
 
 The Jordanian legislation has maintained the Hanafi view on maintenance for 
the `idda; the JLPS added two new articles to the JLFR, but they serve an explanatory 
purpose only.30 Article 144 provides that no widow is due maintenance31 while 
Article 79 states that ‘the man must pay the maintenance of his mu`tadda by talaq, 
tafriq or faskh’.  On this point, Samara notes that the JLPS does not make the classical 
Hanafi distinction regarding the reason for the tafriq or faskh; the classical view holds 
that where the reason arises from the wife (for example by her apostasy) then she is 
not due maintenance.32 No maintenance is due after a void marriage, nor after an 
unconsummated irregular marriage, since in neither case is `idda required. The JLPS 
also provides that no maintenance is due for the `idda which follows consummation in 
an irregular marriage.33 In other ways, maintenance for the `idda period follows the 
 425 
same rules as those governing the wife's maintenance during marriage. Thus, the 
amount of maintenance is assessed according to the circumstances of the divorcing 
man34 and the only woman who is not due maintenance for the `idda of divorce in a 
regular marriage is the one divorced in ‘disobedience’.35 If the man is absent when the 
divorced wife submits a claim for maintenance for the `idda period, she must swear 
the oath to the fact that she is not nashiz, in order to qualify for maintenance.36 The 
similarity between marital and `idda maintenance is shown by the fact that the court 
may change marital maintenance into `idda maintenance during the hearing of a claim 
due to the intervention of a talaq, or rescind an award made for marital maintenance 
at the end of the `idda following a divorce. 
 
 One difference between marital maintenance and maintenance for the `idda 
period is that whereas a ruling for marital maintenance can be made by the court from 
the date of the wife's application for it, maintenance for the `idda period is awardable 
by the court  from the date of the dissolution of the marriage. The wife may therefore 
be some way into the `idda period before she submits a claim for maintenance. On the 
other hand, the JLPS provides that if the wife is notified of the talaq at least one 
month before the end of the `idda period and does not claim maintenance until the 
`idda is over, she loses her right to claim.37 
 
 In the case material, claims by the wife for maintenance for the `idda period 
tended to be disputed less than those for marital maintenance; once it is established 
that the woman is in an `idda where maintenance is due, the only defence the husband 
may make to a claim for this maintenance is that his wife has been divorced in 
‘disobedience’, and this was rarely raised. When the husband raises an action to 
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terminate the `idda maintenance award, the only defence the wife can make is that her 
`idda has not expired.  In one case in the 1975 material, the wife established in 
defence to her husband’s action that she was in her eighth month of pregnancy from 
him and therefore still in her `idda. In another case, a husband raised an action to have 
a maintenance award rescinded exactly three calendar months after he had divorced 
his wife, claiming that his wife, who was in her twenties, did not menstruate and in 
fact had never had a period throughout their ten-year marriage. The wife however 
stated that she did menstruate and had had one period since the date of the talaq. She 
took the oath to this defence when the husband could not prove his claim, and the 
man's application was dismissed. These exceptions aside, in the vast majority of 
cases, the wife comes to court to acknowledge the end of her `idda and the 
maintenance award is accordingly terminated. 
 
 A woman may of course waive her right to maintenance during the `idda 
period if her marriage ended by a khul` settlement. As noted in Chapter Six, under the 
provisions of the 1951 law, it appears that practice in the courts was to prevent a 
woman from claiming maintenance for the `idda period if she had made a ‘general 
renunciation’ (ibra’ `amm) of her rights in the khul`, but the JLPS stipulates that 
maintenance for the `idda period lapses only if it is explicitly waived in the khul` 
settlement.38 Many women do explicitly waive the maintenance for the `idda period 
but it is possible that other women do not claim it subsequently because they are not 
aware that they lose this right only by an explicit renunciation. This misunderstanding 
of the rules is one of the reasons put forward by Barhum for the low number of 
women who claim maintenance for the `idda period in Jordan.39 Barhum notes that in 
his field survey of 237 divorcées in Amman, over half were entitled to maintenance 
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during the `idda period, but very few received it and even fewer submitted claims to 
court. Layish similarly notes that very few claims were submitted to the shari`a courts 
inside Israel for maintenance in the `idda period. He suggests that this is because 75% 
of divorces are by mutual consent and the maintenance is either informally given up 
or is waived in the khul` settlement, and because the maintenance itself lapses if not 
claimed in time.40 
 
 These observations of a low number of claims for maintenance for the `idda 
period held true also in the West Bank case material. In 1975, for example, the case 
material showed only sixteen claims for maintenance for the `idda period.41 Claims 
for maintenance specifically for the `idda period are most likely to be made by 
women who have left the marital home where before the divorce the husband 
provided for them without the need for a court order, and often as part of a strategy in 
ongoing negotiations between the spouses and their families. There are many claims 
where, as noted above, the original award is made for marital maintenance but by the 
time the award is rescinded by the court, a divorce has occurred and it has served as 
maintenance for the `idda period without a separate claim being made.   
 
8.3.2  Fees for the care of children 
 
 In the event of there being children from a marriage that has been dissolved, a 
number of financial claims may be submitted by the ex-wife against the children's 
father - or, in the event of her being a widow, against the person charged with their 
maintenance. If the marriage has been terminated by the death of the wife, these 
claims may be presented by the person who is awarded custody (hadana) in her 
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stead.42 Financial claims that may be made by the wife connected with children fall 
into two categories: those made on behalf of the children and those made on her own 
behalf. In the first category, the wife may claim maintenance for her children from the 
father, who is responsible for their maintenance if they do not have independent 
capital or means of support.43 She may also claim separate expenses for the children's 
accommodation, if the father is no longer housing the family. These expenses can be 
claimed at any time during the marriage or after its dissolution, whenever the husband 
has ceased providing for his children. They are therefore not dependent upon the 
termination of the marriage or the `idda period. The same applies to claims for the 
‘fee of childbirth’ (ujrat wilada) which is more accurately described as ‘expenses of 
childbirth’ (masarif wilada) since the woman may not claim a fee for the function of 
childbirth, but can only claim back from the father any outlays she has made from her 
own money on the birth, for example to a midwife or to a doctor (as she can during 
the continuation of her marriage).44 
 
 The second category of financial claims related to children consists of fees 
which may be claimed by the ex-wife in return for her performing certain functions in 
respect to the children: that is, the fee for breastfeeding the children (ujrat al-rada`) 
and the fee for undertaking their custody (ujrat al-hadana). Both these fees are based 
on standard Hanafi law, and the absence of any reference to them in the JLFR 1951 
had left them in place by default. Both breastfeeding and custody are regarded as the 
duties of the mother within marriage and therefore neither can be claimed until the 
end of matrimony; that is, they can be claimed during the `idda of a final talaq, but 
not during that of a revocable talaq.45 Since it will in most cases be the mother 
performing both functions, it will also usually be her claiming the fees. If, for some 
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reason, she is unable to breastfeed her children, or is not awarded custody, the woman 
who performs these functions in her stead can claim the fees at any point, since she is 
not bound in matrimony to the father of the children. 
 
 The fee for suckling is assessed according to similar fees granted to the wife's 
peers (ujrat al-mithl) and in accordance with the circumstances of the maintainer of 
the children (usually the ex-husband). The JLPS adds that if the wife seeks a fee 
higher than that usually granted her peers, the amount granted shall not in any case 
cause harm to the man who must pay it.46 The fee for suckling is due from the date 
breastfeeding begins until the child is weaned, with the maximum age at which 
weaning is presumed to have occurred set at the classical limit of two years.47 For the 
first two years of the child's life, then, the divorced and nursing mother may claim 
both the fee for breastfeeding and the fee for custody. The fee for custody, again, is 
assessed according to the peers of the women, provided it is not beyond the means of 
the maintainer, and it may be claimed until the end of the period of hadana, which 
according to the JLPS occurs at puberty (bulugh) where the custodian is the mother.48 
 
 In the case material, both the fee for rada` and for hadana were sometimes 
included in the rights that the wife waives when her marriage ends with a khul` 
settlement.  Where claims for the fees were made, it was often in conjunction with a 
claim for maintenance for the children; and a claim for ujrat rada` was nearly always 
accompanied by a claim for ujrat hadana. The reverse is not however true, due to the 
greater length of time during which the fee for hadana is due. The case material 
showed twelve claims made for one or both fees in 1965, sixteen in 1975 and twelve 
in 1985. The number of claims is about equivalent to those made for maintenance for 
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the `idda period. Given that more women are likely to be due maintenance for the 
`idda than due these fees, it may be that women are more likely to claim those fees 
connected with their children than those they are due in their own right. 
 
 The payment of a wage to a divorced or widowed wife for her performance of 
certain parenting functions may be intended to compensate -- at least in part -- for the 
fact that the traditional rules give no rights of maintenance to the wife after the `idda 
is over: in the Gaza Strip, Islah Hassaniyya points out that they fall due the woman 
when she is no longer entitled to maintenance from her ex-husband.49 Instead, the law 
considers that she is entitled to a payment in return for providing a ‘service’ for the 
father of her children who, ultimately, ‘belong’ -- in law -- to his family and 
bloodline; thus Tucker describes the rules on custody as classing the mother’s rights 
to her child as ‘temporary, conditional, and partial.’50 The rules restrict whom the 
woman can remarry while retaining custody of her children, and do not assume that 
she will go out to work,51 thus a ‘wage’ could be seen by the jurists as a fair return. 
However, there remains an assumption that divorced women will return to and be 
supported by their natal family until they remarry. The level of fees awarded divorced 
mothers frequently appears to reflect this assumption. The amounts for the two 
separate functions of rada` and hadana awarded in the case material studied were 
always equal, and in 1985 ranged from five dinars to two dinars a month for one 
child, that is from ten to four pounds sterling at that time; in the later WCLAC 
material they ranged from three to fifteen dinars per child per month. 
 
 The 1976 Jordanian law did not deal explicitly with the divorced mother’s 
accommodation, an issue that has preoccupied legislators and the public elsewhere in 
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the region. In Egypt, the 1979 legislation which was subsequently overturned gave the 
mother the right to the matrimonial home -- including a home owned by the husband -
- following divorce, for the duration of custody. According to Najjar, this was among 
the provisions of the 1979 law that produced ‘the most abrasive exchange between the 
proponents and opponents of the law, for the simple reason that Egypt has been 
suffering from a suffocating housing shortage, as the Egyptian newspapers described 
it.’52 This provision was replaced in 1985 requiring the husband to prepare an 
independent dwelling for his ex-wife and their children, and allowing him to stay in 
the marital home if he has done so. The Jordanian law does not explicitly deal with 
these matters, but the published decisions from the Shari`a Court of Appeal in 
Amman establish three main principles with regard to the custodian’s 
accommodation. The first is that the father of the children is obliged to provide 
accommodation only in the event that the wife does not have any (she has no family 
able and willing to take her in, for example) and the court must establish this before 
making an award for the cost of accommodation.53 The second is that the cost of 
accommodation is not based on the number of children in the woman’s custody but on 
the general need for accommodation for herself and the wards in her care.54 Finally, 
the court has clarified that if the woman submits a claim to the court for the costs of 
accommodation after having already rented the place for this purpose, she is entitled 
to the fee for accommodation from the date she submits the claim. If she has not 
already rented the accommodation then she may claim only from the date of the 
court’s ruling.55 
 
 
 
 432 
8.3.3     Dower 
 The other standard financial claim that can be made by the wife after the end 
of matrimony under the traditional rules is for deferred dower.  The deferred dower 
can only be claimed when the marriage is over - that is, when the divorce or 
separation is immediately final, or when the `idda of revocable talaq is over.  A claim 
may also be made for prompt dower or tawabi` not received during the marriage. 
 
 Classical law deals in great detail with the circumstances in which the full 
dower is due after marriage, or half the dower, or the proper dower (mahr al-mithl) or 
no dower at all. The JLPS reproduces the classical Hanafi rules on this subject.56 In 
brief, full dower is due on the death of either party or after talaq in a consummated 
regular contract. Half the dower is due where talaq occurs before consummation or 
valid seclusion, and where the marriage is dissolved (by faskh) due to an action by the 
husband.57 The whole dower lapses if a faskh occurs due to an action by the wife, 
such as apostasy.  In addition, no dower is due if separation occurs before intercourse 
or seclusion due to a disease or physical condition preventing consummation in one of 
the partners. A void marriage does not give rise to the right of dower; an irregular 
marriage does so only if it is consummated.58  
 
 In the case material, the only frequent variation to the award of the full dower, 
besides the proportions awarded after separation for niza` wa shiqaq, is the half dower 
due in a regular marriage dissolved by talaq before consummation, discussed above in 
Chapter Five. Where the talaq occurs after consummation, the woman may claim for 
the full amount of deferred dower immediately in the `idda of a final divorce, or at the 
end of an `idda following a revocable talaq. In the case material, such claims were 
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rarely disputed. Occasionally, the husband defended his ex-wife's claim on the basis 
that she had already received the amount due from him. This defence was also raised 
by husbands when the wife was claiming the unpaid remainder of her prompt dower 
and/or the tawabi` along with the deferred dower. The case material also showed 
claims for jihaz made by women after the end of the marriage showing little 
difference in substance or procedure from claims during marriage.59 In 1998, in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, during the course of the Model Parliament project, 
activists and advocates discussed proposals for the disposal of the marital home and 
the regulation of the division of property acquired after the couple had married in a 
manner that would give recognition to the domestic labour of women and their 
contribution to and rights in the family.60 
 
 There is however one main difference in the results of claims for deferred 
dower as compared to prompt dower, with the case material showing examples of the 
husband being allowed to pay the former in instalments. The substantial amounts that 
may be registered as deferred dower may not be immediately available to the husband 
on divorce; and while the requirement of ‘equality’ (kafa'a) means that he must be 
able immediately to produce the prompt dower, no such proof is needed of his ability 
to produce the sum he agrees to have registered as deferred dower. Indeed, one 
frequently cited purpose of having a high deferred dower is that it would not be easily 
available to the husband and would cause him some difficulty to obtain, thus 
restraining any speedy and ill-considered recourse to unilateral talaq.   
 
 Where the woman's marriage is terminated by the death of her husband, she 
may claim her deferred dower from the husband's estate. This claim takes priority 
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over the distribution of the estate and is in addition to her shar`i inheritance as spouse 
relict. The case material for 1975 showed one widow seeking amendment of the list of 
heirs and entitlements drawn up after her husband's death to include her entitlement of 
deferred dower, and another claiming her deferred dower from her dead husband's 
father who was administering the deceased's estate. 
 
8.3.4     Compensation for arbitrary talaq 
  
 The introduction in the JLPS of compensation (ta`wid) for a woman arbitrarily 
divorced by her husband followed a precedent set in the Syrian law of 1953 (and 
developed in 1975) which has been taken up in varying forms and to various extents 
in a number of Arab states in the intervening years. At the heart of these texts is the 
idea of the man’s injury of the woman through his misuse of his power of talaq, and 
the innovative step of empowering the courts to subject the man’s justification for his 
action to scrutiny. Although men are widely urged to be circumspect, restrained and 
fair in their use of unilateral talaq, the laws in Jordan and most Arab states recognise 
the same legal value attaching to a talaq issued ‘arbitrarily’ as to one issued ‘for good 
reason.’ A court ruling that the talaq was unjustified or injurious leaves the validity of 
the divorce intact, but holds the husband responsible for his action through effectively 
imposing a financial penalty. The calculation of the amount of compensation is 
closely connected to marital maintenance, and it is clear that part of the aim of 
compensation is to ensure some financial provision for the woman beyond the end of 
her `idda.61 
 
 Modern legal texts requiring the divorcer to pay his ex-wife compensation are 
usually presented as a development of the Quranic recommendation that a gift of 
‘consolation’ (mut`a) be given to divorced women, expanding this concept and 
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empowering the courts to enforce it.62 Quranic verses on mut`a gave rise to different 
interpretations among the classical schools.63 The dominant Hanafi opinion, that 
mut`a was obligatory only in the case of a wife who is divorced before consummation 
in a marriage where no dower has been specified,64 is reflected in the JLPS, Article 
55: 
If talaq occurs before the dower has been specified and before consummation 
of the marriage or valid seclusion, then mut`a is due. Mut`a shall be assessed 
according to custom and usage and with regard to the circumstances of the 
husband, provided that it shall not exceed half the proper dower. 
 
 The Shafi`is, on the other hand, hold that mut`a is mandatory for every woman 
divorced or separated without there being a reason for the divorce from her side; their 
exception is for a talaq before consummation, when they hold half the dower to be 
due. In 1953, the Syrian legislators departed from the Hanafi view and used the 
Quranic institution of mut`a to justify the inclusion in the SLPS of an article which 
provided for compensation for the wife in the event of the husband pronouncing an 
‘injurious talaq’ without reasonable cause and giving rise to damage and poverty for 
the wife. The wife could petition the court for compensation to a maximum amount of 
the equivalent of one year’s maintenance.65 This was to be paid in addition to the 
wife’s maintenance for the `idda period, and in assessing the amount of compensation 
to be awarded, the court was to take into account the degree to which the husband had 
wronged his wife and his financial circumstances. 
 
 In 1976 the JLPS included a similar but not identical provision: 
Article 134: If the husband divorces his wife arbitrarily (ta`assufan), such as if 
he divorces her for no good reason (sabab ma`qul), and she applies to the 
qadi, he shall award her against the man who divorced her such compensation 
(ta`wid) as he  considers appropriate, provided that it shall not exceed the 
amount of her  maintenance for one year. This compensation shall be paid in a 
lump sum or in instalments according to the requirements of the case and the 
circumstances of the husband, rich or poor, shall be taken into consideration in 
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this. This shall not affect the rest of the matrimonial rights of the divorced 
woman, including maintenance for the `idda period. 
 
 In the Explanatory Memorandum to the JLPS, the Jordanian legislature echoed 
the Syrian arguments for the introduction of the provision on compensation. The 
Memorandum stated that Article 134 ‘takes the principle of the compensation of the 
woman in the event of an arbitrary divorce from the recommendation of mut`a’. It 
also refers to the doctrine of siyasa shar`iyya, noting that the ruler can order the 
commission of the recommended, the permissible or something that brings a shar`i 
benefit, and that according to the Hanafis this order must then be obeyed.66 
Muhammad Mheilan, Qadi al-Quda in Jordan, observed with regard to Article 134 
that:  
when God gave the husband possession of three talaqs against his wife, it was 
on condition that the man would treat his wife well and use the talaq correctly; 
if the man's talaq is not for any legitimate reason, then he is being arbitrary in 
his use of that right and must pay his ex-wife compensation if she claims it.67 
 
 Although clearly based on the Syrian provision, the Jordanian text is more 
radical, since it awards compensation for the mere incidence of an arbitrary talaq, 
with no regard for the material consequences such a talaq holds for the wife -- that is, 
there is no requirement that the qadi believe that the wife is going to suffer damage 
and poverty as a result of the talaq. This reflects Mheilan's approach, that the man is 
being punished for his arbitrary use -- or abuse -- of his right of talaq, since this abuse 
will inevitably cause some hardship to the woman. Another radical aspect of the 
Jordanian approach to compensation has been established by the courts rather than by 
legislation. This is the placing of the burden of proof firmly upon the man, through 
the establishment of the legal presumption that unilateral talaq is arbitrary.  The text 
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on compensation does not make this clear, but a decision from the Amman Shari`a 
Appeal Court in 1978 held that: 
The woman does not have to prove her claim that the talaq was arbitrary, 
since talaq is fundamentally disapproved (makruh); it shall be considered 
arbitrary so long as it was not pronounced for a good reason, and a divorcer  
who claims that he did have a good reason must prove this defence.68 
 
 Any talaq pronounced without the consent of the wife thus potentially falls 
into the category of arbitrary talaq, even if the wife was present when it was 
pronounced. Compensation cannot be claimed for a talaq pronounced in exchange for 
the wife's waiving of her rights in a khul` agreement, nor for a talaq issued by the 
court in the process of tafriq - this last in contrast to the situation in Egypt.69 The 
exception to this is possibly the pronouncing of a talaq by the court on behalf of a 
woman when the marriage contract provides for her divorce if a specified condition 
comes to pass (for example if her husband takes another wife). If the husband has 
agreed to the stipulation and proceeds to carry out the action therein stipulated 
against, the wife may be able to claim compensation for the ensuing talaq. 
 
 In practice, when faced with an allegation of ‘arbitrary talaq’, establishing a 
‘good’ reason (or ‘reasonable cause’) for a talaq is extremely difficult for the ex-
husband and his lawyer.  Of the 26 claims for compensation submitted by women in 
the 1985 case material, only one was rejected. In this case, the basis for the claim that 
was rejected was a first revocable talaq, and the wife acknowledged that she was still 
in the `idda. Her claim was therefore dismissed, since it was established in the 
Jordanian Shari`a Appeal Court soon after the promulgation of the JLPS that a 
divorcée can claim compensation only when the state of matrimony has been 
terminated.70 Apart from this one case, all the women who applied for compensation 
in the case material were granted awards of varying amounts. In ten of the cases, the 
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ex-husband explicitly acknowledged the woman's claim; four were heard in the 
absence of the defendant; in six, the man defended the claim but failed to establish 
that he had reasonable cause for the divorce, and in the remaining five claims the 
records did not show whether a defence was made. 
 
 In most cases where the claim was defended, the records merely state that the 
husband denied the talaq had been arbitrary but could not prove his defence. In one 
case, however, the clerk recorded in detail the husband's defence, which rested on his 
claim that his ex-wife used to use certain blasphemous colloquialisms to curse him. 
The woman denied this claim and the court asked the man to prove it; he then stopped 
attending court and eventually the woman took the oath of denial to his defence and 
was awarded compensation. It may be that the court recorded this particular case in 
more detail because of the gravity of the contents of the defence presented by the 
husband, which, if proven, would certainly have been held to constitute a shar`i 
reason for divorcing her. Jordanian Appeal Court decisions have affirmed some of the 
other obvious positions, such as that no compensation will be due if the ex-husband 
establishes that his wife was legally in a state of nushuz when he divorced her, or that 
he had in fact divorced her at her request.71 In one case the man had claimed that his 
ex-wife had had a tattoo done without his consent; on appeal, the Appeal Court 
directed that he had to prove that this had been done during the course of the 
marriage, which might imply that if in fact this was the case, it might stand as good 
reason, or contribute to establishing such a reason.72 In another, the court stated that 
the fact that the wife was infertile, slow of speech and generally ‘simpleminded’ was 
not in and of itself ‘reasonable cause’ for a talaq; the court continued that in such 
circumstances, the man should treat his wife ‘with affection and mercy, as God 
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commanded’, observing that it was unlikely she would be able to find an alternative 
source of income.73 One reported case where the Amman Appeal Court held the 
divorcer’s defence of a claim for compensation to be unequivocally established was 
where he proved that he had ‘divorced his wife reluctantly after enduring her harm, 
neglect and failure to perform her marital duties for over eight years.’74 
 
 On the whole, the Jordanian and West Bank Palestinian courts appear to seek 
first and foremost the establishment of a strictly shar`i reason for talaq, not 
necessarily including therein reasons which custom and culture would hold to ‘justify’ 
a divorce. Thus blasphemy (as in the case above), insulting of or violence against the 
husband and his family, adultery and apostasy, along with legally established nushuz, 
would serve to overturn the assumption of arbitrariness in a unilateral talaq. On the 
other hand, the fact that the wife is unable to bear children would not necessarily be 
held to constitute an acceptable reason for a unilateral talaq. Having children is not a 
requirement of the marriage contract between the spouses, and in Jordanian law the 
man retains the option of taking another wife in a polygamous union.75 However, in 
other areas of conduct, the assumption of arbitrariness may be undermined by the 
establishment by habitual practices by the ex-wife falling short of the standards of 
conduct expected customarily by society, whether in public or in their domestic life, 
as illustrated by the cases cited above.  
 
 Besides the general difficulty of proving a shar`i defence, the husband may be 
reluctant to disclose to the court the details of what in fact provoked his talaq, or is in 
any case unwilling to have such details set down in the record. The records in the 
West Bank courts frequently note that the husband denied the talaq had been arbitrary 
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but ‘failed to establish his defence’, and in some cases at least this means that the 
husband either refused to elaborate or refused to have the details recorded. 
 
 Although this may affect the defence of a compensation claim, it appears also 
to be the reason why so few women are awarded the maximum amount of 
compensation available, that is, the equivalent of twelve months maintenance. The 
qadi exercises his discretion when the ex-husband is unable to prove a shar`i defence, 
or is unwilling to have it recorded, and yet the judge feels or has heard in court that 
the man was not totally and absolutely to blame for his action; or, to put it the other 
way, maximum compensation is awarded only when the qadi is convinced that the ex-
wife was totally wronged and blameless in the affair. Thus, the qadi will only dismiss 
a claim for compensation when the husband establishes that there was a shar`i reason 
for the talaq; on the other hand, conduct by the wife which would customarily be 
considered fair cause for talaq, without amounting to a shar`i reason as such, may 
serve to reduce the amount of compensation that the qadi awards the woman. 
 
 Maximum compensation was awarded to the ex-wife in only one of the 25 
applications in the case material in which awards were made.  In this case, the man 
had divorced his wife with a first revocable talaq while she was pregnant.  She 
obtained a maintenance award and when her `idda and the marriage were terminated 
by childbirth, she applied to the court for compensation.  The husband did in this case 
defend the claim but the court, unconvinced of his stated reasons, awarded the woman 
the equivalent of twelve months of her existing maintenance award, to be paid in 
twelve monthly instalments. 
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 This award, although unusual, clearly shows maximum compensation being 
paid as there exists a previous maintenance order with which to compare it.  In effect, 
the court merely extended the maintenance order for a further year. In other cases, it is 
not clear how the award of compensation compares with maintenance as the monthly 
instalment for compensation may either exceed or fall below a previous maintenance 
award. It can thus be deceptive to assume that the compensation is actually equivalent 
to maintenance for the same number of months over which it is paid. In some rulings 
in the case material, the monthly instalment of compensation exceeded previous 
maintenance award levels. In others, it was less: this was often the case where the 
spouses agreed together on the award to be made. In one such case, the parties chose 
an expert (khabir) to assess the woman's maintenance level in order to take it as a 
basis for compensation. In yet other cases, the parallel between monthly maintenance 
and monthly instalments of compensation is clear, as in the one case where maximum 
compensation was awarded. 
 
 Although Article 134 of the JLPS makes payment by instalment optional, in 
the case material it was rare to find compensation being paid in a lump sum; in only 
two of the awards in the case material was no mention made of the period over which 
the amount was to be paid.76 In the seventeen rulings where it was possible to 
calculate awards as months of the amount of a previous maintenance award, in only 
four was it the equivalent of six months or less, in the remainder seven months or 
above. 
 
 The similarities between claims for marital maintenance and for compensation 
for arbitrary divorce were given as the reason for a ruling by the Jerusalem Shari`a 
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Court of Appeal that claims for compensation could be heard in any shari`a court, 
without regard to the place of residence of defendant or plaintiff, as in the case of 
claims for maintenance.77 In a claim for marital maintenance, the assumption is that 
the wife is due maintenance and once she establishes the fact of her marriage, if the 
husband wishes to defend her claim, the burden of proof rests on him to establish that 
she is nashiz and therefore not due maintenance. In the same way, in a claim for 
compensation for arbitrary talaq, the assumption by the court is that the wife is due 
compensation, once she has established the occurrence of a unilateral talaq ending the 
marriage, and the burden of proof then falls on the husband to establish a shar`i 
reason for the divorce. 
 
 The claims for compensation for arbitrary talaq in the case material display 
three major features: that claims are rarely successfully defended; that the amounts 
awarded are -- arguably -- relatively low compared with the material and emotional 
losses sustained by the woman; and that the number of applications for compensation 
is low compared with the number of unilateral talaqs. In Bethlehem, eighteen 
unilateral talaqs were registered in 1985 and only one claim for compensation; in 
Ramallah, there were 83 unilateral talaqs and thirteen compensation claims; and in 
Hebron, 48 unilateral talaqs and twelve compensation claims. It is true that the figures 
of the Ramallah court for talaq are somewhat distorted and that in many other cases 
there may well be an informal agreement between the spouses to the talaq, not 
amounting to a formal renunciation of rights in a khul` settlement. Nevertheless, it 
seems likely that not all women are aware of their right to compensation in the event 
of an arbitrary unilateral talaq being pronounced against them. The qadi does not 
inform her of this right in the event of a unilateral talaq being registered by her 
 443 
husband, and since it is not traditionally part of the family law of the area, she may 
well not know of her right to ta`wid unless she engages a lawyer, which is unlikely 
unless she has other claims to raise.  This has implications for the intended deterrent 
effect of ta`wid, since it may be the case that many men too are ignorant of the fact 
that a claim for compensation may be made against them in the event of their 
unilateral divorce of their wife.  
 
 The WCLAC study examined claims for ta`wid in the West Bank courts of 
Hebron, Dura, Ramallah and Nablus over the years 1989, 1992, 1993, and 1994, 
finding a total of 58 claims, with a proportion of 6% ta`wid claims to unilateral talaqs 
registered (subject to the above reservations) and a particular concentration of claims 
in the Nablus court (41 of the 58). Moors found that in Nablus in the mid-1980s, 
almost a third of women entitled to claim compensation went to court to claim it,78 
and although the WCLAC material suggests a lower rate of claim even in Nablus, it 
did suggest that claims there are more routine than in the other courts.79 Attitudes of 
court personnel are likely to play a part in this along with local knowledge and 
custom. The levels of compensation awarded in different courts are also interesting 
and suggestive of the attitudes of the qadis working in the different courts. In contrast 
to the material for the current study, the WCLAC material, weighted by the high 
proportion of cases in Nablus, showed a maximum of twelve months maintenance in 
four cases, with seventeen of the 38 cases where the assessment could be made falling 
in the range of six months or under and 21 in the seven to twelve months range. In the 
earlier work for this study, eight of the twelve rulings in Hebron were made over ten 
months and in only eight rulings in all the courts were the instalments to be paid over 
six months or less. 
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 Compensation for arbitrary talaq has been the focus of much attention since 
1976 by the shar`i judiciary in Amman, with changes to the 1976 provision being 
prepared in proposed amendments to the law drafted in 1985 and 1987, as well as being 
the subject of a special three-page memorandum from the Department of the Qadi al-
Quda’ in Amman in 1980, justifying the whole issue of compensation within the shar`i 
framework of mut`a. The changes suggested in successive versions of the draft 
amendments proposed the addition of some procedural clarifications drawn from 
implementation of the current text, and the increase of the maximum levels of 
compensation, varying from a proposed maximum of the equivalent of three years’ 
maintenance (as is now the case in Syria) to five years, sometimes including also a 
minimum level of the equivalent of one year’s maintenance. For its part the 
Memorandum, issued just four years after the JLPS itself, and entitled ‘Reasons 
Necessitating Modification of Article 134 of the Personal Status Law 1976,’ serves the 
role of a full ‘explanatory memorandum’ to the original article on compensation in the 
1976 law, which was not dealt with in any great detail in the original Explanatory 
Memorandum to the JLPS. 
 
 The document begins with the reason for the permissibility of talaq - that is, to 
prevent the greater damage involved in hostility of the spouses and the disruption of 
family life by an unhappy union. It recalls two hadiths of the Prophet, the first recorded 
by Ibn Dawoud that ‘the most odious of permitted things to Allah is talaq’ and the 
second reported on the authority of Mu’adh Ibn Jabal that ‘Allah created nothing more 
hateful to him than talaq’. Talaq without a legitimate pretext (hujja) is thus arbitrary 
talaq which damages the woman concerned both emotionally and in regard to her 
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reputation; the Islamic shari`a therefore established mut`a for the divorced woman to 
console her in her distress. The document cites four Quranic verses as evidence and 
further notes that the Prophet ‘gave mut`a to his wife Umayma bint Nu`man [...] and 
used to order his Companions that mut`a [should be provided] for the divorcée.’ 
 
 The document then sets out the Hanafi and majority Hanbali positions on mut`a 
and takes note of the view of Ibn Hanbal selected by Ibn Taymiyya that mut`a is 
obligatory for all divorcées. It also notes one Maliki view to the effect that mut`a is 
obligatory for every divorcée after consummation whether or not the dower has been 
specified, and sets out the Shafi`i and Zahiri views. By selecting a variety of these 
views, it is concluded that it is permissible to hold mut`a as obligatory for all divorcées.  
There is then an argument for the assessment of the amount of mut`a to be made by the 
qadi, with or without the assistance of experts, according to the capacity of the 
husband, on the basis of material in the Qur’an and the practice of the Prophet and it is 
pointed out that nothing in the shari`a forbids payment by instalments. 
 
 The final paragraphs of the document recall again that arbitrary talaq (i.e. talaq 
without a legitimate pretext) is odious and does not accord with the aims of the shari`a. 
People have exceeded the shar`i limits in effecting talaq, with a consequent increase in 
the injury that arises therefrom. There is thus a need to deter its incidence and to lighten 
its effects where it does in fact occur: ‘Therefore legislation is required to reduce the 
incidence of arbitrary talaq which has no justification, and to restrain those who rush 
into talaq to injure the wife and get rid of her in abusive and hostile manner.’ The 
ruling authority is permitted to introduce such legislation in the public interest, by way 
of siyasa shar`iyya and al-masalih al-mursala. 
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 In its detail and its invocation of justification in the Qur’an and the hadith as 
well as more immediately social justification, it may be that the memorandum was 
drafted as much in response to criticism directed at the introduction of the principle of 
compensation as in justification of the specific proposed amendment to which it was 
attached. It is noticeable that the word mut`a is used more frequently than ta`wid, 
emphasising the shar`i origin of the institution of compensation. In the subsequent 
and successive draft revisions of the provision (in 1985, and 1987), the word ta`wid is 
used throughout. 
 
 Critics of Article 134 can be divided very generally into those for whom it 
does not go far enough, and those who are hesitant about the principle itself. By 1987, 
it might have been assumed that the cursory treatment of the issue in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the draft law of that year was indicative of the establishment both in 
law and practice of compensation and its widespread acceptance. This is not 
necessarily the case. Samara, for example, starts his section on Article 134 by quoting 
the text of the article without prefacing it with an introduction on the legal 
background as is his wont elsewhere in the book, because, he points out, he could not 
find any shar`i texts on either arbitrary talaq or on compensation.80 His criticisms 
stem from the basic position that talaq is the right of every married man, and that 
since neither the Qur’an nor the practice of the Prophet provide that talaq must rest on 
reasons, then a man should not be punished for his exercise of this right. He makes a 
five-point argument against the principle of ta`wid: that there is a ‘general permission’ 
(ibaha `amma) for talaq in the Qur'an and the practice of the Prophet, and that ‘a 
generality can only be constrained by a shar`i text, not by rational argument’; that 
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compensation is a penalty, and that a penalty can only be imposed for a crime, which 
implies that talaq for no good reason is a crime; that Islam allows financial penalties 
only in specified instances (e.g. diya), and that the general rule is that punishment is 
physical, not financial; that the comparison of compensation with mut`a is false and 
there are important distinctions between the two; and that attempts to justify the 
legislation for compensation on the argument that the temporal ruler can order the 
obligatory performance of matters that are permitted or recommended in the shari`a 
are misguided, since this principle applies to issues on which the shari`a is silent, not 
where they are specifically classed by the Qur'an into another category of action, such 
as recommended.81 
 
 Samara draws support from criticisms similar to his own made by Abu Zahra 
in Egypt in the 1950s, when some Egyptian courts were already awarding 
compensation to divorcées in advance of legislation. One of Abu Zahra's criticisms 
focused on the fact that by forcing the husband to disclose the reasons for his talaq, in 
order to produce a defence to a claim of arbitrariness in his exercise of talaq, the court 
may be obliging him to reveal in public things that should remain confidential and 
thus to destroy the respect between the spouses enjoined by the Qur’an. Thus, either 
the man will reveal things that should remain private, which he is not supposed to do, 
or else he will risk having the maximum award made against him.82 
 
 The arguments around compensation for arbitrary talaq thus invoke not only 
the various interpretations of the institution of mut`a, but also the principle of the 
unlawful exercise of rights. This discussion is summarised by Anis al-Qasem in a 
1990 article focusing on the civil codes of Arab states and examining the debate on 
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the general Islamic principle, ‘permissibility negates liability’ conducted between ‘the 
purists who would not admit any liability, and [...] the pragmatists who would not 
allow intentional injury, though arising from the exercise of a recognised right, to 
escape liability’.83 Noting that the pragmatists can also base their case on the shari`a, 
al-Qasem goes on to demonstrate the constraints placed upon the general principle by 
reference to the husband's right to divorce and the entitlement of the wife to claim 
damages (i.e. in the form of compensation) if he abuses his right. 
 
 Despite this ongoing debate, and the criticisms from some jurists, the 
‘pragmatist’ wing of the Jordanian legislators seem to have won the argument on this 
particular provision, since debates on the article on ta`wid since its promulgation have 
resulted in proposals not for its abolition or reduction but rather for its expansion. In 
the 1985 draft revision of the provision, the maximum of compensation was set at the 
equivalent of five years maintenance, and a minimum of three years was proposed. In 
the 1987 version, revised proposals were made of a minimum of one year and a 
maximum of three years, unless the spouses themselves had agreed on something else. 
A draft explanatory memorandum to this latter proposal argued that setting levels 
higher than those therein proposed might encourage husbands to refrain from talaq for 
quite the wrong reasons and proceed to abuse and mistreat their wives to the extent 
that the wife is forced to give up her dower and lose her right to compensation (i.e. in 
a khul` divorce).84 None of these amendments have yet made it into law, and this is 
clearly an issue that continues to preoccupy the shar`i hierarchy, shar`i jurists and 
commentators and various sectors of civil society concerned with women’s rights and 
the family. 
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 Raising the maximum level of compensation to the equivalent of three years’ 
maintenance would bring Jordanian law into line with the provision in Syria, where 
the new Law of Personal Status introduced this level in 1975.85 It could be that the 
idea of a minimum level came from the discussions in Egypt, where the debate on 
compensation for arbitrary talaq was going on for some time before the institution 
was finally introduced in the ill-fated 1979 legislation. In particular, several articles 
were written by the late Jamal al-`Utayfi, advocating the financial compensation of 
the wife after an ‘unjust’ talaq, with the ex-husband providing her with an income for 
so long as she remained unmarried.86 The original Egyptian provision was re-issued in 
1985 and set a two year minimum and no maximum, and included consideration of 
the length of the marriage in the factors to be taken into account by the judge setting 
the award.87 A proposal following this last element of the Egyptian provision was 
advocated in Jordan during the period that modifications were being considered to the 
1976 article. In a pamphlet written in 1984, advocate `Atayat recommended that there 
should be a direct relation between the length of the marriage and the calculation of 
compensation ‘so that if the wife is arbitrarily divorced after twenty years of marriage, 
she can seek compensation for all those years.’88 In addition, court decisions in Egypt 
have established that the mut`a payment is an entitlement of women divorced without 
their consent by whatever means. El-`Alami reports an Appeal Court decision setting 
aside a ruling by a first instance court which had rejected a claim for mut`a by a 
woman judicially divorced from her husband by the court on the grounds of injury. 
The Appeal Court argued that in cases in which it is possible for a ruling to be given 
for judicial divorce, the qadi is in effect acting in place of the husband in effecting the 
talaq, and for the purposes of mut`a it is therefore equivalent to divorce by the 
husband himself without the wife’s consent.89 
 450 
 
 Thus, the existing Jordanian article, as applied in the West Bank courts, lags 
behind developments in both Syria and Egypt (as well as other Arab states) in its 
intention and ability to increase the financial rights of divorcées beyond the 
established entitlement of maintenance during the `idda period, deferred dower, and 
fees related to parenting. The 1994 Jerusalem conference on Women, Justice and the 
Law recognised this when participants called for the maximum amount of 
compensation for arbitrary talaq available to women to be increased beyond the 
current maximum in Jordanian law.90 More specifically, advocate Asma Khadr’s 1998 
book addressing the issue of a Palestinian personal status law calls for ta`wid to be 
awarded in accordance with estimates provided by experts, provided that this be not 
less than the equivalent of maintenance for five years for a woman divorced by 
arbitrary talaq, or as alimony until her death if the marriage had lasted over fifteen 
years.91 Proposing that experts be involved in setting the levels may be envisaged as 
opening the way for professionals from outside the shar`i system -- and from outside 
the ranks of the more traditional pool of khubara’ -- to be called upon to describe the 
nature and extent of injury occasioned by the divorce.    
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A PALESTINIAN LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS? 
 
9.1 Context 
 
 The 1976 JLPS and the 1954 Egyptian-issued LFR have a number of 
important differences in substance, as noted in the course of this study, despite their 
common residual reference to the Hanafi school. Beyond the text, however, they 
display two important similarities: they both clearly stand in need of revision, if only 
in view of the amount of time that has passed since their promulgation; and they are 
not ‘Palestinian legislation’. Both of these points, along with the need for territorial 
unification, have been raised in support of the call for a more appropriate Palestinian 
law of personal status to be prepared. 
 
 Despite the poor level of protection of rights, livelihoods and national identity 
afforded to the Palestinians during the course of the twentieth century by ‘law’ in the 
hands of their various rulers, a remarkable amount of effort and attention has been 
focussed since the beginning of the transitional period on the drafting and discussion 
of legal ‘texts’ presented as the first ‘national’ Palestinian legislation.  In considering 
the extent to which there is currently a tendency towards centralization in the legal 
order under the Palestinian Authority, Botiveau highlights the role of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) during the Israeli occupation and their 
contribution to ‘regulatory activities’ in the ‘non-state legal field’, leading to the 
formulation of ‘a general norm - a national law based on Palestinians’ representation 
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of their own identity’.1  In the two examples of ‘texts’ (of different status) considered 
in this Chapter, the draft Basic Law and the various proposals for personal status laws, 
the idea of representation of national identity -- with reference to the immediate 
history of struggle in the West Bank and Gaza -- can be seen to be a strong motivating 
factor for the drafting process.2 
 
 Palestinian NGOs have also been deeply involved in both processes. In the 
case of the draft Basic Law, a broad range of NGOs from diverse sectors participated 
in the public debate, with human rights organisations getting involved in drafting 
alternatives. In the case of personal status law, the main NGO actors have been 
women’s rights groups. Historically, and through its different phases, the Palestinian 
woman’s movement had not focused sustained attention on the issue of personal 
status law or indeed other ‘social justice’ requirements: as Dajani writes, ‘it has 
become almost axiomatic among national liberation movements that the struggle to 
end foreign rule takes precedence over other social agendas, including those of 
women’.3 After the broader mobilisation of women in the intifada, some activist 
Palestinian women were put in mind of the experience of Algerian women and the 
failure of the post-revolution independence government to attend to the ‘social’ (and 
gender) agenda.4  Palestinian women sought to raise and address issues of gender 
discrimination in society and in law, and to strengthen and broaden women's 
participation in the institution-building processes proceeding with an eye on 
statehood. Just after Yasser Arafat returned to Gaza to head the Palestinian Authority, 
at a press conference in August 1994, the Declaration of Women’s Rights (or the 
‘women’s charter’) was agreed by a range of those involved in the women’s 
movement, on an initiative from the Women's Affairs Technical Committee, and 
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submitted to the Palestinian Authority by the General Union of Palestinian Women. It 
cited a number of principles on women’s rights for incorporation into the constitution 
and legislation of a future Palestinian state, and included references to the non-
discrimination commitments of the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence and 
to international human rights instruments including the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The Declaration of 
Women’s Rights emphasised throughout its text the principle of equality between the 
sexes ‘in all aspects of life’ , although it went into no details on family law.5   
 
  A number of lobbying targets were achieved by the women's movement as a 
result of high-profile and energetic issue-specific campaigns, some of them indicated 
in the Declaration.  By way of example, these include a Directive circulated by the 
Ministry of the Interior in the PA clarifying that a married woman does not need her 
husband’s approval to apply for a Palestinian passport, nor an adult (over 18) single 
female her guardian’s consent; and the Ministry of Transport’s climbdown over 
requiring unmarried women to be accompanied by a relative for driving lessons.6  The 
vulnerability of these achievements lies in the fact that most have been effected by 
way of regulations or directives issued by PA officials, rather than by way of law 
passed by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).7 
 
 On the specific subject of personal status law, although no ‘legislation’ marked 
the transitional period (as compared to administrative directives), a heated public 
debate that began in 1998 took the discussion beyond the shar`i judiciary, where the 
Qadi al-Quda had announced his intention to unify the laws in the West Bank and 
Gaza, and beyond the women’s movement where a series of activities in the NGO 
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sector had led up to the final debating sessions convened by the  Model Parliament: 
Women and Legislation project. Although this project had been preceded by a number 
of meetings and conferences at which personal status law had been discussed,8  none 
had provoked the responses that were directed at the Model Parliament, or had the same 
impact in focussing public debate on the issues at stake.  Questions that were posed in 
the context of the debate included not only particular positions to be adopted in the text 
of a future Palestinian law of personal status, but whether the law should not only be 
unified geographically but should also apply to all citizens (i.e. of whatever religion), 
and what should be the role of religious courts. 
 
 By that time, however, some of the options being discussed within the 
‘discursive public space’ that opened up around the subject9 may already have been 
pre-empted by the prompt and sustained attention to ‘institution-building’ within the 
putative Palestinian state by the Qadi al-Quda and subsequently his Deputy. As 
described in Chapter Two, these efforts encompassed the level and staffing of senior 
appointments (including the post of Qadi al-Quda itself) and the expansion and 
upgrading of the shar`i judiciary and staff of the shari`a courts. They met with a 
positive response from the Executive (in the person of President Arafat) and clearly 
presumed the continuation of the separate communal jurisdiction of the shari`a courts 
in a future Palestinian state. Further commitments in this direction were elicited during 
the transitional period from the executive and from the PLC in the form of draft 
‘constitutional’ texts which, although not passed yet into ‘law’, must be seen both as 
indicative of a consensus in the current legislature, with the accord of the executive, 
and as setting the broad framework for the constitution of the Palestinian State.10 
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9.2 The Status of Shari`a and the Shari`a Courts in Draft 'Constitutional' Texts 
 
 At the same time as building up the shar`i judiciary on the ground, the Qadi 
al-Quda also addressed himself very early on to its constitutional recognition in the 
draft Basic Law for the transitional period, describing as his own ‘small part in 
building these institutions of the Palestinian National Authority’ a memorandum he 
wrote in 1994 regarding the draft text and specifically its omission of any mention of 
the shar`i judiciary.11 The Basic Law, a sort of draft interim constitution, attracted 
wide-ranging discussions in Palestinian civil society  as of 1994, particularly on the 
guarantee of human rights and the rule of law, and the structuring of relations between 
the executive, legislative and judicial authorities. Human rights organisations and the 
women’s movement were among those who engaged in debate, consultation and 
lobbying efforts around the successive drafts. The Baisc Law was widely seen not 
only as vital for the transitional period but as indicative of things to come in a future 
Palestinian state, and it proved highly contentious for the executive.12  Despite having 
passed its third reading by the PLC in October 1997, by the formal end of the interim 
period on 4 May 1999, the Basic Law had still not received ratification by President  
Yasser Arafat. Nevertheless, its wide discussion in civil society and the process of its 
passage by the Legislative Council remain significant. 
 
 The main drafter of the original text of the draft Basic Law was Anis al-
Qasem, Chair of the Legal Committee of the Palestine National Council. Commenting 
on the extensive public debates on the draft text that he had originally presented in 
1994, noted that women’s organisations had raised questions to do with personal 
status issues, but that ‘it was explained and accepted that a basic law was not the place 
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for such subjects and that that had to be attended to in special legislation.’  In similar 
vein he explained the absence, in his draft texts, of any reference to the place of 
shari`a in the Palestinian legislative process: 
The Draft intentionally avoided the inclusion of issues that may be divisive at 
this stage within the Palestinian community, such as the religion of the state, 
the sources of legislation and boundaries.  It has been the regular practice in 
the Arab states to declare that Islam is the religion of the state and shari`a the 
main source or a source of its legislation.  Within the Palestinian community, 
there are various trends on the subject: the secular, the modernist and the 
fundamentalist.  It was thought that such an issue should be decided upon in 
an atmosphere of freedom when the time comes for the preparation of a 
permanent constitution.13 
 
 However, right at the beginning of this process, in June 1994, Abu Sardane 
attended a meeting with Yasser Arafat and other senior PLO members to discuss his 
memorandum, where he emphasised the significance of Palestine as a Muslim land 
since the victory of Umr Ibn al-Khattab and invoked the fifteen-century history of the 
Palestinian shar`i judiciary ‘which was applying the principles of Islamic law long 
before man-made laws were borrowed from the West.’ He reports that those at the 
meeting were convinced by his arguments and that a decision was taken to implement 
his recommendations.14 
 
 Predictably, when the PLC published its own draft version in the summer of 
1996, and began discussions of it in plenary, the place of shari`a gave rise to 
impassioned interventions.15 The published discussions did not reach the intensity or 
depth of the debates in Egypt in preceding decades, but they revolved around similar 
issues: the role of Islam and whether the shari`a—or ‘the principles of shari`a’—were 
to be ‘a source’, ‘a principal source’ or ‘the principal source’ of legislation.16 Al-
Qasem's cautious position regarding the timing of legislating on such issues was 
overturned, and by the time of its third reading the draft Basic Law included the 
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provision that ‘the principles of the Islamic shari`a are a principal source of 
legislation’ (Article 4/1). At the time of writing, it remains to be seen whether this text 
will be duplicated in the Palestinian Constitution and whether, if it is, the result will 
be comparable to the consequences of the similar amendments to the Egyptian 
Constitution in 1971 and 1980, described by Botiveau as ‘having represented an 
institutionalisation of legal Islamization’.17  
 
 In addition, Article 92(1) of the draft Basic law provides that ‘matters of 
personal status are to be dealt with by the shari`a and religious courts in accordance 
with the law.’ The following year this article was relied up by the shar`i judiciary in a 
further argument over legal drafting. In 1997 Shaykh Abu Sardane had left for Amman, 
from where he had been summoned out of retirement to take up his post; he is still 
officially Qadi al-Quda, but effectively his functions are carried out by others, notably 
Shaykh Taysir Tamimi, appointed as Inspector of the Shari`a Courts in 1994,18 who 
was formally appointed as Deputy Qadi al-Quda by presidential decree in March 
2000.19 This has included asserting the role of the shar`i system in debates over draft 
legislation. In June 1998, a memorandum signed by Shaykh Tamimi and a number of 
other senior officials in the shar`i system was presented to the PLC’s Legal Committee 
on the subject of the text of a draft Law Regulating the Judicial Authority. The draft 
omitted any mention of the shar`i judiciary.20  The  memorandum recalled the presence 
of the shar`i judiciary in Palestine since the Islamic conquest, referred to Article 92 of 
the draft Basic Law, and called on the Legal Committee to draft a law for the shar`i  
judiciary.21 In an ensuing meeting between members of the shar`i judiciary and 
members of the Legal Committee, the press reported that it was agreed that ‘not 
mentioning the shar`i judiciary was an oversight’. For his part, Tamimi reportedly 
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declared that the draft Judicial Authority Law was unconstitutional as a result of the 
omission, and himself presented to the Committee a draft Law of Establishment of 
Shari`a Courts in Palestine. He described ‘the attempt to wipe out the shari`a courts’ as 
‘aimed at dealing a blow to our national struggle and our historical battle with those 
who deny our rights’. He also called on the PLC to ‘rely on the Islamic shari`a as the 
sole source of legislation’.22 Although the PLC had already declined to take that 
particular wording on the source of legislation in Palestine, the insistent linkage by 
members of the shar`i judiciary of their presence and role in the history of Palestine 
with the current stage of the national struggle and, consequently, their place in the 
coming state, clearly has resonance. 
 
9.3 The Model Parliament and Associated ‘Texts’ 
 
 In terms of substantive law, Shaykh Abu Sardane had also moved quickly in 
announcing in 1995 that he was establishing a committee made up of himself and the 
heads of the two Shari`a Appeal Courts in the West Bank and Gaza to select the 
‘soundest’ of the laws applied in the shari`a courts of the two regions in order to unify 
application of Muslim personal status law under the PA. Abu Sardane recognised that 
some of the existing provisions were outdated, and that selection could be used in 
matters open to interpretation: ‘rather, we are obliged to take the ijtihadi view that 
realizes the interest of our Muslim people whether this view is from the four well 
known fiqh schools or from other recognised schools’. On the other hand, he declared 
himself tending more towards the Jordanian model applied in the West Bank, 
considering it ‘better developed’ than the Gazan law.23  In his approach, Abu Sardane 
was emulating patterns set in neighbouring Arab states in the process of codification: 
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the key was that the law was to be Palestinian, but there was no reason to assume it 
would be radically different, under his formulation, from those applied in Jordan or in 
Syria. 
 
 However, Abu Sardane’s project did not result in a personal status law, and it 
does not appear that a draft was produced before he left for Jordan. The next publicly-
announced effort from within the shar`i judiciary to draft a personal status law came 
in direct response to actions on the issue by the women’s movement -- specifically, a 
series of high-profile and wide-ranging activities in the West Bank and Gaza in the 
spring of 1998 in the framework of the Model Parliament, and texts and publications 
associated with the project. The Palestinian Model Parliament: Women and 
Legislation was organised by a non-governmental women’s organisation, the 
Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), with support and 
participation from a number of other groups.24 The project ran for a period of two 
years in an effort to identify in all areas of existing law those provisions 
discriminatory to women's rights and to draft, debate and build consensus on proposed 
amendments to those provisions, to be forwarded for the attention of the Palestinian 
Legislative Council. In its various stages it involved a large number of workshops and 
discussion meetings in all areas of the West Bank and Gaza, and built on earlier 
meetings which had resulted in the 1995 publications cited in the Bibliography.  A 
independent study by lawyer and human rights activist Asma Khadr published by the 
WCLAC in the lead-up to the final sessions of the Model Parliament in the West 
Bank and Gaza, and a set of draft proposals for modifications to personal status law 
drawn up for discussion in the Gaza final session, received particular attention in the 
press and in meeting halls.25 
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 Asma Khadr’s study reviewed a range of legislative texts with a view to 
identifying provisions and positions discriminatory towards women and proposing 
alternative texts, in some cases giving more than one option for amendment. The 
areas reviewed included the draft Constitution/Basic Law, legislation on civil and 
political rights, family law, employment and labour law, economic and social rights 
(including social security and insurance), and penal legislation.  As her optimal 
system, Khadr argued for reliance on human rights principles, including gender 
equality,  (and the incorporation of these principles in domestic law), with an explicit 
constitutional text on the plurality of sources of legislation. She then set out the case 
for a unified civil law system, including the principle of  ‘the rule of legal and judicial 
uniformity’ apparent in all other spheres of the law, and the need for ‘legislative 
harmony’. She held that the current system of communal jurisdictions ‘violates the 
principle of legitimacy’ since, if continued in a Palestinian state, non-elected 
authorities with no constitutional status would be setting laws for part of the 
population - i.e. the personal status laws for non-Muslims. Although she 
acknowledged the Islamic shari`a - along with international law - as ‘authoritative 
frameworks/sources’ (marja`iyyat) for Palestinian legislation, she took on the 
religious court system directly, by arguing that optimally a unified civil code 
embodying the principle of gender equality should regulate family affairs for all 
Palestinians regardless of religion, and that the religious authorities should maintain a 
guiding and counselling role but no longer have a legislative or judicial role in 
personal status matters. Her specific proposal was that the civil authorities should be 
responsible for the registration of marriage contracts and other such transactions, and 
that disputes on family law should be heard in the regular (statute) court system 
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‘which could annex a specialised family law chamber, which in its turn could hear 
judges from the religious courts appointed in accordance with the law’ - here she gave 
Egypt as an example. Khadr conceded that this would need time and effort and would 
necessarily affect the powers and functions of the religious authorities, but insisted on 
the principle of gender equality as the basic authoritative principle in reformulating 
family law, and offered certain suggestions in regard to personal status law until such 
time as her preferred goal might be realised.26 
 
 Khadr prefaced her specific proposals on personal status law with the 
requirement that if the present system were to continue, the legislature must rely on 
the range of fiqh schools and opinions, must ‘open the gate of ijtihad’ and that at least 
one third of any committees working on drafting family or personal status law should 
be women.27 Her proposed amendments -- which are not exhaustively listed here -- 
included that the age of marriage be raised to eighteen by the solar calendar for males 
and females,28 that both parties to the marriage contract should present a recent 
medical certificate as part of the contract documents, and that the criminal penalties 
for breaking the law ruling the conclusion and registration of the contract be increased 
to a maximum of three years in prison and a fine of 100-500 dinars.29 More 
controversially, she proposed that documentation and registration of the contract be a 
‘condition of conclusion of the marriage, thus suggesting the invalidation of 
unregistered marriages, and adding that specific requirements as to the religion or the 
sex of witnesses to the contract should be dropped.30 On guardianship in marriage, 
Khadr argued that whatever the past justification was for the institution, ‘today it is 
used to justify the impairment of women's capacity’, and proposed the following 
amendment to the existing law: 
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1. The approval of the wali is not a condition in the marriage of a sane woman 
who has reached her eighteenth year by the solar calendar; 
2. Either or both parents may object to a contract of marriage and the qadi shall 
rule on the objection, which decision may be appealed; 
3. The objection shall only be accepted before the contract has been concluded or 
within one week of the parent's knowledge of it; 
4. The judge may rule that the contract shall not be completed for a certain 
period, or may rule for dissolution; 
5. The qadi shall not prevent a contract of marriage that the two parties insist on 
concluding two years after a decision [by the court] to uphold an objection [by the 
parents].31 
 
 The proposal shows an attempt to deal with the concerns of parents in 
Palestinian society, seeking to make that ‘space’ for their view in law that is generally 
recognised in Palestinian society, but without conceding the principle of legal 
capacity of the individual or accommodating gender discrimination. On the other 
hand, she advocated the repeal of Article 165 of the current Jordanian law allowing 
the wali to insist his adult female ward come to live with him, not only on grounds of 
legal equality and capacity, but in light of the potentially grave social implications for 
a woman who is driven to refuse to do so.32  
 
 On maintenance, Khadr proposed that each spouse be responsible for their 
own upkeep, while a working spouse would be responsible for the maintenance of a 
non-working spouse.33  On divorce, she proposed that the husband taking a second 
wife be added to the existing grounds on which a woman was entitled to seek judicial 
divorce;  and that talaq by the husband had to occur in court, with the wife notified of 
the session in which the talaq occurs.34  In these suggestions she takes on core issues 
in the ‘traditional’ fiqh rules still reflected in the law applying in the West Bank and in 
Gaza: the validity of extra-judicial talaq, non-recognition of an assumption of injury 
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in the event of a polygynous marriage, and the ‘maintenance-obedience’ equation 
regulating the spousal relationship. All these issues have of course been debated 
elsewhere in the region; with variations, they have been targets of the women’s 
movements in other countries, and in some cases they have been approached in 
legislation: but neither Egypt nor Jordan currently has legislation in place 
substantially amending the traditional positions.35 
 
 In terms both of framework and of specific provisions, Khadr’s work found a 
certain amount of resonance in the document prepared for the final session of the 
Gaza Model Parliament, which dealt only with personal status law. A similar 
emphasis was laid on the fact that the personal status laws being criticised are 
‘inherited laws’ - that is, not issued by Palestinians for Palestinians - and that a 
Palestinian law must conform to the spirit of the 1988 Declaration of Independence 
and to the guarantee of gender equality made in the draft Basic Law, as well as having 
regard for international human rights law in general and CEDAW in particular.  At 
the same time, the document proposed development of Muslim family law within its 
own framework, stating that the shari`a is a principal source of personal status law 
and claiming the space for interpretations of the sources beyond the classical rules to 
give substance to the principles of equality and justice.36 The document did not 
propose a civil law, nor did it question the role of the shari`a (or other religious) 
courts. 
 
 On the specifics, the Gaza Model Parliament document proposed the age of 
eighteen by the solar calendar as the minimum age of marriage for males and females, 
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but in the discussions at the final session a clause was inserted providing that the 
types of cases in which exceptions would be made (i.e. in permitting marriage under 
this age) should be exhaustively set out in the law. Participants in the plenary might 
have had in mind local objections to Abu Sardane’s attempt to raise the minimum age 
of marriage in Gazan law, and the arguments made by some for girls below eighteen 
being allowed to marry if their ‘social circumstances’ made it in their interest. On the 
other hand, the final session approved a proposed text on the guardian based on Abu 
Hanifa’s opinion that an adult sane woman did not need the consent of a wali to her 
marriage, with none of the clarifications on the room for parental objection 
incorporated in Khadr’s suggestion.37   
 
 The Gaza proposal on maintenance was broadly similar to Khadr’s suggestion, 
placing a joint responsibility of the two spouses ‘according to their ability’ and 
providing for arrears of one year preceding the submission of a claim to court; like 
Khadr, the drafters called for a government fund to cover the payments of 
maintenance to needy women, to be recoverable by the state against the husband. The 
arguments here referred to economic realities in modern day life (i.e. the contribution 
of many women to the finances of the family, and the necessity of giving a value to 
household labour as a form of work and of expenditure).38 Although the 
recommendation was passed, concerns raised at the meeting reflected those raised 
elsewhere: namely, that placing financial obligations on women in the family should 
logically be accompanied by equalising the inheritance portions of males and females, 
since one of the justifications advanced for the double portion of males is precisely 
that it is males who carry the financial obligations of the family while the woman has 
only rights against the males. Since the fiqh texts base the gender-specific portions on 
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what are considered by the dominant interpretations to be explicit Quranic verses, 
tackling the issue of inheritance is considered particularly problematic.39 Indeed, 
neither Khadr nor the Gaza Model Parliament document proposed amendments to the 
gender-specific proportions of the basic rule; the focus was rather on the need for 
administrative regulations to prevent the coercion of women into giving up their 
portions in favour of their brothers or other relatives, and, in the case of Khadr, the 
observation that the Palestinian legislator could at least equalise inheritance portions 
in everything but mulk property in accordance with pre-existing law and practice.40 
 
 On divorce, the Gaza document proposed the invalidation of extra-judicial 
talaq, mandatory efforts at reconciliation, and implied a system of judicial khul` 
similar to that adopted in Egyptian law in January 2000, allowing the wife to obtain a 
divorce even if she could not prove injury, and in such a case forfeiting her deferred 
dower.41 On polygyny, the document proposed a clause that stated that ‘the 
presumption in marriage is monogamy; polygamy is the exception’ and then 
proceeded to elaborate on circumstances in which the qadi would be allowed to 
permit a polygynous union: the infertility of the first wife, her being afflicted with a 
chronic or infectious incurable disease or her loss of capacity. The proposed provision 
included the notification requirements already legislated in other Arab states and 
expressly recognised a man’s polygynous marriage as a form of injury to the first wife 
which would entitle her to a judicial divorce should she choose to seek one.42  In the 
final session, however, the proposed provision was overturned and the text that was 
finally voted on stated quite simply that ‘polygyny is prohibited’.43  Rather than a 
proposed text combining elements already agreed upon by a number of Arab 
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legislatures (with the exception of the assumption of injury), the plenary had chosen 
one only so far legislated in Tunisia. 
 
 The Model Parliament provoked a reaction far beyond that expected by those 
involved in the activities, ranging from denunciatons of particular proposals to 
criticisms of the discussions taking place at all.44 Some of the reactions from 
individuals and groups identified broadly as ‘Islamist’ translated into personal attacks 
on women involved with the project -- on their morals, their loyalty to the Palestinian 
national cause and to their religious beliefs. The exercise was portrayed by some as a 
‘conspiracy’ of hostile forces linking the UN, the EU and Israel, portrayed as actively 
denying Palestinian rights and seeking to weaken Palestinian resolve and unity 
through supporting and funding attacks on Palestinian Arab and Muslim values, 
family structures, and national unity; women leading the debates were portrayed as 
Westernised and removed from ‘authentic’ Palestinian society and values.45  Meetings 
were organised and statements circulated, including at Friday prayers in mosques in 
the West Bank,46 where it was reported that the organisers were denounced as 
‘spreading ideas of the devil’ - or according to some, ‘devil worship’, being ‘agents of 
Western corruption’ and advocating polyandry.47 Some of the attacks were so 
potentially damaging that there was talk of libel action.48  
 
 This response in turn provoked a counter-mobilisation of those defending the 
legitimacy of holding the debate.49 Those joining the debate from various perspectives 
raised issues related to the place of Islam and Islamic law in the cultural heritage of 
Palestine, the meaning of democracy and pluralism and its history in Palestinian 
 474 
society and in the revolution, the protection of freedom of expression, women’s rights 
and the nationalist struggle. Human rights organisations, the wider women’s 
movement, political parties and members of the PLC lent their support, and the 
Ramallah final session in the West Bank was opened by the governor of Ramallah 
with a message from President Arafat.50 
 
 It was clear to observers that many aspects of this battle in the press and other 
public fora owed as much to strictly political  manoeuvring as to strong reactions on 
issues of personal status. Hammami and Johnson, for example, in their lucid analysis 
of the discourses at work in the campaign and counter-campaign around the Model 
Parliament, note a ‘strong sense that the parliament had posed a challenge to the 
Islamic social vision, which Palestinian nationalist factions had failed to mount’, 
accounting at least in part both for the reaction from 'Islamist' groups and individuals 
and the counter-reaction from  others, including the Palestinian Authority.51 The 
complex political dynamics of the transitional period will continue as a backdrop to 
discussions of a Palestinian personal status law, whether this takes place earlier or 
later into statehood. 
 
 For its part, the shar`i judiciary as an institution cannot be identified with the 
more political attacks on the Model Parliament and its organisers. Hammami and 
Johnson consider an intervention by the head of the West Bank Shari`a Court of 
Appeal, Shaykh Hamed Bitawi, in the Parliament's Nablus meeting on personal status, 
as ‘the spark that touched off the larger Islamist attack on the model parliament and 
the women’s movement’.52  In newspaper interviews he was reported as referring to ‘a 
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dangerous conspiracy against our shari`a courts and against Islamic and the Muslims’ 
, ‘incitement against the personal status law that has been applied for 1500 years’ and 
questioning the standing of the leading women involved as being of a ‘foreign 
culture’ with no expertise in the Islamic shari`a and without proper consultation with 
those who did in fact have such expertise.53  A memorandum to the Speaker and 
Members of the PLC signed by eleven shari`a court judges and about seventy others 
associated with the shar`i establishment (shari`a college instructors, imams etc.) made 
similar points, objecting to a number of specific proposals under discussion as well as 
to Khadr’s suggestion that the shari`a courts -- as the memorandum paraphrased it - 
be abolished.54 As the political debate heated up, however, leading figures in the 
shar`i judiciary distanced themselves.55 The Mufti of Jerusalem, Ekrameh Sabri, 
agreeing with the need to amend the existing personal status law, declared that there 
was ‘nothing wrong if the Model Parliament presents its suggestions to the 
Department of the Qadi al-Quda’ on the basis that the Department would be drafting 
a proposed law and sending it to the PLC: the concern of the shar`i judiciary,  
according to the Mufti, was that non-specialists (i.e. in the shari`a) would pass a ‘raw’ 
text to the legislature for approval.56 
 
 This insistence on the adequate qualification of anyone involved in drafting a 
personal status law for consideration by the legislature was a constant theme from 
members of the shar`i establishment. An interview with Shaykh Taysir al-Tamimi, 
described as Acting Qadi al-Quda, was headed with the summary: ‘Humans may not 
try to prohibit what Allah has permitted: the scholars of shari`a and the PNC 
members are the only parties empowered to set the law of personal status’.57 In the 
interview, Tamimi was reported as criticising  a number of particular points in the 
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various proposals being discussed while conceding concerns on certain matters. The 
shari`a courts, he said, frequently found fathers trying to marry their daughters off 
below the minimum age of marriage, and while this was wrong, marriage after the age 
of puberty brought ‘no injury’ to males or females. He gave a standard defence of 
polygyny in its function of organising sexual relations within a moral and legal 
framework; denounced ‘honour killings’ as against the shari`a;  and agreed with the 
need for some sort of legal mechanism to ensure that women did in fact receive their 
shari`a-assigned inheritance entitlement, while rejecting any idea of changing the 
rules on succession. Some suggestions he dismissed as ‘not ijtihadi matters’, meaning 
that they were not open to amendment, such as allowing equal value to testimony of 
males and females (as suggested by Khadr in the context of the marriage contract). 
This was also his position on marriage guardianship for females: he cited a hadith 
purporting to establish the need for the guardian,58 as well as concern for the 
vulnerability of women as prey to impious men.59 At the final West Bank session of 
the Model Parliament, the issue of guardianship was reported to have provoked an 
uproar, with Shaykh Tamimi, who attended the session, threatening to withdraw from 
the session inter alia on the grounds that a vote could not be taken on a matter 
covered by a hadith.60  
 
 Some of the above positions articulated by Shaykh Tamimi have been reflected 
in actions he has taken as Deputy Qadi al-Quda, discussed further below. On others, 
such as polygyny and the role of the wali, he is very much in line with the 
establishment shar`i view in Jordan, Egypt and elsewhere in the region. Nevertheless, 
for the shar`i judiciary, the Model Parliament forced a clarification on the kind of 
personal status law they would envisage in Palestine, and gave direct impetus to a 
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drafting process confined to the circle of shar`i scholars but by no means uninformed of 
the concerns articulated during this turbulent process. For those who were or became 
involved in the Model Parliament and/or other sectors of the women’s movement, the 
reaction to the Parliament’s activities forced a reflection on strategies and provoked a 
discussion on, among other things, the appropriate approach to shari`a in seeking a 
more egalitarian personal status law that would conform more closely to the principle 
of gender equality. 
 
9.4 Fall-out and Follow-up 
 
 In direct response to the discussions at the Model  Parliament, Shaykh Tamimi 
in April 1998 announced the establishment of a preparatory committee to work towards 
the drafting of a personal status law. The committee was to be made of up ‘the elite, 
men [sic] of law and ifta, teachers and deans in religious studies and lawyers in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip’ and there were to be a number of sub-committees, ‘among 
the most important of which is a woman's committee of those qualified to participate’. 
Tamimi  described the motivation as a need to unify the West Bank/Gaza laws ‘as a 
basic step in establishing the state and the principle of unified and inalienable 
Palestinian sovereignty’. The draft would be drawn from ‘the Qur’an, the Sunna, and 
the recognised schools of fiqh’ and all those with suggestions were invited to contact 
the Office of the Qadi al-Quda in Ramallah. It was announced that the committee 
would study other Arab and Islamic personal status laws, and would in time present a 
draft to the PLC's Legal Committee for discussions before presenting it to the PLC.61  
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 A number of key phrases in the public statements by leading members of the 
shar`i judiciary are repeated in these announcements. First it might be noted that 
Shaykh Tamimi continues to assert the right (or interest) of the shar`i establishment (in 
the form of his committee) to draft and present a personal status law for the attention of 
the legislature, retaining in this projection a measure of control over the content of the 
law. Second is the linkage between matters shar`i and the process of state-building and 
the principle of national unity: here, the appeal is to pre-occupation and pre-European 
colonial history and the sense of continuity represented by the shari`a courts - a 
suggestion of ‘authenticity’ which is expressed directly in arguments about the nature 
of personal status law. At the same time, this appeal is based on a system that is 
premised upon the communal distinctions between Palestinians of different religions. In 
some ways,  therefore, the ‘unity’ referred to can only really mean unifying family law 
for Muslim Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Third, there is the insistence that 
persons working on drafting a personal status law are to be ‘qualified’. The clear 
implication is that they should be qualified in fiqh and ‘religious studies’. The status of 
the shari`a as the sole source of legislation for personal status issues is not open to 
discussion, any more than the future of the shari`a courts and the whole system built 
around them. Firm indications in the draft constitutional ‘texts’ for the Palestinian state,   
that communal jurisdiction over personal status matters is set to continue for the 
foreseeable future, put Palestinian personal status law firmly within the pattern of 
neighbouring Arab states.62 
 
 It also fits a pattern, however, in having an active and articulate women’s 
movement seeking change and alternatives. In the Palestinian women’s movement, 
differences in evaluation of the events of 1998 and the ‘phenomenon’ of the Model 
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Parliament63 have led to a number of different strategies towards family law being 
proposed and pursued by individuals NGOs, and through an informal coalition 
established to build consensus on the framework and on particular provisions. These 
strategies range from  in-depth work on reinterpretation of the fiqh sources to produce a 
radically new ‘Muslim family law’64 to proposals for a unified personal status law that 
would include the shari`a as a principal source but would also draw on international 
human rights principles. The idea is that such a law would apply to all Palestinians 
under the jurisdiction of the state, with, where necessary and/or appropriate, exceptions 
for non-Muslim Palestinians: this of course has a precedent in the OLFR, although the 
sections applying to Christians and Jews were not applied under the British in Palestine, 
and North African states provide more recent precedents.65  
 
 A further proposal that has been discussed in this forum is the promulgation of 
an optional civil code under which those who chose to do so could marry and regulate 
their family affairs outside the religious court system. The early indications -- from 
before the Model Parliament -- are that such a proposal would be vigorously opposed 
by the shar`i establishment. In 1996, it was reported that the PA Justice Minister, Freih 
Abu Meddein, had responded to petitions ‘from human rights groups and private 
citizens in Israel’ by approving the opening of a civil marriage registry office in Jericho 
for the use of Jewish Israelis who could not or did not want to get married under the 
rules of Jewish law applied by the Israeli state.66 The London Guardian reported that a 
small Israeli company was promoting the idea of a ‘mini Las Vegas - a marriage centre 
which will draw couples from all over the world and provide living to the 
Palestinians’.67 The idea was vigorously opposed by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Shaykh 
Ekrameh Sabri, who argued that Islam recognises the religious freedom of other faiths, 
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and that it would be an interference in the way in which they chose to regulate their 
affairs to provide such a service. There was a suggestion that he was concerned that 
such a mechanism would provide an opportunity for Muslim (and Christian) 
Palestinians with Israeli nationality (and conceivably Palestinian residents of East 
Jerusalem) to obtain a civil marriage in Palestine.68 By way of comparison, el-Cheikh 
reports that the Sunni shar`i establishment was ‘the most categorical in its rejection’ of 
the draft civil marriage law presented to the Lebanese cabinet in 1998.69 
 
 In the meantime, besides working on drafting a Palestinian personal status law 
in the above committee, Deputy Qadi al-Quda Shaykh Tamimi responded to certain 
practical concerns though a number of administrative directives to the qadis and other 
officials in the shari`a courts. These have included an attempt to tighten up registration 
procedures of marriage, with strict instructions regarding the functions and conduct of  
the marriage notaries (ma’dhuns),70 seeking to ensure that only recognised officials 
(liable to disciplinary procedures) are involved in marriage procedures. Similarly, he 
addressed the procedure to be followed by the qadis in registering a deed of 
‘acknowledgement of marriage’ (tasaduq bi’l-zawaj), requiring detailed information 
from the parties regarding the circumstances and exact procedure (or ritual) of their 
marriage, and the transfer of the file to the Qadi al-Quda’s office for verification.71 
Given the concern Tamimi articulated at attempts by some members of the population 
to marry off their underage daughters, it might be that out-of-court marriages involving 
underage parties was at least one of the practices being targetted in these instructions. 
 
 Two other administrative directives also reflect concerns articulated in the 'texts' 
associated with the Model Parliament and with the surrounding discussions. The first 
 481 
concerns the division by the shari`a courts of inheritance portions between the various 
heirs to an estate. The preamble puts the contents in the context of representations made 
to the Qadi al-Quda’s Department regarding problematic circumstances in which some 
heirs get others to waive all or some of their portions, including through ‘fraud 
(impersonating), ignorance and threats’.72 The directive sets out detailed information to 
be taken from the persons involved, and inter alia requires that the final document is to 
be signed by all parties and the implications of the division to be explained to each heir, 
including the monetary value of their portion ‘especially if it involves real estate, a 
company, shares or such like’.  Again, all the documentation is to sent to the Qadi al-
Quda’s office for verification. The Deputy  Qadi al-Quda’s point here may be to 
empower the heirs (notably, women) with knowledge of precisely how much their 
share is worth. 
 
 In the final administrative directive to be noted here,73  the Deputy Qadi al-
Quda requires every fiancé to undergo a ‘CBC’ blood test for tilisemia before a 
marriage contract can be concluded.74 Although restricted to testing for a particular 
disease, the Deputy Qadi al-Quda seems clearly to be responding to concerns 
articulated inter alia during the discussions of the Model Parliament, and reflected in 
demands elsewhere in the region. A further procedural matter that could be addressed 
pending the promulgation of a substantive personal status law is the establishment of a 
public fund from which maintenance payments could be made to needy women on the 
basis of awards from the religious courts, with the authorities then pursuing recovery of 
the amount from the errant husband - or father, in the case of maintenance for children. 
This has been a lobbying target in Palestine, where it will involve the PA as well as the 
shari`a courts, and will need political decisions on how it should be funded. 
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 Although such moves are piecemeal, they do respond -- at least on an interim 
level -- to real and practical concerns identified by lawyers working in the shari`a 
court system as well as by sectors of the women's movement. Responding to such 
concerns poses no perceived risks to the integrity of the shar`i system, nor does it 
implicate the substantive law it applies, in the same way as do discussions on 
fundamental changes to personal status law; rather, it serves to demonstrate the extent 
of flexibility beyond the code that the shar`i system retains during this transitional 
period. 
 
 Such measures are of course also a prime target for specific and discrete 
lobbying activities. Siniora notes that one of the lessons learned from the Model 
Parliament is that it is necessary ‘to combine advocacy at the decision-making level 
with building support through public awareness at the grassroots level’.75  The 
lobbying activities of the women’s movement, and on the other hand of the shar`i 
judiciary, as well as of interested political parties (particularly the ‘Islamist’ 
tendencies) and the wider public response to further debate on the issues are all likely 
to have an impact on the conduct of both the executive and the legislature in 
considering a future Palestinian law of personal status. Elsewhere in the region, the 
notorious sensitivity of the issue of personal status law has on more than one occasion 
been blamed for the use of less than democratic means to legislate changes.76 In 
Palestine, it was to be expected that personal status law would not be among the 
priorities for legislation during the transitional period. However, during this period, 
the ground has been prepared for a wide-ranging, hotly contested and intense debate 
on the subject once the state is declared and is functional. The first Palestinian law of 
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personal status will be promulgated in quite different times to those prevailing when 
Egypt, Jordan and other states in the region first legislated on family law. For all the 
aspects it combines, it stands to be not only an exercise of real and immediate import 
for that portion of the Palestinian people finally included in the Palestinian state, but 
also one of potentially considerable moment for the region. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
Breakdown of court material studied, 1965, 1975, 1985 
 
Court and year Marriage contracts  Deeds of talaq/khul` Litigation cases 
 
1965    
Bethlehem   448   47   64 
Ramallah   708   147   206 
Hebron  1,248   110   238 
Total    2,404   304   508 
 
1975    
Bethlehem   441   53   59 
Ramallah   1040   138   234 
Hebron  1331   114   231 
Total    2,812   305   524 
 
1985    
Bethlehem   475   62   97 
Ramallah   1038   183   308 
Hebron  1806   138   242 
Total    3,319   383   647 
 
Grand Total                8,535    992          1,679  
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APPENDIX II 
 
Breakdown of subject matter of claims in the case material, by court and year 
 
  1965   1975   1985  
Subject matter  Beth. Ram. Heb. Beth. Ram. Heb. Beth. Ram. Heb. 
 
Maintenance 32 124 135 38 133 142 67 180 134 
          
 
Separation 3 24 12 2 21 10 4 20 4 
          
Custody, access 4 9 10  11 15 9 23 13 
and related 
 
Fees for custody 5 4 15 4 9 18 3 9 11 
and rada` 
 
Proof of divorce  0 5 4 1 5 0 2 6 0 
or revocation 
 
Succession 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 3 1 
          
 
Obedience 16 26 34 10 24 21 4 19 11 
          
 
Proof of  1 3 5 1 9 3 2 10 28 
majority (rushd) 
 
 
Dower   1 7 13 3 12 14 4 21 20 
and jihaz 
 
 
Judicial  0 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 2 
dissolution (faskh)  
 
Objection to 2 3 4 0 4 3 0 0 2 
award made in absentia 
 
Compensation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 13 12 
for arbitrary talaq 
 
Permission 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
to marry          
 
Death decree 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 
on missing person          
 
Other  0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 4 
          
TOTAL  64 206 238 59 234 231 97 308 242 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Breakdown of court material used in the WCLAC study (years 1989, 1992, 1993, 
1994) 
 
 
Court Nafaqa Ta`a Tafriq Ta`wid Dower Custody Talaq 
Ramallah 219 17 97 3 25 31 963 
Nablus 460 20 63 41 * 65 819 
Hebron 168 8 38 11 26 11 753 
Dura 58 3 15 3 12 6 121 
Sub-total 905 48 213 58 63 113 2,656 
        
Gaza 401 5 80 0 28 35 1333 
Rafah 181 24 22 0 2 11 429 
Sub-total 582 29 102 0 30 46 1,762 
        
Total  1,487  77  315  58    93   159  4,418  
Note: reproduced from Welchman, Islamic Family Law -Text and Practice WCLAC 
1999, 16. * Claims for dower in Nablus court not available. 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
Proportions of prompt to deferred dower in the sample of contracts in the case material, 
by court and year 
 
 
Court Sampleprompt   deferred  equal prompt  
   greater   greater   and deferred 
 
1965 
Beth. 45  41 91%  2 4.5%  2 4.5%    
Ram. 71  46 64.8%  11 15.5%  14 19.7%  
Heb. 125  118 94.4%  1 0.8%  6 4.8% 
 
total 241  205 85.1%  14 5.8%  22 9.1% 
 
1975 
Beth. 45  24 53.3%  7 15.6%  14 31.1% 
Ram. 104  34 32.7%  38 36.5%  32 30.8% 
Heb. 134  106 79.1%  12 9%  16 11.9% 
 
total 283  164 58%  57 20.1%  62 21.9% 
 
1985 
Beth. 48  2 4.2%  41 85.4%  5 10.4% 
Ram. 104  4 3.8%  80 77%  20 19.2% 
Heb. 181  45 24.9%  112 61.9%  24 13.2% 
 
total 333  51 15.3%  233 70%  49 14.7% 
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APPENDIX V 
Items registered as tawabi` in the case material, by court and year 
 
 
 
    Subject matter  Bethlehem Ramallah Hebron total 
 no. % no. % no. % no. % 
         
1965         
gold jewellery 5 27.8% - - 12 6.6% 17 6.5% 
furniture 10 55.5% 61 96.8% 129 70.9% 200 76.0% 
gold and furniture 3 16.7% 2 3.2% 38 20.9% 43 16.3% 
other/unknown  - - - - 3 1.6% 3 1.1% 
 
Contracts with tawabi` 18 100 63 100 182 100 263 100 
         
 
1975         
gold jewellery 2 7.4% 3 2.9% 42 7.4% 47 6.7% 
furniture 21 77.8% 93 91.2% 397 69.5% 511 73.0% 
gold and furniture 4 14.8% 5 4.9% 131 22.9% 140 20.0% 
other/unknown  - - 1 1% 1 0.2% 2 0.3% 
 
Contracts with tawabi` 27 100 102 100 571 100 700 100 
         
 
1985         
gold jewellery 66 75.0% 24 13.3% 441 31.1% 531 31.5% 
furniture 10 11.4% 142 78.4% 89 6.3% 241 14.3% 
gold and furniture 12 13.6% 15 8.3% 879 62.1% 906 53.8% 
other/unknown - - - - 7 0.5% 7 0.4% 
Contracts with tawabi` 88 100 181 100 1416 100 168 100 
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APPENDIX VI 
 
Polygynous contracts in the case material by court and year 
 
 
Court and year   No. of Contracts Polygynous Contracts:  
             Number  % of total 
 
 1965 
 Bethlehem   448               22           4.9 
 Ramallah     708                40            5.6 
 Hebron   1248         72            5.8 
 
 Total             2404              134            5.6 
 
 1975 
 Bethlehem         441                23            5.2 
 Ramallah               1040                39            3.8 
 Hebron               1331                96            7.2 
 
 Total             2812               158            5.6 
 
 1985 
 Bethlehem                475                23            4.8 
 Ramallah    1038                37            3.6 
 Hebron      1806               104            5.8 
 
 Total             3319               164            4.9 
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APPENDIX VII 
 
Proportions of talaq to khul` in the case material by court and year 
 
court  entries  khul`  talaq  % khul` % talaq 
 
1965 
Bethlehem 47  35  12  74.5  25.5 
Ramallah 147  106  41  72  28 
Hebron110  55  55  50  50 
total  304  196  108  64.5  35.5 
 
1975 
Bethlehem 53  46  7  67  13    
Ramallah 138  66  72  48  52 
Hebron114  59  55  52  48 
total  305  171  134  56  44  
 
1985 
Bethlehem 62  44  18  71  29 
Ramallah 183  100  83  55  45 
Hebron138  90  48  65  35 
total  383  234  149  61  39 
 
total  992  601  391  60  40 
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Glossary of Arabic Terms 
 
 
`aqd    contract 
ba’in    final (of a talaq) 
batil    void (of a contract of marriage) 
baynuna kubra  the ‘greater finality’ occasioned by the third of three 
     talaqs 
baynuna sughra  the ‘lesser finality’ occasioned by the first or second 
     talaq being or becoming final  
bikr    virgin, previously unmarried woman 
bulugh    puberty 
damm    ‘annexation’, taking into one’s protective custody 
dukhul    consummation 
faskh    judicial dissolution 
fasid    irregular (of a contract of marriage) 
fiqh    jurisprudence (broadly used for the rules of shari`a’ 
     worked out by the jurists) 
ghayba wa darar  absence and injury (as grounds for judicial divorce)  
hadana   custody 
hajr    desertion 
hujja, pl. hujuj   deed (e.g. of talaq) 
ibra’    renunciation, waiving (of rights) 
`idda    waiting period (of the woman after the end of her  
    marriage, during which she may not remarry) 
idrar/darar   injury 
ijtihad    ‘interpretation’ (broadly, the way sources of law and 
    texts are interpreted for the purposes of deriving rules
    of implementation) 
iqrar bi-talaq   acknowledgement (through deed at court) of (out-of-
    court) talaq 
ithbat talaq/zawaj  establishment of talaq/marriage (through litigation) 
jihaz    ‘trousseau’ of a woman on marriage 
kashf    investigation, examination 
khalwa    seclusion (of a couple giving rise to presumption of  
    consummation of a marriage) 
khul`/mukhala`a  divorce settlement involving a final talaq by the 
husband     in return for a consideration (usually the waiving 
of her     financial rights) from the wife 
ma’dhun   official marriage notary 
madhush   overwhelmed (with anger, as a state of mind) 
mahr    dower 
maskan   dwelling 
mut`a    gift of consolation for divorced wives enjoined by the 
    Qur’an 
mu`tadda   woman in the `idda period 
nafaqa    maintenance 
nashiz    disobedient 
nushuz    disobedience 
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niza` wa shiqaq  discord and strife (as grounds for the husband or wife to 
    seek judicial divorce) 
qadi    judge 
Qadi al-Quda   Chief Islamic Justice 
raja`i    revocable (of a talaq) 
rushd    legal majority 
shari`a/shar`i   (inadequately translated as) ‘Islamic law’ 
sijill (pl. sijillat)  court record 
ta`a/bayt al-ta`a  obedience/the ‘house of obedience’ 
tafriq    judicial divorce 
tafwid    delegation (of divorce) 
talaq    unilateral divorce 
talaq ta`assufi   arbitrary unilateral divorce 
tasaduq bi-zawaj  acknowledgement of marriage 
tawabi`   ‘effects’ of the prompt dower 
ta`wid    compensation 
thayyib   previously married woman (widow or divorcée) 
`usma    ‘protection’, used to denote general delegation of power 
    of talaq from husband to wife 
wakil    appointed representative; government post roughly  
    equivalent to ‘junior minister’ 
wali    guardian  
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